Conversion at Corinth: an exploration of the understandings of conversion held by the Apostle Paul and the Corinthian Christians by Chester, Stephen J.
Glasgow Theses Service 
http://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
theses@gla.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
 
Chester, Stephen J. (1999) Conversion at Corinth: an exploration of the 
understandings of conversion held by the Apostle Paul and the 
Corinthian Christians.  
 
PhD thesis 
 
 
 
 
http://theses.gla.ac.uk/3936/ 
 
 
 
Copyright and moral rights for this thesis are retained by the author 
 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or 
study, without prior permission or charge 
 
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the Author 
 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the Author 
 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the 
author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
 
CONVERSION AT CORINTH 
An Exploration of the Understandings of Conversion Held by the 
Apostle Paul and the Corinthian Christians 
by 
Stephen J. Chester 
Submitted for the Degree of Ph.D. to the University of Glasgow, Dept. of 
Theology and Religious Studies 
March, 1999 
C hes be\-' I qqq 
I 
. PAGE 
NUMBERS 
CUT OFF 
IN 
ORIGINAL 
Abstract 
Conversion has been a neglected topic in recent New Testament 
research. The thesis attempts to end this neglect through the pursuit of two inter-
connected aims. They are: 
(i) to clarify crucial theoretical issues surrounding the study of 
conversion and converts, so making more accessible to New Testament scholars the 
insights offered by recent studies of conversion in several different disciplines. 
(ii) to explore the understandings of conversion held by Paul and the 
Corinthians, so contributing to our knowledge of each, and allowing the perspectives of an 
advocate of conversion and those who responded to his advocacy to be compared. 
The structure of the thesis flows from these aims. Part 1, Studying 
Conversion and Converts, examines theoretical issues. The nature of conversion is 
discussed. Is conversion a universal phenomenon or a particular one? Is it essentially an 
individual phenomenon or a social one? It is concluded that conversion is best approached 
through particular understandings of it, but that there are some common features across 
time and across the boundaries of religious traditions. One of the most important of these 
common features is that conversion involves both a personally acknowledged 
transformation of the self and a socially recognised display of change. Alongside the need 
to understand conversion stands the need to understand converts. Recent studies 
recognise that converts are active in their own transformation, especially in the accounts 
which they offer of their conversion experience. Taking issue with dominant recent trends, 
it is concluded that although such conversion accounts develop they do not necessarily 
distort. The work on conversion of New Testament scholars Gaventa and Segal is briefly 
reviewed in the light of the preceding theoretical discussions, and some broad questions 
with which to approach particular understandings of conversion are defined. These 
concern expectations as to how conversion takes place, and expectations as to its 
consequences. Anthony Giddens' structuration theory is selected as an appropriate 
theoretical resource with which to pursue these questions. 
Part 2 of the thesis explores Paul's Understanding of Conversion in 
the context of debates on his soteriology. Dominant recent interpretations minimise the 
significance of his conversion experience for Paul's theology, emphasise participatory 
categories of thought at the expense of forensic ones, and emphasise the communal and 
cosmic levels of Paul's thought at the expense of the individual level. In an attempt to test 
these emphases against Paul's understanding of conversion, chapters are devoted to Paul's 
use of the vocabulary of calling, his expectations in relation to the conversion of Gentiles 
(1 Cor. 14:20-25, 1 Cor. 6:9-11), and his expectations in relation to the conversion of 
Jews (Gal. 1:11-17, Phil. 3:4-12, 1 Cor. 4:1-5). The last of these chapters focuses on the 
only Jewish conversion about which Paul informs us in any detail, namely his own. Among 
•• ,,,i,.t .. :;; 
the conclusions which emerge from these chapters is that Paul's conversion experience is 
significant for his theology. Although he expects conversion to result in great changes in 
the ethical dimensions of Gentile practical consciousness and minimal changes in the same 
dimensions,of Jewish practical consciousness, Paul's own experience of unrecognised sin 
provides an underlying unity. Jew and Gentile share a common plight, both of 
transgression and of bondage to the power of sin. To express the solution provided by 
Christ, Paul is creative in his use of language, blending existing categories of meaning. In 
particular, he allows the forensic and participatory categories of his thought to interpret 
each other. He also integrates the different levels of his thought, closely relating the 
individual and the communal dimensions of conversion. In the light of these conclusions a 
more balanced approach to the study of Paul's soteriology is required. 
Part 3 of the thesis explores The Corinthians' Understanding of 
Conversion. As well as being shaped by Paul, the Corinthians' understanding of 
conversion is also influenced by Graeco-Roman culture. This influence takes various 
forms, and the two selected for examination are the influence of the voluntary associations 
and the influence of the mystery cults. Although the Corinthian church is certainly not a 
voluntary association, there are a range of issues in relation to which the Corinthians' 
attitude reflects the influence of the associations. In their approach to patronage, to 
conduct at the Lord's Supper, to litigation between believers and to the Jerusalem 
collection, the Corinthians' practical consciousness resembles that to be found in the 
voluntary associations. It does so to a degree which renders their conduct unsatisfactory 
from Paul's perspective. The influence of the mystery cults, whose presence in first century 
Corinth can be demonstrated as a matter of archaeological and literary record, expresses 
itself in the significance the Corinthians grant to baptism. Initiation into the mystery cults 
grant the individual a new exalted personal religious status under the patronage and 
protection of the deity. Prompted by the extraordinary experience of the receipt of the 
Spirit, the Corinthians regard baptism in a similar way (1 Cor. 12:13, 1 Cor. 2:6-16, 1 
Cor. 1:10-17; 1 Cor. 15:29). Finally, conclusions are drawn as to the essential differences 
between the understandings of conversion held by Paul and the Corinthians, and the way 
pointed to further comparative studies of conversion in the first century. 
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PART 1 
STUDYING CONVERSION AND CONVERTS 
1 
Developing a Balanced Approach to Conversion 
1.1 Understanding Conversion 
"The author has not succeeded in divesting himself of pro-Jewish and pro-Christian 
proclivities, and the rival Hellenistic religions of redemption are accordingly represented 
to their disadvantage. The weighting of the scales on the Jewish-Christian side is most 
evident in the author's central contention that while genuine conversion was 
characteristic of the proselyte's adherence to Judaism and the pagan's turning to 
Christianity, it was not typical of the Gentile's 'adhesion' to his own cult brotherhoods 
.. .In line with the perspective distortions already noted ... Professor Nock's own volume is 
lacking in that objectivity and that understanding of basic social needs and processes 
which are essential to significant work in the field of the history of religions. "1 
Although it was published as long ago as 1933, Conversion by AD. 
Nock still looms large in all studies of religious change in the ancient world and, indeed, 
in many studies of conversion in other eras and regions. Nock's methods and conclusions 
may be subjected to criticism, and discussion of the subject held to have moved on, but 
such reservations are uttered with the respect due to a classic work of scholarship. The 
robust tone of the opinions quoted above therefore comes as something of a shock, 
especially when one realises that they are those of a contemporary reviewer, H.D. 
Willoughby of the University of Chicago,2 and thus offered without the benefit of the 
hindsight of six and a half decades. Their content is striking, both in that their author is 
blind to the manifest virtues ofNock's work,3 and in that the areas which he selects for 
criticism are precisely those in which Nock is today generally regarded as deficient. At 
once the victim and beneficiary of his own scholarly tunnel vision, Willoughby misses 
much, but what he does see is perceived with unusual clarity. By ignoring entirely Nock's 
lWilloughby (1934), pp.337-38. 
2That Willoughby came from this university is significant in terms of his criticisms ofNock, since SJ. 
Case of Chicago had been the pioneer of the use of sociology in New Testament study. Indeed, 
Willoughby specifically criticises Nock for failing to draw on Case's work. 
3Willoughby does mention Nock's mastery of his sources and his elegant prose, but evidently considers 
these insignificant qualities. 
2 
argument as to the historical causes of the success of Christianity and concentrating 
instead on issues related to his concept of conversion,4 Willoughby has indeed isolated 
the weaknesses in Nock's work. It deserves to be challenged both in relation to personal 
religious change within Graeco-Roman religion, and in relation to the social dimension of 
conversion. 
1.1.1 Conversion: A Universal or Particular Phenomenon? 
The first of these two areas of difficulty features strongly in the 
opening chapter of Conversion, where Nock offers a number of sharp contrasts between 
different categories of religious experience and behaviour. Prophetic religion is 
contrasted with traditional religion, faith and creed with ritual and myth, exclusive 
worship with supplements to ancestral piety, and moral reformation with a desire for 
knowledge of the secrets of the universe. Only the first of each pair of opposites can be 
equated with conversion. Religious change characterised by the second is not conversion 
but, instead, a lesser transformation which Nock terms 'adhesion'. This is because 
conversion involves "the taking of a new way oflife in place of the old, "5 and requires, "a 
consciousness that a great change is involved, that the old was wrong and the new is 
right. "6 In the ancient world only Judaism and Christianity satisfied these criteria since 
they alone "demanded renunciation and a new start,"7 conveying the idea that religion is 
"all or nothing. "8 The cults of Graeco-Roman religion in general, and the mysteries in 
4To summarise briefly, the main component of Nock's historical argument is that the conquests of 
Alexander disrupted a previously stable pattern of Greek religion. By ending the independence of the 
city-state as a political unit, Alexander broke old ties and associations, so creating a demand for new 
groups. As Nock (1933), pp.99-100 puts it, "Zeus and Athena had been good protectors for the citizen of 
a town which was one of a number of towns living as it were in a small luminous area. But now this 
little world was swallowed up in the oi/wumene, the inhabited world as known, and a vast uncertainty 
had come into men's lives." After several centuries of delay, Christianity provided a new world-wide 
religious community for the new wider world. Anyone doubting the fecundity of this argument need only 
consult the classic debates between Robin Horton and H. 1. Fisher on conversion to Christianity and 
Islam in modem Africa. See Horton (1971, 1975a, 1975b) and Fisher (1973, 1985). Although he never 
mentions Nocle, Horton attributes the success of Christianity and Islam in Africa to remarkably similar 
processes as those outlined above, while Fisher's rebuttals employ Nock's distinction between conversion 
and adhesion. 
5Nock (1933), p.7. 
6ibid. 
7Nock (1933), p.14. 
8Nock (1933), p.160. 
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particular, did not insist on such a decisive break with the past. "There was therefore in 
these rivals of Judaism and Christianity no possibility of anything which can be called 
conversion. "9 For Nock conversion is the preserve of certain religions and, although it is 
formally left unsaid, no attentive reader can fail to detect the implication that it is a mark 
of superiority. 
While few would doubt that the contrasts drawn by Nock do capture 
important differences between Graeco-Roman religion and Christianity, most would now 
deny that these differences are an acceptable basis on which to define conversion. For 
example, while exclusivity of worship is undoubtedly one of the most important 
differences between Graeco-Roman religion and Judaism or Christianity, it is far from 
obvious that its corollary is a greater depth of emotional commitment and religious 
devotion on the part of monotheists. By making such a connection, and by building it 
into his definition of conversion, Nock implies a degree of emotional deficiency within 
Graeco-Roman religion. lO Yet although most scholars now seek to avoid such loaded 
definitions of conversion, 11 there is a lack of consensus as to how this is best achieved. In 
his Understanding Religious Conversion, L.R. Rambo argues that "most studies of 
conversion to date have been too narrow in orientation, employing ... assumptions too 
deeply rooted in religious traditions. "12 Rambo therefore attempts to provide a 
descriptive seven stage model of the conversion process capable of application to a 
multitude of different varieties of conversion. "I believe that such a broad survey 
approach is necessary and appropriate in an increasingly pluralistic religious 
9Nock (1933), p.14. 
lONock (1933), p.l38 acknowledges that the portrayal of mystery initiation in Book XI of Apuleius' 
Metamorphoses acquires "the emotional values of conversion," but makes clear, both here and p.155, 
that this represents an abnormal level of pagan religious emotion. 
11 Although how conversion is defined continues to function as a means of making value judgements in 
some recent studies. See Goodman (1994) for a work in which a disinclination to seek converts 
implicitly functions as a mark of superiority. The value judgement is the opposite to that made by Nock, 
and rests on demonstrating that the character ascribed by Nock to Judaism is erroneous, but is no less 
strongly implied. 
12Rambo (1993), p.4. 
4 
environment. More specialised, normative definitions of conversion are the preserve of 
particular spiritual communities. "13 
Yet in a work published only a year prior to that of Rambo, the same 
consciousness of religious pluralism led mediaeval historian Karl Morrison to opposite 
conclusions. "It is a confusion of categories to use the word conversion as though it 
were an instrument of critical analysis, equally appropriate to any culture or religion. The 
word has a profound, mystical sense in the West for which some great religions and 
languages of the world have no equivalent. Even in the history of the West, it has 
displayed different connotations at different moments. Thus, the word is more properly a 
subject, rather than a tool of analysis. "14 Morrison therefore offers a highly detailed 
exploration of the hermeneutics of conversion current within twelfth century 
monasticism emphasising that, even within this closely defined field, "texts on conversion 
display an intricate ebb and flow of several, conflicting traditions ... the doctrine of 
conversion set forth is not uniform. It is conspicuously made up of ill-matched ideas of 
conversion, which do not agree in every detaiI."15 The drawing of these different ideas 
into an ensemble was "a virtuoso exercise in metaphorical analysis: the discernment of 
similarity in dissimilars."16 Whereas Rambo concludes in the interests of inclusiveness 
that, for all the variety observable in its manifestations, conversion is an event or process 
which can occur in any time and place, Morrison finds no such continuity. Thus, the 
student of conversion faces a continuing dilemma: is the sort of religious bias present in 
Nock's work best avoided by offering a universal definition of conversion, or one which 
is as historically and culturally specific as possible? 
13Rambo (1993), pp.3-4. 
14Morrison (1992a), p.xiv. 
15Morrison (1992a), p.lS. 
16Morrison (l992a), p.20. 
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1.1.2 Conversion: An Individual or Social Phenomenon? 
The second area of weakness identified by Willoughby in Nock's work, 
namely his neglect of the social dimension of conversion, has also become a pressing 
concern in recent studies of conversion. While he was acutely aware that Christianity was 
what, for want of neutral terminology, we must call a church, whereas Graeco-Roman 
religion was not, Nock seems always to think of the Christian community as a collection 
of individuals. His chapter on the spread of Christianity as a social phenomenon focuses 
entirely on how it would have appeared to the individual pagan.17 There is little 
consideration of the role played by the early Christian communities in securing and 
sustaining the conversion of their members, of the means by which new converts were 
integrated into them, or of the relationship between the communal and ethical dimensions 
of conversion. These omissions are perhaps largely due to the fact that, as Nock 
acknowledges,18 his understanding of conversion owes much to that of William James, 
who famously defined religion as "the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in 
their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they 
may consider the divine."19 James exhibits the same relentless focus on the individual 
when defining conversion as "the process, gradual or sudden, by which a self hitherto 
divided, and consciously wrong inferior and unhappy, becomes unified and consciously 
right superior and happy, in consequence of its firmer hold upon religious realities. "20 As 
an otherwise admiring critic comments, James regarded religious communities as "highly 
secondary"21 growths and this results in his giving us only a "partial view"22 of the 
human religious impulse. We may feel the same about Nock and his view of conversion. 
Happily, there is much evidence in recent work on conversion in the 
ancient world of a desire to remedy this deficiency. Having explored accounts of 
17Nock (1933), chapter 12. 
18Nock (1933), pp.7-9. See also endnote on p.7. 
19James (1902), p.3l. 
20 James (1902), p.l89. 
21Marty (1982), p.xxi. 
22Marty (1982), ibid. 
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conversion in three ancient texts, Eugene Gallagher concludes that "each of the texts 
considered portrays conversion as a continuing process, which involves entering a new 
community, adopting specific forms ofbehavioUf, and participating in ongoing ritual life. 
The texts emphasise the continuity between 'personal' and 'institutional' religious 
experience, rather than the discontinuity asserted by James. "23 Similarly, the work of 
Alan Segal on the experience of Paul as a convert draws from recent sociological studies 
in order to stress the important role in conversion played by the community. "Conversion 
resembles a new and conscious choice to socialise to a particular group - a 
resocialization. The convert builds up a new structure of reality, corresponding to the 
structure of the group joined. The values of the new group forms the convert's new 
reality. The degree of resocialization depends on the distance the convert must travel 
between the old and new communities and the strength of the new commitment. "24 
It thus seems that, even if he was weak in this area, Nock has not here 
bequeathed students of conversion the sort of awkward dilemma presented by the choice 
between universal and particular definitions of conversion. There is some degree of 
consensus as to how his failing should be rectified. However, opinions concerning the 
social dimension of conversion constantly interact with the issue of universality and 
particularity. In demonstrating the significant part played by communities in conversion, 
Gallagher discusses three stories, one drawn from each of Christianity, Judaism and 
Graeco-Roman religion, thereby implying that the concept of conversion can be applied 
equally well to all three religious traditions. In justifying his use of the modern studies of 
conversion from which he derived his views on the role played by communities in 
conversion, Segal asserts that "Paul is a convert in the modern sense of the word "25 and 
that "there are some simple continuities in the phenomenon of conversion throughout 
23Gallagher (1993), p.14. The texts considered are the Acts of John, Joseph andAseneth, and Book XI 
of the Metamorphoses of Apuleius. 
24Segal (1990), p.74. See also pp.5-7. 
25Segal (1990), p.6. 
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Western history. "26 Gallagher implies the pervasIveness of conversion across space, 
Segal asserts it across time. 
Other particularly striking examples of such interaction can be found in 
recent discussions of the most significant surviving description of personal religious 
change within Graeco-Roman religion. The Metamorphoses of Apuleius describe the 
adventures of a wealthy young man Lucius who, through incautious fascination with sex 
and magic, is transformed into an ass, enduring many fabulous bawdy adventures before 
being changed back into human form through the agency of the goddess Isis. At this 
point, the comic tone of the rest of the novel gives way to a passionate and undeniably 
beautiful account (Book XI) of Lucius' subsequent devotion to Isis and his initiation into 
her mysteries. For Wayne Meeks, this is not a conversion story as there is "rather little in 
Apuleius' tale to support a view of initiation as a moral transformation, and nothing at all 
to suggest induction into the kind of community we see among the Epicureans and the 
Christians. Being or becoming religious in the Graeco-Roman world did not entail either 
moral transformation or sectarian resocialization. "27 Meeks thus supports Nock's 
judgement that Lucius is not a convert,28 but does so on a somewhat different basis, 
emphasising precisely the connection between the moral and social dimensions of 
conversion neglected by Nock. Yet while this implies that, for Meeks, conversion is a 
phenomenon only applicable within certain religious traditions, the references which he 
makes to modern studies of conversion suggest essential continuity within those 
traditions across time. 29 
In her work on the Metamorphoses, far from denying that Lucius was 
a convert, Nancy Shumate reads the entire novel as a narrative of conversion. It 
represents a pattern of conversion in which "a perception of the collapse of familiar 
26Segal (1990), p.29. 
27Meeks (1993), p.28. 
28See Nock (1933), pp.138-55. 
29See Meeks (1993), pp.21-22. 
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cognitive constructs precedes the convert's reconstruction of a new world and world 
view along religious lines. The process of conversion is a kind of shift in cognitive 
paradigms ... habituated structures of meaning and systems for organising reality 
disintegrate ... Religious discourse offers a means of restructuring the pre-convert's 
broken world and of re-establishing a foundation upon which to build a reliable system of 
knowledge. "30 The dominant concern of the comic bulk of Apuleius' novel is the 
disintegration of Lucius' cognitive world as he is plunged, time and again, into situations 
where nothing is quite as it seems, while the final Book XI relates the construction of a 
new cognitive world with Isis as its ordering principle. For Shumate, Lucius experiences 
"precisely the sort of radical cognitive reorientation that Nock claims characterised 
conversions to Judaism and Christianity (and possibly philosophy) exclusively. The 
conversion of Lucius does involve the adoption of a 'world-order sharply contrasted with 
(that) in which the neophyte had previously moved."'31 Yet Shumate conceives of this 
new world-order entirely in relation to Lucius as an individual, and the role of 
communities in conversion is not discussed. She suggests that Nock was justified in 
drawing upon James, whose work Shumate admires, but was mistaken "in stressing the 
moral strain in James' analysis at the expense of the epistemological or the cognitive. "32 
Thus, Shumate emphasises the individual and cognitive dimensions of 
conversion at the expense of social and moral dimensions and the connections between 
them. She and Meeks reach different conclusions on the question of Lucius' convert 
status, and do so on quite different grounds, defining conversion differently.33 These 
30Shumate (1996), pp.14-15. It should be noted, when comparing the two, that Meeks' comments 
amount to no more than a few pages, whereas Shumate devotes an entire book to conversion in the 
Metamorphoses. 
31Shumate (1996), pp.26-27, quotation from Nock (1933), p.13. Her italics. 
32Shumate (1996), p.22 n.17. 
33 Another illustration of the centrality of the question of definition is that, conscious of the danger of 
deprecating the value of conversion experiences psychologically less complex than those studied by 
James and Nock:, Hefner (1993), p.17 argues that "conversion need not reformulate one's understanding 
of the ultimate conditions of existence, but it always involves commitment to a new kind of moral 
authority and a new or reconceptualized social identity." This is clearly contrary to Shumate's 
understanding of conversion, who, while not arguing that all religious change involves a shift in 
cognitive paradigms, does argue that this sort of experience was more common in the ancient world than 
many have supposed. See Shumate (1996), pp.24-30. Thus, the same impulse to avoid denigrating the 
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different definitions, derived from different studies of conversion in the modern world,34 
interact with the issue of universal and particular definitions of conversion. By drawing 
on such studies both imply the existence of continuities across space and time, but they 
locate the boundaries of these continuities in different places. We have already seen that 
Meeks places them between Christianity and Graeco-Roman religion on the basis of his 
perception that the latter did not require the resocialization involved in conversion to the 
former. Ignoring such considerations, Shumate chooses instead to speak of conversion 
experiences and narratives as possessing generic features which are "common to a very 
wide, but not exhaustive, range of expressions of conversion which share a cultural 
foundation of dualism. "35 Operating from an avowedly post-modern perspective, and 
fully committed to cultural particularity, it is this underlying foundation of Platonic 
dualism which Shumate relies upon in order to justify the connections she asserts 
between conversion in the ancient and modern worlds, and between conversion in 
Christianity and in Graeco-Roman religion. 36 The opinions which she and Meeks express 
about the Metamorphoses thus illustrate particularly clearly the dilemmas facing anyone 
seeking to reach an understanding of conversion. How is one to balance the individual 
and social dimensions of conversion, and how is one to relate any solution to this 
question to the issue of the universality or particularity of conversion? The prescience of 
Willoughby's criticisms ofNock is once again demonstrated. 
religious capacity of ordinary people leads to opposite conclusions as to what is truly important in 
conversion. Does an emphasis on the conversion of the individual as a shift in cognitive paradigms 
implicitly devalue mass conversion, or is the truly prejudicial assumption that which holds the 
individuals involved in such mass movements to experience only relatively superficial change? 
34Shumate (1996), p.34 speaks of conversion in an "admittedly Jamesian sense." Meeks (1993), p.21 n.6 
and p.22 n.7 cites more recent sociological studies such as Beckford (1978), Richardson, 1. (1978), and 
Wilson, B. (1975). 
35Shumate (1996), p.22. 
36Shumate (1996), pp.260-62, 281-82 describes how certain dualistic aspects of Platonic discourse have 
become naturalised. within western culture such that they are no longer marked as specifically Platonic. 
The Metamorphoses represent an early stage in this process. For Shumate, p.261: "all conversions and 
narratives about them are Platonic, at least in the West. " 
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1.1.3 Balancing the Elements of Conversion 
As regards the first of these dilemmas, one cannot but feel that Meeks 
is right to assert the importance of the social and moral elements of conversion. 
Shumate's argument would have been strengthened by a demonstration of the connection 
between the shift in cognitive paradigms she emphasises and these other elements of 
conversion, especially since it is not obvious that they are as completely lacking in the 
Metamorphoses as Meeks suggests.37 By relying so heavily on James, Shumate 
reproduces one of Nock's errors even as she criticises him. 38 If subsequent study of 
conversion in modern western society has made James' individualism suspect, how much 
more so in relation to the ancient world. Yet the effect of giving full weight to 
communities and their ethics should not be to produce an equally dubious neglect of 
individuals and their experience. The understanding operative in this thesis will therefore 
be that conversion is "an experience rooted in both self and society. It involves a 
personally acknowledged traniformation of self and a socially recognised display of 
change. "39 
To commit oneself to even such a general understanding as this is 
undoubtedly to imply that there are features of conversion common to a wide variety of 
contexts. While providing an important corrective to Nock's tendency to project back 
37It certainly was not to Gallagher, see above p.6 n.2l. To give one example, although Lucius' 
conversion does not result in the adoption of a Jewish or Christian type of sex"Ua1 morality, it does mark 
the decisive subordination of sexual pleasure to religious concerns. Note how the disrobing Photis is 
described as "the picture of Venus rising from the ocean waves"(lI.l7), but is never mentioned in Book 
XI having been displaced by the vision of Isis which emerged "suddenly from the midst of the sea" 
(XI.3). 
38 Although to be fair, Shumate is deliberately attempting to correct readings of the Metamorphoses 
which, (1996) p.ll, "reproduce a blind spot that characterises the study of Greco-Roman paganism in 
general: they focus entirely on the externalised manifestations and the narratives of religion - rituals, 
actions, myths - while avoiding the question of what emotional and cognitive content such actions and 
myths, and indeed cult membership and a relationship with the divine in general, had for the religious 
individual." She also recognises that a shift in cognitive paradigms is not the only type of conversion, 
and speaks of instances in which moral transformation is central. However, even here the influence of 
James is sufficiently strong that the community into which an individual is converted receives little 
attention. See Shumate (1996), pp.14-15 and pp. 145-48. 
39Jules-Rosette (1976), p.132. My italics. This extraordinary article is a sociological analysis from the 
pen of a researcher who experienced conversion to the African Christian sect (The Apostles of John 
Maranke) which she was studying. 
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onto preVIOUS eras a rather post-enlightenment, individualistic and Protestant set of 
assumptions about what is truly important in religion and in conversion, the extreme 
particularism advocated by scholars such as Morrison entails its own difficulties. For one 
thing, "in the Middle Ages, the term conversion described not only the complex 
experience that sophisticated monastic intellectuals knew; it also included a wide range 
of experiences such intellectuals might have had some difficulty in describing as 
conversion in the true sense. "40 For another, "though, in absolute terms, all religions and 
all cultures are unique, the faiths we know as world religions show striking continuities 
over time and space. "41 Whether or not her attribution of such commonality to Platonic 
dualism is correct, Shumate is right to assert the existence of some common elements in 
conversion experiences and accounts, both across time and across the boundaries of 
religious traditions. 
Yet to say that is not to say that conversion is somehow essentially the 
same III every context. Rambo's protest against definitions of conversion rooted in 
particular religious traditions overlooks the point that, even could an abstract neutral 
definition of conversion be constructed, no conversion experience could wholly conform 
to it, since it is to, or within, such particular traditions that conversions take place. The 
understanding of conversion adopted above is therefore not an alternative to the careful 
exploration of particular understandings of conversion. I agree with Morrison that such 
explorations are vitally necessary, since actual cases of conversion are always labelled as 
such from particular perspectives.42 I doubt, however, that when undertaking such 
explorations it is possible to treat conversion entirely as the subject of analysis. In 
Morrison's case, it seems clear that it is the desire to find a conception of conversion as 
far removed as possible from that proposed by Nock and James which partially shapes 
40Muldoon (1997), p.3. His italics. 
41Hefner (1993), p.5. 
42 A point which should be appreciated by any student of the New Testament who has consulted the 
literature which considers whether Paul was a convert. It is often unclear on the basis of whose 
perspective the question is being debated. For example, whether Paul would have considered himself to 
have converted and whether those synagogue communities offended by his lninistry would have done so 
are rather different questions. See below, p.26. 
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his decision to restrict his examination of conversion in the Middle Ages to twelfth 
century monasticism.43 Preconceptions play their part and so, while regarding the 
understanding of conversion I have adopted above (pp.lO-11) as too imprecise to be, in 
any meaningful sense, a tool of analysis, I would regard it as a helpful 'rough guide' in 
undertaking precisely the sort of explorations favoured by Morrison. 
The advantage of such a 'rough guide' over a more precise analytical 
tool is its ability to balance similarity and difference. On the one hand, it recognises that 
there are features of conversion common to many contexts. By equally emphasising the 
rootedness of the conversion experience in both self and society, it alerts the researcher 
to the need to examine evidence of the transformation of self in both its individual and 
communal dimensions. This is crucial, since one doubts that it is possible to produce a 
rounded portrayal of any particular understanding of conversion without paying attention 
to both.44 Yet on the other hand, it also recognises the distinctiveness of particular 
understandings of conversion. The manifestations of the individual and communal 
dimensions of conversion, and the relationships between them, vary enormously. 
1.2 Understanding the Convert 
1.2.1 The Active Convert 
If the emphasis of the largely literary and/or historical studies cited in 
the above discussion has been primarily on understanding the event or process of 
conversion, then it is fair to say that the main emphasis of many recent sociological 
studies has been on understanding the convert. Responding to the success enjoyed by 
43Morrison (l992a), p.3 comments that "in Nock's view, conversion was largely a change of mind or 
behaviour marked by a single, identifiable event in history ... Conversion, in other words, was a turning 
point, or peripety." He contrasts this, p.66, with the twelfth century monastic view that "the idea of 
conversion described continuing and danger-filled transformation, rather than abrupt and permanent 
change." 
44Indeed, one possible criticism of Morrison (1992a) is that although his work is on the hermeneutics of 
conversion in twelfth century monasticism, the monastic communities themselves remain curiously 
disembodied throughout the book. The focus is on the ideas rather to the exclusion of the social reality 
which the ideas were shaped by, and which they helped to shape. 
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conversionist cults in contemporary North America, and confronting a popular 
perspective which attributed such success to manipulative techniques, sociologists 
examining these movements began to suggest that, far from being the passive victims of 
cult leaders, converts engaged actively and willingly in the process of their own 
conversion. 45 This approach was very different from that of earlier studies, which had 
often resorted to explaining conversion in terms of various forms of psychological 
deficiency on the part of the convert. 46 It has been pointed out that the question really 
being asked in such studies was how the religious in general, and converts in particular, 
could possibly believe what they professed.47 
The first significant break with this psychological approach came in the 
mid-1960s in the work of John Lofland and Rodney Stark, who conducted research on 
an obscure Korean millenarian cult newly arrived in North America.48 Although their 
findings can only appear somewhat crudely deterministic to the reader of the late-1990s, 
their work was significant in that it combined an emphasis on the psychological 
predisposition of the convert with an attempt to explain how such a predisposition was 
activated in the case of some but not in that of others. Here external influences were 
important, but the ones stressed were what could be termed 'normal' social processes 
over which the convert enjoyed some control, such as the formation of affective ties with 
existing members of the cult.49 This element of Lofland and Stark's analysis provided a 
45For a clear account of this shift from a passive to an active paradigm ofthe convert see Richardson, J. 
(1985), and Kilbourne and Richardson (1988). The latter is particularly helpful in explaining how this 
new paradigm interacts with, and exists alongside, earlier ones. 
46This had been, so to speak, the flipside of James' sympathetic characterisation of conversion as 
providing the necessary resolution of psychological difficulties. Note the contrast between the unhappy 
pre-convert and the happy convert in his definition of conversion. See above, p.5. 
47Taylor (1978), p.316. 
48Lofland and Stark (1965). Perhaps fortunately for their subsequent academic careers, this obscure cult 
did not remain so for long. Lofland and Stark were in fact observing the Unification Church or 
'Moonies.' 
49This emphasis on conversion as a social process also finally broke the link established by James 
(1902), pp.206-08 between the speed of a conversion and the degree to which converts were in control of 
what was happening to them. James had identified gradual conversions as volitional but sudden ones as 
acts of self-surrender. 
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crucial Jumping-off point for those who were to develop further the concept of the 
active convert. 50 
This development took the form of an emphasis on the interaction 
between converts and the communities they enter. Articles appeared arguing that social 
networks playa crucial role in conversion but only for those already actively involved in 
religious seeking.51 Converts act to discover and make use of the particular means of 
personal transformation offered by, and institutionalised within, a conversionist group, 
possibly 'trying out' several groups in the process. 52 There is a considerable period during 
which converts behave entirely according to the expectations of the community they 
have joined, but are privately less than fully convinced as to the truth of that community's 
message. In effect, they are trying out a role, learning how to be a convert. 53 The 
accounts which they offer of their conversion experiences are also constructed according 
to the expectations of the community, thus influencing the descriptions offered of pre-
conversion dispositions,54 and raising the possibility that individual converts may subtly 
revise their accounts as the norms of the community evolve. 55 
Such approaches eventually led to attempts to define the convert as a 
social type, distinguishable from others on the basis of the different changes made by the 
individual in order to embrace the role of the convert. David Snow and Richard 
Machalek focus on converts' talk and reasoning, arguing that conversion involves a 
50Richardson, J. (1985), p.169 points out that many of those who have done so were pupils of Lofland. 
Stark himself has preferred instead to concentrate on the impact of social processes upon potential 
converts, emphasising both that social networks playa vital role in conversion and that converts make 
rational choices in relation to the perceived compensations and rewards offered by religious groups. 
Religions succeed if they are able to satisfy social needs. Studies such as Bader and DeMaris (1996), and 
Kox, Meeus and Hart (1991) suggest that Stark's work has considerable value in a modern western 
setting. However, Stark's recent attempt to apply his ideas to the rise of early Christianity suffers from a 
lack of attention to questions of cultural particularity. For example, Stark infers the growth pattern and 
class composition of early Christianity from the success of Mormonism in modern North America. See 
Stark (1996), chapters I and 2. 
51Heirich (1977). 
52Straus (1979). 
53Balch (1980). 
54Taylor (1978). 
55Beckford (1978). 
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change in universes of discourse, the broad interpretative frameworks in terms of which 
people live and organise experience. 56 There are four main indicators of such 
paradigmatic change - biographical reconstruction (converts will reinterpret their past life 
in light of the present), the adoption of a master attribution scheme (converts will 
ultimately attribute all events to a single cause), the suspension of analogical reasoning 
(converts will resist metaphors which imply that their own group or world view can be 
compared to others), and the embracing of a master role (converts will see their role 
within a religious group as the core of their identity and all other role identities will be 
subordinate). While these suggestions are stimulating, they fail to define the convert as a 
social type. Of the four indicators proposed by Snow and Machalek, only biographical 
reconstruction is restricted to converts. In so far as they are accurate descriptions of 
religious universes of discourse, the other three indicators could also be true of those 
with a lifelong religious commitment. 57 
1.2.2 Conversion Accounts and Conversion Experiences 
Thus, the attempt to understand the convert as an active participant in 
his or her own transformation has come to focus increasingly on the conversion account 
as the arena in which that activity is most clearly displayed. It had already been argued 
that "accounts of conversion experience constitute an inextricable part of the experience 
to which they refer and whose very observable, accountable and 'researchable' character 
bears witness to its artful accomplishment. "58 Underlying this is the recognition that 
human beings are interpretative creatures for whom to have an experience is to interpret 
it. Indeed, experience is only comprehensible on the basis of interpretation, and thus, as 
the above quotation indicates, one cannot sharply distinguish between the two since they 
56Snow and Machalek (1983) and (1984). It should be noted how similar in broad terms is their 
conception of conversion as a shift in universes of discourse to Shumate's conception of conversion as a 
shift in cognitive paradigms. Yet the content which Snow and Machalek give to this relates to the 
individual as part of a community, rather than in isolation. 
57 Staples and Mauss (1987); Segal (1990), p.28. 
58Taylor (1978), p.319. 
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are inextricably linked. 59 Researchers may therefore be misled by accounts which discern 
conversion as that which was always meant to be, and therefore offer intimations of 
predispositional factors which can only be seen retrospectively and would not have been 
apparent had the subject been examined by a researcher prior to conversion. Allowance 
must be made for biographical reconstruction. 
There are a variety of ways of doing so, and I have 
identified at least three different approaches. They are: 
(i) To regard conversion accounts as inherently and especially 
unreliable. Snow and Machalek had themselves concluded that "converts are uniquely 
denied impartial knowledge about the factors that might have precipitated conversion. "60 
In an article on Paul and Augustine, Paula Fredriksen suggests that "the conversion 
account is both apologetic and anachronistic ... the conversion account, never 
disinterested, is a condensed, or disguised, description of the convert's present, which he 
legitimates through his retrospective creation of a past and a self "61 The difficulty with 
this position is that one doubts that problems of reliability are unique to converts. The 
interpreted nature of all experience means that no individual can enjoy unmediated access 
to their own past. Whatever difficulties we face in knowing our own pasts are therefore 
shared by all, and not just converts. While it may not be the intention of those 
propounding it, the opinion that converts are especially unreliable embodies a stereotype 
59 Shumate (1996), p.17: "One could say that for all intents and purposes there is no such thing as 
experience per se or, to put it more precisely, there may be experience but it is not possible for it to have 
any meaning outside of an attributional system." 
60Snow and Machalek (1983), p.280. My italics. This proposition was supported by the fact that 
converts to Nichiren Shoshu Buddhism often spoke of their former lives as an illusion. Yet several of 
their subjects were quite clear that, for example, they felt contented with life prior to their conversion. It 
is simply that they now regard that contentment as having been illusory. Far from being highly 
misleading, this would seem to suggest some degree of awareness of the nature of biographical 
reconstruction on the part of the converts themselves. 
61Fredriksen (1986), p.33. Her italics. The most significant element of the evidence upon which 
Fredriksen bases this claim is the alleged irreconcilability of the account of his own conversion in 
Augustine's ConfeSSions with the picture of him which emerges from the Dialogues he wrote at the time. 
For accounts of Augustine's development which perceive considerably more continuity see Markus 
(1994), chapter XVIII and O'Connell (1996), pp.259-309. 
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of the convert as dangerous deceiver, and does so just as surely as a stereotype of the 
convert as inadequate victim lurked behind the emphasis of earlier studies upon 
psychological deficiency. The history of the study of conversion is also to some degree 
the history of evolving forms of scholarly prejudice against converts. 
(ii) To assert that biographical reconstruction is symptomatic of wider 
epistemological difficulties. Conversion accounts are inherently unreliable, but they are 
not thereby unusual. Morrison suggests that "the experience of conversion is inaccessible 
through the screen of the text and, indeed, that there is, interpretatively speaking, little to 
distinguish a fictive reconstruction of an actual event from the fictional invention of one 
that never happened. "62 Those studying conversion should therefore concentrate on the 
accounts of conversion themselves, reconstructing the processes of composition and 
habits of thought which shaped them.63 Thus, there is the phenomenon of conversion 
experience and there is the name conversion, but the thing and its name are quite distinct, 
conversion accounts revealing not the thing but the understanding( s) of conversion 
packed into the name. On this basis, the problem of the perceived unreliability of 
converts' accounts of their own experiences is neutralised and universalised by attributing 
that problem not to converts themselves, but to the nature of language. Converts are 
epistemologically disabled not because they are converts, but because they are human 
beings. 
(iii) To assert that the conversion account constitutes the conversion 
experience. On this view, conversion accounts do not represent conversion experiences, 
and their words do not refer to the thing they purport to describe. Expressing it crudely, 
the conversion account is the conversion. Peter Stromberg argues that the claims of 
62Morrison (1992b), p.144. 
63Morrison (1992a), p.39 makes much of the mediaeval writers awareness "not only that their work was 
proportionately fictional but that it was necessarily fictional, for the mind, bound to its own nature, had 
to use the thoughts and words available through nature to speak about supernatural things." Yet even 
when coupled with the belief that such fictional elements could and must convey truth, this speaks more 
of a sense that words can only partially and imperfectly represent an experience of the supernatural like 
conversion, rather than of the impossibility of their doing so at all. 
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converts that their experiences have changed them in fundamental ways "have ultimately 
to do with the possibility that a particular language may bring about self-transformation 
.. .it is through the use of language in the conversion narrative that the processes of 
increased commitment and self-transformation take place. "64 The response of researchers 
should be to "abandon the search for reality beyond the convert's speech and to look 
instead at the speech itself, for it is through language that the conversion occurred in the 
first place and also through language that the conversion is now re-lived as the convert 
tells his tale. "65 This position radically alters the terms of the debate about reliability. On 
the one hand, if conversion is the achievement of self-transformation through the 
adoption of a particular language then, in offering a researcher samples of that language, 
the convert provides access to that which brought about, and sustains, his or her 
transformation. Particular languages, and therefore conversion accounts, may undergo 
internal development over time but, since conversion is constituted by language, this 
does not entail falsification. Subsequent modifications of the particular language adopted 
by a convert also alter the 'experience. '66 On the other hand, all conversion accounts are 
inherently unreliable precisely in that they purport to refer to an independent experience 
not constituted solely by their own language. 
F or all the differences between these three positions, it is not difficult 
to detect the influence of post-modem hermeneutics upon them all. The relationship 
between the convert and the conversion experience is being construed in parallel ways to 
that between the reader and a text. Although all understand the activity of the 
reader/convert in different ways, it is his or her activity in reconstructing the 
text/experience which is held to be important, and which bestows meaning, not some 
64Stromberg (1993), p.xi. In this study the particular language examined is that of evangelical 
Christianity . 
65Stromberg (1993), p.3. 
66The consequences of this are expressed clearly by Griffith (1990), pp.161-62: "Truth in autobiography 
cannot be measured by the standard of factual accuracy alone ... A truthful narrative may be said to 
create a myth of the self that is thoroughly informed by, and hence supportive of, the principle its author 
has identified through conversion. " 
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gIven factor in the text/experience itself67 Either such gIven factors are wholly 
inaccessible, or their existence is entirely constituted by the account. Perhaps because the 
image of the reader hovers so palpably in the background, this has tended to produce a 
focus on the individual. Despite the fact that the concept of biographical reconstruction 
developed from an awareness of the way in which community norms mould the accounts 
offered by converts, communities come to be treated simply as suppliers of language. At 
this point, the concept of the active convert is in danger of turning into the concept of 
the autonomous one. 
In contrast, but with similar consequences for our VIew of the 
conversion experience, Gallagher emphasises the wider role played by communities.68 He 
does so by examining not only the reconstruction of conversion experiences, but also 
their preconstruction.69 Communities, together with the vocabularies of belief they 
employ, engender experience, not vice versa. "Beliefs and attitudes are formative of, 
rather than consequent upon, the experience. They define in advance what experiences 
are possible. "70 Conversion accounts simply reflect the communal beliefs and concepts 
which structure conversion experiences. When such views on preconstruction are added 
to the three approaches to reconstruction examined above, then a common trend 
emerges: experience is eclipsed, and conversion explored solely as a construct. I disagree 
with this trend in the following two ways: 
(i) The recognition that religious traditions exercise profound influence 
over the preconstruction, and reconstruction, of conversion experiences and accounts 
67Shumate (1996), p.14: "Fonnulating and accepting one interpretation of any text, including the text of 
the world, is, like religious belief, an act of faith; and ... all closure is the product of an act of will on the 
part of a reader rather than a feature of objective reality." While accepting that it is sometimes helpful to 
speak of the social world as a text for the purposes of metaphor and analogy (see below, pp.35-36), and 
recognising that language is one of the central features of social life, I am ill at ease with positions 
which imply that a social process like conversion is little different from a text. Converts may produce 
texis containing accounts of their experiences which scholars then read but, in reconstructing their 
experiences, converts themselves are not reading a text. 
68See above, pp.5-6. 
69Preconstruction is my tenn, not Gallagher's. 
7°Gallagher (1990), p.138 quoting Proudfoot (1985). 
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does not necessarily imply that experience is either completely inaccessible or reducible 
to such constructions. It is also possible to argue that construction enables experience. 
As Lofland and Skonovd observe, "the conversion experience itself is partly moulded by 
expectations of what conversion is about or 'like', and ... there is therefore the probability 
of a relatively 'good fit' between the 'real' experiences and the paradigmatic accounts. "71 
Precisely because human beings can only experience what they can conceive, and 
precisely because all experience is only comprehensible on the basis of interpretation, 
conversion accounts may refer to conversion experiences. 
(ii) Somewhat significantly given that the subject under discussion is 
conversion, both preconstruction and reconstruction have a limited capacity to explain 
religious change. In the latter case, this is because the paradigms of conversion 
authorised by communities develop over time, and one of the motors of such 
development may be the accounts of their experiences offered by converts.72 The 
existence of authorised interpretations does not eliminate the possibility of originality 
within interpretation since the traditional materials provided by such authorised 
interpretations need not always be deployed in entirely traditional ways. In the former 
case, it is not clear how preconstruction can account for the emergence of new religious 
movements. If it is defined in advance which experiences are possible, then how are we 
to explain the appearance of new accounts of religious experience?73 "The fact that 
symbols change in meaning, sometimes slowly, sometimes with amazing speed, is the 
surest indication that something more than human linguistic patterns are at work and that 
the term experience points to something real in the world that is not completely captured 
by our pre-set explanations and interpretations. The traffic, in short, moves both ways. 
71Lofland and Skonovd (1981), p.374. Their italics. Lofland and Skonovd themselves explore 
conversion motifs, seeking to identify several different types of conversion. This is not uninteresting but, 
as they themselves admit, is of limited usefulness in terms of analysis simply because no actual 
conversion ever conforms entirely to these ideal types. 
72Far from the least significant example of this may be Paul himself. 
73Rather than arguing that preconstruction defines in advance which ex-periences are possible, I would 
suggest that its role is to define which experiences are impossible. Human beings cannot experience 
what they cannot conceive, but in many contexts the powers of human conception are rather wide. 
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Our language shapes our experience, but our experience also stretches, reshapes, and 
sometimes even shatters our language. "74 
F or these reasons, I do not believe that conversion experiences are 
either completely inaccessible or constituted solely by language. Instead, experience 
forms one element in a set of complex reciprocal relationships. As illustrated by the 
simple diagram below, such relationships exist between (i) the conversion experience and 
its authorised interpretation, (ii) such authorised interpretation and the conversion 
account, and (iii) the conversion experience and the conversion account. 
/ The Conversion EXPerience~ 
Authorised Interpretation " ) The Conversion Account 
In each of these relationships, each element influences, and is 
influenced by, the other.75 This indicates that while conversion accounts certainly do 
develop, they do not necessarily distort. They have the potential to tell scholars not only 
of the present, but also of the past. 
1.2.3 Summary 
In 1.1 the difficulties of understanding conversion were examined. Is 
conversion a universal phenomenon, or a particular one? Is it an individual event/process, 
or a social one? The solutions proposed recognise the existence of common elements in 
conversion experiences and accounts, both across time and across the boundaries of 
religious traditions. However, this does not imply that conversion is the 'same' in every 
context. Particular understandings of conversion vary enormously, and detailed 
74Johnson (1998), p.50. His italics. 
75 Although the balance of such reciprocal influence, and the kind of influence exercised, will vary from 
case to case, it is important that studies of conversion recognise the significance of all three. 
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explorations of them are necessary. The guide adopted for such explorations (pp.l0-11) 
limits its assertion of common elements to the recognition that conversion is rooted in 
both the individual and society. The transformation of self involved is both personally 
acknowledged and socially recognised. In 1.2 it was noted that recent scholarship has 
rejected approaches to understanding the convert which emphasise psychological 
deficiency. In their place have appeared approaches which stress the degree to which the 
convert is active, and which focus particular attention on the convert's engagement in 
biographical reconstruction (converts reinterpret their past life in the light of the 
present). Here, and in the study of the way in which communal beliefs and attitudes 
engender experience (preconstruction), it is often suggested either that conversion 
experiences are completely inaccessible, or that they are entirely constituted by the 
language adopted at conversion. I take issue with this, concluding that, far from 
eliminating experience, construction enables it, and that experience itself influences 
conversion accounts, and authorised interpretations of conversion, as well as being 
influenced by them. 
1.3 Conversion in Recent New Testament Study 
Despite the fact that, to state the obvious, early Christianity was a 
new religious movement which could only grow by persuading outsiders to accept its 
message and enter its communities, the subject of conversion has received little attention 
from New Testament scholars,?6 There are only two recent works of any significance, 
From Darkness to Light by Beverly Gaventa, and Paul the Convert by Alan Segal. 
1.3.1 Beverly Gaventa 
Gaventa surveys the attitudes towards conversion displayed in several 
New Testament texts (Luke-Acts, Paul's letters, John, 1 Peter), and in order to do so 
defines her first task as being "to distinguish between conversion and other types of 
76 A fact commented upon by Gaventa (1986b), p.3. 
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change. "77 Such distinctions are drawn on the basis of the degree of change involved in 
any given case, and here Gaventa relies upon the work of sociologist Richard Travisano 
who seeks to distinguish between conversion and change of a lesser magnitude, which he 
terms alternation. The difference between the two is that alternation denotes transitions 
to personal identities which, even if not encouraged, are at least permitted within an 
individual's existing universe of discourse. In contrast, conversion denotes the transition 
to an identity which is proscribed. "The ideal typical conversion can be thought of as the 
embracing of a negative identity. The person becomes something which was specifically 
prohibited. "78 Conversion therefore denotes change of a very high magnitude. 79 
Perhaps conscious of this, Gaventa introduces 'transformation' as a new 
category between 'alternation' and 'conversion'. This she holds to denote change which is 
great, but which falls short of a complete rejection of the past, instead involving a "re-
cognition of the past."80 This is compared to a Kuhnian paradigm shift in the natural 
sciences where the available data is not rejected, but its interpretation radically 
transformed. While the affinities of this idea of transformation with that of biographical 
reconstruction are obvious and potentially useful, Gaventa never succeeds in resolving 
certain confusions between this category and that of conversion. The introduction of 
transformation leaves conversion as a complete negation or rejection of the past, and one 
doubts that such a thing is actually possible within normal social life. 81 Short of 
destruction of the personality via torture or illness, no human being is a slate which can 
77Gaventa (1986b), p.8. 
78Travisano (1970), p.601. In subsequent sociological research Travisano's paper proved influential not 
so much for his distinction between conversion and alternation itself as for the fact that it implied an 
active subject seeking out changes in identity. See Richardson, 1. (1985), p.171. 
79 And, implicitly, also involves deviancy, something which is not obviously true in all conte}.is. 
80Gaventa (1986b), p.ll. One of the problems of Gaventa's work is that at this stage she terms her three 
categories 'alternation', 'transformation' and 'conversion', so implying three categories of personal 
change, one of which qualifies as conversion. Yet by the conclusion, pp.146-52, she is discussing three 
types of conversion, the conversion category of the introduction being dubbed 'pendulum-like 
conversion.' Her definition of conversion thus suffers from self-inflicted confusion. 
81 Travisano himself had not spoken of a general rejection or negation of the past, but instead of the 
embracing of forbidden identities which may, of course, include elements drawn from the past. This 
point is neatly illustrated by the fact that Travisano regards Jews who become Jewish Christians as an 
example ofthe embrace of a proscribed identity and hence of conversion. See Travisano (1970), pp.598-
600. 
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be wiped clean. Gaventa's handling of Paul himself illustrates these problems clearly. 
Placing the Paul of his own letters in the category of transformation, Gaventa quite 
properly points to his use of the language of transformation. 82 Yet given Paul's se1f-
confessed hostility to the church prior to his transformation, it is also difficult to regard 
his experience as anything other than a clear example of the embrace of a negative 
identity which had been specifically prohibited within his existing universe of discourse. 
The distinction between transformation and conversion thus collapses. While her 
expositions of individual passages remain of interest, Gaventa's study offers little of 
continuing methodological value. 83 
1.3.2 Alan Segal 
In contrast to Gaventa's survey of several New Testament texts, Segal 
confines himself to the letters of Paul and to Luke's portrayal of him. While also pointing 
to the fact that Paul understood himself and others becoming Christians in terms of 
transformation, Segal takes this not as evidence for a type of change falling short of that 
of conversion but, instead, as evidence that Paul was indeed a convert. This conclusion is 
based on the continued prominent use of the metaphor of transformation in modem 
studies of conversion,84 the evidence provided by Paul's own letters of biographical 
reconstruction,85 and the fact that, on becoming a Christian, Paul changed 
communities. 86 The last of these three indicators attains a particular significance, for 
although Paul did not lose "his commitment to Judaism, he chose to express that 
commitment in an entirely novel way, by participating in a Gentile community. "87 This 
82Gaventa (1986b), pp.40-46. Only Paul as presented by Luke and some of the imagery in John and 1 
Peter fall into the category of conversion, with Cornelius and the Ethiopian eunuch of Acts falling into 
that of alternation. 
83It should be remembered, in relation to both Gaventa and Segal, that the 1990s has seen a veritable 
explosion of literature on conversion. It is therefore perhaps not surprising that their methodology 
should now appear inadequate. 
84Segal (1990), pp.28-29. The centrality of the image of transformation in the accounts of conversion 
offered by modem social science provides yet another objection to Gaventa's attempt to distinguish 
between conversion and transformation. 
85ibid. 
86Segal (1990), p.6. 
87Segal (1990), p.7S. 
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was a virtually unique change of communities in Paul's own social context,88 and Segal 
argues that it provided an important impetus for Paul's theology. Holding to a tradition 
of Jewish mystical apocalypticism which identified the principal angelic figure of the Old 
Testament as the Kavod (glory) of God, Paul interpreted his vision of the risen Christ as 
a revelation that the two figures were one and the same. 89 Segal is thus able to assert 
strong connections between Paul's conversion experience, his change of communities, 
and his theology. 
There is much to be applauded here, not least Segal's desire to pay full 
attention to both the personal and social dimensions of Paul's transformation. Whether or 
not one accepts that Paul is a representative of a Jewish tradition of mystical 
apocalypticism, Segal's argument that it provided the resources by which Paul interpreted 
his vision of the risen Christ is undeniably stimulating. It provides an illustration of how a 
convert may be active in fresh and creative ways, but be so in relation to communities 
and the interpretative traditions which they authorise, suggesting that, in order to 
understand his experience, Paul made use of the authorised interpretative traditions of 
both the community he left and that which he joined. Segal's Paul is a convert who is 
active, but scarcely autonomous. Further, Segal's tying together of experience, 
community and theology contrasts with much recent Pauline scholarship where the 
tendency has been to neglect the significance of Paul's experience, emphasising the 
importance of subsequent communal factors in the development of his theology yo Segal 
reasserts the significance of experience without reverting either to discredited portrayals 
of guilt as the driving force behind Paul's conversion, or to individualistic conceptions of 
Paul as an isolated passive subject utterly swamped by external powers beyond his 
control. By doing so he provides the opportunity for debate to advance. 
88Segal (1990), p.295. 
89See Segal (1990), pp.34-71 for an extended discussion of mystical apocalypticism and its relationship 
to Paul's experience. 
90Por a discussion of this trend, which came in the wake ofE.P. Sanders' influential re-reading offirst 
century Judaism, see 2.1. 
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Despite these virtues, there are also some difficulties, one of which 
concerns the measurement of change. Although recognising early Christianity to have 
formed a sect within Judaism, Segal asserts Paul to have been a convert on the basis that 
"in modem usage and social science the word conversion can denote moving from one 
sect or denomination to another within the same religion, if the change is radical. "91 The 
problem here is one of definition. From whose perspective is a change of community to 
be deemed radical? Is it that of the 'convert', that of the community left or the community 
joined, or that of the scholar? On Segal's reading, Paul was a convert without exiting 
Judaism and, moreover, one who insisted that "the Jew as well as the Gentile must be 
converted, and the new community that Jesus founded must be a community of 
converts. "92 Yet Paul's repeated submission to physical punishment at the hands of 
synagogue authorities (2 Cor. 11 :24) suggests a perception on their part that he had 
significantly violated the boundaries of Judaism, even as it bears witness to Paul's own 
determination to deny that his activities did so. Further, the very subtitle of Segal's book, 
The Apostolate and Apostasy of Saul the Pharisee, reflects subsequent Jewish 
perceptions that Paul was someone who abandoned Judaism. These perspectival 
difficulties do not invalidate Segal's reading of Paul or his insistence that Paul was a 
convert, but they do suggest that his desire to distil the most value-neutral definition of 
conversion possible is a forlorn one.93 As in Gaventa's work, the attempt to define 
conversion on the basis of the degree of change involved encounters considerable 
difficulties. 
The emphasis which Segal places on Paul's use of the metaphor of 
transformation also demands comment. By pointing to the fact that modem social 
science frequently describes conversion in terms of transformation, Segal deflects any 
potential impact of the acknowledged fact that Paul rarely uses terms which could 
91Segal (1990), p.6. His italics. 
92Segal (1990), p.1l3. 
93Segal (1990), p.285. Shumate (1996), p.22 offers similar criticism. 
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legitimately be translated into English usmg the noun 'conversion' or the verb 'to 
convert'.94 Yet he does so without ever asking whether this feature of social scientific 
accounts may not be the result of the influence of Paul's own letters as seminal 
documents within western civilisation, something openly acknowledged by many 
sociologists. 95 To some degree, a convert in the modem world is someone of whom it is 
appropriate to use Paul's vocabulary.96 This circularity thus actually serves to strengthen 
Segal's point that Paul was indeed a convert. There is something more than a little odd 
about the position of those who seek to deny that Paul was a convert when it is Paul's 
own thought which has supplied so much of the content of subsequent understandings of 
conversion.97 However, such support is double-edged for, even as it suggests that Paul 
was a convert, it renders that conclusion almost tautological, robbing it of much of its 
analytical power. We are once again brought face to face with the limitations of 
definitions of conversion as analytical tools. 
1.3.3 Summary 
Despite the virtues of their work, the studies by Beverley Gaventa and 
Alan Segal exhibit the problems attendant upon attempts to define conversion in terms of 
types or degrees of change. In Gaventa's case, the boundaries between some of her 
categories of change are blurred, and neither she nor Segal address the question of from 
whose perspective types and degrees of change are assessed. The illusion that a more or 
94Paul rarely uses the Greek verbs bncr'tpEq>co (I turn) or IlE'tcx.VOECO (I repent, I change my mind). 
This is explained by Gaventa (1986b), pp.40-46 as the result of a preference on Paul's part for terms 
which reflect divine, rather than human, initiative. Witherup (1994), p.18 points to the previous use of 
these terms to refer to the restoration of Jews to an unimpaired relationship with God rather than to an 
entirely new relationship. Segal (1990), p.2l insists: "Paul is a convert in the modern sense of the term." 
But is there a single modern sense of the term? 
95E.g. Rambo (1993), pp.xi & 4; Richardson, J. (1985), p.164; Snow and Machalek (1984), p.169. Some 
speak directly of Paul, others of biblical inheritance, or of the theological traditions in which they belong 
or grew up. 
96We are thus left in the somewhat paradoxical situation that the Greek equivalents for the English term 
conversion, itself derived from the Latin verb convertere, 'to turn round', are not much employed by Paul 
himself, but that the understanding(s) packed into that term in English-speaking cultures are heavily 
influenced by him. It is the latter which seems the more significant fact, unless it is to be deemed 
inadmissible to refer to those who believed in Christ through Paul's ministry as converts. 
97Particularly the position of Krister StendahI, whose view that Paul was not a convert is discussed at 
5.2.1. 
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less neutral definition of conversion is possible appears a real danger here. Further, the 
strong influence exercised by Paul over modem conceptions of conversion raises other 
problems. The application to early Christianity, in order to identify conversion and 
converts, of a definition or typology of conversion based upon social-scientific studies 
from modem North America, runs the risk of circularity. My adoption of a rather less 
closely defined understanding of conversion (pp.l 0-11) seeks to avoid these problems by 
balancing the recognition of common elements in many conversion experiences and 
accounts with the acknowledgement that this does not mean that conversion is the 'same' 
in every context. Consciousness of the existence of common elements should simply play 
a sensitising role, suggesting likely lines of enquiry in particular cases, and providing a 
reminder of the need to pay attention to both the individual and communal dimensions of 
conversIOn. 
1.4 Questions and Resources 
1.4.1 Selection of Subjects and Questions 
I therefore intend to explore particular understandings of conversion 
current within early Christianity, making them the subject of analysis. Those selected are 
that of the apostle Paul and that of the church at Corinth, as reflected in 1 Corinthians. 
The rationale behind this selection is twofold. Firstly, Paul spent his entire ministry 
engaged in making converts. It therefore seems something of a glaring omission that 
within the vast literature devoted to him there is no study which makes a detailed 
examination of his understanding of conversion. Despite extensive discussion of his own 
conversion, and of its impact on his theology, there is little material exploring Paul's 
attitude towards the conversion of others.98 To rigidly separate these two areas of 
enquiry would be artificial since one of the aspects of his theology upon which Paul's 
98 Although the studies of Gaventa and Segal encroach onto this area, their focus is much more, as the 
title of Segal's book implies, on Paul's own conversion and its consequences. Gaventa (1986b) devotes 
pp.17 -40 to Paul's accounts of his own experience, but only pp.40-46 to the evidence he provides 
concerning the conversion of others. 
29 
experience may have impacted is his understanding of the conversion of others. In my 
view this impact was significant, and I therefore devote a chapter to what Paul tells the 
reader of his own experience. At this point the discussion above (1.2.2) as to whether 
biographical reconstruction implies that conversion accounts necessarily distort the past 
has considerable significance. Nevertheless, I am attempting to redress an imbalance and, 
even were one to take the contrary view that Paul was not a convert and that his own 
experience did not significantly influence his later understanding of the conversion of 
others, the chapters dealing with this latter topic would remain valid in their own right. 
Secondly, by also examining the understanding of conversion current 
within the church at Corinth I avoid the false impression that Paul's view of conversion 
was the only one current within early Christianity or even within those communities 
which he himself had founded. A comparison between these two understandings of 
conversion may thus illustrate the limited degree to which advocates of conversion can 
control the understandings of it constructed by their converts, and also some of the ways 
in which converts can be active in the context of community. One could undertake a 
study which compared Paul's understanding of conversion to that of another New 
Testament writer, so avoiding the difficulties inherent in mirror-reading,99 but the specific 
opportunities offered by this interface between a community and its founder would be 
lost. Further, 1 Corinthians is unusual among the New Testament documents in the 
degree to which it concentrates on issues of communal life. It is therefore a particularly 
suitable text given my intention to focus upon the communal as well as the individual 
dimensions of conversion, offering as it does data about a community with a clearly 
defined historical and geographical location. Knowing that the Corinthian 
correspondence was sent by Paul to the church at Corinth during the sixth decade of the 
first century enables us to situate the Corinthian understanding of conversion more 
precisely within the wider context of Graeco-Roman culture than would otherwise be 
99For a discussion of the possible pitfalls of mirror-reading, along with a defence of its propriety, see 
Barclay (1987). 
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possible, especially given the rich archaeological record available for first century Corinth 
and its environs. 
Having thus selected the understandings of conversion to be explored, 
there remains the issue of how such explorations are to be conducted. What sort of 
questions are to be asked? Clearly it is desirable that the questions asked be ones which 
can be answered reasonably adequately employing the available evidence. While the New 
Testament texts contain some hints, answers to the admittedly fascinating question of 
why it was, historically speaking, that early Christianity succeeded in winning converts 
remain frustratingly elusive. This is not a debate I enter,lOO preferring instead to explore 
the understandings of conversion selected with two other broad questions in mind. They 
are (i) what does the available evidence reveal as to expectations of how conversion took 
place? and, perhaps with even more emphasis, (ii) what expectations are revealed as to 
the consequences of conversion? This second question will be pursued with particular 
reference to ethical behaviour and community life. 
1.4.2 Selection of a Theoretical Resource 
Defining some broad questions with which to approach the 
understandings of conversion selected for exploration still leaves open the issue of 
theoretical resources. My rejection of close definitions of conversion as tools of analysis 
is not a plea for a naively empirical approach which believes in the possibility of simply 
sticking to the facts. In my opinion, one of the most creative and stimulating theoretical 
approaches to be employed by a New Testament scholar in recent years is that found in 
David Horrell's The Social Ethos of the Corinthian Correspondence. 101 Drawing on the 
100 Those interested should consult Nock (1933), MacMullen (1981, 1984), and Stark (1996) among 
others. An illustration of the hazards awaiting the unwary is provided by Meeks (1984), pp.22-23,191-
92 whose suggestion that Christianity was particularly attractive to those experiencing status 
inconsistency has found little support, despite the otherwise joyous reception accorded to the book. 
101Horrell (1996). I dissent entirely from the criticisms of Horrell's approach offered by Esler (1998). In 
particular, the allegation that Horrell has made an unnecessary and unpersuasive attempt to substitute 
his own approach for the use of models (p.260) entirely misrepresents Horrell's argument. Far from 
attempting to impose a monolithic approach to the social-scientific study of the New Testament, Horrell 
simply offers an alternative to the use of models and suggests that New Testament scholars need to 
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theory of structuration developed by sociologist Anthony Giddens, Horrell explores the 
social ethos of Paul's letters to Corinth, and that of the later 1 Clement, seeking to 
determine whether or not their authors express symbolic orders which are ideological, 
i.e., whether they provide resources which enable dominant groups to present their own 
sectional interests as universal ones, portraying such domination as an inevitable element 
of social reality. This ideological criticism is not itself obviously relevant to the study of 
conversion. Yet as Horrell stresses, structuration is a general social theory which might 
be put to various other uses. 102 There are important elements of structuration theory 
which make it an extremely suitable theoretical resource for the study of conversion. 
1.4.2.1 Alternatives to Structuration Theory 
However, my selection of structuration theory is not based solely on its 
own merits. For a study of conversion, it is vital that the theoretical resources employed 
offer an adequate account of social change, and the alternatives to structuration theory 
struggle to do so. Functionalism, the favoured resource of Meeks and Theissen, "adopts 
an essentially static view of society. "103 Social activity is understood as fulfilling a 
function, often satisfying a need, in the setting in which it arose. This allows us to view 
societies as functioning wholes, but obscures the fact that the consequences of activity 
become the conditions on which subsequent activity is based. The ongoing character of 
social life is lost. To ask how various aspects of social activity functioned within the 
early churches can be fascinating and instructive, but can tell us relatively little about the 
processes by which they came to exist. Where the early churches are presupposed as the 
context within which social activity fulfils a function, it is precisely their character as 
communities of converts which is relegated to the background. 104 
sharpen and refine their understanding of what constitutes a social-scientific model. I can find no 
suggestion in Horrell's work that such models cannot be usefully employed in New Testament study. 
102Horrell (1996), p.53. 
103Horrell (1996), p.37 
104Theissen (ET 1982), pp.27-67 provides a clear example of this in his essay on legitimation and 
subsistence. In suggesting that there was conflict between itinerant charismatics and community 
organisers, his focus is not primarily on the relative effectiveness, in various contexts, of these lifestyles 
in winning converts, i.e., in creating commnnities. Although this is discussed, Theissen's main emphasis 
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Similarly, the valuable work of Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann in 
the sociology of knowledge, while brilliantly describing the way in which symbolic 
universes are constructed and maintained, pays insufficient attention to social change. 
This deficiency stems not so much from an inherent failure in theory as from what might 
be termed a lack of a sense of history. Thus, while concluding that the proper object of 
sociological enquiry "is society as part of a human world, made by men, inhabited by 
men, and, in tum, making men, in an ongoing historical process," 105 Berger and 
Luckmann's work offers no convincing description of the ongoing historical process 
itself Attention is drawn to the construction of symbolic universes, the various means by 
which they are granted an aura of objective reality, and so to their moulding of human 
beings as social products, but, having shown how society acts back upon its human 
producers, little space is devoted to exploring how they in tum act to modify it. This 
emphasis "obscures the extent to which social order is continually reproduced only in and 
through the activities of human subjects, and hence neglects the important relationship 
between reproduction and transformation. "106 Berger and Luckmann's theory lacks a 
convincing account of how social change is generated. In relation to conversion, this 
difficulty was noted more than twenty years ago by Brian Taylor: "It is difficult to see 
how a Bergerian approach to religious knowledge can account at all for the initial 
acquisition or transference of religious and non-religious plausibility structures. "107 
Similar problems beset approaches based upon 'Mediterranean 
anthropology'. One might agree in broad terms with the hypothesis that "first century 
falls instead upon the function of these different lifestyles within the church. They provide competing 
modes of legitimation for the ministries of those adopting them. 
105Berger and Luckmann (1967), p.21l. 
106Horrell (1996), p.4l. See also Horrell (1993). While entirely agreeing with Horrell's point, I am not 
sure that his tendency to express it in the form of ideological criticism is helpful. Berger and Luckmann 
could surely argue that in drawing attention to the social construction of reality they also, by implication, 
expose the fact that sectional interests can be made to masquerade as universal ones. 
107Taylor (1976), p.13. His italics. By this comment he means that while Berger and Luckmann's work 
demonstrates that all human beings live within, and contribute to, social constructions of reality, they 
provide no account of how individuals and groups come to dwell within one symbolic universe rather 
than another. 
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Mediterranean persons were strongly group-embedded, collectivist persons ... They were 
attuned to the values, attitudes, and beliefs of their in-group, with which they shared a 
common fate due to generation and geography. "108 First century Graeco-Roman society 
was clearly much less individualistic than the modem West. However, what is not so 
clear is how, given such a society, new groups like the church managed to gain a 
hearing. 109 How did collectivist persons come to join a new group, membership of which 
entailed a violation of expectations held by groups in which such persons were already 
embedded? Indeed, how is conversion possible in "a social system that downgraded 
personal 'change' as ancient Mediterranean society did?"110 Interestingly, Segal attributes 
the possibility of conversion and of sectarian commitment in the first century to the 
existence within Hellenistic society of individual religious choice. III On this account it is 
the very existence of a degree of individual choice which fosters deep group 
commitment. Whether or not Segal's proposal is correct, it serves to illustrate the extent 
to which 'Mediterranean anthropology' simplifies the relationship between individuals and 
groups and omits to account for social change. When studying conversion to a new 
religious movement, this is, as with functionalism and the sociology of knowledge, 
something of a handicap. 
l08Malina and Neyrey (1996), pp.16-17. 
l09Not clear either is the degree to which anthropological studies of peasant societies in the modern 
Mediterranean provide genuinely close parallels to first century Mediterranean society in general, or to 
particular expressions of it. I share the doubts expressed by Meggitt (1998b). Meggitt points to the work 
of Perkins (1995), who argues that Graeco-Roman culture possessed a strong and developing sense of 
the self. In relation to Mediterranean anthropology, the comment of Rohrbaugh (1996), p.2 is revealing: 
"no biblical writer had modern Americans in mind when he wrote ... all too few Americans have ancient 
Palestinian peasants in mind when they read the Bible." However justified the broad point that reading 
the Bible is always a cross-cultural exercise, it remains the case that neither Paul nor his converts were 
Palestinian peasants. 
lloMalina and Neyrey (1996), p.54. This observation is made in the course of a discussion of the means 
by which Paul, in Phil. 3: 2-11, provides the necessary justification for his own culturally suspect 
abandonment of ancestral heritage. The claim that Paul did so by implying that he was imitating and 
sharing Christ's abandonment of the honour that was his by right (phil. 2) is itself plausible, but does 
little to explain how, in a society where great importance was attached to the maintenance of honour, 
such a counter-cultural piece of self-justification could itself be credible. 
11lSegai (1990), pp.30-33. Even if one disputes this and suggests instead that it was typical for kin and 
household groups to make collective decisions to convert at the behest of their dominant male, one still 
needs to account for such decisions. Even group leaders are 'group-embedded' and might therefore 
normally be expected to conform to pre-existing group expectations. 
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1.4.2.2 Structuration Theory: Reproduction and Transformation 
In contrast to these essentially static pictures of society, structuration 
theory attempts to provide an account of human social life which encompasses both 
continuity and change. As Giddens states, his theory "might accurately be described as an 
extended reflection upon a celebrated and oft quoted phrase in Marx. Marx comments 
that 'Men (let us immediately say human beings) make history, but not in circumstances 
of their own choosing. "'112 This means that instead of concentrating primarily upon one 
or the other, any successful social theory must overcome the dualisms of agency and 
social structure, of human freedom and external constraint, of change and continuity, so 
transforming them into dualities. In other words, Giddens wishes not only to find a way 
to acknowledge the force of each of Marx's twin insights, but to practise them 
sociologically. He pursues this goal by means of drawing a distinction between social 
structures and social systems, terms which others have often regarded as 
interchangeable. For Giddens, social systems are composed of repeated social practices 
strung across varying spans of time and space, while social structures form the means by 
which these systems are organised into societal totalities. Social structures can fulfil this 
organising role because they are the rules and resources of social life which are drawn 
upon by individuals in every social situation. They are the means by which we know how 
to behave, the key to social competence. As such they have no presence in time-space 
apart from their instantiation in social practices. This 'virtual reality' means that social 
structures are reproduced in social practices and simultaneously laid open to 
transformation. On the one hand social structures account for the continuities displayed 
within human social life (reproduction), on the other they are themselves changed by that 
life (transformation). 113 
112Giddens (1984), p.xxi. I therefore find incomprehensible the comment of Esler (1998), p.258 that 
"Horrell's own view rests on a presupposition concerning human behaviour which is itself biased in 
favour of maximising individuals' freedom and power." 
I13For the purposes of analysis, Giddens divides social structures into three types: structures of 
signification, of domination, and of legitimation. These three types of social structure and their complex 
relationship to each other are not matters pursued in this thesis. Those interested to explore further 
should consult Giddens (1984), pp.28-34. 
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To illustrate this theory, Giddens employs the analogy of language. 114 
"When I utter a sentence I draw upon various syntactical rules ... These structural 
features of the language are the medium whereby I generate the utterance. But in 
producing a syntactically correct utterance I simultaneously contribute to the 
reproduction of the language as a whole. This view rejects the identification of structure 
with constraint: structure is both enabling and constraining. "115 Like the rules and 
resources of social life, syntactical rules both make meaningful communication possible 
and define or limit it, but themselves have no existence apart from the language. Further, 
again like language, the rules and resources of social life change through use. "Every act 
which contributes to the reproduction of a structure is also an act of production, a novel 
enterprise, and as such may initiate change by altering that structure at the same time as 
it reproduces it - as the meanings of words change in and through their use. "116 Thus, the 
possibility of transformation is inherent in every act of reproduction. 117 This double focus 
on reproduction and transformation is extremely helpful for a study of conversion. The 
emphasis on the latter makes it possible to grant full weight to the individual 
transformation involved in conversion, including the degree to which converts are active. 
Yet the equal emphasis on the former means that this can be done without lapsing into 
the view that human actions are essentially voluntary. If conversion experiences and 
conversion accounts change the rules and resources ( structures) of social life, they do so 
from within. It is a basic error to "extricate human action from the contextuality of time-
114It should be noted that this is an analogy only. See my own comment above, p.l9 n.67. Giddens 
(1984), p.24 makes clear the limits of the analogy; "When I produce a grammatical utterance, I draw 
upon the same syntactical rules as those that utterance helps to produce. But I speak the 'same' language 
as the other speakers in my language community; we all share the same rules and linguistic practices, 
give or take a range of relatively minor variations. Such is not necessarily the case with the structural 
properties of social systems in general. " 
115Giddens (1982), p.37. Also quoted by Horrell (1996), pp.47-48. 
116Giddens (1976), p.ll8. Also quoted by Horrell (1996), p.49. 
1170ne should note that this balance between reproduction and transformation serves to make clear the 
historical nature of sociology as a discipline. That the two occur simultaneously makes the location of 
social practices in time-space crucial to their analysis. 
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space. Human action occurs as a duree, a continuous flow of conduct, as does 
cognition. "118 
1.4.2.3 Structuration Theory: Practical Consciousness 
Giddens explains the way in which rules and resources structure the 
ongoing flow of social life using the concept of practical consciousness. In most social 
interactions, the humans involved share a huge amount of mutual knowledge, much of it 
concerning the 'rules' and 'resources' (social structures) upon which they have learnt to 
draw in maintaining appropriate and competent behaviour in whichever particular 
context they are located. Most of the time, this knowledge is purely implicit, and people 
are unaware of it unless questioned about it. This is rare, since such questions are usually 
provoked only by a lapse or fracture in competency. Human beings know how to behave, 
but they only focus on that fact when an individual behaves in a way which demonstrates 
that they do not share such knowledge. Put succinctly, if a little crudely, Giddens' point 
is that most of the time human beings operate on a sort of social auto-pilot. It is this 
auto-pilot which he terms practical consciousness. 
Practical consciousness works by the monitoring of conduct. Lapses of 
competence are noticed. Yet, the fact that awareness of the 'rules' and 'resources' 
(structures) of social life usually only surfaces when provoked by such lapses, points to 
the particular character of the monitoring of conduct which they entail. In the following 
quotation, the key concept is that of 'reflexivity', a term by which Giddens appears to 
intend something of a synthesis between the grammatical term implying the action of a 
subject upon itself, and the automatic quality of conduct implied by the phrase 'reflex 
action': 
"Human social activities ... are recursive .. .It is the specifically reflexive form of the 
knowledgeability of human agents that is most deeply involved in the recursive 
118Giddens (1984), p.3. 
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ordering of social practices. Continuity of practices presumes reflexivity, but 
reflexivity in turn is possible only because of the continuity of practices that makes 
them distinctively the same across space and time. 'Reflexivity' hence should be 
understood not merely as 'self-consciousness' but as the monitored character of the 
ongoing flow of social life ....... Purposive life is not composed of an aggregate or 
series of separate intentions, reasons and motives. Thus it is useful to speak of 
reflexivity as grounded in the continuous monitoring of action which human beings 
display and expect others to display. "119 
On the one hand, the reflexive monitoring of conduct is something 
which human beings do to themselves but, on the other, it is not self-conscious. It is not 
formulated mentally into definite separate intentions, reasons, motives etc. 
This largely implicit nature means that practical consciousness occupies 
a position between that of discursive consciousness and the unconscious. "The vast bulk 
of ... the mutual knowledge incorporated in encounters, is not directly accessible to the 
consciousness of the actors. Most such knowledge is practical in character: it is inherent 
in the ability to 'go on' with the routines of social life. The line between discursive and 
practical consciousness is fluctuating and permeable, both in the experience of the 
individual agent and as regards comparisons between actors in different contexts of 
social activity. There is no bar between these, however, as there is between the 
unconscious and discursive consciousness. "120 Thus, human beings exhibit discursive 
consciousness, practical consciousness, and the unconscious; and it is the second of these 
three, practical consciousness, which is especially crucial to social life. It is practical 
consciousness which grants social life its repetitious character, and permits the 
development of social systems (repeated social practices strung across varying spans of 
space and time). 
119Giddens (1984), pp. 2-3. 
120Giddens (1984), p. 4. 
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1.4.2.4 The Potential Benefits of Structuration Theory 
F or the student of conversion, the value of the concept of practical 
consciousness is that it allows us to register the communal dimension of conversion, 
especially in its impact on behaviour through the repeated social practices established by 
communities. Conversion means not just that there are many new things to be learnt at 
the level of discursive consciousness, but also a new set of implicit rules and resources 
( structures) to be acquired shaping appropriate and competent conduct in a host of 
contexts. In conversion, perhaps to a greater degree than in many other forms of social 
activity, these social structures are laid open to transformation. Yet, it must be 
remembered, this does not eliminate their reproduction for, without an element of 
reproduction, social activity could not be interpreted. The recursive nature of social life 
is essential to human ability to make sense of it. The way is therefore open to an 
exploration of conversion which operates partially in terms of a dialectic between 
reproduction and transformation. In relation to Paul's own understanding of conversion 
we shall ask which areas of his converts' practical consciousness he expects to have been 
transformed by conversion? Are these the same or different with regard to Gentiles and 
Jews? In relation to the Corinthians' understanding of conversion similar questions are 
prompted. Do Paul's expectations as to the impact of conversion upon practical 
consciousness conform to that which we can deduce about those of the Corinthians? Are 
the transformations of practical consciousness which they desired, and experienced, more 
or less radical than those desired by Paul? If there are differences, which factors in the 
Corinthians' cultural context might be influencing them? 
In what follows, I attempt to use such questions with lightness of 
touch, in line with Giddens' own desire that "the concepts of structuration theory, as with 
any competing theoretical perspective, should for many research purposes be regarded as 
sensitising devices, nothing more. That is, they may be useful for thinking about research 
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problems and the interpretation of research results. "121 Nevertheless, sensitisation is a not 
insignificant function, particularly in relation to a project where one of the lessons of 
other studies is that there is a considerable danger of unduly neglecting either the activity 
of the individual or the role of the community. By successfully conceptualising human 
agency, and yet, through the concepts of practical consciousness and social structures, 
embedding that agency in the ongoing flow of social life, structuration theory inevitably 
directs attention to both. The individual acts but, in doing so, is always both enabled and 
restrained by the existing rules and resources of social life. 
Finally, I hope that structuration theory, itself so concerned to turn 
dualisms into dualities, will assist me to do something similar. In his discussion of social-
scientific approaches to New Testament study, Horrell cites Giddens, among others, in 
support of the view that there are no legitimate methodological distinctions between 
sociology and history.122 In contrast, John Elliott's discussion of the same subject is 
largely organised around sharp distinctions between historical and social-scientific 
criticism. One of the distinctions he draws is that whereas the former deals with "religion, 
theology as phenomenon distinct from politics and kinship, "123 the latter deals with 
"relations of beliefs to social system (ideology); embeddedness of beliefs in politics and 
kinship."124 While this is a broadly accurate description of what has actually happened 
within New Testament study, I consider the distinction a false one. It is a cause for regret 
that so many studies can be neatly categorised as either concerned with Pauline theology 
or with the social life of his communities. My hope is that this thesis will not lend itself to 
such easy classification. In Paul's letters we find a passionate concern for the relationship 
between human beings and God. This passion is such that, even when asking questions 
which are of themselves perfectly legitimate, to consistently interpret the evidence 
121Giddens (1984), pp.326-27. Also quoted by Horrell (1996), p.45. Giddens continues: "But to suppose 
that being theoretically informed - which it is the business of everyone working in the social sciences to 
be in some degree - means always operating with a welter of abstract concepts is as mischievous a 
doctrine as one which suggests that we can get along very well without ever using such concepts at all." 
122Horrell (1996), pp.26-31. 
123Elliott, J. (1995), p.l 09. 
124ibid. 
40 
offered by his letters without reference to it is ultimately an act of distortion. Yet equally, 
we also find no evidence that this passion exists independently of social life in general, or 
that of the early Christian communities in particular. The one is bound up with the other, 
and, however inadequately, I wish to express that intimate connection. Theological 
approaches to Paul can also be sociological and vice versa. 
PART 2 
PAUL'S UNDERSTANDING OF CONVERSION 
2 
Conversion and Soteriology 
2.1 Dominant Trends in the Analysis of Paul's Soteriology 
Anyone now engaged in a study of Pauline soteriology works in the 
aftermath of a revolution. In the last twenty years the previously dominant view, that 
Paul stressed faith in Christ in opposition to the emphasis of Judaism on salvation by 
works, has been overturned. The driving force behind this revolution was not so much a 
re-interpretation of Paul's letters, as the recognition that to describe first century Judaism 
as simply teaching salvation by self-satisfied human effort is a distortion. 1 Completely 
discredited is Bultmann's depiction of a Judaism characterised by "the self-reliant attitude 
of the man who puts his trust in his own strength and in that which is controllable by 
him. "2 In its place stands a Judaism fully aware that its covenant relationship with God is 
based upon divine grace, and that its obedience to God's law is simply a response to that 
grace. But how, then, are we to read Paul? Against what is he reacting when he contrasts 
his own teaching on faith with that of Jewish Christian opponents? 
E.P. Sanders, the principal agent of the revolution, offers a clear-cut 
explanation. "This is what Paul finds wrong in Judaism: it is not Christianity. "3 By this 
Sanders means that in accepting Christ as saviour, Paul has simply shifted to another 
pattern of religion. Paul rejects the law, the covenant and election as means of salvation 
not because it is impossible to observe the whole law, or because Jewish attempts to do 
so have been corrupted by self-righteousness, but on the grounds that if Judaism could 
1 A different reading of Paul then followed. This order of events is clearly demonstrated by even a 
cursory inspection of Paul and Palestinian Judaism. In this seminal work Sanders devotes the first 430 
pages to Judaism, but a mere 150 or so to Paul. The latter is read in light ofthe former. Dunn (1998), 
p.339 says of Sanders that "in the light of the new perspective on Second Temple Judaism he could only 
see an incoherent and inconsistent Paul. " 
2Bultmann (ET 1952), p.240. 
3Sanders (1977), p.552. His italics. 
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bring salvation then the sending of Christ was pointless. 4 It is what Paul now believes 
about Christ which determines his attitude towards Judaism, not dissatisfaction with 
Judaism which leads him towards Christ. Similarly, Paul's view that humanity needs 
Christ as its saviour follows from his belief that Christ is its saviour. "Paul's thought did 
not run from plight to solution, but from solution to plight ... the conclusion that all the 
world - both Jew and Greek - equally stands in need of a saviour springs from the prior 
conviction that God had provided such a saviour. If he did so it follows that such a 
saviour must have been needed. "5 Here lie the roots of Paul's portrayal of sin as the 
plight from which humanity required deliverance, and here too an indication of which 
elements of his theology are most important. Righteousness by faith, understood within 
the Lutheran tradition as central to Paul's thought, "serves primarily as a negative 
argument against keeping the law as sufficient or necessary for salvation. "6 It is also a 
reflex of the view that Christ is the saviour. Used by Paul as a transfer term, 
righteousness by faith sometimes bears a 'forensic' sense,7 but more frequently a 
participationist one. Thus, righteousness by faith "is not anyone doctrine, "8 and "Paul is 
not primarily concerned with the juristic categories, although he works with them. The 
real bite of his theology lies in the participatory categories. "9 
4Sanders (1983), p.27: "Paul has a view of God's intention which excludes righteousness by the law; his 
position is dogmatic ... God sent Christ; he did so in order to offer righteousness; this would have been 
pointless if righteousness were already available by the law (Gal. 2:21); the law was not given to bring 
righteousness (Gal. 3:21). That the positive statement about righteousness through Christ grounds the 
negative one about the law seems to be self-evident. " 
5Sanders (1977), p.443. His italics. 
6Sanders (1977), p.492. 
7Inverted commas are placed around the term 'forensic', both here and subsequently, in order to indicate 
when it is being used in line with Sanders' own somewhat unusual definition. Refusing to allow that 
Paul's notion of righteousness includes any element of imputation, Sanders takes forensic righteousness 
to denote the forgiveness of past transgressions through Christ's atoning sacrifice. This contrasts with 
Paul's participatory use of righteousness to denote deliverance from the power of sin. See Sanders 
(1977), p.492 n.57. Since 'forensic' is here primarily defined using the ideas offorgiveness and sacrifice, 
not every instance of 'forensic' righteousness identified by Sanders involves the use of legal imagery. See 
below, p.lll n.37. 
8Sanders (1977), p.492. 
9Sanders (1977), p.502. 
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Sanders' presentation of a Paul utterly clear in his insistence that 
salvation comes through Christ, but somewhat arbitrary in his application of this 
conviction to Judaism, has not found favour with all who accept his re-reading of Second 
Temple Judaism. An alternative understanding of Paul's soteriology has been developed 
by JD. G. Dunn, who rejects Sanders' view that righteousness by faith is primarily 
intended by Paul to mark, in various ways, the transfer from the plight of sinful humanity 
to its solution in Christ. Instead, Dunn argues that "the doctrine of justification by faith 
was formulated within and as a result of the early mission to Gentiles. It was a polemical 
doctrine, hammered out in the face of Jewish Christian objections to that mission as law-
free and not requiring circumcision. 'Justification by faith' was Paul's answer to the 
question: How is it that Gentiles can be equally acceptable to God as Jews?"10 Dunn thus 
restores the unity of justification by faith,l1 but without returning to the Reformation 
understanding of faith in Christ as standing in direct opposition to good works done as 
an attempt to gain or achieve righteousness. 
Paul's phrase, 'the works of the law,' does refer to all that the law 
requires, but in a context like the Gentile mission where the relationship of Israel to other 
nations was at stake, some issues were more sensitive than others. Dunn identifies 
circumcision, food laws and Sabbath observance as key identity markers which Jews 
understood as demonstrating their separation from the nations and their loyalty to the 
covenant. 12 By arguing that Gentiles could be acceptable to God simply through faith in 
Christ without performing such works of the law, Paul challenges central aspects of 
Jewish identity and finds fault with contemporary Judaism on grounds other simply than 
its failure to be Christianity. For Paul, his Jewish Christian opponents' affirmation of 
justification by works "is tantamount to saying 'God is God of Jews only."'13 Judaism has 
l°Dunn (1998), p.340. 
11ibid. Dunn here repeatedly speaks of justification by faith as a doctrine. 
12See Dunn (1998), pp.354-66. 
13Dunn (1998), p.363. 
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gone astray through an ethnocentric identification of righteousness with Jewish identity, 
and "the 'works' which Paul consistently warns against were, in his view, Israel's 
misunderstandings of what her covenant law required ... furthermore, that 
misunderstanding meant a misunderstanding of God and God's promised (covenanted) 
intention to bless also the nations. "14 Rather than, as in Sanders' reading, rejecting the 
covenant as a means of salvation, Dunn's Paul is the one who understands the covenant 
and gives it expression. IS Sanders draws the sting of Paul's criticism of Judaism by 
asserting the discontinuity between Paul and Israel's heritage (Paul has switched to a 
different pattern of religion); Dunn chooses instead to emphasise continuity between the 
two, and in doing so reinstates the force of the criticism, although aiming it against the 
misdirection of Judaism rather than against Judaism per se. 
Underlying both these readings of Paul lies the earlier work of Krister 
Stendahl, who made the crucial exegetical point that there was little evidence on which 
to base the long cherished assumption that the pre-Christian Paul had struggled with a 
guilty conscience. Far from being introspective, "Paul was equipped with what in our 
eyes must be called a rather 'robust' conscience. In Phil. 3 Paul speaks most fully about 
his life before his Christian calling, and there is no indication that he had any difficulty in 
fulfilling the law. "16 Stendahl thus provided the basis upon which Sanders was able to 
argue that Paul worked from solution to plight, since Paul himself had experienced Christ 
as solution before he had ever recognised his plight. Further, Stendahl emphasised the 
continuity between Paul and Israel's heritage by speaking of Paul not as a convert, but as 
one who had been called to be an apostle. He also insisted that "justification by faith was 
hammered out by Paul for the very specific and limited purpose of defending the rights of 
14Dunn (1998), p.366. 
15This remains a difference between them although, in defining Paul's grounds for rejecting Judaism, 
Sanders (1983), p.47 moved closer to Dunn: "What is wrong with the law, and thus with Judaism, is that 
it does not provide for God's ultimate purpose, that of saving the entire world through faith in Christ, 
and without the privilege accorded to Jews through the promises, the covenants, and the law. " 
16Stendahl (1976, original 1963), p.80. 
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Gentile converts to be full and genuine heirs to the promises of God to Israel." 17 It is not 
difficult to see here an anticipation of several of Dunn's emphases. Yet Stendahl's Paul 
does not have a developed critique of Judaism. Justification by faith is an apologetic 
rather than a polemical doctrine. 18 Like Sanders, Stendahl refuses to reach judgements as 
to the superiority or inferiority of Paul or Judaism. 19 
Stendahl thus appears as a highly significant forerunner of the dramatic 
shift in the understanding of Paul's soteriology which followed the publication of 
Sanders' Paul and Palestinian Judaism. Much earlier still, but no less influential, were 
the works of William Wrede and Albert Schweitzer. As early as 1904, Wrede had 
asserted that "the soul-strivings of Luther have stood as a model for the portrait of 
Paul. "20 The apostle's teaching on justification by faith did not derive from his own 
religious experience but from two polemical purposes: "(1) the mission must be free from 
the burden of Jewish national custom; (2) the superiority of the Christian faith in 
redemption over Judaism must be assured. "21 These purposes apart, justification is not of 
central importance for Paul, and his soteriology should be understood primarily in terms 
of participation in the death of Christ and the indwelling of the Spirit.22 For Paul, faith is 
simply the means by which the individual appropriates what Christ has accomplished for 
humanity as a whole: "the history of salvation is the content of his faith. "23 Schweitzer 
disagrees with Wrede to the extent that he does not regard the practicalities of mission as 
having a significant impact upon Paul. Instead, Paul rejects the law because he, unlike 
others, thinks through systematically the relationship between Christ's death and his 
17Stendahl (1976), p.2. 
18See Stendahl (1976), p.130. At this point Dunn's debt is not to Stendahl, but rather to F.C. Baur, who 
had emphasised that the target of the formulation justification by faith was the restriction of God's 
blessing to Jews. See Dunn (1998), pp.339-40, and Baur (ET 1875) Vol.II, chapters 1-3. 
19See Sanders (1977), p.552 and Stendahl (1976), p.4 who reads Romans 9-11 as "an affirmation of a 
God-willed coexistence between Judaism and Christianity in which the missionary urge to convert Israel 
is held in check. " 
20Wrede (ET 1907), p.146. 
21Wrede (ET 1907), p.I27. 
22See Wrede (ET 1907), pp.l02-09. 
23Wrede (ET 1907), p.1l5. 
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typically Jewish eschatology. Now that the new age has dawned the law is redundant, for 
those who die with Christ also die to the law. This means that there is no need to root 
Paul's soteriology in his own experience,24 and that at the heart of his thought lies the 
mystical doctrine of being-in-Christ. Righteousness by faith appears only when Paul is 
disputing with those who believe in a righteousness by the law, and he does not derive 
his ethics from it. "The doctrine of righteousness by faith is therefore a subsidiary crater, 
which has formed within the rim of the main crater - the mystical doctrine of redemption 
through the being-in-Christ. "25 
Between all of the scholars discussed above there are significant 
differences of opinion. Yet their views on Paul contain several common features which 
make it possible to speak of a constellation of readings. These common features are: 
(i) Although the particular terminology is that of Sanders, all would 
agree that Paul worked from solution to plight. His theology of sin is not rooted in his 
own conversion experience, nor his insistence on justification by faith. Indeed, Paul's 
experience holds little significance for his theology in general. 26 
(ii) In negative terms, all are agreed as to what is not the central theme 
in Paul's theology. The greatest degree of emphasis is placed either on participation in 
Christ, or on salvation history (the inclusion of the Gentiles in God's people), but not on 
forensic terminology. Even if the importance of justification by faith is maintained, it is 
defined in other ways. Paul uses legal imagery, but it is not of crucial importance to him. 
24Schweitzer (ET 1912), p.105: "How do we know that Paul when he was still a persecutor ofthe 
Christians was suffering inward distress from his experiences of the powerlessness of the law?" 
25Schweitzer (ET 1931), p.225. 
26 A partial exception here is Dunn who, although he regards justification by faith as a doctrine 
formulated primarily as a result of the early mission to the Gentiles and not as a result of Paul's 
experience, does acknowledge that Paul's attacks on Jewish ethnocentrism reverse his earlier zeal to 
maintain the boundaries ofIsrae1. See Dunn (1998), pp.346-54. 
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(iii) Although the significance of Paul's gospel for the individual is 
acknowledged, this is a subsidiary level of Paul's thought. In contrast to Bultmann's 
concentration on the revision of the individual's existential self-understanding of his or 
her position before God, it is the communal and/or cosmic levels of Paul's thought which 
receive emphasis. 27 
2.2 Critical Issues and Questions 
That the 'new' interpretation of Paul should turn out to have 
antecedents in such venerable works as those of Wrede and Schweitzer reinforces a point 
already made above. The now dominant readings of Paul stem not in the first instance 
from a re-interpretation of Paul's letters, but from a re-interpretation of Second Temple 
Judaism in the light of which Paul is then read. 28 It is this re-interpretation of Judaism 
which renders plausible readings of Paul which were once those of a decided minority. 29 
A central issue for the understanding of Paul's soteriology is therefore whether this re-
interpretation of Judaism is credible. Here I am in substantial agreement with Stephen 
Westerholm. In Israel's Law and the Church's Faith, Westerholm finds Sanders' account 
of Judaism only partially convincing. Although Judaism acknowledges and even 
emphasises covenant grace, "observance of the law may be regarded as Israel's path to 
life. "30 Paul himself agrees that were it possible to do so, the law promises life to those 
who observe its commands, and "if Paul is wrong in considering the law a path to 
27Here Kasemann was the agent of change, challenging Bultmann's emphasis on anthropology and 
asserting (ET 1971), p.23 that "neither the exegetical nor the theological findings allow what the apostle 
calls the universe to be reduced to the world of men." Sanders (1977), p.547 theoretically grants equal 
significance to both the individual and the social levels of analysis: "both Judaism and Paul take full 
account of the individual and the group" (his italics). However, Sanders' own lack of interest in 
exploring Paul's individual eA~rience, and his insistence, pp.522-23, that what Paul meant by 
participation in Christ is beyond our grasp, has helped to direct subsequent research away from the 
individual level. 
28See above, p.41 n.1 
29Sanders (1977), p.434: "Schweitzer has been ignored in much of German Protestant scholarship, 
which constitutes the most influential single body of scholarship on Paul." Sanders makes full 
acknowledgement of his own debts to Schweitzer. 
30Westerholm (1988), p.142. 
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salvation, it is an error he shares with Leviticus, Deuteronomy and Ezekiel. "31 The 
fundamental disagreement between Paul and Judaism is not that he stresses faith and 
grace whereas Judaism excludes these in favour of works, but that Judaism has not 
despaired of human capacity to respond to God's grace by obeying the law. Paul has 
done so, and he therefore "attributes salvation to divine grace to the exclusion of any 
role by human works in a way which is not typical of Judaism. And the tenet that 
justification is by faith alone is both necessary to Paul and pointless from the perspective 
of Judaism. "32 
On this reading Paul does, as in Lutheran interpretations, contrast 
salvation by human works with salvation by faith alone, the latter providing the answer 
to the problem of sin. Yet Judaism is not caricatured as a religion of work-righteousness. 
"The methodological error has often been committed in the past of concluding that, since 
Paul contrasts grace and works and argues for salvation by grace, his opponents (and 
ultimately, Judaism) must have worked with the same distinction but argued for salvation 
by works. Clearly this distorts Judaism, which never thought that divine grace was 
incompatible with divine requirements. "33 The opposition between faith and works is 
Paul's own insight which "takes as its starting-point faith in a crucified messiah. The 
evidence of the epistles does not support the view that Paul, before his encounter with 
the risen Christ, was tormented by an inability to keep the law. "34 Westerholm thus 
recognises that Paul works from solution to plight, but apparently does not find it 
31Westerholm (1988), p.147. See Lev. 18:5; Deut. 4:1, 5:33, 6:24-25, 8:1, 30:15-18; Ezek. 18:19,20:11; 
Neh.9:29. 
32Westerholm (1988), p.142. For similar positions see Riches (1993), pp.136-38; Segal (1990), pp.125-
33; Seifrid (1992), chapter 2. 
33Westerholm (1988), p.149. For Raisanen (l987a), p.200 this is an acceptable account of Paul, but 
would remain something of a caricature of Judaism: "Apparently Paul misconstrues Jewish 'soteriology', 
ignoring the pattern of gratuity on which it was based as well as the role accorded to man's repentance." 
But this implies that (i) soteriologies cannot be mixed, and that (ii) grace is self-evidently superior to 
works. See James 2:14-26 for a soteriology which quite clearly combines grace and works, and Wrede 
(ET 1907), pp.129-30 for the suggestion that works are morally superior to grace. Where Westerholm 
and Raisanen would agree is in regarding Sanders' account of Judaism and the content of Paul's letters 
as incompatible. 
34Westerholm (1988), p.220. 
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necessary to draw from this Sanders' conclusion that Paul has no critique of Judaism 
beyond its failure to be Christianity. What Westerholm does not do is offer any 
explanation as to the origin of Paul's critique. If Paul did move from solution to plight, 
then how did he arrive at his opposition between faith and works? Further, although his 
views on justification and grace might be thought to imply the centrality of forensic 
categories for Paul, Westerholm does not discuss this, or the relationship between these 
categories and those of participation in Christ and salvation history. Similarly, while 
Westerholm's position might be thought to imply that questions of individual salvation 
are vital to Paul, this and its implications for the communal and cosmic levels of Paul's 
thought are not discussed. 35 
In the following exploration of Paul's understanding of conversion, I 
attempt to support Westerholm's general position by exploring these under-discussed 
areas in his own work. I have the following questions particularly in mind: 
(i) If Paul does work from solution to plight, and yet his theology of 
sin is not to be understood merely as a reflex of his faith in Christ as saviour, what is its 
origin? Can either it, or Paul's insistence on justification by faith, still be attributed to the 
influence of his conversion experience? 
(ii) Are forensic categories really of little importance to Paul? Must the 
dominant emphasis in recent scholarship on participation in Christ, and/or the inclusion 
of the Gentiles in the people of God, be at the expense of the forensic? 
(iii) Does Paul share the modern perception that to place emphasis on 
certain levels of analysis is to remove it from others? Does it follow that if the communal 
35The discussion of Romans in Westerholm (1997) seems in many places to imply the inter-
connectedness of all three levels in Paul's thought, but the point is never explicitly made. 
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and cosmic levels of his thought were important to Paul, the faith of the individual must 
have been less so? 
I believe that approaching these issues through an analysis of Paul's 
understanding of conversion offers a distinct advantage. For to one like Paul, who 
devoted his life to winning and sustaining converts, soteriology was not an abstract or 
theoretical issue. Conversion is, as it were, soteriology in action. By asking how he 
expected conversion to take place, and what he expected its consequences to be, 
concrete form is given to the contours of Paul's soteriology. Those elements which prove 
to be important answers to these questions are therefore also important elements in 
Paul's soteriology. To claim this is not to claim comprehensiveness. There are important 
elements in Paul's understanding of conversion and in his soteriology on which the 
following discussion does not comment. There is little on christology not because 
christology is unimportant, but because it is difficult to see how christology can account 
for that which is distinctive to Paul. The very controversy which Paul's views on 
conversion attracted in his own day illustrates the point, since many others who shared 
his faith in Christ came to different conclusions. Sanders' proposal, that Paul rejected the 
law simply because not to do so would render the coming of Christ unnecessary, lacks 
credibility precisely because many other Jewish Christians did not perceive the two as 
mutually exclusive. An explanation is still required of why Paul is different. Similarly, 
some of Paul's most striking images of conversion receive little attention. The 
participatory images of the new creation (K<X1Vr\ K'ticnC;),36 of being conformed to 
Christ (crUf...lf...l0P<P0c;), 37 of being transformed into his likeness (f...l£'t<Xf...lOp<pcocriC;), 38 of 
being joined to him (KOAAcico),39 and of being united with him (crUf...l<PUCO),40 are not 
discussed. This is not because they, or participation in Christ, are unimportant, although 
36Ga1. 6: 15, 2 Cor. 5: 17. 
37Rom. 8:29; Phil. 3:10, 3:2l. 
38Rom. 12:2, Phi1. 3:21 
3~om. 12:9,1 Cor. 6:17 
4oRom.6:5. 
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Paul does use these images relatively infrequently, but because their significance is not an 
issue at stake between myself and those scholars with whom I am in dialogue.41 I am not 
attempting to diminish the importance of participation in Christ. 
However, I am questioning some common assumptions as to the 
relationship between different elements in Paul's soteriology. In regard to the significance 
of Paul's own conversion I am testing the assumption, common since Stendahl, that if 
prior to his conversion Paul did have a robust conscience, and if he did therefore work 
from solution to plight, his experience cannot lie at the root of his theology of sin or his 
insistence on justification by faith. Does the latter really follow from the former? As for 
participation in Christ itself, I am testing the assumption that if it is accorded 
significance, then that accorded to forensic categories must diminish. While these two 
tracks are undoubtedly present in Paul's thought,42 does separating them and playing 
them off against each other or, indeed, against salvation history, assist us in our attempts 
to understand him?43 Here I pay some attention to the work of Ernst Kasemann, who 
instead attempts to allow the different elements of Paul's theology to interpret each 
other. 44 Can following this procedure help to produce credible readings of specific 
41For a discussion of this imagery see Segal (1990), pp.20-30, 58-71. 
42The identification of these two tracks dates back to 1853 and the work ofR.A. Lipsius. Schweitzer (ET 
1912), p.19: "Lipsius is the first to recognise the two trains of thought in Paulinism and to remark that 
one is based upon the juridical idea of justification, while the other has its starting-point in the 
conception of sanctification - of the real ethical new creation by the Spirit." 
43Kasemann (ET 1969), pp.I71-72: "He (paul) managed to combine present and future eschatology, 
'declare righteous' and 'make righteous', gift and service, freedom and obedience, forensic, sacramental 
and ethical approaches ... ifparticular aspects of the question are made into absolutes, as has frequently 
happened, the Pauline dialectic is destroyed." See also (ET 1971), pp.65-66: "It has always been a 
characteristic of Pauline interpretation in Germany ... to postulate alternatives which destroy the apostle's 
dialectical treatment of the facts. It is no comfort that in English-speaking countries something similar 
came about under different omens. There the church is not infrequently played off against the 
individual, sacrament against faith, liturgy against kerygma, ethics against eschatology, the gospels 
against Paul and, in the same way, salvation history against the doctrine of justification." 
44Way (1991), p.2IO: "This is a very unusual approach, and has not been widely or fully understood." 
Kasemann has sometimes been erroneously discussed and criticised as if he simply merges various terms 
and themes in Paul's thought, whereas what he actually seeks is a dialectic between them. From one side 
of the debate Seifrid (1992), p.45 feels that in interpreting justification by faith by participation in 
Christ, Kasemann unhelpfully renders the forensic elements subsidiary; while from the other, Sanders 
(1977), p.438 n.41 is naturally in sympathy with the attempt to interpret righteousness by faith using 
participatory concepts, but then cannot understand why Kasemann continues to attach such importance 
to justification. My own criticism of Kasemann relates not to this procedure, but to his assumption that 
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passages?45 For example, by juxtaposing terms and ideas suggestive of forensic 
justification with those suggestive of participation in Christ, does Paul himself allow the 
forensic and the participatory elements of his thought to interpret each other? Similarly, 
in relation to the different levels of Paul's thought, I am testing the assumption that a 
recognition of the importance of the cosmic and the communal implies a reduction in the 
significance of individual faith. Must one be played off against the other? Here lies one of 
the benefits of my use of structuration theory,46 for the concept of practical 
consciousness is a particularly appropriate analytical tool with which to pursue this 
question. Possessed by the individual, but shaped by shared understanding of what 
constitutes competent behaviour in myriad recursive social circumstances, practical 
consciousness privileges neither the individual nor the communal levels of analysis. In 
asking which elements of his converts' practical consciousness Paul expects to have been 
transformed by conversion, and in asking whether these expectations were the same with 
regard to both Jews and Gentiles, I am employing questions which sensitise one to 
evidence relating to both levels. 
My questioning of common assumptions in these three areas provides 
themes which run throughout part 2 of the thesis. Each is more prominent in some 
chapters than others, but none is irrelevant to any chapter. One chapter (3) is devoted to 
a survey of Paul's use of the group of cognate terms (Kcx,Aeco, KAll(n~, KATr[;6~) which 
conceive conversion as a divine calling. This is the vocabulary which Paul uses more 
frequently than almost any other to denote conversion.47 One of the key issues here is 
justification so interpreted forms the unifying centre of Paul's thought. I would prefer to speak of a 
number of central themes which Paul uses to interpret each other. 
45Way (1991), p.201 offers the criticism that Kasemann fails to provide detailed exegesis of specific 
passages in support of his claim that the righteousness of God is both gift and power. 
46For a discussion of structuration theory, see 1.4.2. It is also fair to note that the spirit of structuration 
theory has played a part in shaping the questions with which I approach Paul's soteriology. Just as 
structuration theory is concerned to tum dualisms into dualities (both agency and social structure, both 
human freedom and external constraint, both continuity and change), so I am concerned to ask whether, 
in terms of the importance accorded to them, we must choose either solution or plight, either forensic or 
participatory categories, either the individual or the communal level of analysis. 
47See below, p.54 n.2. 
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whether Paul describes the calling of all in the same way, and this helps to set the stage 
for the following two chapters, which discuss Gentile conversion (4) and Jewish 
conversion (5) respectively. Placed next to each other, these two discussions enable an 
assessment of the similarities and differences between what Paul has to say about Gentile 
and Jewish conversion. The chapter on Gentile conversion discusses selected passages 
from 1 Corinthians which reveal Paul's expectations as to how his converts in Corinth 
were converted, and as to the consequences of their being so. That on Jewish conversion 
explores passages from various of Paul's letters, and focuses on his self-understanding as 
a Jew who has come to believe in Christ, again asking what he understands about how 
his conversion took place, and what he understands about its consequences. 
3 
God's Converting Call: Paul's use OfK<lAEOO 
3.1 Introduction 
Paul rarely employs terms which could legitimately be translated into 
English using 'conversion' or a cognate term.l Indeed, he does not seem to distinguish 
between beginning the Christian life, remaining within it, and completing it, in quite the 
sharp manner which seems to be natural in our modern western setting. When describing 
Christian identity, he applies some terms to the past, present and future of people's 
Christian lives; others belong predominantly to one of these phases, but rarely exclusively 
so. It is therefore little surprise also to find that when referring to conversion, Paul uses a 
variety of terms to denote the beginning of the Christian life. He does not describe 
conversion in a single way. He does, however, use some terms to describe conversion 
more frequently than others, and one of the most frequently used is the group of cognate 
terms which conceive conversion as the receipt of a divine calling.2 Out of 27 
appearances, the verb K<lAEOO is used in the aorist tense 14 times,3 and in the perfect 
tense a further 3 times,4 when it denotes the present state of being called but does so on 
lThe English verb 'to convert' derives from the Latin convertere, the basic meaning of which is 'to turn 
around.' One could therefore use it to translate the Greek £1ttO"'tpE<j>c.o, 'to turn back to' or 'to turn 
towards', and perhaps in some cases ~£'t<X.VOEc.o, 'to change one's mind,' or 'to repent'. Paul never uses 
the latter to refer to anyone coming to be in Christ, and the former only twice. See Gaventa (1986b), 
p.40f. and 1 Thess. 1:9-10,2 Cor. 3:15-16. 
20ther major cognate groups are 1ttO"'t£uc.o (42 uses), 1tiO"'ttC; (86), 1ttO"'tOC; (21) and 8tK<X.lOc.o (25), 
OlK<X.toO"UVl1 (14), OlK<X.ic.oC; (2). Such frequent use means that, assessed as terms eA'Pressing Christian 
identity in general, either of these groups might be thought more important to Paul than K<X.A.Ec.o K'tA.. 
However, OtK<X.tOc.o is used to refer back to conversion less frequently than K<X.A.Ec.o, and while 
1tlO"'t£Uc.o is used to do so an identical number of times, this is a smaller proportion of its total number 
of uses than in the case of K<X.A.Ec.o. 15 of the 42 appearances of 1tlO"'t£Uc.o are in the aorist tense, and 2 
in the perfect, while in the case of OlK<X.tOc.o, 12 of the 25 appearances of the verb are aorist. Another 
verb which one might have expected to figure prominently with reference to conversion is O"qS~c.o, but 
out of 20 uses it occurs only twice in the aorist tense (Rom. 8:24, 1 Cor. 1:21), i.e., Paul does not often 
use it to refer to someone coming to be in Christ. 
3Rom. 8:30(2), Rom. 9:24, 1 Cor. 1:9, 1 Cor. 7:18, 1 Cor. 7:20, 1 Cor. 7:21, 1 Cor. 7:22(2), 1 Cor. 7:24, 
Gal. 1:6, Gal. 1:15, Gal. 5:13, 1 Thess. 4:7. 
41 Cor. 7: 15, 1 Cor. 7: 17, 1 Cor. 7: 18. 
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the basis of God's past action. 5 These 17 references back to the beginning of the 
Christian life make KCXAECO the only verb used by Paul which refers directly to 
conversion in a majority of cases. We therefore begin our attempt to probe Paul's 
understanding of conversion by examining this vocabulary of calling. 
As noted above, the verb KaAEco appears 27 times in the seven 
generally accepted letters of Paul, although in one instance (1 Cor. 10:27) it carries one 
of its most common meanings in ancient society, that of an invitation to a meal or a 
party, and this usage can be discarded from consideration. In addition to the remaining 
26 uses of the verb,6 the noun KAl1(:n~ appears 4 times,7 and the adjective KAl1't6~ 7 
times,8 thus giving a total of 37 occurrences of KaAEco K'tA. relevant to our 
investigation. There is a definite pattern to these occurrences, with 16 uses in 1 
Corinthians, 13 in Romans, 4 in Galatians, 3 in 1 Thessalonians, and 1 in Philippians. The 
concentration of 29 uses in 1 Corinthians and Romans is striking, and dictates that in 
what follows our attention is mainly directed at these two epistles. Given the very 
different themes addressed in these two epistles, this concentration seems significant in 
itself, indicating that Paul does not only use the concept of calling in relation to a single 
issue or aspect of church life. 9 
This breadth of usage raises the question of breadth of meaning. If it is 
true that in contemporary usage KaAEco bore two basic senses, one of which is 'name, 
designate, give a title to', and the other of which is 'summon, invite',lO then is it the case 
SOf the remaining 9 uses of the verb, 6 are in the present tense, and 3 in the future. However, all of the 
latter are scripture quotations, i.e., as far as Paul is concerned they all refer to what has now come to 
pass through his ministry. 
6Rom. 4:17, Rom. 8:30(2), Rom. 9:7, Rom. 9:12, Rom. 9:24, Rom. 9:25, Rom. 9:26,1 Cor. 1:9,1 Cor. 
7:15,1 Cor. 7:17,1 Cor. 7:18(2), 1 Cor. 7:20,1 Cor. 7:21,1 Cor. 7:22(2), 1 Cor. 7:24, 1 Cor. 15:9, Gal. 
1:6, Gal. 1:15, Gal. 5:8, Gal. 5:13, 1 Thess. 2:12,1 Thess. 4:7, 1 Thess. 5:24. 
7Rom. 11:29, 1 Cor. 1:26, 1 Cor. 7:20, Phil. 3:14. 
8Rom. 1:1, Rom. 1:6, Rom. 1:7, Rom. 8:28, 1 Cor. 1:1,1 Cor. 1:2, 1 Cor. 1:24. 
9In particular, Jew/Gentile questions and the issue of the law vs. faith in Christ dominate Romans, but 
this is not true of 1 Corinthians. Calling is not a concept which Paul only or predominantly employs 
when the integrity of his law-free Gentile mission is at stake. 
lOSee Klein (1984), p.53. 
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that Paul must primarily intend one or the other? Could his meaning be broader than 
either of these categories alone would allow? Taking my cue from structuration theory's 
emphasis that transformation is at hand in every act of reproduction, I am concerned to 
explore whether Paul's usage not only reflects previous and contemporary ones, but, in 
addition, develops the meaning of calling in distinctive ways. Once again drawing from 
structuration theory, I am also concerned to explore the potential impact of Paul's 
concept of calling upon the practical consciousness of his converts. He most frequently 
uses Kcx,AECO K'tA. with regard to status on being called, and with regard to the new 
role/identity created by that calling. 11 This is suggestive, for it may indicate that Paul's 
focus is on the before and after of calling, from what and to what, rather than on the 
event itself In terms of the general questions with which I approach the subject of 
conversion (1.4.1), this vocabulary is concerned less with how conversion takes place 
than with its consequences. For ifby calling them God changes who people are, granting 
them a new identity, then behavioural consequences may follow in many areas of life. An 
approach which seeks to discover the impact of calling upon practical consciousness is 
therefore one which offers a potentially close fit with the evidence available to us. It 
could offer little in terms of exploring the event itself, but it can help to analyse change, 
the calling from what and to what, with which Paul's use of Kcx,AECO K'tA. seems 
predominantly concerned. As Paul discusses his converts' calling in terms of changes to 
their identity, he provides raw materials with which they may construct a new set of 
implicit rules and resources governing appropriate and competent conduct in a host of 
contexts. 12 
11 See the classification of Paul's use of K<X.A.£W K'tA.. in Appendix 1. 
12It may sound odd to talk of the construction of practical consciousness having defined it as something 
implicit and reflexive. See 1.4.2.3. Yet it should be remembered that Giddens is careful to distinguish 
practical consciousness from the unconscious, while emphasising that the line between the two is 
fluctuating and permeable. See Giddens (1984), pp.2-4. Further, practical consciousness is as much 
subject to the dualities of continuity and change, and of agency and constraint, as any other feature of 
social life. This can be illustrated in the academic field by the number of scholars who now 
unhesitatingly use inclusive language but never did so twenty years ago. An aspect of their practical 
consciousness has been reconstructed. 
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Yet the all-embracing nature of practical consciousness, its reflexive 
monitoring across space and time of the ongoing flow of social life in all its forms, means 
that it can scarcely be addressed to the available evidence in the form of a single 
question. Similarly, the issue of meaning cannot be pursued in relation to narrowly 
linguistic criteria, but must be assessed in relation to the practical, theological and social 
issues raised by Paul's concept of calling.13 There is needed a range of more detailed 
questions with which to analyse the evidence, questions which will enable the building-up 
of conclusions regarding the broader concerns outlined above. I propose to employ the 
following seven questions: 14 
(i) What is revealed about God by the understanding that He is the one who calls? 
(ii) If God calls, is there an expected and matching human response? 
(iii) If through calling people God changes who they are, how is this change expressed? 
Does everyone who is called receive a role/task and, if so, what is it? 
(iv) Is this change limited to a task, or does it also confer a new identity in terms of the 
relationship between the person called and God, or between the person called and other 
human beings? 
(v) Is God's calling given primarily to individuals or to groups? 
(vi) How does being called affect ethnic status? 
(vii) How does being called affect social status? 
These questions are aimed at providing a rounded picture of the way in 
which Paul uses the concept of calling in relation to conversion. They include questions 
13Martin (1990), p.xvii. "If one wishes to talk about the meaning of early Christian language, one must 
talk about that language in the context of the Graeco-Roman city. Regardless of the origin of the 
language, one must explain how it worked among and for Greek-speaking Gentiles." 
14The questions loosely reflect the classification of Paul's use OfK<XAEOO K'tA. provided in Appendix 1. 
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which focus primarily on the new relationship with God established by conversion, but 
also ones which explore the social implications of that new relationship. New human 
relationships are also created by conversion, entailing both the disruption of existing 
social and communal patterns and the creation of new ones. In their turn, these bring 
with them new dilemmas and new answers as individuals and communities construct new 
rules and resources for living. With these concerns in mind I now preface a detailed 
examination of Paul's use of KaAEoo K'tA. with an exploration of comparable previous 
and contemporary usage. This comparative material is approached using the same seven 
questions as will be applied to Paul, and the intention is to provide a backdrop against 
which to situate Paul's own use of KaAEoo K'tA. This will enable an assessment to be 
made as to what is distinctive in Paul's use of the language of calling (3.4.1). 
3.2 Calling in Paul's World 
There can be no doubt that the principal background to Paul's use of 
the concept of calling is to be found in the Hebrew scriptures and, in terms of Jewish 
sources, it is natural that our emphasis should fall on the Septuagint. In terms of other 
surviving ancient Jewish texts Paul is unusual precisely in that he takes up and develops 
the language of calling. There is one other first century Jewish text, 4 Maccabees, which 
does use this vocabulary. However, this is a matter of only two occurrences and, rather 
than devote space to it here, we shall return to it later as a counterpoint to Paul's own 
usage (3.4.1). In terms of parallels in surviving Graeco-Roman texts, there are also very 
few authors who use the language of calling. Apart from isolated miscellaneous uses of 
KaAEoo, and despite some interesting other similarities between the Septuagint and 
Diogenes Laertius, the only significant parallel is provided by Epictetus the Stoic 
(c.50CE - 120CE), upon whom attention is therefore concentrated. 15 
151 am not aware of any others, having made a search which primarily examined the works of other 
Stoics. The fact that l(cx,AEOO is an extremely common verb capable of conveying a wide range of 
meanings precludes an exhaustive search of Greek literature. 
59 
3.2.1 Calling in the Septuagint 
Examining the occurrences of KaAEco in the Septuagint is not easy, 
since it is an extremely common verb and is employed in a wide variety of ways. 16 There 
are numerous occasions where KaAEco simply means a summons,17 and others when it 
refers to the naming of an object or person. 18 In terms of God having been said to call, 
here too there are a variety of uses. God can speak audibly (call out) to his servants, such 
as to Moses19 or to Samuel. 20 He can also be said to call events in the sense of summon 
them, for at 2 Kings 8: 1 God calls a famine upon the land. At Wisdom 11 :25 creation is 
spoken of as having been called into being by GOd,21 and this sense of the summoning of 
creation into existence is matched by the way that God is sometimes said to have called 
the stars by name, so displaying an intimate knowledge of what he has made.22 Yet none 
of these occurrences appear to be genuine forerunners of the way in which Paul uses 
KaAEco.23 If we are searching for cases which we might examine using the questions 
outlined above, then we are left with a comparatively small group of 19 Septuagintal 
uses, heavily concentrated in second/third Isaiah, from where 17 of them come.24 
In terms of their characterisation of God, these texts employ various 
themes. Mention is made that God is everlasting,25 and there are reminders of his past 
16KaAEOO appears 481 times in the Septuagint. There are no relevant uses of KAl101.C;, and all bar one of 
the relevant uses of KAl1't6C; occur in the formula KAl1'trl a:yta - see 3.3.4. The possible exception is at 
Zeph. 1:7, <'ht ll'tOt~aK£ KUPtoC; 'trlv 8ucrtav ainou, Kat TrrtaK£ 'tOVC; KAl1'tOVC; au'tou, 
although this may bear the restricted sense of an invitation to a single sacrificial meal. 
17E.g. 2 Sam. 1:15 where David summons a servant. 
18E.g. Lev. 13:45, which instructs that a leper shall be called unclean. 
19Exodus 3:4, 19:3,20. 
20rn 1 Sam. 3 KaAEoo is used eleven times to describe God speaking to Samuel. 
21God is told that Creation was KA118E.V uno crou. 
22E.g. Psalm 147:4 
23However, they are not entirely irrelevant. A passage like Wisdom 11 :25 is very different from Paul in 
the sense that he always speaks of God calling people. However, it remains relevant in that Paul can 
sometimes discuss God's call to human beings in ways that conceive of it as an act of creation. See Rom. 
4:17 and 3.3.1. 
24rs. 41:2,41:4,41:9,41:25,42:6,43:1,45:3,46:11,48:12, 48:15, 49:1, 49:6, 50:2, 51:2, 61:6, 65:12, 
66:4. The other two passages are Jer. 7: 13 and Hos. 1: 10. 
25rs. 41:4,48:12. 
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faithfulness to his people.26 However, one theme emerges more consistently than any 
other, namely that the God who calls is the creator God. Sometimes he is said to have 
created those whom he calls. At Is.46: 11 Cyrus is portrayed as the object of God's 
calling (KaAcOv), who says of the Persian king, £AciAllcra, Kat TlYCX:YOV, EK'ttcra 
Kat £1toillcra, Tlyayov au'tov, Kat Euc60cocra 'trlV 600v au'tou.27 At Is. 43: 1, 
where God encourages his people with the assurance that he has called Israel by name, 
the Lord is described as 6 1tot11cra~ crE 'IaKw(3, Kat 6 1tAcicra~ crE 'IcrparlA. At 
other times it is his creation of the world which is in view and, although it is not 
explicitly stated, the function of such references to God's creative power seems to be to 
provide a basis for trust in the promises now being made through the prophet. An 
assurance at Is. 48: 15 that the purpose of the calling of Cyrus is to benefit Israel is 
prefaced by a declaration from the Lord that" XEip !-lou £8E!-lEAicocrE 'trlV YllV, Kat 
" OE~tci !-lOU £cr'tEpecocrE 'tOV oupavov (Is. 48: 13).28 There is also some evidence 
that the act of calling itself could be thought of in terms of creation. Is. 51: 1-3 refers to 
the calling of Abraham, and God's honouring of his promise to multiply the patriarch, in 
order to assure readers that he will now honour his promises to restore Zion. Abraham is 
described as the rock which those who seek the Lord have hewn and Sarah as the quarry 
which they have dug. For Westermann, this mention of rock and quarry is an allusion to 
ancient myths concerning the birth of men and women from such materials. The point of 
such an allusion here is "to give Israel's descent from Abraham and Sarah the status of an 
act of creation. "29 
26Is.46:8-10. 
27 Cyrus is not named, but instead referred to as a bird from the east. There is general agreement 
amongst commentators as to the identification. See Knight (1984), p.l04; McKenzie (1968), p.87; 
Motyer (1993), p.370; North (1964), p.166; Westermann (ET 1969), p.185; Whybray (1975), p.1l7. 
28See also Is. 42:5-9 and Is. 45:7, where the identity ofthe creator and the God who calls Cyrus (45:4) is 
once again asserted. 
29Westermann (ET 1969), p.236. Knight (1984), p.149 disagrees, arguing that the rock is God, but 
allowing that when Abraham stood upon this rock, the power to become a rock for others was imputed to 
him. Knight's position is somewhat undermined by his acceptance that the quarry is a reference to Sarah 
and her barren womb, something which demands that the rock be identified with Abraham. Indeed, his 
position seems to have more to do with the exegesis ofMt. 16:18 than that ofIs. 51:1-3. 
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Yet creation is by no means the only context in which the concept of 
calling appears. As implied above with reference to Is. 42:8-9 and Is. 51:1-3, there is also 
much said of God's dealing with Israel within history. A prominent theme here is that 
God called, but his people did not respond. Is. 66:4 provides a typical example, with God 
rejecting his people on EKdAEcra a,)'tou~, Kat OUX, lmTtKo'Ucrdv !-lO'U, EAdAl1cra 
Kat OUK TlKo'Ucrav.30 In every instance of Israel failing to respond similar vocabulary is 
used. God's people are said simply not to have obeyed (unaKouco),31 or also not to 
have heard (cX.KOUCO, napaKouco).32 Yet there are hints that these breaches in the 
relationship between God and his people may not be permanent, and that Israel will not 
always be unresponsive. The mention of divorce between God and Israel in Is. 50: 1 is 
understood by commentators to refer not to a final split, but to a breach in relationship 
which left open the possibility of reconciliation. 33 Further, Hosea 1: 10 states that those 
who had been told that they were not God's people shall be called his sons, a promise 
which in its own context refers to a restoration of those lost to the people of God 
through the destruction of the northern kingdom of Israel. 34 It seems that God's people 
can refuse to respond to his call, but not forever. 
Such a conclusion is perhaps not all that surpnsmg gIven the 
covenantal framework of thought within which these texts were formed. Yet that 
framework itself renders all the more striking what is said about whom God has called 
and the impact that calling has on their identity, and/or the role/task it grants them. As 
30See also Is. 50:2, Is. 65:12, Jer. 7:13. 
311s. 50:2, Jer. 7:13. 
321s. 65:12, Is. 66:4. In fact the two concepts are quite closely related in the Septuagint. Kittel (1964), 
p.224: "The frequent use of Un<XKouew for ~~1!) in the LXX shows how strongly the idea of hearing is 
still present for the translator in the Gk." 
33Whybray (1975), p.149: "There is no divorce but only an informal separation or 'sending away', and 
consequently no hindrance to subsequent resumption of the marriage." See also Knight (1984), p.143; 
McKenzie (1968), p.1l2; Motyer (1993), p.397; North (1964), pp.98-99. Only Westermann (ET 1969), 
pp.223-24 seems to see the split as more final. 
34Paul puts this verse to rather different use in Rom. 9:25-26. Ziesler (1989), p.248: "In Hosea the words 
have to do with the lapse and return of the northern kingdom of Israel, but as Paul uses them they 
concern the incoming of Gentiles; unlike the Israelite northerners, they have never previously been 
God's people." 
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referred to several times previously, one of those said to have been called is Cyrus of 
Persia. 35 In addition to being described as called, he is spoken of as cino civa'toAcOv 
Du::alOcruvl1 (Is 41:2), and as 6 XPtcr'to~ !-lOU (Is. 45:1), a title previously used for 
pre-exilic Jerusalem rulers.36 At Is. 45:4 the Lord says to Cyrus, uEV£K£V 'tau natDO~ 
!-lou'IaKw\3, Kat ' IcrparlA 'tau EKA£K'tOU !-lOU, EYW KaAecrco cr£ 'tc9 6vo!-la'tt 
crou, Kat npocrDe~O!-lat cr£. God has granted Cyrus prodigious power in order to 
benefit his servant Israel,37 and, interestingly, servant (na1.~, DOUAO~) is a title never 
given to Cyrus, whose relationship with the Lord is less intimate.38 It is said quite plainly 
to Cyrus cru De OUK £yvco~ !-l£ (Is. 45:4b). God's calling gives Cyrus a new role, but it 
is one simply as an inadvertent agent of divine providence and of divine concern for 
IsraeP9 Cyrus is not aware that he has been called by Yahweh, his calling does not 
change his self-identity, he is not a convert. Although the terms applied to Cyrus are 
fulsome, perhaps even shockingly SO,40 his calling is to perform "a non-recurrent task in 
one particular set of circumstances. That is all he is anointed to do. "41 
If Cyrus' calling relates only to a task, the same cannot be said of that 
given to Israel. 42 Here the relationship with God is characterised in general terms, with 
35Is. 41:2, Is. 45:3-4, Is. 46:11, Is. 48:15. There is general agreement amongst commentators that in the 
MT there is also a reference to Cyrus and calling at Is. 41 :25. A literal rendering of the Hebrew would 
give the meaning 'he shall call on my name.' Westermann (ET 1969), p.87 points out that this is 
problematic, since Cyrus never was a worshipper of Yahweh. Perhaps for this reason the LXX opts to 
employ the third person plural future passive form of the verb - KA,llSrlO"ov't<xt 'tql 6v6f..L<X'tt f..L0u, thus 
shifting the reference from Cyrus to the inhabitants of the north and the east, and from calling upon God 
to being called by him. See also Knight (1984), p.4l. 
36E.g. Ps. 2:2, Ps. 17(18):50, 1 Kings 16:6. 
37The Septuagintal translators also introduce this idea at Is. 48:14 where Cyrus becomes the instrument 
of God's love for Israel. The MT says unambiguously that God has loved Cyrus. See Knight (1984), 
pp.1l9-20; McKenzie (1968), p.96; Motyer (1993), p.380; Westermann (ET 1969), p.20l. 
38Westermalffi (ET 1969), p.160: "While Deutero-Isaiah calls Cyrus Yahweh's anointed, he never calls 
him his servant, and this is simply because 'servant' implies a mutual relationship in which there is 
permanence. " 
39McKenzie (1968), p.28: "Cyrus will achieve something for which neither his own plans nor his 
resources are responsible. He will conquer as none of his predecessors have done, because it is necessary 
that he conquer the entire world known to the Israelites before Israel can be restored to its own land." 
40See Westermann (ET 1969), p.159. 
41Westermann (ET 1969), p.160. 
421s. 41:9, 42:6, 43:1, 48:12, 49:1, 49:6, 50:2, 65:12, 66:4, Jer. 7:13, Hos. 1:10. 
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Israel referred to as God's people (A<x6~)43 or, in many of the texts from second Isaiah, 
as God's servant.44 Here one of the most long-standing questions in the study of Isaiah 
becomes relevant, namely that of the identity of the servant in those passages known as 
the servant songs.45 The traditional alternatives were that the servant is either a messianic 
figure, or simply a personification of the nation.46 However, only those references to the 
servant's calling in Is. 49: 1 and 49:6 fall within the servant songs proper so, on either of 
these views, all of the other relevant cases would refer to Israel as a nation. 47 Yet a more 
recent approach rejects the effective separation out of the servant songs and, considering 
second Isaiah as a whole, argues that it contains two Israels, one of which is positive and 
the other negative. In this case what we have is the "servant-group Israel seeking to re-
establish and restore the whole servant-people Israel to their rightful place in the plan 
and purpose of God. "48 If this position is adopted then some of second Isaiah's 
references to the calling of Israel refer to the positive strand in the life of the nation,49 
and some to the negative. 50 None of the references to Israel's calling concern the entire 
nation, but all of them are to a group rather than to an individual and, in the case of the 
positive Israel, to a group called to the task of restoring the entire nation to a right 
relationship with God. 
In two places this task is said to extend beyond the boundaries of 
Israel. Those called are d~ OtaO"KllV 'Yevou~, Et~ <l>cO~ eOvcOv (Is. 42:6, Is. 49:6), 
43Jer. 7:12, Hos:1:10. 
44This is expressed using ]ta,tC; at Is. 41:8, Is. 42:1, Is. 49:6, but using 801)A.oC; at Is. 49:3, 49:5. These 
instances are all adjacent to references to Israel's calling, but in general second Isaiah prefers ]ta,te;, Is. 
48:20 being the only other instance of 801)A.oC;. 
45Is. 42:1-4, 49:1-6, 50:4-9, 52:13-53:12. 
46Westermann (ET 1969), p.209 notes that "apart from 49:3, Deutero-Isaiah never uses Israel except in 
parallelism to Jacob." The servant is thus nearly always described using both an individual and a 
collective name. 
47The reference to Israel's calling in Is. 42:6 is so close to one ofthese songs that if the messianic 
interpretation of the songs is adopted then its meaning might be held to be affected by its final conte:-..i 
within Isaiah, even if it had originally been intended otherwise. 
48Knight (1984), pp.130-31. Laato (1992) develops this idea at some length, arguing that the positive 
Israel is a circle of prophets. 
49Is. 42:6, Is. 49: 1, Is. 49:6. 
SOls. 43:1, Is. 48:12. 
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and, implicitly at 42:6, and explicitly at 49:6, this task involves the extension of salvation 
(crco"'Cllpia) to the Gentiles. At 49:6 this task is placed by the MT in contrast to that of 
restoring Israel, the latter being regarded as too small a thing for the servant. 51 Once 
again, the Septuagintal translators may have found the prophet uncomfortably radical 
here for they bind the two tasks together, with that of restoring Israel said to be a great 
(I.lE-ra ) task for the servant to be given. It is in this passage also that the idea of a pre-
natal call appears, it being said of the servant's relationship with God that EK KOtAia~ 
!.lll"'Cpo~ !.lou EKaAEcrE "'Co 6vo!.la !.lou (Is. 49: 1). There is thus a movement from the 
exclusive intimacy of the womb to crco"'Cllpiav £co~ EcrXa"'Cou "'C1l~ rll~ (Is. 49:6). 
God's calling has expanded decisively. 52 
A similar expansion can be seen in the case of the only individual to be 
called apart from Cyrus. It is said at Is. 51:2 that Abraham was called when El~ Tlv 
... Kat btArlSUVa au"'Cov. This is the one instance in the Septuagint where calling might 
be termed conversion. As we have seen, Cyrus was no convert and, however the 
servant's identity is understood, the calling of Israel the servant takes place within a pre-
existing relationship between God and His people. There are no obvious conversion 
motifs at Is. 51:2,53 but the allusion to the act of creation in 51: 1 does make it clear that 
the episode was one which established a new relationship between God and the 
patriarch. 54 This is significant because although our survey of calling in the Septuagint 
may prove to provide parallels to various aspects of Paul's use of KaAE-CO K"'CA., Paul's 
central equation of calling and conversion is not one of them. Abraham provides the only 
precedent, and at that a partial one, for this feature of Paul's usage. In the Septuagint, the 
God who calls is the creator who keeps his promises to his people despite their 
51McKenzie (1968), p.105; Motyer (1993), p.388; North (1964), p.190; Westermann (ET 1969), p.212; 
Whybray (1975), p.139. 
52But perhaps it is more accurate to speak here of the extension of the impact of God's calling. The 
effects of the servant's calling e::\.1end to the ends of the earth, but it is not said that the Gentiles will be 
called. In both Is. 42:6 and Is. 49:1-6 their inclusion is described in other terms. 
53 Although Abraham did become the archetypal convert in Jewish tradition. See Adams (1997). 
54See above, p.60. 
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unresponsive nature, and who calls individuals (Cyrus) and groups (positive Israel) to 
perform tasks which benefit that people. Although his calling sometimes looks beyond 
the boundaries of Israel to the salvation of the Gentiles, God does not call in the sense of 
convert. 
3.2.2 Calling and Graeco-Roman Philosophy 
3.2.2.1 Calling and Conversion to Philosophy 
When one exarmnes the use of KCXA£CO K'tA. in Graeco-Roman 
literature, it is philosophy which provides nearly all the relevant examples. 55 Philosophy 
stands out because, although not dogmatic or exclusive, it did demand a certain lifestyle, 
and it did have a sense of mission in the quest for truth. 56 Individuals who were 
previously quite definitely not philosophers might become so, and we have a number of 
stories which relate such a change in a way that might lead us appropriately to label them 
as conversion or call narratives. 57 This is an etic description, since none of these 
narratives employ KCXA£CO K'tA., or any other terms which might be considered technical 
equivalents for conversion. However, three stories related by Diogenes Laertius do 
display a certain consistency in the way they characterise the response of those converted 
to philosophy. 58 Having been confronted by him in an Athenian alley, Xenophon is said 
to have become a hearer (ciKPOCX'tTtC;) of Socrates.59 Here the noun functions as an 
equivalent to 'pupil' or 'follower', and the same can be true of the verb. On having the 
55The exceptions are Pausanias, Descriptions of Greece, 10.32.13 and Aelius Aristides, Orations, 30.9. 
The former tells of a shrine of Isis near Tithorea in Phocis, which none may enter unless called to do so 
by the goddess herself through the means of a dream. The latter tells of a call given by Asc1epius to one 
Quadratus, upon whom is conferred the task of restoring the city of Pergamum. 
56Nock (1933), pp.164-86 draws attention to these features in order to argue that conversion to 
philosophy was the only genuine parallel within Graeco-Roman society to conversion to Christianity. 
Nock's definition of conversion may be vulnerable to criticism (see 1.1), but he is certainly correct to 
draw attention to the parallel. 
57Hengel (ET 1981), p.28: "The motif of a 'conversion to philosophy' comparable to a 'call' is to be 
found in particular in the early Academy and among the Cynics." The texis Hengel, pp.27-33, regards as 
relevant are Aristotle, Fragments, 'Nerinthos' 74; Diogenes Laertius, Lives, 2.48, 4.16f., 6.13f., 6.22, 
6.87f.,7.3; Philo stratus, Vita Apoll. 1.13,1.33,1.34. 
58Diogenes Laertius is unknown except from his Lives of the Philosophers, which he is believed to have 
compiled in the third century CEo 
59Diogenes Laertius 2.48. Hicks (1925), p.179, gives the translation 'from that time onward he was a 
pupil of Socrates.' 
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passmg Crates pointed out to him by the owner of an Athenian book shop, Zeno 
followed the philosopher and Ev'tcu8cv llKO'UO'c 'tou Kpd.'t1l't0~.60 The intoxicated 
Polemo disrupted a lecture by Xenophon only to be converted to philosophy by hearing 
(axouov) the discourse. 61 As Polemo was a resident of Athens, and as the disruption 
was deliberately planned, he is presumably not being said to have heard the contents of 
Xenophon's philosophy for the first time, since he knew enough of it to wish to express 
his contempt. On this occasion Polemo hears in a way that he has not heard before, one 
which produces a positive response, receiving what is heard rather than rejecting it. 
Although it is not explicitly as a response to being called, Diogenes Laertius regards 
hearing as an appropriate response to the claim of philosophy upon one's life, just as the 
Septuagint regards hearing as an appropriate response to the call of the Lord. 62 
3.2.2.2 Calling in Epictetus 
Epictetus the Stoic (c.50CE - 120CE) is one philosopher who 
explicitly describes philosophy as a calling.63 Epictetus teaches that the philosopher is 
called to bear witness to the true nature of life, whereby all that is morally good is within 
the grasp of each individual, i.e., it is 'internal' in the sense that it is not determined by 
any of the material circumstances of our lives. These are beyond our control, but the 
good consists of what is ours to control, namely conception, choice, desire, aversion 
etc.64 If the individual maintains a proper division between these two classes of things 
then it is possible to live in freedom, and no material circumstance, however grim, can 
touch the self It is an approach perhaps most memorably summed up by Epictetus' 
60Diogenes Laertius 7.3. Hicks (1925), p.l13 has 'from that day he became Crates's pupil.' Note that 
Aristotle, Fragments, 'Nerinthos' 74, provides an entirely different account of how Zeno became a 
philosopher. 
61Diogenes Laertius 4.16f. 
62See above, p.61. 
63Epictetus refers to philosophy as a calling 5 times in his Discourses - l.29.33, 1.29.46, l.29.49, 
2.1.34, 2.l.39. At Encheiridion 7 he compares life to a shore visit during a sea voyage. When the 
captain calls one must be prepared to respond immediately, leaving behind whatever one has collected. 
Within this imagery the call given by the captain is clearly an audible one, but equally clearly the figure 
of the captain stands for God. 
64See Diss. 1.1 and Ench. l.l. 
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quotation from Plato's Apology of the words of his hero Socrates, Y AvU'to~ Ked, 
MEAl1'tO~ cX.1toK'tElval f.lEV Duvav'tal, !3AcX\lfal 0' OU.65 
Further, this calling is given by God. The philosopher mounts the stage 
of life cO~ f.lcXp'tu~ uno 'tou 8EOU KEKA l1f.lEVO~, 66 and is told by God that he has 
been considered worthy to be produced as a witness, This role may involve considerable 
hardships in relation to those things which do not belong to the moral world and so are 
beyond the control of the philosopher. He must be a witness whether he finds himself 
enjoying the privileges of senatorial rank, or whether he finds himself in rags, To those 
who complain against God in such circumstances Epictetus poses the rhetorical question, 
'tau'ta f.lEAAE1~ f.lap'tupE1v Kat Ka'talcrXUVElV 'tTlV KATlcrlV TlV KEKAl1KEV;67 
To complain about material circumstances is to make a fundamental mistake and, 
instead, the philosopher should concentrate his attention on those things within the moral 
purpose, for it is only they which have the power to make one lead a life of error. Those 
things outside the moral purpose, such as material circumstances, can be approached 
with cheerful confidence. In fact, the philosopher should welcome hardship, for being 
called (KA118Ev'ta) to face a difficulty means that EArlAu8EV 6 Kalpo~ 'tou 
cX.noDE1~al, Et nEnalDEUf.lE8a.68 Hardship is a Kalpou KaAouv't0~,69 and in 
response the philosopher should leave lawsuits and intellectual problems to others, 
instead practising how to die, or to be in chains, or tortured, or exiled, Epictetus 
instructs his hearers, ncXv'ta 'tau'ta 8appouv'tco~, nEn018(hco~ 'tcP KEKA l1KO'tl crE 
En' au'tci, 'tcP cl~lOV 'tTl~ XcOpa~ 'tau'tl1~ KEKP1KO't1.70 Once again, the philosopher 
has been called by God and deemed worthy to fill such a role. 
65 Diss. 1.29.18; Plato, Apology, 30c, For a fuller account of Epictetus' moral teaching see Vorster 
(1990), pp.39-44, 
66 Diss, 1.29.46 
67 Diss. 1.29.49 
68Diss, 1.29.33 
69Diss, 2,1.34 
7oDiss.2,1.39 
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All of this makes very clear what Epictetus regards as an appropriate 
response to the call to be a philosopher, namely to live the morally good life in whatever 
circumstances one finds oneself Yet it is far less clear what Epictetus thought about the 
God who gives such callings. At one point Epictetus approvingly quotes Euphrates as 
saying that his being a philosopher was ndv't<X EIJ,<XU'teP Ked 8eeP.71 The centrality of 
this desire to please God distinguishes Epictetus from other Stoics. Like them his 
concept of God was formally a monistic one, but it has often been noted that the way in 
which he actually speaks about God seems to imply a much more personal deity. 
Epictetus does indeed think that it is "the obligation of human beings to live in 
conformity with immanent reason, "72 but he conceives that immanent reason in a 
strikingly concrete manner. Oldfather speaks of Epictetus as having "conceived of his 
God in as vivid a fashion as the writers of the New Testament, and almost as intimately 
as the founder of Christianity himself "73 Stadter says that "for Epictetus, his teaching 
was his service to God, and he followed this profession as a divine calling, "74 while Long 
notes that "Epictetus calls God the father of mankind. "75 There is thus no doubt that, for 
Epictetus, calling is a divine act. 
However, this act is always viewed from the perspective of present 
moral responsibility. Neither God's role as creator, nor his concern for the salvation of 
his creatures, are emphasised in relation to calling. Instead, the focus is relentlessly on 
the task to which the philosopher has been called, the witness which must be borne even 
in the midst of hardship. At Discourses l.29.44-49, the concept of bearing witness 
(lJ,<Xp'tup£co, IJ,dp'tuC;) appears repeatedly, and Oldfather is undoubtedly right here to 
translate all the occurrences of K<XA£CO K'tA. in terms of a summons. If this legal 
71 Diss. 4.8.18 
72Kee (1985), p.144. Kee, pp.135-44, provides a useful survey of Stoic thought in relation to 
'eschatology. ' 
730ldfather (1926), p.viii. The tone is admittedly old-fashioned, but the point is clear. 
74Stadter (1980), p.24. 
75Long (1984), p.235. 
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metaphor does speak of a new relationship with God, then it is a relationship 
concentrated on a particular task. Although this task is open-ended and relevant to every 
situation in life, Epictetus does not use KaAEco K'tA. to refer back to the start of a 
person's life as a philosopher. This vocabulary expresses what it is to be a philosopher, 
but it does not specifically refer to the conversion to philosophy. The philosopher's task 
may grant a relationship with God, but there is little sense of calling as the decisive event 
which initiated this relationship, and there is little hint that calling creates new 
relationships with other people. To be called does not result in becoming part of a 
community,76 Instead, the philosopher should show moe; civSpco1toe; civacnpEcpE'tat 
1tE1tat8EU/-lEVOe;,77 and demonstrate 'tlva 8uva'tat AOytKOV llYE/-lOVtKOV 1tpOe; 
'tae; ci1tpOatpE'tOUe; 8uvci/-lEte; civ'tt 'ta~ci/-lEvov.18 These are the virtues of 
detachment. Epictetus conceives God's calling as directed towards the individual; God 
has no people. 
Not surprisingly, this means that ethnic status is simply an absent issue 
in Epictetus' references to calling. Yet through his insistence on the indifference of the 
philosopher to material circumstances, social status looms large. Epictetus, himself a 
former slave, asserts that when a slave is manumitted very little has happened at all, since 
manumission cannot make anyone truly free. 79 If freedom is not a benefit, then neither is 
enslavement a disadvantage, for Epictetus insists that even if circumstances should take 
away the time needed to read and think, philosophers can still fulfil their calling. Even 
76The philosophical schools are sometimes held to resemble the Pauline churches, but even Alexander 
(1994), p.62, one of the advocates of this thesis, admits that, "The prevailing picture of 'a closed 
organisation of initiated disciples' which scholars have gleaned from these groups (Pythagoreans and 
Epicureans) is not obviously reflected, for example, among the Stoics." See also Meeks (1983), p.83. A 
recent article uses network analysis to explore the reasons for Epictetus' failure to persuade members of 
his network to adopt his ethical Stoicism as a way oflife. Hock (1992), p.140: "Epictetus' students and 
visitors were themselves part of social networks which transmitted and reinforced a merely academic 
norm for those who wanted to call themselves Stoics." See Diss. 2.19 for a tirade against this academic 
norm. 
77Diss. 1.29.44 
78Diss. 2.1.39 
79Diss.2.1.25-28 
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leisure to read and think is something outside the moral world. 80 This counsel of 
indifference makes Epictetus' attitude towards society difficult to categorise. On the one 
hand his views implicitly question dominant values and practices such as honour and 
patronage, on the other he would not regard any attempt to change these things as 
capable of setting people genuinely free. He asks rhetorically, 'YI-lE1.<; ouv Ot 
qnAocro<j)Ot 8t8clcrKE'tE KCX'tCX<j)POVE1.V 'tcOv I3cxcrtA£cov; - MTt Y£VOt'to. 'ti<; ill-lcOv 
8t8clcrKEt ciV'tt1totE1.cr8cxt npo<; 0::\)1:0'0<;, cOv E.KE1.VOt exoucrtv e;oucricxv;81 He 
does not regard it as any part of the business of philosophers to attempt to change the 
ways of kings, but neither would he allow that the things over which kings have authority 
include the judgements of philosophers. Epictetus is no social revolutionary, but neither 
does he reify the status quo. 
3.2.3 Summary 
Assessed in relation to the seven questions with which we approached 
their use ofthe concept of calling, the Septuagint and Graeco-Roman philosophy present 
both interesting similarities and striking divergences: 
(i) Both the biblical writers and Epictetus present calling as an act of 
God but, hardly surprisingly, the way in which they conceive of God is different. 
Epictetus discusses God's calling solely in relation to present moral responsibility, but in 
second Isaiah stress is also placed upon God's role as creator, God's everlasting nature, 
and God's faithfulness to His promises. 
(ii) The same vocabulary can be used to describe an appropriate 
response to a calling. Diogenes Laertius uses the concept of hearing to denote entry into 
the philosophical life, and the Septuagint understands hearing and obeying as the right 
response to God's call. However, it must be remembered that Diogenes Laertius does not 
80Diss.4.4.6-13 
81Diss. 1.29.9 
71 
himself discuss philosophy as a calling, and the person whom one hears is another human 
being, not God. For Epictetus, it is God who calls, and the appropriate human response 
is patient endurance of suffering in witness to the truth. 
(iii) The roles and tasks granted by calling are rather different. Here the 
Septuagint is marked by diversity. Cyrus of Persia is an inadvertent agent of divine 
providence, if a much blessed one; Abraham is knowingly the father of a nation; Israel is 
to be a light to the Gentiles. In contrast, Epictetus is relentlessly singular. The 
philosopher is to be a witness to the truth about the moral good. 
(iv) In terms of a change in identity through relationships, the emphasis 
of the Septuagint is on the restoration of God's people. God's servant nation is called to 
once again be true to their God, to be who they are. For Epictetus, one who is called to 
philosophy has a changed relationship with God and other people only in the sense of 
having been deemed worthy to be a witness. It is this role which is primary. 
(v) The preponderance of references to the calling of Israel suggests 
that the Septuagint understands God's calling to operate primarily in relation to a group, 
namely God's people. For Epictetus, it operates primarily in relation to individuals. There 
is little sense that by becoming a philosopher one joins a community. 
(vi) In the Septuagint ethnic status looms large in relation to calling. 
On the one hand, the calling of both Abraham and Cyrus operate in relation to that of 
Israel. On the other, God's concern is said to extend beyond Israel, and part of the 
purpose ofIsrael's calling is to be a light to the nations. For Epictetus, ethnicity is simply 
not an issue. 
(vii) The same is true of the Septuagint in relation to social status. It 
simply does not appear as an issue. Yet here, his emphasis on indifference to material 
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circumstances means that Epictetus has much to say. The philosopher must be prepared 
to accept either the most exalted or the most lowly position in society as the context in 
which to fulfil his calling. 
These conclusions provide a backdrop against which to situate Paul's 
concept of calling, and they will be compared to those reached through putting the same 
questions to Paul's own use of Kcx.AEOO K'tA. (3.4.1). The Septuagint is clearly a source 
for Paul's use of this vocabulary in the sense that, had it not appeared in the scriptures, it 
seems unlikely that Paul would have employed the concept of calling. Yet as we shall 
see, despite important similarities, this does not mean that Paul uses the concept in an 
identical way, and the material drawn from Graeco-Roman philosophy will help us to 
situate the differences. On the one hand we shall see that Paul shares some concerns 
present in Epictetus but absent from the Septuagint, most notably that of the relationship 
between calling and social status. On the other, Paul does not necessarily have identical 
things to say in relation to these common concerns, and there are areas where, even as he 
diverges from the Septuagint, Paul appears much closer to it than to Epictetus. For 
example, that God has a people is not an idea which Epictetus contemplates. Since Paul's 
letters were written during years which were probably those of Epictetus' childhood, the 
latter is clearly not a source for Paul's use of the concept of calling. Yet the marked 
differences between the two also make it obvious that Paul's and Epictetus' concepts of 
calling do not share a common source. The philosophical material therefore provides 
useful analogies to Paul's use of Kcx.AEOO K'tA., but nothing which is more directly 
related. Indeed, in both it and the Septuagint perhaps the most striking feature is the one 
which is missing. Calling is not used to denote conversion. 82 
82As implied above, pp.64-65, the concept of conversion may have been available or relevant to the 
authors of the Septuagint to only a limited degree. However, this fact only serves to highlight the new 
focus of Paul's usage. 
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3.3 Calling in Paul 
3.3.1 The God Who Calls 
At Rom. 4: 17 Paul speaks of the God in whom Abraham believed as 
'tou ~q;>01tOtouv'tOC; 'tOUC; VEKPOUC; K<Xt K<XAOUV'tOC; 'td Il:n QV't<X WC; Qv't<X. 
Although it has been disputed, there is little doubt that the calling referred to here is 
God's act of creation, calling into existence the things that do not exist. 83 Yet it is not 
clear what metaphorical function this reference to creation performs in Paul's argument. 
Certainly creation is being evoked in relation to the promise of faith (4: 16), but which 
aspect of the fulfilment of that promise is here compared to creation? There are several 
opinions to choose from. Does 4: 17-18 refer to the giving of life to the dead womb of 
the barren Sarah?84 Or is there here a reference to the faith which Abraham demonstrated 
in his abortive sacrifice of Isaac?85 Or rather than looking back to Abraham, have these 
verses moved on to anticipate the resurrection of the dead?86 Exercising caution, Ziesler 
sees in 4: 17 a range of possible metaphorical references. "The point is that God has 
created life where there was no life, in giving a son to Abraham and Sarah, in calling the 
Gentiles into his people, and we look forward to v.2S where he creates life in the 
resurrection of Jesus Christ. "87 
83Wisdom 11 :25 provides a clear precedent for describing creation in terms of calling - see above p.59 
n.21. However, it was once widely held that to denote the objective fact of non-existence would require 
'tc:X OUK 6v'ta, whereas 'ta ~" 6v'ta implies a subjective impression, i.e. 'things reputed not to exist.' 
See, for example, Godet (ET 1886), pp.112-13. However, Lightfoot (1895), p.166 alleges that "In fact 
'tc:X ~ r1 6v'ta is much more usual than 'tc:X OUK 6v'ta in the sense of 'things not existing'." He seems to 
have won the argument since most recent commentaries do not even mention the other possibility. But 
see Cranfield (1975), p.244, and Zerwick and Grosvenor (1979), p.468: "not speaking of non-existent 
things as if they existed, but calling them into existence." 
84Fitzmyer (1993), p.386. 
85Barrett (1971a), pp.96-97. 
86Kasemann (ET 1980), p.123: "It is an anticipation of the resurrection of the dead, which as no other 
event deserves to be called a creation out of nothing and presents the eschatological repetition of the first 
creation." 
87Ziesler (1989), p.132. 
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Ziesler undoubtedly has a point. In 4: 17 Paul is asserting who God is, 
and if he is the God who creates then it is not unreasonable to expect this aspect of his 
character to manifest itself in a variety of ways. Part of the beauty of the metaphor is its 
ability to evoke the whole sweep of salvation history. Yet if we pay attention to the 
context of the verse, there is one point in that history on which the focus principally falls, 
namely the calling of the Gentiles into God's people. Paul quotes the promise of Gen. 
17:5, no:tepa. nOAAcOv E8vcOv 'te8EtKd crE, so depicting Abraham as the father of all 
who have faith in order to demonstrate the legitimacy of his law-free gospel for Gentiles. 
This is the purpose of his argument, and the connection between the detail of 4: 17 and 
this wider purpose is best captured by Calvin: 
"He (Abraham) was, however, past procreation, and therefore it was necessary for 
him to raise his thoughts to the power of God who gives life to the dead. There is, 
therefore, no absurdity if the Gentiles, who are otherwise barren and dead, are 
brought into the fellowship ... We have here, moreover, the type and pattern of our 
general calling, by which our beginning is set before our eyes (not that which 
relates to our first birth, but which relates to the hope of the future life), namely, 
that when we are called of God we arise out of nothing. "88 
Here is both the correct breadth of reference (from Abraham's wish for 
an heir right through to the Christian hope for resurrection life), combined with the 
proper principal focus on the bringing of the Gentiles into God's people. Thus, the main 
point of using the metaphor of creation is to refer to conversion. Considerable support is 
offered to this interpretation by 1 Cor. 1: 28. In a context which clearly refers to the 
conversion of Paul's readers (1:26), God is said to have chosen 'tci 1...l:Tl 6v'ta., tva. 'tci 
6v'ta Ka'tap'Y'T,\cr1l Here those lacking existence suffer primarily the non-existence of 
social exclusion,89 but it is conversion which demonstrates God's refusal to mirror that 
exclusion in his dealings with human beings. They are granted existence on his higher 
88Ca1vin (ET 1961), pp.95-96. 
89Godet (ET 1886), p.113. They are denied "the recognition of any value whatever in public opinion." 
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authority. Again conversion involves God calling into existence the things that do not 
exist. For Paul, the God who calls is the creator, and the act of calling is an expression of 
this aspect of God's character. 
3.3.2 The Human Response 
Yet Rom. 4: 17 and 1 Cor. 1: 28 are the only texts which directly 
present calling in terms of creation. To draw from them alone the general conclusion that 
Paul understands calling to have the status of an act of creation might be overly hasty. 
Their meaning could prove to be atypical. Here the question of human response to divine 
calling is of assistance since things that do not exist are in no position to make a 
response, either positive or negative. Only once they have already been called into 
existence can they act for themselves. There can be no response from them which either 
makes it possible for their calling to take place, or which prevents it. If they subsequently 
react it will be as a consequence of their having been called, and not an integral part of 
the act of calling itself. Such is the logical outcome of conceiving calling as an act of 
creation. Whether or not we find this pattern will provide us with an indication as to 
whether Paul is consistent in the way he understands calling. 
Certainly there is no term describing a human response which regularly 
appears in connection with KaAEco K1:A. None of the other verbs used by Paul to refer 
to his readers having come to be in Christ do so, despite the fact that some appear well 
suited to the task of denoting a response. I1t()1:EUCO never stands in relation to KaAEco 
K1:A.,90 neither does napaAavl3dvco, and Aa~l3dvco does so only once. This is at 
Rom. 1:5 where Paul speaks of himself as among those who received XdptV Kat 
cX.nocnOArlV, having earlier referred to himself as KAll1:d~ <in6cnoAo~ (Rom. 1: 1).91 
90n t<nEUCO appears in the aorist active form twelve times. Seven of these instances seem to refer either 
to the point at which Christians came to be in Christ, or to the point at which Abraham came to faith -
Rom. 4:3,10:14,13:11,1 Cor. 3:5, 15:2, 15:11, Gal. 3:6. 
91 There are twelve other occasions when the concept of receiving something could be said to apply to 
having come to be in Christ - the gospel/tradition about Christ/God's Word (Gal. 1:9, 1:12, 1 Cor. 11:23, 
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Such a connection is significant, for the purpose of the grace and apostleship which Paul 
has received is to bring about the obedience of faith (l.>1taK0tlv niO''tecoC;) among the 
nations, in which are included Paul's readers in Rome, who are KAl1'toi ' Il1O'01) 
XPtO''t01) (1 :6).92 Thus, those who are 'called of Jesus Christ' are implicitly expected to 
display the 'obedience of faith. '93 Whether this phrase equates faith and obedience, or 
whether it speaks of obedience as the result of faith is much debated.94 One doubts that 
an either/or choice is strictly necessary. Anxiety at any hint that salvation involves works 
has led some to strenuously insist that the obedience required is faith,95 but if Paul had 
shared such anxiety, then surely he would not have combined the two in a single genitive 
phrase. More likely is a concern on Paul's part to demonstrate that far from being the 
opposite of obedience, faith implies it. 96 Yet however one understands the phrase 
'obedience of faith', the fact that it results from apostolic ministry does make it appear a 
response. What is less clear is whether it is a response determined by the fact that the 
Romans have been called, or whether their calling to some degree depends upon their 
faith. Again, one doubts whether the context demands an absolute either/or choice, but it 
is the ministry of those called to be apostles which produces the obedience of faith. The 
faith of those who display this response depends upon God's effective calling of others, 
and so the primary emphasis is on divine initiative rather than human response. 
15: 1, 15:3, 1 Thess. 2: 13), the Holy Spirit (Rom. 8:25[2], 1 Cor. 2: 12, 2 Cor. 11 :4, Gal. 3 :2), and grace 
(Rom. 5:17). 
92This genitive phrase could mean 'called by Jesus Christ', or it could mean 'called to belong to Jesus 
Christ'. Most commentators prefer the latter since Paul nowhere else pictures Jesus rather than God as 
the one who calls and because, in the previous verse, the obedience of faith is U1tEP 'tou 6V0J.HX,'tO<; 
ex,u'tou, thus suggesting that believers bear Christ's name. See Barrett (1971a), p.22; Dunn (1988), p.19; 
Sanday & Headlam (1896), p.12. For the opposite point of view, see Cranfield (1975), p.68. 
93The same phrase also appears at Rom. 16:26. However, even among those who accept that chapter 16 
as a whole formed part of Paul's original letter, some doubt that 16:25-27 did so. See Garlington (1991), 
p.1 n.l. 
94Ziesler (1989), pp.63-64. "It could be the faith that consists in obedience, or indeed the obedience that 
consists in faith .. .It could be the faith that leads to, or requires, obedience." Although he believes it to 
imply rather than exclude the latter, Ziesler decides that the primary focus is on the former because "the 
context is about becoming a Christian. " 
95E.g. Kasemann (ET 1980), p.15. 
96See the comments of Barrett (1971a), p.21 and Garlington (1991), p.1 n.4. Certainly Rom. 6:1-2 
suggests sensitivity on Paul's part to the charge that his theology legitimated disobedience. 
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Similar questions arise at 1 Cor. 1: 1-3, a letter opening which contains 
many similar features to Rom. 1: 1-6. Just as the obedience of faith is the mark of the 
wider church of which the Romans are a part, so here the Corinthians are part of a wider 
church whose members are 'tOt~ £ntK<xAOUf.l,eVOt~ 'to 6vof.l,<X 'to-\) Kupiou (1 :2). 
Paul uses the verb £ntK<XAeco only five times,97 and only here does it stand in 
relationship with K<XAeco so that those who are called are also those who call upon the 
name of the Lord. In the Septuagint, and especially in Genesis, it often denotes calling 
upon the name of the Lord in the context of an act of worship,98 but it also developed a 
wider range of meaning, so that one might call upon the name of the Lord for 
deliverance, or for salvation.99 In Rom. 10: 13 this soteriological sense is to the fore when 
Paul quotes Joel 3:5, 1t<i~ yap o~ dv £1ttK<XAecrll't<Xt 'to 6vof.l,a Kupiou 
crcoS"cr£'t<Xt. Doubtless to call upon the name of the Lord for salvation inevitably leads 
one to worship, but here that is not the primary meaning. If the soteriological sense is the 
main one at 1 Cor. 1:2 also, then we would have an instance of God's calling having a 
human response which enables and completes it. However, this seems not to be the 
case.lOO The phrase £v n<xv'tl 'ton,!? can be rendered simply 'in every place', but is taken 
to imply 'in every meeting-place'. WI The use of primarily 'cultic' terms such as the verb 'to 
sanctify' (aytd.~co) and its cognate noun 'the saints' (01 aytot) in the same verse is also 
strongly suggestive of worship. 102 Of course, calling upon the name of Christ in worship 
would make little sense were it not for his soteriological function. As in Rom. 10: 13, the 
one sense does not exclude the other, but the primary emphasis is different in each case. 
97Rom. 10:12, 10:13, 10:14, 1 Cor. 1:2,2 Cor. 1:23. 
98E.g. Gen. 4:26, 13:4,21:33,26:25. 
99E.g. Ps. 50: 15. See Fee (1987), p.33 n.26. 
lOoWeiss (1910), p.4~, "Denn hier handelt es sich urn das dauernde und wiederholte 'Anrufen' des 
Namens im Gebet, waIn-end Rom 10:12,13,14 (auch Apg. 2:21,22:16) der entscheidende grundsatzliche 
Akt der Anrufung bei der Bekehrung gemeint ist, der die Rettung verbUrgt. " 
IOIBarrett (1971b), pp.33-34 and Fee (1987), p.34 both accept this point, which was first made by 
Lietzmann (1969), p.5, based on Jewish synagogue inscriptions. It is disputed by Conzelmann (ET 
1975), p.23 n.38. 
lO2On the nature of these terms, see 3.3.4. 
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At 1 Cor. 1:2 calling upon the name of the Lord is a response to God's calling, but one 
that is consequent upon it rather than constitutive of it. 
Thus, in relation to calling, Paul provides nothing which might be 
construed as a constitutive response, and remarkably little which might be construed in 
terms of human response at all. Indeed, in the one case where there is clearly implied a 
negative human response to God's call, that response is portrayed as ultimately 
ineffective. Israel may have rejected the gospel but this is not final, af.l£1:af.lEA l11:a ydp 
1:d x,apiO"f.la1:a Kat 11 KAllO"t~ 1:0U 8£ou (Rom. 11:28). Yet it is not as though 
Paul's letters lack responsive terms in general. The concept of obedience is frequently 
used in a way which suggests it to be a constitutive part of being a Christian. 103 Similarly, 
Paul speaks of hearing as a vital part of coming to be in Christ. 104 Indeed, these terms 
appear in close proximity in Rom. 10: 14-18, and the phrase aKoll~ 1tio"1:£co~ (Gal. 3:2) 
is reminiscent of U1taKOrlv 1tio"1:£co~ (Rom. 1: 5). That faith is the common factor is 
significant, since faith also figures strongly in Rom. 10: 14-18. 105 It seems almost as if we 
are dealing with alternative sets of vocabulary. When he wishes to discuss the human 
dimension of conversion Paul reaches for, among others, the concepts of faith, of 
hearing, and of obedience. When it is the divine dimension of conversion which he has in 
mind,106 KaAECO K1:A. is his favourite cluster of terms. 107 Rom. 1: 1-6 and 1 Cor. 1: 1-3 
103Theverb U1taKouro is used in this way at Rom. 6:16,6:17,10:16, Phil. 2:12. As well as at Rom. 1:5, 
the noun U1taKOll is used in this way at Rom. 6: 16[2], 15: 18, 16:26. 
104The verb aKouro is used in this way at Rom. 10: 14[2], 10: 18, 11:8, 15:21, Phil. 4:9. The noun aKoll 
is so used at Rom. 10:16, 10:17[2], Gal. 3:2, 3:5, 1 Thess. 2:13. 
105The verb 1ttO""tEuro at Rom. 10:14[2], 10:16, and the noun 1tiO""tts at Rom. 10:17. 
106If the lack of a matching vocabulary of human response provides negative proof that calling speaks of 
the divine dimension of conversion, then positive support is provided by Rom. 8:30, where calling is one 
item in a sequence of salvific divine actions running from foreknowledge to glorification. Dunn (1988), 
p.485 comments, "The thought is not of an invitation which might be rejected; God does not leave his 
purpose to chance, but puts it into effect himself ... EKaAEO"Ev denotes divinely accomplished 
conversion. " 
1070f the other terms expressing God's salvific initiative, the verb EKAE'Yo~at occurs only three times 
(1 Cor. 1:27[2], 1:28 - although the noun EKAOYll appears at Rom. 9:11, 11:5, 11:7, 11:28), the verb 
E~a'Yopa~ro only twice (Gal. 3:13,4:5), the verb <i'Yta~ro six times (Rom. 15:16, 1 Cor. 1:2,6:11, 
7: 14[2], 1 Thess. 5:23), and the verb Ka"taAa~l3avro only once (phil. 3: 12). This leaves the verb 
8tKatOro as the next most frequently used term to describe God's initiative. See above, p.54 n.2. 
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are rare instances of the two sets of vocabulary to some degree overlapping. Otherwise 
these two sets provide alternative perspectives from which to view conversion, 
perspectives which Paul utilises without formulating their implicit tension between divine 
providence and human freedom.108 Whichever of these two perspectives better 
represents Paul's thought as a whole,109 there can be no doubt that the concept of calling 
belongs to the divine dimension of conversion. Rom. 4: 17 may be unusual in conceiving 
of calling as an act of creation, but it is certainly not anomalous in its depiction of calling 
as a divine act. 
3.3.3 Calling to a Role/Task 
Paul refers to his call to be an apostle three times. 110 If Rom. 1: 1-6 did 
not make it clear enough, Gal 1: 16 is explicit that this was tva Eua'Y'YEAi~cof.lat 
au'tov EV 'tol~ eSvEcrtv. Those whose faith has resulted from this commission are 
characterised in a different way. They are KA ll'tOt aywt, III a phrase which seems to 
stand in direct relation to Paul's KA ll'to~ <i1tOcr'tOAO~. That it does so raises some 
difficult questions, for they are clearly not precise equivalents. All of Paul's readers have 
been called to be saints, and this term is one that applies to every Christian, but the call 
to be an apostle is restricted to a few. Further, whereas Paul is explicit about what he is 
to do as an apostle, the saints do not have a specified task or role. Instead, Ot aywt 
functions as a general term, which means 'the Christians', but does so from the particular 
aspect of their being a people set apart for GOd. 112 This is who they are, not what they 
are to do, however much the latter may quite properly follow from the former. This 
contrast between the role or task of the apostle and the identity of the saints is not an 
108Even in Romans 9-11 where Israel's resistance to the gospel provides what appears to be a classic 
instance of tension between divine providence and human freedom, Paul's focus remains firmly on 
Israel. The wider theoretical issue is discussed by implication only, with chapter 9 seeming to emphasise 
divine providence, and chapter 10 human freedom. It is noteworthy that the concept of calling features 
strongly in Rom. 9 (Rom. 9:7, 9: 12, 9:24, 9:25, 9:26, 9:29), but not at all in Rom. 10. 
109For a discussion see Westerholm (1997), pp.110-14. 
1l0Rom. 1:1,1 Cor. 1:1, Gal. 1:15. For a full discussion of Gal. 1:11-17 see 5.2. 
lllRom. 1 :7, 1 Cor. 1:2. For a discussion of this phrase, see below pp.30-31. 
112See Balz (ET 1990), pp.16-19. Paul uses the term twenty-five times without once giving any hint that 
to be a saint implies a particular task. 
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absolute one since anyone reading Paul can sense that his apostleship is not something 
that governs merely one aspect of his life, or which demands of him a task he might one 
day complete and lay down. l13 In an important sense the task of sharing the gospel 
defines who he is, yet it is an identity in large part based on a task whereas to be a saint 
is not. 
This raises a dilemma. Should one emphasise this difference, or should 
one emphasise the fact that both Paul and his converts have been called by the same 
God? How one answers has the potential to make a significant difference to one's 
ecclesiology. On the side of difference lies the fact that apostleship is the only role to 
which Paul applies the vocabulary of calling. It does appear first in the list of such roles 
given at 1 Cor. 12:28-31, but they are there described as Xaplcr/-1cx:ta. Yet despite the 
fact that he claims this leadership role for apostles, and hence for himself, Paul is quite 
clear that apostolic calling is for the sake of the community. As we have seen from Rom. 
1: 1-7, he is KATl"COC; <inocr'toAoC; in order that they might be KA TJ'tOt a:ywl. Analysed 
in the abstract the tension between these two callings is obvious, but understood in this 
more dynamic way they enjoy a unity as part of the unfolding of God's purposes. Just as 
Paul can say that God set him apart EK KOlAlac; /-1TJ'tpOC; /-10u (Gal. 1: 15), so he can 
say of God's relationship with all Christians that those OUC; npo£yvro, Kat np0cOplcrEV 
(Rom. 8:29). Paul's attention is primarily focused on the God who calls, and on his 
saving purposes, rather than on the relative positions of the human beings who are 
called. 114 His position can be summarised thus: some who are called receive a specific 
task as an apostle, and in their case this is part of the way in which conversion changes 
their identity . Yet the purpose of this task is to playa role in securing the conversion of a 
much greater number of others for whom a change of identity is expressed in other ways. 
113See Rom. 15: 18-24 for evidence of Paul's unlimited conception of his task. 
114Lightfoot (1895), p.143. "His apostleship and their church membership were both alike to be traced to 
the same source, to the merciful call of God, and not to their own merits. " 
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3.3.4 Calling and Identity 
What does it mean to be KA:rrtoi dytOt? Particularly in relation to 1 
Cor. 1:2, where Paul addresses his letter 1lyteXcr/-lEVOt<; EV Xptcr'tcP 'Illcrou, KAll'tOte; 
aytOte;, this is part of the wider question of the meaning of the group of cognate terms 
(aytci~w, dytoe; K'tA.) usually translated into English in terms of sanctification. Are 
these terms 'cultic,' or 'ethical,' or both?ll5 In fact, critical opinion is largely united in 
understanding these to be primarily cultic terms, but ones which have strong ethical 
consequences. 116 This is based on the Septuagintal usage, where the primary meaning of 
these terms is clearly cultic, since the objects of the sentences in which they appear are 
priests, people, places and vessels, i.e., persons, things, or locations set apart in the 
context of worship. 117 However, this 'set apartness' had come to apply to Israel in the 
whole of its life as God's people. lIS They were to be a holy, separate nation and this 
wider horizon naturally granted the terms a strong moral component, since Israel's 
separateness was to be instantiated in behaviour. When Paul applies these terms to his 
converts, he is saying that they are a people set apart by GOd. 119 This implies nothing 
1150f course, in the conventional sense, the absence of sacrifices, priests etc. meant that early 
Christianity had no cult. What is intended when Paul is said to have used the concept of sanctity in a 
cultic sense is that it primarily expresses God's setting apart of persons as his people. 
1160n 1 Cor. 1:2 see Barrett (1971b), p.32; Fee (1987), pp.32-33; Godet (ET 1886), p.42; Hering (ET 
1962), p.2; Lightfoot (1895), p.145. On Rom. 1:7 see Barrett (1971a), p.22; Cranfield (1975), pp.69-70; 
Dunn (1988), p.20; Fitzmyer (1993), p.239; Ziesler (1989), p.64. The exceptions are Witherington 
(1995), p.80, who denies that the cultic background has any significance for Paul's use of these terms, by 
which he establishes moral boundaries for the community; and Kasemann (ET 1980), pp.15-16, who 
wishes to avoid any connection between holiness and conduct. Witherington is certainly right that Paul's 
language serves to establish moral boundaries, but rather misses the point that there must first be a 
people for such boundaries to enclose. That Kasemann's position is untenable can be seen from 1 Thess. 
4:7: 01> yap EKdA£cr£v TU.ta<; 6 9£0<; Ent aKa9apcri9'- aAA' EveXYlacrJ.lcP· 
117Proksch (ET 1964), pp.105-07. 
l1sDunn (1988), p.20; Fee (1987), pp.32-33. 
119It is sometimes maintained, e.g. Coenen (ET 1975), that the term EKKATpia, used twenty two times 
by Paul in 1 Corinthians alone, retains it root sense of 'called out', thus contributing to this sense of 
separateness. It is true that the Septuagintal translators use it to render Hebrew terms referring to the 
assemblies of Israel, but for these terms they also use cruvaY(J)YTt. Further, already for several centuries 
EKKATpia had been the name of the assembly of the competent full citizens of a polis, and this 
meaning could account for the adoption of the term within Christianity. In support of this, Roloff (ET 
1990), pp.410-15, points out that, as at 1 Cor. 1:2, Paul frequently speaks of the EKKAllcria 'tou 9£ou. 
If EKKATpia already specifically conveyed a sense of being called out by God, then this reference to 
God would be redundant. 
82 
about their previous behaviour, but it conveys considerable expectations as to the 
future. 120 
That what we have here is a description of the new people of God in 
terms previously applied to Israel is perhaps additionally confirmed by the Septuagintal 
background of the phrase KA ll'toi dYlOl itself. There it refers thirteen times to the 
sacred assembly of God's people, commanded by him, on the first and last days of the 
Passover celebration. 121 However, there is a marked reluctance among recent 
commentators to accept this reference to the Passover as relevant to Paul's usage, 
perhaps because the Septuagintal translators appear to misunderstand the Hebrew and, 
instead of giving a Greek equivalent for 'holy convocation' or 'sacred assembly', simply 
state that the days on which this was to meet should be 'called holy'. 122 Kasemann writes 
confidently that "Gentile Christians would hardly have been aware that in the LXX 
formula klete hagia, the sacred assembly is hidden behind the phrase about the elect 
saints. "123 This is true, but it does not necessarily mean that Paul's readers were unaware 
that the formula appeared in relation to the Passover. One does not need to understand 
the significance of the underlying Hebrew in order to know where the Greek formula 
occurs. At 1 Cor. 5:6-8 Paul certainly expects his readers to understand some of the 
procedures for celebrating Passover, since he uses them as a metaphor by which to 
express his desire for the church to be sexually pure. It is therefore possible that Paul 
might also expect his readers to catch the Passover allusion in the words KA ll'toi dylOl. 
If so, then when he refers to his readers in this way, it does not simply indicate Paul's 
120Lightfoot (1895), p.145: "All who are brought within the circle of Christian influences are in a 
special manner Christ's, all who have put on Christ in baptism are called, are sanctified, are holy. Let 
them not act unworthily of their calling." Note the 'indicative - imperative' form of the sununary, which 
in this case reflects the ethical implications of Paul's thinking based on a cultic meaning. Exceptions to 
this pattern in Paul's usage are I Cor. 7:14[2] and 1 Thess. 5:23. In the former the ethical dimension is 
entirely missing, whereas in the latter it is very strongly emphasised. This range of application is 
another indication that it would be an error to treat the cultic and ethical dimensions of these terms in an 
either/or fashion. See Fee (1987), p.32 n.2l. 
121Ex. 12:16, Lev. 23:2,23:3,23:4,23:7,23:8,23:21,23:24,23:27, 23:35, 23:36, 23:37, Num. 28:25. 
122Barrett, Dunn, Fee and Fitzmyer all fail to mention the Septuagintal background. 
123Kasemann (ET 1980), p.15. Cranfield (1975), p.70 also rejects any connection. For a major 
commentary accepting a connection one has to go back to Sanday & Headlam (1896), pp.12-13. 
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application to them of Israel's mantle as the people of God. A term which previously 
referred to a specific cultic occasion is now applied to the whole life of the people of 
God, so providing us with an example of the extension of the holy into every part of life. 
In relation to the church, Paul takes even further the process already begun within Israel, 
and perhaps also provides his converts with one means of coming to terms with a new 
faith which, when considered from a Gentile perspective, appeared to lack a cult. 
This feature of Gentile Christianity may well have been controversial. 
As Dunn notes, "the fact that Gentiles should count themselves a:YlOt when they offered 
no sacrifices, called no man 'priest', practised no rite of circumcision, must have been 
puzzling to most pagans and offensive to most Jews. "124 A term previously used to set 
Israel apart from the nations in terms of faithful law observance (Lev. 20:22-26), now 
refers to churches predominantly composed of Gentiles. By applying terms denoting 
separateness to those who formerly counted as those to be separated from, Paul uses the 
concept of calling to articulate his claim that Gentiles are now part of the people of God. 
As he says at Rom. 9:25-26, quoting from Hos. 2:23, KaAECS'(o 'tov ou Aaov Jlou 
Aaov Jlou.l25 In doing so, Paul not only asserts the common standing of those Jews and 
Gentiles who believe in Christ, but also separates his Gentile converts from those 
Gentiles who remain outside God's people. The fact that those are included who were 
previously excluded throws into even sharper relief a point on which Paul and his critics 
would have agreed: the call which God gives is to be part of the people which he has set 
apart for himself In terms of identity, this is what it means to be called. 126 
124Dunn (1988), p.20. 
125See also Hos. 1:10 
1260ther terms which might be thought to give further expression to this idea include KA:rrtoi 'IT]cmu 
Xptcr'tou (Rom. 1:6) and d<; Kotvroviav 'tou ulou au'tou (1 Cor. 1:9). For discussion ofthese terms 
see p.76 and below, p.84 respectively. 
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3.3.5 Who is Called - Individuals or Groups? 
Having argued that calling grants a new identity principally in terms of 
belonging to the people of God, it might be thought self-evident that the concept of 
calling is primarily a communal one. This is certainly true in terms of the results of 
calling. Paul seems little interested in calling as an individual experience, and there is no 
hint that its results are conceived primarily in terms of the benefits it brings to 
individuals. Paul never refers to an individual as a saint (a:ytoc;), but speaks only of 
saints (a:ytol). He also speaks of the Corinthians as called by God EtC; KOlvcoviav 'to\) 
'\)10\) au'tO\) (lCor. 1:9). This ambiguous genitive construction could denote calling 
into fellowship with Christ, or it could denote calling into the fellowship of which Christ 
is the head, i.e., the church. Most commentators regard each as implying the other, but 
there is disagreement as to where the primary emphasis falls. 127 Yet whichever meaning 
is primary, the form of the verb EKA "STl'tE is aorist passive second person plural. Even 
if the fellowship into which they were called is primarily with Christ it is understood in a 
collective rather than an individual manner, and is something which they enjoy as a 
community. Paul understands that to which people are called in predominantly communal 
terms. 
However, in terms of what people are called as, the picture is very 
different. It is true that in 1 Cor. 1 :26f. Paul discusses calling in a way which stresses 
God's election of the socially disadvantaged but, in what has become a crucial phrase in 
Corinthian studies, his ou 1tOAAOi (1:26) indicates that although there were very few in 
127Campbell, KY. (1932), p.380 takes this phrase as a genitive of the thing shared, i.e. those called 
share together in Christ. See also Barrett (1971b), p.40. Witherington (1995), p.89 agrees, and 
emphasises that this fellowship involves concrete, practical sharing of wealth and possessions. On this 
view the phrase primarily concerns the relationship of Christians with one another. However, such 
reasoning seems false. For if concrete, practical sharing among Christians is sharing Christ, then it is 
difficult to see any distinction between the two possible meanings. One is the other, for as one shares 
Christ, one is equally both in fellowship with him and with fellow Christians. However, majority 
opinion favours fellowship with Christ. See Conzelmann (ET 1975), p.29; Fee (1987), p.45; Godet (ET 
1886), p.60; Lightfoot (1895), p.150. 
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the church who could claim to be wise, or powerful, or well-born, there were some. 128 
Further, it is obvious that not every person who might be termed foolish, or weak, or 
despised, is called. Paul may understand God's calling to have a social pattern but, given 
that its purpose is omot; f.lTl KaUXrlcrl1'tat micra crcip~ EVc01ttOV 't01) 8E01) (1 Cor 
1:29), it is clear that this pattern is not rigid. Its intention is to undermine any notion that 
social status is of ultimate significance before God, not to establish low social status as a 
qualification for divine approval instead of high social status. Those who are called may 
be drawn predominantly from certain social groups, but they are called as individuals and 
not as groups. When Paul discusses calling in relation to social groups in 1 Cor. 7: 17-23, 
he nevertheless speaks in the first instance to individuals. In his rhetorical questions at 
7: 18 his interrogative pronouns are singular ('tt, 'ttt;),129 and when at 1 Cor. 7: 21 he asks 
001)AOt; EKArl811t;; the form of the verb is aorist passive second person singular. 
When we tum to ethnic status, we find a similar emphasis on the 
individual. Paul does speak of Israel being called as a nation,130 but he also speaks of 
Jews being called to be in Christ on the same basis as Gentiles.l3l The message of Christ 
crucified is a stumbling block to Jews and a folly to Greeks, but not so to 'tOtt; 
KA l1'tOtC;, 'Iouoatotc; 'tE Kat "BAA l1crtV (1 Cor. 1:24). Not only are both Jews and 
Greeks called, but those who are called do not share the attitude towards Christ and his 
cross characteristic of the ethnic groups from which they come. Although Paul does not 
articulate it, his various statements imply that Jewish Christians are in receipt of two 
callings, one which comes to them by virtue of their membership of the people of Israel, 
and one which brings them to be in Christ. The first of these callings comes to them as a 
birthright, but the second calling is always experienced by people as a historical event or 
128See Theissen (ET 1982), pp.70-73. For discussion of the recent challenge to Theissen from Justin 
Meggitt, see below, pp.197-98. 
129See also his questions to the married at 1 Cor. 7:16. 
13oRom. 9:7, 11:29. 
l3lRom. 9:24, 1 Cor. 1:24. 
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process within their own lives. 132 The first of these callings in no way reduces their need 
for the second, and this second calling comes to them not on the basis of their being 
Jewish but on the basis oftheir being human. OU yap ECrttV ()taO''tOA:f\, naV'tE<; yap 
rUla'tOV Kat UO''tEp01)V'tat 't11<; ()O~ll<; 't01) 8E01) (Rom. 3:22-23). God calls both 
Jews and Gentiles, but he does not call them because they are Jews or Gentiles. 
Membership of an ethnic group is no more of a qualification for divine approval than 
social status. Although it is given in order for those called to become part of his people, 
God's call to be in Christ is not conceived of by Paul as given to groups, but as given to 
individuals. 
3.3.6 Calling and Ethnic Status 
It is therefore clear that, in terms of salvation, Paul regards ethnic 
status as irrelevant. At Rom. 9:24, in the context of a discussion of divine election, Paul 
speaks of those whom God has called ou I-L0VOV E~ 'Iou()alrov eX'A'Aa Kat E~ 
E8vcOv. In doing so he seems to move beyond what is said at 1 Cor. 1:24, for the phrase 
E~ ('out of) could be taken to imply that, by virtue of being called, Christians cease to be 
Jews or Gentiles, something tantamount to a demand for the elimination of ethnic 
difference. Dunn denies this, writing that "the sense of the 'us' as a new and distinct body 
(cf Eph. 2:15), let alone a 'third race', is still over the horizon. "133 This denial is perhaps 
insufficiently nuanced. On the one hand, Paul is certainly advocating that Jews and 
Gentiles be a single community in Christ, and the fact that some Jews are called but not 
others, some Gentiles but not others, means that at the deepest level Jews and Gentiles 
who are called to be in Christ have more in common with each other than with Jews or 
Gentiles who are not called. They are a new and distinct body in the sense that the 
church must become "virtually the primary group for its members, supplanting all other 
1320ther terms are employed to speak of God's pre-historical prior knowledge and decision. Calvin (ET 
1961), p.182 comments on the place of calling in the sequence of divine actions listed at Rom. 8:30, 
"God by his calling openly testifies to his hidden purpose." See also Barrett (1971a), pp.169-70; 
Cranfield (1975), p.432. 
133Dunn (1988), p.570. 
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loyalties. "134 Paul's insistence that ethnic status plays no part in salvation cannot but have 
sociological consequences. 
On the other hand, there are limits to the impact of these sociological 
consequences upon the ethnic identity of those who are called. Dunn is right that Paul is 
not demanding the adoption of a third ethnic identity. Paul can tolerate nothing which 
imposes Jewishness as a requirement for church membership, hence his sustained fury in 
Galatians towards those seeking to persuade his converts to be circumcised; yet this does 
not mean that he believes in a third race for to do so, far from maintaining his sense that 
ethnic status counts for nothing in relation to salvation, would grant it significance. Paul 
does not believe those called to be Christians to have ceased to be either Jews or 
Gentiles; his aim is not to obliterate difference. 135 This can be clearly seen in the advice 
he gives concerning circumcision at 1 Cor. 7:18-19.136 His main point is an expected 
one, fI 1tEpt'toJltl OUbEV E(ntV, Ked fI ci:KpoJ3uO''tia OUbEV EO''ttV (7: 19). Whether 
a person is circumcised or not is unimportant but, precisely because it is not, he has 
already given instruction that the person who was circumcised when called must not 
remove the marks of circumcision, and the person who was not circumcised when called 
must not now become so. Paul says both Jltl E1ttO'1tci0'800, and Jltl 1tEPt'tEJlVE0'800 
(7: 18), and with apparently no exceptions. To permit or encourage epispasm would 
suggest something undesirable about Jewishness, so granting significance to ethnic status 
134Meeks (1983), p.78. A clear expression of this distinctness comes at 1 Cor. 12:2 where, in relation to 
worship, Paul speaks of being Gentile in the past tense: 01.00:1:E O'tl O'tE MVll Tl'tE 1tpOC; 't<X dOCOA(x' 
't<X aq,cov(X. WC; d.v TJyE<JeE a.1t(X.y6~EVOt. 
135In this respect, Kasemann (ET 1980), p.273 helpfully expresses the significance of Rom. 9:24 in 
eschatological terms. "If the t~ can be related to h:dAE<JEV, it (the church) is in fact called out ofthe 
peoples of the old aeon. " Paul's relativisation of ethnic difference with regard to salvation reflects the 
degree to which the new aeon has arrived, his acceptance of the continuance of ethnic difference the 
degree to which it has still to be realised. The same is true in relation to Gal. 3:28 with its famous 
statement that in Christ there is neither Jew nor Greek. 
136This advice comes in the course of Paul's discussion of marriage, and 7: 17-24, where Paul digresses 
in order to discuss calling in relation to ethnic status and to social status, seems designed to illustrate the 
principles shaping his advice on marriage. There is nothing to suggest that either Jew-Gentile or slave-
master relationships were currently causing problems in the church at Corinth. On the basis of Gal. 
3:28, Bartchy (1973), pp.162-65 suggests that these two examples were chosen because they were 
regularly linked with male/female relationships in Paul's own thinking. 
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just as surely as did the demand of others that Gentile Christians be circumcised. 
Robertson and Plummer rightly comment that, "A Jew when he becomes a Christian, is 
not ostentatiously to drop all Jewish customs and modes oflife. "137 Paradoxically, Paul 
issues a demand for the maintenance of ethnic distinction in order to demonstrate its 
ultimate insignificance. His ideal is not a church in which ethnic distinction is obliterated, 
but one in which it continues without defining or impairing community. 138 
3.3.7 Calling and Social Status 
Such conclusions concerning ethnic distinction are not drawn from 1 
Cor. 7: 18-19 as often as one might expect, because at first sight they appear to have 
unpalatable consequences for the exegesis of 7:20-24 where Paul applies the same 
principles to the social status of those who are slaves.139 At 7: 21 he writes, OOUAOC; 
EKA:it8T}C;; JlTt O'Ot Jl£AE'tCO< ciAA' £1 Ked &uvacrat EA£u8£poC; y£vEcr8at, 
JlaAAOV xpncrat. The meaning is unclear, since it is difficult to determine whether the 
final clause should be supplied with freedom (,instead use freedom'), or slavery ('indeed 
use slavery').l40 Yet, presumably, if ethnic distinctions have a positive value for Paul then 
so must social ones, and it initially seems as if we are pushed towards the 'use slavery' 
option. 141 Bomkamm summarises Paul's principles thus: "in themselves all outward 
137Robertson & Plummer (1911), p.146. Today the tone of this comment sounds somewhat patronising 
but, regarded as of its time, it displays remarkable insight. 
1381 thus disagree with Boyarin (1994), p.8 when he writes of Paul that "his system required that all 
human cultural specificities - first and foremost, that of the Jews - be eradicated, whether or not the 
people in question were willing." However, what Paul has done is to uncouple religious and ethnic 
identity, and so Boyarin is correct to point out that tolerating ethnic difference within the Christian 
community does not remove the offensiveness of Paul's attitude to those for whom Jewish difference is of 
central religious importance. While recognising that it also does not remove that offensiveness, I would 
hold that a verse like 1 Cor. 7: 18 moves Paul a step beyond mere 'tolerance', and grants ethnic 
distinction a positive value within his thought even though it no longer defines religious identity. After 
all, ethnicity is something that God has appointed (!lEpi~(J) - 1 Cor. 7: 17). 
139E.g. Bartchy (1973), p.138, who astonishingly comments on 7: 18-19 that "Paul's point is not that the 
changes he mentions are prohibited. Rather, he claimed that the question of religious status is not at all 
important. " 
14°Opinion has always been split amongst scholars [Chrysostom, (ET 1839), p.253, records 
disagreement in his day], and this continues in the recent commentaries. For 'indeed use slavery' see 
Barrett (1971b), p.170 and Conzelmann (ET 1975), p.127. For 'instead use freedom' see Fee (1987), p. 
315-18; Schrage (1995), pp.139-40; Witherington (1995), pp.181-85. 
141Combes (1998), pp.56-58 argues in precisely this way. Paul allows exceptions to his advice not to 
seek a change in marital status, but not to his advice about ethnic status. Since the structure of his 
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circumstances whatsoever are no longer of importance; as regards the salvation of 
believers, they have basically ceased to be absolute and do not enter into religion. At the 
same time they are, and continue to be, of supreme importance because they denote the 
specific place on earth and history where Christ has already made believers free for a 
new existence."142 Bornkamm has already concluded both that Paul wishes none of his 
readers to change their ethnic status, and that he wishes Christian slaves to refuse any 
offer of manumission. It seems that attention to the principles of Paul's argument tends to 
produce readings of7:21 which favour remaining in slavery.143 Is this connection a valid 
one? 
Certainly it is difficult to see how Paul's statements of principle in 7: 17 
and 7: 20 could be understood as doing anything other than assigning a similar 
importance to social status as to ethnic distinction. At 7: 17 Paul instructs that each 
person is to walk cO~ EJl£ptO"EV 6 KUpto~, EKCXO"'tOV cO~ K£KA 11KEV 6 OE6~. The 
use of the verb JlEpi~c:o, with its sense of dividing or apportioning, suggests that Paul 
means that an individual's circumstances have been appointed by God, something which 
quite clearly implies divine responsibility for the position of those in slavery.l44 Further, 
at 7: 20 Paul talks of each one remaining EV 'tTI KA itO"Et 11 EKA it011 (in the calling in 
argument connects slavery and ethnic status more closely than slavery and marriage, he cannot intend 
an exception in relation to slavery. See below, pp.92-94, for my reasons for dissenting from this view. 
142Bornkamm (ET 1971), p.2IO. Bornkamm perhaps overstates things in his second sentence, where the 
adjective 'supreme' rather muddies the distinction between the importance of circumstances here, and 
their irrelevance in relation to salvation. There is also perhaps a false distinction between outward 
circumstances and inward religion hovering in the background. As we saw in relation to ethnic status, 
Paul's approach cannot but have sociological consequences. Nevertheless, the broad thrust of 
Bornkamm's summary, i.e., that social circumstances are completely irrelevant in one way, but still 
significant in another, is correct. 
143Harrill (1995), pp.76-77. "Most of those scholars who stress grammatical and syntactical 
considerations prefer the 'take freedom' option, whereas most of those who stress context prefer the 'use 
slavery' interpretation." Also Bartchy (1973), p.23; Dawes (1990), p.689. Combes (1998), pp.56-58 
argues for 'use slavery' entirely on the basis of context, ignoring most of the grammatical issues. 
144Despite the discomfort such a thought provokes, it is difficult to see how a monotheist could believe 
anything else, since God could have ordered things otherwise. Although it is far from Paul's mind, his 
words implicitly raise questions of theodicy. Why has God allowed some to endure slavery but spared 
others? 
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which he was called). 145 Here he seems to come close to identifying the circumstances of 
his readers when they became Christians as their calling. Many commentators assume 
that Paul does not mean what he appears to say. c.K. Barrett is representative when he 
writes, "Paul is not thinking primarily of a vocation to which a man is called, but of the 
condition in which a man is when the converting call of God comes to him and summons 
him to the life of Christian faith and obedience." 146 This position carries some credibility 
since if Paul is saying that the social circumstances of his readers are their calling, then he 
would be doing more than granting such circumstances significance as the location in 
which Christ has set the believer free to live a new existence. Given that elsewhere Paul 
consistently equates calling and conversion, he would be granting social status the 
ultimate significance which the rest of his argument appears so concerned to deny to it. 
Far from urging his readers not to alter their social status because it is of no ultimate 
importance before God, he would be urging them not to desire such change because 
social status is of such ultimate importance. 
We are therefore left with readings of 7: 20 which either strain the 
meaning of Paul's words in an attempt to separate calling from social circumstances, 147 
or which equate the two in apparent contradiction to the rest of Paul's argument. 148 A 
productive hint as to the way out of this impasse is offered by Epictetus, who, as we 
have seen, asks hypothetical philosophers, complaining to God about their 
circumstances, whether this is the way in which they are going to disgrace 'tTW KA flO't v 
ftv K£KA TlKEV (the calling which he has called). 149 Despite the differences in the tenses 
of the verbs and the cases of the nouns, here is a statement which combines the noun and 
145Bartchy (1973), pp.132-55 takes the calling in which one must remain as simply that of being a 
Christian. This is not credible since it would then be difficult to establish any relationship between 7:20 
and either 7:18-19, or 7:21-24. Paul's examples are not concerned with remaining a Christian, but with 
the social circumstances in which the believer is found by Christ. See Fee (1987), p.314 n.35 & n.36. 
146Barrett (l971b), p.168. See also Fee (1987), p.314, Lightfoot (1895), p.228; Murphy-O'Connor 
(1979), pp.69-70; Talbert (1987), p.4l. 
1470fwhich the most striking recent example is Elliott, N. (1995), pp.35-36. 
148E.g. Hering (ET 1962), p.55: Paul "does not mean the calling which makes us Christians but that 
which we have to actualise by accepting our situation in life. " 
149Diss. l.29.49. See above, p.67. 
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the verb in a way curiously similar to Paul. 150 Attention is drawn to this by Weiss, who 
concludes of Epictetus' use of calling that, "dieser Sprachgebrauch nahert sich also 
unsrem 'Beruf an. "151 Once this connection to 'occupation' or 'profession' is established it 
is a short step to his conclusion that "die Lebensverhaltnisse seiber sind die Form, in der 
die besondere christliche KA llene; an den Einzelnen ergeht, darum darfen sie selbst 
KAllcne; heiBen. "152 
One doubts whether Weiss has properly understood Epictetus,153 who 
compares those philosophers complaining of harsh circumstances with tragic actors who 
confuse their costumes with themselves. 154 The philosopher must be prepared to accept 
the role of a person in rags as readily as that of a governor. 155 Thus, philosophy is not 
equivalent to an occupation or profession. It is something deeper, for whether or not one 
enjoys the profession of governor is irrelevant to the moral good which is within the 
grasp of each individual. The calling of which Epictetus speaks is a calling to be a 
philosopher, and not a calling to any particular set of social circumstances; yet, the 
philosopher cannot fulfil this calling without embracing whatever circumstances happen 
150In Paul the verb refers to the one called and so is aorist passive, and the noun dative; in Epictetus, the 
verb refers to God and so is perfect active, and the noun accusative. 
l5lWeiss (1910), p.1S7. Epictetus' words are also noted by Lightfoot (lS95), p.229; Hering (ET 1962), 
p.55 n.19. 
152ibid. 
153Deming (1995), p.167, also rejects Weiss' position. Yet rather than argue that Weiss has 
misunderstood Epictetus, Deming concludes that there is no genuine parallel between Epictetus' concept 
of calling and that of Paul. Citing Bonhoffer, he argues instead that for Epictetus calling is only an 
occasional conunission, received from God by someone who is already a philosopher, and who must now 
meet a particularly challenging situation. In fact, this is not quite what Bonhoffer (1911), p.20S says, 
"Bei Epiktet aber ist die KA:TlOl.C; entweder eine auBerordentliche gottliche Berufung zu einer 
au.Berordentlichen Lebensaufgabe, zu einem llap'tuptOv, oder aber jeder durch die Umstande sich 
anzeigende Aufruf zur Erfullung einer bestimmten sittlichen Pflicht." Although Epictetus does not use 
calling to refer back to the event of conversion to philosophy, he does use it to express what it is to be a 
philosopher (see above, pp.6S-69). Trying circumstances do not represent merely occasional 
conunissions - the philosopher should practise (IlEAE'taro) suffering - Diss. 2.1.39. Deming also 
proposes that Stoicism has influenced the Corinthians, who perceive themselves to have received a call 
to face a trying situation, which crisis justifies abandoning their non-Christian spouses. Deming points 
to Epictetus, Ench. 7, where on receipt of a call from God, the philosopher must be ready to leave behind 
wife and child. However, since this applies especially to an old man (yeprov), the call which God gives 
seems to refer to death, not to a crisis within life. 
154Diss. 1.29.41. ~0''t<X'L xpOVOC; 'taxa, tv cP Ot 'tpayq>80t 01.1l0'0V't<X'L e<X'\)'touc; E!V<X'L 
1tpoO'ro1tEla Kat tllJ3aoac; Kat 'to O'uPlla. 
155 Diss. 1.29.44-49. 
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to pertain. Paul's argument has the same force. The Christian slave is called to be a 
Christian, not a slave; yet, this calling cannot be fulfilled unless slavery is accepted. 
Godet is right when he insists that slavery itself is not the calling, but also that, "the idea 
of the call must be taken to embrace all the external circumstances which furnish the 
occasion and determine the manner of it. "156 The social circumstances in which a person 
was converted do not constitute their calling, but Paul would think that an overt concern 
to change them was inconsistent with the call to be in Christ. 157 
Thus, Paul is consistent in his statements of principle and, whether in 
relation to ethnic or social status, he teaches both that a person's circumstances cannot 
affect their standing before God, and that, however difficult, such circumstances are to 
be accepted. 158 Yet, despite this, Paul does teach that in light of 1:iIv EVEc!'twO"av 
civd:YK1lV (7:26), some social circumstances are relatively better than others. He says of 
those who marry, 8At\jf1V OE 1:TI O"apKl e;ouo"lv Ot 1:0101)1:01, EYW OE UllcOV 
<j>Eioolla1 (7:28). Although marriage is not in itself bad, aflliction really is something 
undesirable and, where possible, something to be avoided rather than a test to be 
welcomed. Yet any afllictions brought by marriage must be accepted if one was married 
when one was called; they do not justify seeking change. One's calling must be lived out 
in the circumstances in which it was received, despite the fact that not all circumstances 
are equally good. This raises the question of change which comes despite its not being 
sought, and whether it may be accepted. The advice of 7: 15 that the unbelieving spouse 
156Godet (ET 1886), p.356. 
157Winter (1995), pp.159-63 offers an alternative explanation. Citing Dionysius of Harlicarnassus, 4.18, 
he proposes that the noun KA:ftmc; is a technical term meaning 'class' or 'rank' in society, so that 7:20 is 
simply an instruction to remain in the same social circumstances as when one was called. Dionysius 
claims that the Latin word ciassis was derived from KATtmc;, because when the Roman army had been 
called out in former times, it had arranged itself in groups according to social status. This sounds like a 
doubtful story (Liddell & Scott conclude their reference to it with an exclamation mark) but, even if true, 
for a Latin word to have its origin in Greek does not prove that the Greek word bore the same meaning. 
Etymological influence does not flow backwards! Winter produces no examples from Greek literature of 
KATtmc; having this meaning. 
158Paul's final statement of principle at 7:24 reinforces this double focus: EKacr'toc; EV cP EKA"e11, 
ci8EA~O{, EV 'tmJ'tq> ~EvE'tco napa eEq>. One is not to seek to change one's circumstances, but the 
preposition EV gives a clear distinction between these circumstances and the calling received. 
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desiring a divorce should not be resisted suggests that it may and, if so, then it does not 
necessarily follow from Paul's principles that his advice in 7:21 must be to refuse 
manumission. If he regards slavery as a less advantageous state in which to serve Christ, 
then his advice could be to accept manumission. 159 
To say this clarifies another important point, namely that although 
Paul's principles are consistent, the nature of his examples varies. 160 In regard to ethnic 
status any change is prohibited, both because in this case Paul regards the two states as 
absolutely equal, and because, in normal circumstances, neither circumcision nor 
epispasm can be an unsought change. An unbelieving spouse might decide to leave, and a 
master might decide to grant manumission,161 but an individual has to seek circumcision 
or its reversal. We are therefore left to ask whether Paul does regard slavery as relatively 
less advantageous than being freed. There is nothing in Paul's advice about slavery which 
even hints at an answer either way,162 but one of the reasons which he gives for 
preferring celibacy over marriage seems to apply equally well to freedom and slavery. If 
a married man or woman is anxious to please their spouse to the detriment of their 
devotion to the things of the Lord (7:32-35), then it is difficult to see how the same is 
not true of a slave wishing to please a master. 163 In relation to its context, interpreting 
7:21 as in favour of accepting manumission is at least as credible as the alternative. 
159Note that despite his dismissive attitude towards manumission (see above, pp.69-70), Epictetus, Diss. 
3.22.67-76 suggests that the Cynic should not marry in order to devote himself without distraction 'tTI 
OtaKOVtq, 'tou aEOU. 
160See Dawes (1990), pp.694-97. 
161 As manumission was often perceived to be a reward for hard work and loyal service, the slave who 
took Paul's advice and did not worry about being a slave might be no less likely to receive an offer of 
manumission than the slave who worked hard out of a deep desire to secure manumission. 
162Jfit is intended literally (see below, pp.96-97), then it might be thought that Paul's advice in 7:23b, 
J.lrl yiVEO'aE OOUA,Qt <ivapoom.ov, establishes a preference for being freed. However, were 7:21b to 
mean 'indeed use slavery', then Paul could simply be against change either way, as in the case of ethnic 
status. Only once one has already decided that 7:21b means 'rather use freedom' does a literal reading of 
7:23b make slavery sound the less desirable state. 
163To say this is not to confuse manumission with emancipation. A freedman or woman often had 
continuing obligations to their former master. See below, pp.95-96. Yet neither is a single person 
automatically freed from all family ties and obligations. It is a matter of degree. 
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When one adds to this the strong grammatical and syntactical grounds 
in favour of 'rather use freedom', then it becomes substantially the more likely option. 164 
In the most recent detailed work on the subject, Harrill uses new technology to 
demonstrate by means of word searches that the adverb I-lciAAOV is much more often 
adversative than intensive. 165 This adds to the force of several frequently made points, 
the strongest of which are that (i) in a sentence where a word has to be supplied, it is 
usually taken from that sentence, and so in this case EA£u8£poC;,166 (ii) in 7: 11 and 7:28 
£1 Kat means 'if indeed' rather than 'even if, and is therefore also likely to do so here, 
and (iii) the ciAAci with which 7:2Ib begins leads us to expect an exception to Paul's 
advice not to worry about slavery, whereas an intensification of that advice would 
require 'and'.167 Thus, Paul advises those who are slaves that they should accept 
manumission if the opportunity presents itself 
One should not make too much of this conclusion. The relentless 
attention focused on 7:2Ib owes much to Christian embarrassment at the failure of the 
New Testament to condemn the institution of slavery. 168 Yet what is gained by showing 
164Bartchy (1973), pp.96-120 attempts to introduce another type of criterion, arguing that slaves in the 
ancient world could not refuse manumission, and so for Paul to have advised against it would have been 
pointless. This is effectively rebutted by Harrill (1995), pp.88-90 who produces evidence of some 
circumstances where slaves might formally decline manumission and, pp.98-99, points out that one 
cannot 'read off' social reality from legal convention. 
165Harrill (1995), pp.108-21. This renders unlikely the usual opposing translation 'indeed use slavery' 
but, despite the fact that Harrill does not acknowledge it, still leaves open the possibility that ~&AAOV is 
adversative to the immediately preceding clause, where Paul mentions the opportunity of becoming free. 
Thus, there is no one decisive point which can determine the proper translation. The case for 'rather use 
freedom' is a cumulative one. 
166This highlights a particular difficulty with the conclusion of Bartchy (1973), p.120 that "Paul was 
urging any person in the Corinthian congregation who had received the call (KAll<J1.<;) of God in Christ 
when he was in legal and social slavery to continue to 'use' (in the sense of 'live in' or 'obey') this call 
after his manumission, i.e., in his new status as freedman." In this case the object ofthe verb to be 
supplied is KAll<J1.<; (7:20) from two sentences previously. 
167For an excellent summary of all the grammatical points in favour of supplying 'freedom' as the object 
of the verb see Fee (1987), pp.316-17. 
168Bartchy (1973), p.62: "What hindered Paul or Christian slaves and Christian owners from drawing 
the kind of social consequences from the Gospel which were drawn by the abolitionists in the nineteenth 
century?" The clear implication of the question is that they ought to have drawn such consequences. 
Harrill (1995), p.94f. is scathingly critical of Bartchy's attempts to evade the absence of an abolitionist 
ethos in Paul. Perhaps most seriously, this attempt leads Bartchy to make unprovable statements 
asserting the humane nature of slavery in the first century, e.g., Bartchy (1973), p.72: "Most slaves were 
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that Paul looked favourably on manumission? In the ancient world, as distinct from the 
Caribbean and the American South in the nineteenth century, manumission was a regular 
practice. It was part of the institution of slavery, an incentive for individuals which 
served to maintain the institution as a whole, and for Paul to accept or encourage it does 
not make him a social radical. 169 
Yet that does not mean that Paul's teaching on slavery lacks 
sociological consequences. We concluded in relation to ethnic distinctions that Paul 
wished them to continue, but without defining or impairing community, and the same is 
true in relation to social status. 170 Paul does not expect distinctions in social status to be 
eradicated, but neither does he expect them to determine status within the church, or to 
determine who is part of the church. Evidence for this is found in 7:22, where Paul 
justifies his advice in 7:21 by saying, 6 yap EV Kupiq> KA:Tl8EiC; 80UAOC; 
0:1tEAEU8EPOC; Kupiou EO"'tiv, 6~oiwC; 6 EAEU8EPOC; KATJ8EiC; 80UAOC; EO"'ttV 
XptO"'tou.l71 As Dale Martin points out, the logic of this statement is not to assert the 
equality of all Christians. l72 Instead it establishes an inverse relationship between social 
status and status in Christ. In ancient society, to be manumitted and so become a 
treated well." Bartchy also, pp.114-l6, emphasises the lack of distinction in terms of economic and 
material well-being between being a slave and being free but poor, thus betraying a failure to grasp the 
strength of notions of honour as a motivating force in Graeco-Roman society. 
169See Harrill (1995), pp.74-75. 
170The difference is, as argued above, that whereas Paul makes no such distinction between being 
Jewish or Gentile, Paul does regard being free as relatively more advantageous in relation to the 
Christian life than slavery. 
171 Given that manumission was a perfectly normal feature of slavery to which slaves might be expected 
to aspire, it seems unlikely that Paul would need to eXl'lain or justify his advice that they might accept 
manumission. I therefore understand 7:22 to explain why it is that Christian slaves need not be 
concerned by their social status (7:2la). 
172Martin (1990), pp.60-68. Many of his insightful remarks about 1 Cor. 7:22 seem to me valid whether 
or not one accepts his wider thesis that because slavery could be a means of upward social mobility for a 
minority of 'managerial' slaves, slavery to Christ could be understood as a positive metaphor for 
salvation as social mobility and power by association. For critical reviews see Combes (1992) and Harrill 
(1992). Rather than reflecting social reality, I would suggest that the positive value given to slavery to 
Christ within early Christianity is a deliberately counter-cultural contradiction of it. That to which 
society accords shame, God has accorded honour. Certainly this understanding is consistent with what 
Paul says about calling at 1 Cor. 1:26-31. In relation to 7:22 this means not that Paul is saying that those 
who are free in society but who are slaves in Christ occupy a shameful position, but that he is 
challenging them to embrace this way of thinking about their identity as a worthy one. 
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freedman or freedwoman (cl1tEAEU8EpO~) did not emancipate a slave, replacing 
subservience with autonomy. There remained defined obligations to one's former master, 
who would now be one's patron. 173 What it did do was to raise the former slave to a 
higher position within the social hierarchy of a household. Thus, to say that the person 
who is a slave in society is a freedman or woman of the Lord, while the person free in 
society is his slave, grants the slave a higher status in Christ than the free person. 
This may be something of a rhetorical flourish, and one wonders 
whether Paul really expected to find authority within the church largely in the hands of 
slaves. Yet the flourish very clearly makes the point that the status in Christ of those who 
have been called cannot be determined by their social status. "The gospel 
counterbalances the differences in worldly status. "174 A high social status does not 
necessarily lead to a high status in Christ, nor a low social status to a low status in 
Christ. Paul's rhetoric must have been enjoyed by those in the Corinthian congregation 
who were slaves, but one wonders how any possessing relatively high social status felt 
about it. They may have found difficult Paul's holding apart of social status and status in 
Christ, and doubtless he would have responded that they were wrong to allow human 
ideas about social status to determine their attitude. This seems to be the import of the 
instruction in 7:23b, Jl:rl YlvEcr8E 80UAOt clv8pwmov. Some take this as a literal 
instruction not to sell oneself into slavery in times of hardship,175 but given that Paul 
speaks in such a clearly metaphorical way in 7:22 and 7:23a, one doubts that a sudden 
switch back to literal instruction would corne unsignalled. Rather he is telling the whole 
congregation that they have been paid for by Christ,176 and that therefore they should not 
173Martin (1990), p.33 and p.64: "Had Paul wished to emphasise the eschatological freedom of the 
person in Christ, he would have used the word eleutheros, not apeleutheros. The second had definite 
social significance in that it stressed the relationship of the freed person with the patron." See also Duff 
(1928), chapter 3; Harrill (1995), p.4; Wiedemann (1987), p.28. 
174Horrell (1996), p.160. 
175Barrett (1971b), p.17l; Bartchy (1973), pp.18l-82; Martin (1990), p.66. 
176The point that Paul is addressing the whole congregation is an important one since whereas in 7:21 
he issued instructions in the second person singular, now he reverts to the second person plural. If his 
advice is literal, those to whom it is addressed include slaves who cannot possibly obey. See Robertson & 
Plummer (1911), p.149. 
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be enslaved to human ideas about social status,177 ideas which he is neither endorsing nor 
seeking to eradicate. 
Thus, Paul's teaching about social status is indeed another illustration 
of the same principles which shaped his advice on ethnic distinctions. Like one's 
ethnicity, a person's social standing has been appointed by God, and social status is 
therefore irrelevant to one's standing before God. 178 In these terms there is nothing to be 
gained by a change in status, and Christian slaves need not be concerned by their being 
such. Instead they should live out their calling in the social location in which they 
received it, accepting any resultant difficulties and afflictions. Yet, precisely because 
social status is to be a matter of such indifference, status within society should not 
determine status within the church, 7: 22 suggesting an inverse relationship between the 
two. The life of the church is to contradict the human wisdom which accords great 
significance to social status, and instead demonstrate its irrelevance. Strange as it sounds 
to us, the acceptance of slavery, and the simultaneous refusal to allow social status to 
shape the life of the church, are both corollaries of the same principle. These are the main 
lines of Paul's teaching on social status and, for him, his advice about manumission is a 
secondary matter. Unlike his advice concerning ethnic distinctions, but like that on the 
issue of marriage, Paul does here allow an exception to his general advice against 
change. Although Christian slaves should not seek an advance in status, they may accept 
manumission if it is granted. In relation to modem scholarship, this summary implies that 
it is a mistake to think that in assessing his teaching on calling and social status we must 
choose between Paul the social conservative who endorses slavery, or Paul the social 
177The difficulty with a metaphorical interpretation of 7: 23b is the variety and vagueness of references 
offered. Chrysostom (ET 1839), p.254 suggests it to mean that the slave must not obey an immoral 
command; Lightfoot (1895), p.230 that it refers to slavishly following the 'party-leaders' of 1: 12; 
Conzelmann (ET 1975), p.128 relates it to slavery to sin. My suggestion is closest to that of Fee (1987), 
p.320: "Paul is probably reflecting once again on their penchant to let merely human wisdom ... dictate 
their present anxieties about the need to be free from certain social settings." This better reflects the 
context of Paul's statement than any of the other proposals. 
178Presumably the implication of Paul's argument is that God does not reward or penalise people for 
what God has appointed. 
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realist who merely tolerates it because it is inevitable. 179 He simply does not think in 
those terms. On the one hand, Paul has no interest in the social betterment of individuals, 
or in notions of personal liberation, or in abolishing the institution of slavery, which was 
to be accepted by slaves with equanimity. On the other, he wishes the church to live in 
Christ, and to fulfil its calling by reflecting a set of assumptions about status derived from 
that reality, rather than from the status practices of Graeco-Roman society.180 
3.3.8 Summary 
In relation to the seven questions set out at the start of the chapter, 
we can summarise our findings in relation to Paul's concept of calling as follows: 
(i) For Paul it is always God who calls, and this reflects his role as 
creator. Paul sometimes discusses calling in a way which directly evokes creation, and 
the rest of his uses of the concept are consistent with that. 
(ii) As one might expect, given his emphasis on calling as creation, 
Paul rarely discusses a human response. The vocabulary of calling is used largely to 
denote the divine dimension of conversion. 
(iii) Paul perceives his call to apostleship as having granted him a 
distinctive task. This distinguishes his calling from that of his converts, whose calling 
I79Bartchy (1973), p.l. Even more anachronistic is Elliott, N. (1995), pp.32-52 who takes the 'instead 
use freedom' reading of7:21, and the reading of Philemon which understands Paul to be advocating the 
manumission ('release') of Onesimus, as evidence that Paul held a more hostile attitude towards slavery 
than is usually supposed. However, this argument confuses manumission with emancipation. See above, 
pp.95-96. 
I80This double focus perhaps explains why some modern readers of Paul find his social attitudes to be 
radical, and others reactionary. Indeed, for all the meaning of 7:21b is a legitimate object of scholarly 
attention, one wonders whether the relentless interest in it, and the comparative neglect of the striking 
words of 7 :22 do not at some level represent an avoidance strategy on the part of modern Christian 
scholars. After all, the abolition of slavery means that manumission is not a live issue in western society, 
but the question of whether it is right for the life of the church to reflect the status assumptions of that 
society remains relevant if neglected. Confronted by attempts to either convict or acquit Paul of 
uncritically endorsing ancient slavery, one is reminded of the dictum that "retrospective indignation is 
also a way to justify the present." Finley (1980), p.64, quoting P. Bordieu. 
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grants them a new identity understood primarily in terms of who they have become 
rather than what they are to do. Yet both those callings are united by their 
interconnected places in the unfolding of God's purposes. 
(iv) Paul's converts have become the people of God, set apart by him. 
This is the purpose of their calling, and its maintenance demands that their 'set apartness' 
be instantiated in moral practice. 
(v) This calling to be part of God's holy people is primarily addressed 
to individuals, and not to existing groups or communities. 
(vi) Nevertheless, the calling to be part of God's people does not mean 
that previous communal identities must be completely cast aside. Ethnic distinctions are 
irrelevant to a person's standing before God, and they must not impair or define the new 
community of the church, but they remain of significance as the locations in which the 
members of God's people received their calling and must live it out. There is nothing to 
be gained by changing one's ethnic status, and Paul prohibits it. 
(vii) Paul has a similar attitude towards social status. Such status has 
continued significance as the location in which the members of God's people receive and 
live out their calling. An advance in status should not be sought, but may be accepted. 
Yet it is irrelevant to a person's standing before God, and status within the church should 
not be determined by status within society. 
3.4 Conclusions 
3.4.1 Paul and Calling: Distinctive Use of a Concept 
The relationship between this summary of Paul's use of KaA£oo K'tA. 
and our earlier findings concerning calling in the Septuagint and in Graeco-Roman 
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philosophy is not a simple one. In some cases there are major similarities, in others major 
differences and, in yet others, partial parallels and precedents: 
(i) Unsurprisingly, Paul's understanding of the God who calls is 
fundamentally the same as that found in the Septuagint, something illustrated by the 
shared understanding that in calling God reveals himself as the one who creates. 
Although Epictetus is far from sharing this perspective, and has a very different formal 
understanding of God, he discusses God in surprisingly personal terms. 181 
(ii) The Septuagint conceIves of God's calling as demanding a 
response, but Paul largely uses responsive language elsewhere, leaving the impression of 
calling as a decisive act of God. Yet although only the Septuagint uses such language in 
relation to K<XAECO K'tA., it, Paul and Diogenes Laertius all frame ideas about response 
in terms of hearing and/or obeying. 
(iii) Paul believes that God calls apostles to a task, and apostleship is 
the only task in relation to which he uses the language of calling. Epictetus is equally 
consistent with his emphasis on the duty of the philosopher to be a witness for the truth, 
but the Septuagint is marked by diversity, with Cyrus, Abraham and Israel all being given 
very different tasks to perform. 
(iv) Paul conceives calling as granting a new identity as part of the 
people of God. In doing so he again draws upon the Septuagint, where God calls his 
people back to him, and back to their true identity. This concept of calling to be a people 
is completely lacking in Epictetus, for whom calling always concerns a task to be fulfilled 
by an individual. 
181 Bonhoffer (1911), pp.37-38 may be correct to focus on the task given to the philosopher, but his 
characterisation of Epictetus' God as a clinical'Feldherr' fails to do justice to the warmth of Epictetus' 
references to God. 
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(v) Yet despite the contrast between this emphasis, and that of Paul on 
the communal results of calling, there is also similarity with Epictetus in that Paul 
understands God's call as one addressed to individuals. Here the Septuagint also provides 
partial precedent in the shape of Cyrus and Abraham, but partial contrast in the central 
importance of the call addressed to God's already constituted people, Israel. 
(vi) Ethnicity is of major importance in relation to calling both in Paul 
and the Septuagint. Second Isaiah extends God's concern beyond the borders of Judaism 
in that Israel is called to be a light to the Gentiles, and in that Cyrus is called and used 
even though he is not aware of it. However, Paul decisively changes the significance of 
ethnicity in relation to calling, rendering it irrelevant in terms of who is called but 
maintaining its importance as the appointed location of a person's calling. 
(vii) Social status is of importance in relation to calling both for Paul 
and Epictetus. Their attitudes are fundamentally similar in stressing that any social 
position must be accepted as a legitimate one in which to live out a calling, but different 
in that Paul expects the ultimate irrelevance of status distinctions to be instantiated in the 
life of a community whereas Epictetus does not. 
These seven points suggest that in comparison to the Septuagint, Paul 
is much more consistent and concrete in the way he employs the concept of calling. All 
who are called know they have been called, all who are called are to become part of 
God's people, a few are granted a particular role as apostles to be the instruments 
through which others are called, while both ethnic and social distinctions are relativised 
in significant ways. Paul has used language from a prophetic genre in a less allusive, 
more historical and personal way. It is hard to imagine the Jewish readers of Isaiah being 
asked 80UAO~ EKA"'811~;182 Such a question expects individuals to be able to look back 
1821 Cor. 7:21 
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and identify their own circumstances when they were called. Given that we are talking 
about Jewish readers, it would be very odd if we were to find such an expectation on the 
part of those included in the calling of the Jewish nation by birth. Yet although there is 
no evidence that Paul would expect each convert to be able to name a specific place and 
moment, for him calling does have a time and a location; above all, it does mark the 
transfer to being in Christ. By applying the concept of calling to the event of coming to 
be in Christ, Paul both introduces the need for a fresh call of God to those who are Jews, 
and individualises calling. These are consequences of using calling as a means to denote 
converSIOn. 
Some of the same distinctive factors in Paul's concept of calling also 
stand out in comparison with Epictetus. One could scarcely say that Epictetus' use of 
calling is less consistent than Paul's or less personal, or that it is more allusive; yet, like 
the Septuagint, Epictetus is also less historical than Paul. Calling expresses something 
essential about what it is to be a philosopher, but it is not used to refer back to a 
converSIon event or process. Nor are the hardships associated with the calling to 
philosophy ever anecdotal. Epictetus does not describe the sufferings of real 
philosophers, but theoretical ones, and this grants his concept of calling a slightly 
abstract quality. This sense of detachment fits the ideals of Epictetus' philosophy, and it 
surfaces again in an area where Paul and Epictetus otherwise display strong similarities. 
Both believe that a person can pursue their calling in any social circumstances, and 
neither wish to sweep status distinctions out of society. Instead they declare in favour of 
an alternative ultimate reality, locating freedom beyond society rather than within it. The 
difference is that for Paul the Christian community is an extension of that ultimate reality 
in this world, and therefore social distinctions are ideally irrelevant in its life. There is an 
activism here and a demand to re-order current reality which is alien to Epictetus, for 
whom to fulfil one's calling is to respond appropriately to trying circumstances, to 
demonstrate that all such realities are a matter of indifference. Again one feels that the 
root cause of such differences is Paul's historical use of calling to denote conversion. 
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The significance of this is further demonstrated by a Jewish text which 
employs KCXAECO K'tA. in a manner much closer to that ofEpictetus than to that of Paul. 
In 4 Maccabees,183 the story is told of a Jewish family who preferred martyrdom to 
acquiescing in the demands of Antiochus Epiphanes that they break the Jewish law. The 
martyrs are presented as displaying loyalty not only to Jewish principles, but also to 
those of Stoicism. The author "in many passages adopts Stoic language and echoes Stoic 
views. "184 Indeed the whole thesis of the work is that devout reason is the master of all 
the passions. 185 At 4 Mace. 11 :20 one of the martyrs declares the sacredness of the 
contest of suffering to which he and his brothers have been called,186 and at 4 Mace. 
16: 16 their mother declares that this contest is one they have been called to in order to 
bear witness for the nation and to fight for the ancestral law. 187 Here is the indifference 
to torture and death of which Epictetus speaks, the emphasis on bearing witness and the 
role of God in giving the calling, the sense that to be called is to receive a summons; and 
all as part of a contest depicted "largely as single combat between each martyr and the 
King. "188 Understandably in the context of a story concerning Gentile persecution of 
Jews, the author displays none of Paul's radicalism in terms of the identity of those whom 
are called. God calls Jews. This means that despite the fact that the martyrs' suffering is 
on behalf of the nation, their calling is exclusively an individual one to perform this task, 
not to become God's people, for this they already are. In short, they are not converts, 
and it is driven home yet one more time that what distinguishes Paul's use of KCXAECO 
K'tA. beyond all else, and what shapes all its other patterns, is that it denotes conversion. 
1834 Maccabees is probably a Diaspora texi of the late first century. See Barclay (1996), pp.448-49. 
184Anderson (1985), p.538. 
185See 4 Macc. 1: 1. 
1866 O£ !3acraVt~6f.lEVOC; cJj l.EP01tPE1tOUC; ayffivoc;, £AEYEV, £$' ov Otd. 'trJv EucrE!3EtaV E'tC; 
YUf.lvacriav 1t6vwv aOEA$oi 'tocrou'tOt KA1l0EV'tEC; OUK £VtKl18llf.lEV. 
187"'0 1ta'ioEC; YEvva'ioc; 6 ayoSv, £$' ov KA1l0EV'tEC; U1t£p 't1lC; otaf.lap'tupiac; 'tou tOvOUC; 
£vaywvi.cracrOE 1tpoOUj.1WC; U1t£p 'tou 1ta'tpcpou v6f.lou. 
188Barclay (1996), p.375. His italics. 
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This distinctive element, which stands out both against earlier biblical 
usage and that of Stoic philosophy, suggests the answer to one of our original questions, 
namely whether Paul used KaAEco K'tA. in the sense of 'to name', or in the sense of 'to 
summon'. Klein opts for the former, arguing that, "the causative component present in 
the sense of the term seems to stress the act of 'appointment to salvation,' irrespective of 
any considerations of human response, rather than 'summons' which implicitly includes 
some response." 189 He is certainly right to note Paul's lack of emphasis on human 
response, but one doubts that it follows that the sense of 'summons' is automatically 
ruled out. While there is indeed the sense of intimacy with God implied by the idea of 
naming, the fact that to be called is to be converted means that it also initiates a new 
identity in terms of belonging to a community. Together with all the ethical 
consequences which flow from it, this supplies the sense of urgency implied by the idea 
of a summons. One suspects that part of the appeal held by this vocabulary for Paul was 
the opportunity it offered to meld existing categories of meaning into distinctive ones 
specific to his new faith. Even as he reproduced previous and contemporary meanings, 
Paul transformed them. 190 
3.4.2 Calling and Practical Consciousness 
As we have seen, the two areas of social life specifically discussed by 
Paul in relation to calling are ethnicity and social status, and it is difficult to 
overemphasise the shift in practical consciousness which acceptance of his teaching 
would entail. To their friends and neighbours, Gentile Christians may not have appeared 
all that different from any other groups of Jewish sympathisers. However, the self-
understanding urged on them by Paul, in which both they and Jewish Christians had been 
called into the fellowship of Christ, replaced ethnicity with faith in Christ as the boundary 
189Klein (1984), pp.63-64. 
190Paul's creative use oflanguage, modifying conventional networks of meaning in order to express his 
new faith, is something I also pursue in relation to his use of forensic and participatory terms and 
categories. See 2.2, 4.3.4, 5.3.2, Appendix 2. 
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which defined community. The alien other was no longer Jewish but unbelieving. Yet as 
Paul's advice against both Gentile circumcision and Jewish removal of the marks of 
circumcision implies (1 Cor. 7: 18), one cannot demonstrate that ethnic distinctions are 
nothing by simply allowing one ethnicity to engulf another. The presumption is 
established that ethnic differences must not divide those who are in Christ, but also that 
one group of Christians may not simply impose their practices on others. The details of 
how this new element of practical consciousness found expression in such sensitive areas 
as table fellowship, Sabbath observance, marriage, attitudes towards other worships etc. 
are usually frustratingly beyond our reach, Paul himself providing a good deal of what 
little we know (Gal. 2; Rom. 14-15, perhaps 1 Cor. 8-10). One can only imagine that the 
difficulties might be considerable. 
The same is true in relation to social status. Considerable practical 
difficulties must surely follow from Paul's insistence that while Christians are to accept 
the status realities of Graeco-Roman society, they are simultaneously not to allow these 
realities to define status within the church. How were two individuals to conduct their 
relationship who were slave and master in terms of their social status, but who, 
according to Paul (1 Cor. 7:22), were also the Lord's freedman and a slave of Christ 
respectively? How were church and society to be held apart? The letter of Philemon with 
its carefully chosen phrases suggests the complexity of the task. How too did Paul expect 
the life of the church to give expression to an alternative set of status assumptions 
without its very existence coming to be seen as a threat by society at large? Whether or 
not there ever were satisfactory workable answers to such questions, a new behaviour-
shaping presupposition has been established. For those who are in Christ, this fact is to 
be the fundamental boundary of their social world, not the fact that some are slaves and 
some masters. The alien other are the unbelieving, not those of a different social status. 
It is clear from both these examples that in using calling to denote 
conversion, Paul has developed a powerful conceptual tool by which to maintain the 
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boundaries of the Christian community. The ties that bind those within the church to 
each other are to be stronger than the ties between themselves and any outside. This is a 
fundamental consequence of the fact that God has called them to be his people, and it 
means that their relationship with one another and their relationship with him are 
inextricably linked. 'How would this action affect my relationship with God?' and 'How 
would this action affect my relationship with my brothers and sisters in Christ?' become 
crucial and connected questions in assessing the appropriateness of behaviour. Thus 
Paul's concept of calling yields the building blocks of a new practical consciousness, and, 
as it does so, both separates and joins. Irrespective of who or what they have been, those 
called to be saints are separated from their own pasts, but included in a new future; 
separated from those who do not share their calling, but joined to those who do. 
4 
Gentile Conversion 
4.1 Introduction 
Having examined one of the principal terminologies used by Paul to 
denote conversion, it is desirable to balance that approach with an examination of 
specific passages where he discusses conversion. To that end this chapter will focus on 
passages which feature Gentile conversion. This will enable further exploration of similar 
themes to those discussed in the previous chapter (3), and also provide a basis for 
comparison when the next chapter (5) moves on to examine passages where Paul speaks 
of his own experience as a Jew who came to believe in Christ. These two chapters are 
therefore framed by the question of whether Paul conceives Gentile and Jewish 
conversion identically, or whether there are differences. Our consideration of ethnic 
status in relation to calling (3.3.6) suggested identity in certain respects, namely the 
irrelevance of ethnic status in determining who is called, and parity of esteem for Jew and 
Gentile in the life of the church. Yet it does not necessarily follow that Paul understands 
his own past life and that of his Gentile converts in identical ways. One of the concerns 
of the present chapter will therefore be Paul's attitude toward Graeco-Roman society as 
revealed by his statements about the conversion of Gentiles. 
The passages selected as vehicles for exploring the theme of Gentile 
conversion are 1 Cor. 14:20-25 and 1 Cor. 6:9-11. These two texts complement each 
other in a number of ways. 14:20-25 concerns the conversion of an individual, whereas 
6:9-11 refers to that of Paul's Corinthian readers collectively. 14:20-25 describes the 
event of a conversion, whereas 6: 9-11 contrasts the position of Paul's Gentile converts 
before their conversion with their position after it. 14:20-25 portrays a hypothetical 
conversion depicting not what Paul believed had happened in any actual case(s) of 
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conversion, but instead what he considered ought to happen;l 6:9-11 relates to his actual 
converts, and does so as the climax of a passage where Paul exposes a gap between their 
actual behaviour and that which he believes should have been implied by their 
conversion. Further, 14:20-25 and 6:9-11 employ different vocabulary and yet, it will be 
contended, display similar concerns. In particular, one of the major themes of this thesis, 
that of the importance of unrecognised sin to Paul's understanding of conversion emerges 
from both passages. One of the terms found in 6:9-11 is the verb OtKCXtOCO, another of 
the principal terms used by Paul to denote conversion. Examination of its use here both 
develops the suggestion that in relation to conversion Paul uses traditional language in 
new and creative ways (see 3.4.1), and prepares the ground for further exploration of 
righteousness terminology (5.3.2 and Appendix 2). 
4.2 The Secrets of the Heart Laid Bare - 1 Cor. 14:20-25 
These verses have received much scholarly attention, and yet 
surprisingly little heed has been paid to the dramatic conversion which Paul pictures in 
vv.24-25. Instead, effort has largely been directed to two other areas. Firstly, there is the 
admittedly difficult and perplexing question of the relationship between Paul's statement 
of principle in v.22 and the examples which he gives to illustrate it. Paul states that 
tongues are a sign for unbelievers and prophecy for believers but, on a first reading (and 
perhaps on subsequent ones as well!), the examples he gives seem to prove the opposite, 
and this has provoked much in the way of exegetical gymnastics.2 Secondly, there is also 
the wider question of what these verses might tell us about the subject under discussion 
in the chapter as a whole, which is the relationship between the gifts of tongues and 
1 Allowance must be made for Paul's need to construct a picture of conversion which fitted his current 
argument, an argument which sought to demonstrate the superiority of prophecy over tongues. Even so, 
the hypothetical nature of the conversion described in 14:20-25 makes these verses highly valuable in 
reconstructing Paul's views on conversion. 
2E.g. Johansen (1979), whose article contains many interesting observations, but whose central 
argument that 1 Cor. 14:22 should be read as a rhetorical question has, to my knowledge, been followed 
only by Talbert (1987), pp.87-88. The ovvofv.23, which makes what follows stand as a consequence of 
the words ofv.22 rather than as a denial of them, is generally held to be fatal to his argument. 
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prophecy and their respective places in the worship of the church. Yet a better line of 
approach can be found via the recognition that vv.20-25 first and foremost concern 
conversion. For Paul, conversion provides a criterion against which the gifts of tongues 
and prophecy can be evaluated, and the signs of v.22 operate in relation to questions of 
conversion. That conversion indeed plays an important role in Paul's wider discussion of 
the relative worth of tongues and prophecy is confirmed by the observation that vv.20-25 
form the climax of that argument. The Ti ouv EO"'ttV, cX.OEA<j)Ot; of v.26 heralds not 
more discussion, but instead practical instructions concerning the conduct of worship 
based on what has been argued previously. Paul therefore clearly regards the discussion 
of conversion in vv.20-25 as having clinched his argumenP 
It does so by demonstrating that prophecy is an adequate agent of 
conversion whereas speaking in tongues is not. "The great deficiency of the gift of 
tongues is that it fails to make clear the fundamental proposition, Jesus is Lord. Tongues 
are thus a quite inadequate evangelistic agency. "4 So, presumably, it is their 
unintelligibility, the same factor that prevents them from building up the church (14: 1-5), 
which is the primary reason why Paul does not believe that tongues can convert an 
outsider. A further indication of this is that when Paul turns to practical instruction on 
the conduct of worship he does not forbid speaking in tongues altogether, but allows it in 
cases where there is interpretation and hence ultimate intelligibility (14:27). Prophecy is 
superior because it can communicate in a way that leads to conversion, a way that in 
Paul's view touches the individual outsider much more deeply and directly than simply 
hearing tongues ever can. With good reason we shall concentrate on the account in 
vv.24&25 of the response of the outsider who hears prophecy. 
Yet there is also another level to Paul's debate with the Corinthian 
Christians. Paul's call in v.20 for them to be mature rather than childish in their thinking 
echoes the language of 1 Cor. 3: 1, where he makes his cutting accusation that they are 
3See Richardson, W. (1986), p.146. 
4Barrett (1971b), p.326. 
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'babes in Christ'. The person who esteems tongues over prophecy has a substantially 
different view of what it is to be a Christian, of what counts as spiritual maturity, from 
the person who takes the opposite view. Thus, the debate as to which gifts of the Spirit 
can produce conversion has implications for the way in which conversion and its 
consequences are understood. Paul's wider argument concerning the relationship 
between the gifts of tongues and prophecy, and the puzzle of the relationship between his 
statement of principle in v.22 and the examples which follow, remain extremely relevant 
to this debate and its implications. It is clear that Paul is attempting to revise the 
Corinthians' estimation of tongues downwards, but not clear whether the high value 
which the Corinthians currently place on this gift is something which reflects a more 
widespread positive evaluation of ecstatic speech acts within Graeco-Roman society and 
religion. The traditional translation ofthe exclamation , ... l<x{vEcr8E (14:23) with which the 
outsider responds to the experience of hearings tongues suggests not. 'You are mad' is 
scarcely a reaction which implies that the outsider finds tongues an attractive 
phenomenon. 5 
However, I have argued elsewhere that a better translation is 'You are 
inspired. '6 If I am right, then it is likely that the reaction of the outsider to the experience 
of hearing tongues is a positive one, and by questioning its desirability Paul is implicitly 
raising the issue of how converts to Christianity are to relate to the dominant values of 
the wider society from which they have come and in which they still live. If their 
5 AV, RSV, REB. The GNB opts for 'You are crazy', the NIV and NRSV for the slightly more ambiguous 
'You are out of your mind.' 
6Unpublished paper presented to the Paul seminar of the British New Testament Conference, Leeds 
1997. It is extremely difficult to find an appropriate English translation for llaiv£cr9£ simply because, 
in ancient society, mental illness and divine inspiration were opposite sides of the same coin. Dodds 
(1951), p.68: "The dividing line between common insanity and prophetic madness is in fact hard to 
draw." Given that Paul uses the verb in relation to worship, it seems unlikely that he is warning that 
observers will consider the believers to be on the same level as victims of 'common insanity.' Instead, he 
is worried lest displays of 'prophetic madness' convey a wrong impression as to the nature of the gospel. 
Outsiders may have found the gift of tongues awe-inspiring, perhaps even disturbing, but certainly not 
contemptible. See Martin (1991), and Johnson (1998), p.125: "For those seeing and hearing the tongue-
speakers, the phenomenon was undoubtedly impressive." Tongues thus serve as a positive sign for 
unbelievers, but a limited one. They indicate to outsiders in a general way the presence of divine activity 
among the believers, but do nothing to enable an outsider to distinguish between the Christian God and 
the gods of Graeco-Roman religion. 
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experience of the gifts of the Spirit, and of tongues in particular, are central to the way in 
which the Corinthians understand their faith in Christ, then they may consider tongues to 
be quite adequate agents of conversion. Outsiders are attracted into the church because 
they perceive speaking in tongues to be a high status activity, offering a socially 
attractive experience of transformation. However, this is undesirable from Paul's 
perspective because, for him, such a transformation does not truly constitute conversion. 
It does not require those experiencing it to radically call into question either who they 
have previously been as individuals, or the social values of the society from which they 
come. Instead, they can simply regard themselves as having progressed (see 7.1). For 
Paul, this is shallow, and conversion requires something deeper and more traumatic in 
terms of revaluation. In order to explore what this is, we must tum to the account in 
vv.24-25 ofthe response of the outsider who hears prophecy. 
4.2.1 Prophecy as an Agent of Conversion 
In 1 Cor. 14:20-25 Paul portrays conversion as the result of the secrets 
of an individual's heart being laid bare (cpavepoco) through prophecy. The outsider is 
convicted (EAEYXCO) by all and examined (clvaKpivco) by all. Given these striking 
results, the question arises of the nature of the prophecy. Does it convict the outsider 
because it is specifically addressed to that individual, or does it do so despite ostensibly 
being addressed to someone else and/or being about something else? At this point most 
commentators become safely vague, but Hering boldly states that, "Here, then, there is 
certainly involved the phenomenon of thought-reading by the prophets in a state of 
inspiration. "7 Barrett responds to this dismissively, "There is no need to see here (as e.g. 
Hering does) a miraculous gift of thought-reading. The moral truth of Christianity ... the 
prophetic word of God ... are sufficient to convict a sinner. God's word effects its 
entrance through the conscience, and then creates religious conviction. "8 In fact, there 
are problems with both positions. Barrett's eagerness to protect Christianity from 
7Hering (ET 1962), p.152. 
8Barrett (1971b), p.326. 
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dependence upon the miraculous in the creation of religious conviction is anachronistic 
both in terms of the beliefs of early Christians, and in terms of Graeco-Roman society, 
for "the very concept 'miracle', as used in its modem sense, is not an ancient category 
(implying, as the modem term does, a 'natural/supernatural' dichotomy that is not 
available until the modem period.)"9 Yet, Hering's belief in thought-reading simply 
assumes the answer to another major question concerning these verses. If the prophets 
could read the thoughts of the outsider, this implies that the secrets of his or her heart 
were fully conscious, i.e., he or she knew what they were. The possibility of knowledge 
about the self, hidden from the self, is simply discounted. 
To many, as to Hering, this may appear self-evident, but it becomes far 
from clear when considered in relation to another passage where Paul uses very similar 
language. In 1 Cor. 4: 1-5 Paul appears to be responding to criticism from some at 
Corinth of his performance as an apostle. 10 He disputes their competence to examine him 
upon such matters, arguing instead that it is the Lord who examines (d V<X.Kpi vco) him, 
upon whose coming the things now hidden in the darkness will be brought to light 
(<!>co'ti~co), and the purposes of the heart disclosed (<!><xvepoco) (vsAb-5). However, 
more striking still than this resemblance in vocabulary is Paul's statement in vAa that 
OUOEV yap E!J.<x,\Ytc§ crUVOlOcx., dAA' OUK EV 'tOU'tCP OeOlK<xico!J.<XL Paul here not 
only rejects his own competence to judge himself, but also clearly raises the possibility of 
his having sinned without realising it. As Theissen suggests, the idea of unconscious sin 
and that of eschatological judgement reinforce each other. "Precisely this idea of a -
theoretically possible - unconscious guilt is then underlined by the concluding 
eschatological reservation. The eschatological judge will bring to light not only hidden 
deeds (as in 2 Cor. 5: 10) but also the hidden intentions of the heart ("CaC; \3ouAac; 'tcOv 
K<xpOlcOV) - precisely what, in view of the preceding claim of innocence, must have been 
unconscious. "11 Given this, and given the close resemblance in vocabulary between the 
9Martin, (1991), p.559 n.22. 
lOFor a full discussion of this passage see 5.4. 
llTheissen (ET 1987), p.61. 
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two passages,12 it becomes quite possible that the 'secrets of the heart' of 1 Cor. 14 : 25 are 
hidden from the individual concerned as well as from others. 13 
A possible objection to this conclusion would be to ask how any 
individual could recognise him or herself as the subject of such a prophecy if the 'secrets 
of their heart' had up until the present been hidden from them as well as from others. 
How could they identify themselves when the information they are being given concerns 
truths about their lives of which they are unaware? Do they not need to be told that the 
prophecy concerns them? In fact, this is not such a serious problem as it first appears. 
Many converts in different times and places have witnessed to a subsequent feeling that 
what they now know about their past lives ought to have been obvious to them all along. 
Biographical reconstruction, i.e., the formation of a radically different estimation of the 
story of their own lives from that held prior to conversion, is cited by sociologists as one 
of the characteristics typically displayed by converts. 14 Paul's own refusal to acquit 
himself despite his lack of knowledge of any sin could simply allow for the possibility not 
that he has done things without knowing it, but rather that he has done things which he 
knew about, but which he did not realise were sinfu1. 15 The secrets of the heart are 
hidden not in the sense that they are unknown, but in the sense that they are 
unrecognised. This is exactly how Calvin understands the 'secrets of the heart' of the 
outsider. He writes of v.24, "the consciences of men are sleepy and inactive, and 
untroubled by a sense of dissatisfaction with their sins, so long as they are enveloped in 
the darkness of ignorance." The outsider, "comes to a realisation of what he is like, a 
knowledge which was denied him before ... his conscience is stirred so that he knows his 
sins, which were hidden from him before. "16 
121 Cor. 4:5 has'td Kp'U1t'td 'tou o'K6'to'UC; and'tdc; J30'UA.dC; 'toov Kap8toov, while 1 Cor. 14:25 has 
'td Kp'U1t'td 'tTlC; Kap8iac;. 
13See Theissen (ET 1987), p.79. 
14See 1.2. 
151t is here that Theissen's desire to find evidence in Paul of a concept of the unconscious parallel to that 
of modem psychology becomes problematic. I use the term unconscious in its more general sense, 
simply to indicate that of which someone is not aware. 
16Calvin (ET 1960), p.299. 
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If further evidence is needed that the secrets of the heart do indeed 
concern sin, then it is provided by Paul's statement that the outsider is EAEXE'tcn uno 
nciv'tcov, ciVCXKpivE'tCXt uno nciv'tcov (v.24). Although this is the only occasion on 
which Paul uses EAEYXCO, there can be little doubt that it means to convict of sin. Of its 
17 other uses in the New Testament it specifically relates to sin, or to works, on 10 
occasions17 and on another 5 it seems to bear the sense of 'reprove' or 'rebuke', so that 
although sin is not directly mentioned, it is certainly implied. 18 Only twice does it have 
the distinctly different sense of convincing or confuting someone in argument. 19 
, Avo.Kpi vco means "to examine, investigate, enquire into, question. "20 Paul uses it only in 
1 Corinthians, where he deploys it in a variety of contexts,21 taking advantage of the 
flexibility of meaning implied by the definition above. However, an d:vd.KptO'tC; was 
originally a pre-trial hearing or investigation conducted by magistrates, designed to 
determine whether or not there was a case to answer, and the general sense of the term 
developed from this root by metaphorical extension.22 In 4:1-5 Paul sticks close to the 
original sense by contrasting the preliminary investigations of the present with the final 
judgement of the coming day of the Lord. The close connection of these verses with 
14:24-25 makes it likely that the sense of d:vd.Kptvco is similar in both cases, and so we 
have another confirmation of the primarily ethical nature of the secrets of the heart.23 
Through prophecy, the conscience of the outsider is sensitized to previously 
unrecognized sin. Paul provides his readers with a picture of conversion caused by the 
decisive impact of prophecy on a previously untroubled mind. 24 Conversion is not in the 
first instance a move from a state of crisis to a state of contentment, but the opposite. 
17Mt 18:15, Lk 3:19, Jn 3:20, Jn 8:46, Jn 16:8, Eph. 5:11, Eph. 5:13, 1 Tim 5:20, Jam. 2:9, Jude 15. 
182 Tim 4:12, Tit 1:9, Tit 1:13, Reb 12:5, Rev 3:19. 
19Tit. 1:9, Jude 22. 
20Lightfoot (1895), p.182. 
211 Cor 2: 14,2: 15,4:3,4:4,9:3, 10:25, 10:27, 14:24. 
22Lightfoot (1895), p.182. 
23We shall find an equally strong emphasis on the ethical aspects of conversion in 1 Cor. 6:9-1l. 
24 Compare Epictetus, Diss. 3.23.30-38. Although the activity which causes the effect is different, 
Epictetus argues that the student of philosophy should leave the lecture room in pain rather than 
pleasure precisely because he has been brought to "a realization of the state he was in. " 
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If this is correct, then there is a considerable range of possibilities as to 
the nature of the information contained in the prophecy. On the one hand, it need not 
necessarily be specifically addressed to the individual outsider; on the other, the content 
needs to be exact enough for an outsider to be able to recognise previously hidden truths 
about his or her own life. Something more precise than the sort of general proclamation 
apparently envisaged by Barrett is required, but not necessarily a detailed revelation of 
the particular sins of a named individual. Some knowledge about the person is revealed 
to the rest of those present but this could simply be by means of the dramatic reaction of 
the individual, vividly described in v.25. It is this reaction which demonstrates to whom 
the prophecy applied. It need not involve the naming of names, but it has missed its mark 
if no-one acknowledges that it is in fact about them. Thus, if we are to approach the 
question in the sort of modern terms used by Hering and Barrett, the most accurate 
description of the nature of the information contained in the prophecy would be quasi-
miraculous. That the truths revealed were hidden from the individual concerned arguably 
indicates, when viewed from the perspective of faith, an even more penetrating insight 
than mere thought-reading; yet from a more critical viewpoint it also leaves the 
supernatural insight involved less verifiable. 
4.2.2 Social and Communal Aspects of Conversion 
The confession of the outsider at 14:25 that 6 eEOC; EV Uf..ltv EO''tlV is 
generally taken to be a deliberate reference to Is. 45: 14 where one finds a similar 
confession being made by Gentiles in relation to IsraeP5 If we are right to regard Paul as 
an eschatological thinker, who viewed his mission to the Gentiles in the light of an 
imminent end, then here is an indication that conversion too must be discussed within an 
eschatological framework. Given the close links we have seen between 4: 1-5 and 14:24-
25See Barrett (1971b), pp.326-27; Fee (1987), p.687. Wilk (1998), pp.330-33 argues that Paul connects 
"das Motiv des "Hereinkommens" der Besucher in 1 Kor. 14:23b.24b mit dem vom "Durchzug" der 
Heiden in Jes. 45:14a." Zech. 8:23 is also routinely cited. The verbal resemblance with Paul is not as 
close as in Isaiah, but the point is the same, i.e., Gentiles confess the presence of God in Israel. Paul's 
description ofthe outsider falling upon his or her face also reflects Old Testament vocabulary. Fee, ibid: 
"This is biblical language for obeisance and worship." 
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25, the eschatological context of the former is another such indication. Indeed, given that 
in 1 Cor. 14:25 prophecy brings to light similar things to those exposed by final 
judgement in 1 Cor. 4: 1-5, it rather appears as if the former to some degree anticipates 
the latter. 26 In conformity with Paul's characteristic eschatological tension between the 
'already' and the 'not yet' of the new age, conversion involves the revealing of a partial 
self-knowledge to the outsider, who experiences in conversion what would otherwise be 
hidden until the end. Thus, contained in the picture Paul draws of conversion there is a 
sense that it is a judgement upon the individual concerned during which the (unpleasant) 
truth is revealed. Yet the result of that process is not condemnation, but the possibility of 
a new life. 
What the sins revealed might have been is something Paul does not tell 
us. We do not know for certain whether failure to recognise as such the sins now 
exposed through prophecy was purely an individual aberration, or whether the behaviour 
concerned would have been judged acceptable when considered by the standards of 
Graeco-Roman society. For several reasons one suspects the latter. It makes it easier to 
understand how Paul's hypothetical convert could previously have failed to recognise his 
or her actions as sinful and, if I am right that Paul's assertion of the superiority of 
prophecy over tongues stands in contradiction to the cultural preferences of Graeco-
Roman society, fits more closely with the pattern of Paul's wider argument. Further, the 
description of the conversion which Paul provides sets the church in contrast to the 
wider world. The exposing of the secrets of the heart which evokes the confession of 
14:25 comes only after the outsider has entered the sphere of Christian worship. The 
scriptural background of this confession was noted above, and it is clear that Paul has in 
mind the entry of the Gentiles into the people of God. By believing in Christ, the convert 
becomes part of a chosen people which is distinct from wider Graeco-Roman society 
and, in doing so, rejects the values of that society which had informed behaviour 
26Wilk (1998), p.332 suggests that Paul here conceives prophecy as an event "das die Prasenz des 
Geistes anzeigt und Gottes endgiiltige Offenbarung bei der Parusie antizipiert." 
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previously regarded as acceptable, but now recognised as sinful. Although we have no 
indications from this text as to precisely which areas of conduct are concerned this 
clearly implies a change in practical consciousness, with behaviour which would 
previously have been deemed competent now recognised as a lapse in competence. 
It is fascinating that here we see this communal process as Paul 
imagines it to impact on an individual. 1 Cor. 14:20-25 provides us with a close-up, as if 
through a zoom lens, of the inclusion of the Gentiles in God's people. It is significant that 
what we then see, in the secrets of the heart revealed to the outsider, concerns sin. It 
indicates that far from being pursued separately from issues of individual conscience, the 
place of the Gentiles in the people of God is connected to them. If no individuals are 
convicted of sin in the way that Paul describes, then the inclusion of the Gentiles in the 
people of God cannot take place. It is perhaps therefore not surprising that at the point 
of conversion Paul imagines a confession which is as much about the church as it is 
about God. The church is where He is to be found, and not outside. The self-knowledge 
which is revealed to the convert is shared by all within the community, thus creating a tie 
between the convert and the other members of the church which does not exist between 
the convert and those outside, even those with whom he or she previously had the 
closest of relationships. Again, this implies a shift in practical consciousness since it is 
now to operate primarily in the context of the community and its behavioural norms 
rather than those of the wider society. 
This understanding finds further confirmation in the context of 1 Cor. 
4: 1-5, where Paul's vocabulary so strongly resembles that found in 14:20-25. In 1 Cor. 4 
Paul's expectation of a rejection of the dominant values of Graeco-Roman society is 
much more explicit, and it is clear that it is not shared by some in the church at Corinth. 
Whereas the imagery which Paul uses to describe his own sufferings all suggest someone 
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who is socially marginal and of low status,27 his heavily sarcastic descriptions of the 
Corinthians in 4:8 uses vocabulary which would normally be applied to those who are 
socially exalted. From his perspective they are comfortable and at ease in a world in 
which he is an alien, but if they were truly spiritual, they would find that their experiences 
are more like his. 28 In fact, they should actively try to imitate him (4: 16). It should be 
noted here that this is not a disagreement over the degree of transformation which Paul 
and some in Corinth expect to be experienced as the result of conversion. It is not that 
Paul expects them to have changed whereas they wish to remain the same. Rather, it is a 
dispute over the direction of such transformation. Paul's description in 4:8 of them as 
having become filled, and rich, and kings, stands in contrast to his description of the 
actual social status of the majority of the Corinthian church in 1:26. They regard their 
conversion as having resulted in a transformation which enables them to fulfil the 
dominant values of Graeco-Roman society in a way previously denied to most ofthem,29 
whereas Paul regards genuine conversion as involving a rejection of those values. 
4.2.3 Summary 
1 Cor. 14:20-25 gives us several important indications as to how Paul 
perceives Gentile conversion. Central to the picture provided is the issue of unrecognised 
sin. The outsider is turned into a convert by the revealing through prophecy of sins 
previously hidden from the self This should not be taken to suggest that the individual 
concerned had done things without knowing it, but rather that certain actions, attitudes 
etc. had never previously been assessed as sinful. Conversion results from a sudden 
270f course, Paul's 'natural' social status may have been somewhat higher than this (e.g. the claims of 
Luke that he was a Roman citizen - Acts 22:25ff.), but the point for him was surely that he had 
embraced a lowly lifestyle as a means of imitating Christ. 
28See Barrett (1971b), pp.llO-ll and Fee (1987), p.181: "In contrast to the Corinthians, who are 'filled, 
rich, ruling, wise, powerful, honoured,' he and his fellow apostles look far more like their Lord." Clarke 
(1993), pp.123-24; Horrell (1996), pp.200-04; Witherington (1995), pp.142-44 all discuss this verse in 
terms of a contrast between the understanding of leadership espoused by Paul and that current in 
Graeco-Roman society. 
2~arclay (1992), p.57: "The ironic rebuke (4:8) is directed at the whole church and may reflect a 
consciousness among the Corinthians that, whatever their social origins, their status had been enhanced 
by their adoption of Christianity. " 
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sensitizing of the conscience, and is thus, in the first instance, a move from a state of 
contentment to a state of crisis. Yet this impact of prophecy on a previously untroubled 
mind not only brings a crisis for the individual, but also resolves it. By in some sense 
bringing forward the process of divine judgement on an individual's life it results not in 
condemnation, but in the possibility of a new life. This new life is certainly not entirely 
about the inward concerns ofthe individual. For Paul issues of individual conscience are 
closely connected to the process of the Gentiles coming into the people of God, and this 
communal dimension of conversion involves a transformation of social attitudes. Paul's 
picture of conversion suggests not a transformation enabling the fulfilment of the 
dominant values of Graeco-Roman society to a previously unimaginable degree but, 
instead, a change in the opposite direction which involves the rejection of those values. 
This inevitably has consequences for practical consciousness, both in terms of the 
reflexive assessment of specific behaviour, and the framework against which such 
reflexive assessments are made, which is now that of the believing community. 
4.3 Transforming Identity - 1 Cor. 6:9-11 
Ifin 14:20-25 the issue of unrecognised sin is placed in the foreground 
by the exposing of the secrets of the heart, and the social and communal aspects of 
conversion are implicit, then in 6:9-11 this profile is reversed. Here it is social and 
communal isssues that are in the foreground, and the issue of unrecognised sin is implicit. 
By the use ofa vice list in 6:9-10 Paul bluntly characterises the past lives of his Gentile 
converts as thoroughly polluted by sin, and contrasts this past with what happened to 
them at their conversion. It is through analysis of the sins listed that the issue of 
unrecognised sin once again emerges. Yet before these themes can be explored, it is 
necessary to establish that these verses are acceptable as evidence for Paul's 
understanding of conversion. Although 1 Cor. 6: 9-11 has been a prominent text in recent 
study of Paul's theology, its importance has largely been a negative one, these verses 
being held to embody elements in Paul's thought that are of minor or marginal 
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significance. This allegation has been made principally, although not exclusively, in 
relation to Paul's use in 6: 11 of 8tKa.tOoo, the verbal form of the righteousness 
terminology which is one of Paul's most frequent means of denoting conversion. 30 The 
debate concerning its use here is therefore relevant to Paul's understanding of conversion 
in general and, as we shall see, not unconnected to the themes we have brought forward 
from our examination of 1 Cor. 14:20-25. 
4.3.1 1 Cor. 6:9-11 in Recent Scholarship 
Most find here a perfect example of subsidiary themes. Paul may mean 
what he says, but what he says is not of 'real' importance to him, and thus he is 
effectively distanced from his own words. As in so much else, it was Bultmann who set 
the trend. Focusing on Paul's use of the verb 8tKa.tOoo in 6: 11, he argued in his 
Theology of the New Testament that there it reflects an understanding of Jesus' death as 
an expiatory sacrifice for sin. 31 The verb "is not meant in the specific sense of Paul's 
doctrine of justification, but, corresponding to 'made holy' is meant in the general 
Christian sense: cancellation of sin". 32 The specific sense of Paul's doctrine is forensic-
eschatological,33 by which Bultmann means to set justification in an existential context, 
somewhat distanced from the idea of sacrificial atonement for concrete individual sins. 
By placing his references to 1 Cor. 6:9-11 within the chapter entitled 'On the Kerygma of 
the Hellenistic Church Aside from Paul', Bultmann clearly implies that these verses 
reflect pre-Pauline ideas about justification and the death of Jesus. Here Paul merely 
repeats what he has inherited, but elsewhere he develops his own thoughts. 
Despite the fact that he is attacking Bultmann's interpretation of Paul's 
theology, E.P. Sanders assigns a rather similar role to 1 Cor. 6:9-11. Here the verb 
8tKa.tOoo, which Sanders takes to denote the transfer to being a Christian, marks that 
30See above, p.54 n.2. 
31Bultmann (ET 1952), p.nf., 84f. 
32Bultmann (ET 1952), p.136. 
33Bultmann (ET 1952), p.270f. 
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transfer by indicating that "the Christians were cleansed of the sins just enumerated. "34 
Yet this is the least common of two distinguishable uses of the passive verb. Here Paul 
speaks of being righteoused from concrete sins, but elsewhere he more commonly speaks 
of being righteoused from the power of sin. The former use, represented by 1 Cor. 6:9-
11, reflects a 'forensic' way of thinking about the transfer, the latter a participationist one, 
which means "to be changed, to be transferred from one realm to another: from sin to 
obedience, from death to life, from being under the law to being under grace. "35 Sanders 
asserts that it is this latter use which is more important to Paul, and one of his reasons for 
holding this is that some of the main judicial passages, including 1 Cor. 6: 9-11, contain 
pre-Pauline formulae whereas "Paul's own terms tell us better how his mind worked. "36 
As with Bultmann, 1 Cor. 6:9-11 is regarded as an example of a 
subsidiary theme in Paul's understanding of justification, which is to be understood in 
contrast to a principal one. Admittedly, Sanders labels 1 Cor. 6:9-11 'forensic' whereas 
Bultmann does not, but the difference does not amount to anything more than a label. 37 1 
Cor. 6:9-11 fulfils an identical function in both their interpretations of Paul's theology. If 
there is a difference between the way these verses function for them, it is that Sanders 
places far greater weight specifically on 1 Cor. 6:9-11. For him it is the example of Paul's 
subsidiary 'forensic' use of 81Kaloco, and thus attains something of the status of a proof 
34Sanders (1977), p.471. His italics. 
35Sanders (1991), p.47. 
36Sanders (1991), p.75. 
37This labelling is potentially confusing, but at its root lie different definitions of 'forensic'. See Sanders 
(1977), p.492 n.57. Sanders does not accept that Paul ever speaks of justification in an imputed way, 
however defined, but (1991), p.101, speaks of Paul's expectation that through participating in Christ his 
converts would maintain moral perfection. For Sanders, 'forensic' means the acquittal/forgiveness of past 
transgressions, and as such it implies an understanding of Jesus' death as an atoning sacrifice for sin. 
Thus, that which Sanders labels 'forensic' is that which Bultmann would label 'non-forensic'! Sanders 
(1977), p.465: "I agree completely with Bultmann and most other scholars that what is distinctive in 
Paul is not the repetition of the traditional sacrificial view." The disagreement between them therefore 
concerns (i) how to label the subsidiary theme, and (ii) both the content and labelling of the principal 
theme with which the subsidiary one is contrasted. On (ii) there is a clear divergence between a forensic-
eschatological understanding of justification (Bultmann) and a participatory one (Sanders). Sanders' 
definition of forensic justification is somewhat confusing given that in 6: 11 he believes D1KatOo) to 
denote cleansing, which is scarcely the imagery of the court room. In order to avoid confusion I employ 
inverted commas when using the term forensic in accordance with Sanders' definition. See above, p.42 
n.7. 
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text, being quoted in full twice, and cited a further eight times in the second part of Paul 
and Palestinian Judaism. 38 Sanders writes: 
Although the dominant conception is the change of lordships, Paul frequently 
writes of the transfer as being cleansed of past transgressions in a way that does 
not call to mind the 'participationist' view of dying with Christ to the power of sin 
(but of Christ dyingfor transgressions). The clearest single passage is 1 Cor. 6:9-
11, where Christians are said to have been washed, justified and sanctified of the 
blatant Gentile transgressions (idolatry and sexual immorality head the list).39 
Although strictly speaking Sanders is discussing what is central and 
peripheral to Paul's transfer terminology rather than to his theology as a whole,40 there is 
no doubt where the former leads in terms of the latter. Righteousness by faith is "not any 
one doctrine",41 and there can "be no doubt as to where the heart of Paul's theology lies. 
He is not primarily concerned with the juristic categories, although he works with them. 
The real bite of his theology lies in the participatory categories, even though he himself 
did not distinguish them this Wcry."42 In contrast, IL. Martyn insists that Paul did have a 
'doctrine of rectification'43 and that it was far from marginal to the core of Paul's 
gospe1.44 Paul did indeed inherit a Jewish-Christian tradition of rectification, and his use 
of it at 1 Cor. 6: 11 is selected by Martyn for particular attention. The formula found here 
is fundamentally similar to passages from the Qumran texts,45 and together they equate 
"rectification with God's forgiving initiative in cleansing one from sins. "46 Paul does not 
reject this meaning or launch a polemic against it, but he does elsewhere go well beyond 
38For quotations see Sanders (1977), pp.451,471. For references see pp.452, 463, 468, 498, 500, 501, 
503,545. 
39Sanders (1977), p.498. His italics. 
40Sanders (1983), p.lO. 
41 Sanders (1977), p.492. 
42Sanders (1977), p.502. His italics. 
43Employing the noun 'rectification' and the verb 'to rectifY' is Martyn's method of overcoming the 
perennial problem that although the verb OtK<Xt6c.o and the noun OtKCXtOcruVll are cognate terms in 
Greek, the English terms by which they have traditionally been translated ('to justify' and 
'righteousness') are not. See Martyn (l997b), pp.249-50. 
44See Martyn (1997a), pp.154-56. 
45E.g. 1QS 11:13-15, 1QH 4:34-37, 1QS 11:12. 
46Martyn (1997a), p.145. 
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it (specifically Gal. 3: 6-4: 7), introducing anti-God powers against whose control of the 
cosmos Christ's death is a decisive assault. Thus, "the need of human beings is not so 
much forgiveness of their sins as deliverance from the malignant powers that hold them 
in bondage. "47 By introducing these modifications, Paul has constructed a new definition 
of rectification, which contains the old one within it. 48 It remains a single doctrine, but 
one in which what Sanders would term 'participatory categories' are dominant, and 
forensic categories are seen as primarily belonging to Paul's opponents. Building on the 
work ofKasemann, Martyn insists that rectification is central to Paul's concerns, but then 
defines rectification in a way that is thoroughly participatory.49 Once again, 1 Cor. 6:9-
11 is the typical representative of that which is subsidiary within Paul's thought. 50 
Thus, the arguments presented by Bultmann, Sanders and Martyn all 
reach towards the same conclusion: material which Paul has inherited from tradition does 
not reflect his own 'real' or central concerns, and in 1 Cor. 6:9-11 that inherited material 
has to do with concrete individual sins. One obvious objection to this approach is that, 
had he wished to, Paul could have said something different. If he repeated traditional 
material then he did so because he agreed with it. To be fair, all would accept that when 
Paul repeats traditional material he means what he says, only less so than when he is 
expressing his own ideas. The issue at stake is what is to be emphasised. Yet the fact that 
material is traditional does not of itself demonstrate that it is peripheral to Paul's central 
concerns. If one assumes that it does, then several difficulties arise. How does one 
identifY with certainty that which is inherited tradition and that which is new? Even when 
47Martyn (1997a), p.153. 
48Quoting de Boer (1989), p.185, Martyn speaks of the forensic apocalyptic theology of Paul's opponents 
circumscribed by a cosmological apocalyptic theology. See Martyn (1997a), pp.153-54. De Boer actually 
goes further, speaking of Paul having 'neutralized' this forensic apocalyptic theology. 
49See Kasemann (ET 1971), pp.43-44. Sanders registers a protest against this. "It seems confusing to 
follow Kasemann's procedure of insisting that righteousness by faith is central but then to define it as a 
cosmic and corporate act." Sanders (1977), p.508. 
50 A rather different attempt to present 1 Cor. 6: 9-11 as peripheral to Paul's real concerns is made by 
Scroggs (1983), pp.101-09 who, in an attempt to deflect Paul's condemnation of whatever aspect(s) of 
homosexual behaviour are implied by the terms J.lUAUKOt and apcreVOKOl.'tUl in 6:9, argues that Paul 
is simply borrowing the entire list from Hellenistic Jewish tradition. For discussion of the status of the 
items in the list, see below p.126 n.64. 
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one feels sure that particular material is traditional can one be sure that Paul has not 
adapted it, precisely so as to better reflect his own concerns? Even when Paul does not 
make changes, can we be sure that what he understands by a particular term or concept 
is identical to that which was understood by those using them previously?51 Does the 
bringing of traditional elements into the context of his own thought alter the meaning of 
those elements? Without exercising great care one could all too easily end up with a 
reading of Paul which lacked all balance, elements uncongenial to the interpreter being 
labelled as tradition and pushed to the margins. Such complex questions mean that 
before 1 Cor. 6:9-11 can be examined as evidence for Paul's understanding of Gentile 
conversion, it is necessary to explore whether, and in what sense, the contents of these 
verses can properly be termed traditional. 
4.3.2 Tradition in 1 Cor. 6:9-11 
One can mean a great many things by tradition and, although the three 
scholars whose views we have discussed above all believe 1 Cor. 6:9-11 to be traditional, 
there are variations in what they mean by this. Bultmann speaks of 1 Cor. 6:9-11 in 
connection with Ita stereotyped scheme of primitive Christian teachinglt52 which contrasts 
the present righteous state of Gentile Christians with their former sinful one. Yet there is 
no indication that he conceives of this scheme in terms of fixed formulas, or that what 
Bultmann considers the unusual sense of 81.KCX1.0CO in 6: 11 implies that the verse is a 
quotation from a formula. As we have already noted, Sanders does believe 6:9-11 to be 
at least partially formulaic and to refer to Christ's death for sins. The existence of a pre-
Pauline formula containing a 'forensic' use of 81.Ka1.0CO is important to Sanders since it 
provides support for the distinction between this inherited use of the verb and Paul's own 
51Thus, DinkIer (1992), p.149 comments on 1 Cor. 6:11, "Und auch wenn es sich bier - wie ich mit E. 
Lohse annehme - urn ein liturgisches Zitat handelt, in dem ursprunglich dem Wort OtK<X.lco8ilv<X.l ein 
vorpaulinischer und zwar - wie Bultmann sagt - "genuin-christlicher Sinn der Stindentilgung" eignete, 
so hat doch Paulus das zitierte Verb in seinem eigenen Sinn verstanden und deshalb zitiert." Even if 
DinkIer is wrong in supposing that Paul is using a liturgical quotation, the methodological problem 
which he raises is a genuine one. 
52Bultmann (ET 1952), pp.72-73. The German original (1953), p.73 speaks of'ein Schema der 
urchristlichen Predigt' . 
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participatory one. There are formulaic instances of the former, but apparently not of the 
latter. 53 For Martyn, it is 6: 11 alone which contains a Jewish-Christian formula, and its 
application to Gentiles "is a secondary move on Paul's part. "54 As if all this were not 
complicated enough, other exegetes regard the whole of 6: 9-11 as part of a baptismal 
catechism,55 or a more general baptismal tradition. 56 
If we are to assess the validity of these various claims then we need 
some means of defining and classifYing tradition. E.E. Ellis argues that tradition must 
"mean more than a prior idea or story floating in the memory of the Apostle .. .It is, more 
concretely, a specific item in a traditioning process that was formed and in oral or written 
usage before Paul incorporated it into his letter. "57 The presence of such items in a 
traditioning process are specifically indicated by the presence of such technical terms as 
nexpex8i8ooJ..ll (deliver) and nexpexAex~ . .q3d. voo ( receive). 58 A second rather less specific 
indicator of the presence of a traditioning process is "the employment of the same 
traditional pieces by several apostolic circles. "59 Here the content of the traditional pieces 
may be subject to greater variety, but the common features are sufficient to indicate both 
an agreed understanding and a previously existing context. In effect, Ellis thus proposes 
a 'stronger' and a 'weaker' form of the traditioning process.60 
53 Sanders (1977), pp.502-03. In turn this distinction between two uses of OtKcx.tOW bolsters the wider 
one between participatory categories with which Paul is primarily concerned and juristic ones with 
which he is not. Sanders is well aware that in general participatory categories may well be no more 
original to Paul than 'forensic' ones. Sanders (1977), p.453: "Whether such ideas were actually common 
in Christianity is hard to determine ... when he expresses them Paul does not consider himself as an 
iImovator, but only to be reminding his readers of the implications of their own Christian experience. " 
54Martyn (1997a), p.142 n.4. 
55Dinkler (1992), pp.149,153; Fuller (1986), pp.lOl-02. Meeks (1983), p.129 says of 1 Cor. 6:9-11 that 
Paul is here quoting a catechetical rule. 
56 Schrage (1991), pp.427-28. 
57Ellis (1986), p.48l. Ellis' methodology is affirmed by Eriksson (1998), pp.81-86. This monograph on 
traditions in 1 Corinthians does not include 1 Cor. 6: 9-11 among the passages where Paul is held to 
have employed traditions. 
58See 1 Cor. 11:2, 11:23, 15:3. 
59Ellis (1986), p.482. 
60Something similar had earlier been proposed by AM. Hunter, who distinguishes between 'guarded 
tradition' and 'floating oral tradition.' He too places 1 Cor. 11 :23f. and 15 :3f. in the stronger of these two 
categories. See Hunter (1961), pp.22-23. 
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When one applies these categories to 1 Cor. 6:9-11 it is obvious that 
there is nothing which can qualify for Ellis' stronger form of the traditioning process. The 
necessary technical terms are absent. As regards the weaker form, the vice list of 6: 9-1 0 
clearly does qualify since the New Testament texts bear witness to the existence of such 
lists in the Pauline, Petrine, Johannine and Jacobean circles. Although "no term is 
common to all the lists",61 and the variety in the vices condemned renders futile any 
attempt to construct a hypothetical 'original' list, the overlap between the lists is sufficient 
to suggest the existence of "an agreed understanding about moral imperatives for 
believers that was in some degree formulated and shared and, at the same time, subject 
to different applications and developments within the various early Christian missions. "62 
The vice list of6:9-10 is traditional in form, but it is not a verbatim quotation. As no two 
vice lists are identical or even nearly so, we have no identifiable instance of a list being 
quoted verbatim, and there are simply no grounds for asserting that Paul does so here. 63 
He is responsible for the selection of those vices which he condemns.64 We have no way 
of knowing how Paul would have assessed the seriousness of any individual vice in 
relation to that of the others listed, but "there is one ordering principle: vice is the 
opposite of virtue. "65 
61Easton (1932), p.5. 
62Ellis (1986), pp.483-84. 
63Zoas (1988), p.623: "There is simply no evidence that Paul is merely repeating traditional material in 
these catalogues, even if the form is a traditional one." A comparison of 1 Cor. 6: 9-10 with the vice list 
of Gal. 5: 19-21 is instructive. They are often argued to closely resemble each other in form yet, of the 
twenty-five vices contained in the two lists, only three appear in both. 
64Given this, the attempt by Scroggs (1983), pp.101-09, to suggest that Paul included apcrEvoKol:t<Xt 
and ).w,Acx,Kol simply because they were traditional fails. The former only otherwise appears at 1 Tim. 
1: 10, and the latter nowhere else at all. It was for these reasons that Alfred Seeberg, the pioneer of the 
study of New Testament ethical lists, doubted that these two terms had been part of the original list, in 
the existence of which he erroneously believed. He regarded the inclusion of apcrEvOKol. 'tcx,l as a 'mere 
possibility' compared to that of other vices rated as 'certain' or 'probable', and he excluded )lcx,Acx,Kol 
entirely. See Seeberg (1903, ET 1995), pp.167-72. 
65Meeks (1993), p.69. If further evidence is needed that Paul could fully 'own' such traditional material 
as vice lists one need look no further than 1 Cor. 5:9-11, where with reference to a previous letter he 
twice makes use of short lists, and Gal. 5:21, where he refers to a vice list as if it formed a regular part 
of his teaching. The phrase J3cx,CIlAElcx,v 6EOU 0'0 KAllPOVO)l1lcrOUCIlV, which appears in both 
contexts, is usually considered to be a pre-Pauline formula which already bracketed pre-Pauline vice 
lists. But as the only other instance of its being attached to a vice list is at Eph. 5:5, Paul may have been 
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Thus, all the available evidence suggests that in 6:9-10 Paul uses 
traditional forms and material, but that there is nothing here which could justifiably be 
termed a quotation or a formula. Instead Paul selects, adapts and inserts to suit his own 
purposes, fulfilling the role of an active participant in a traditioning process of the 
weaker sort. But what of 6: 11, which contains all the material relating to the Corinthians' 
post-conversion state? Certainly none of the passages cited by Bultmann in support of 
the existence of a stereotyped scheme of 'then - now' teaching could remotely be 
described as bearing close verbal resemblance to 1 Cor. 6:9-1l.66 The only common 
feature is the existence of a contrast between pre- and post-conversion states. One 
suspects that Bultmann would be happy with such a conclusion, and would employ other 
grounds on which to argue that the use of OlKCX10CO in 6: 11 reflects traditional ideas.67 
The point for our purposes is that there is nothing in the evidence produced by Bultmann 
which could support the claim of Martyn and Sanders that this verse is formulaic. 68 
Martyn himself produces no other example of this particular Jewish-Christian 
rectification formula,69 and the other such formulae in Paul to which he points, namely 
Rom. 3:25f. and Rom. 4:25, differ significantly from 1 Cor. 6:9-11 in that they both 
contain a specific reference to the death of Jesus. 70 Given this, and given that in 6: 11 
Paul is so clearly speaking about Gentiles, the assertion that 6: 11 is either a fixed formula 
or specifically Jewish-Christian appears entirely arbitrary. Indeed, the portion of the 
verse which on a first reading seems suggestive of a formula is not that which refers to 
the first to combine the two. Ellis (1986), pp.484-85 rather fails to recognise this, placing considerable 
stress on the appearance of this traditional phrase in 1 Cor. 6:9. 
66Col. 1:21f., 3:5f., Eph. 2:lf., 2:11f., Tit. 3:3f., 1 Pet. 1:4f., 2:25, 2 Clem. 1:6f. 
67Principally the argument that the meaning of all three verbs in 6: 11 is dominated by the idea of 
baptismal cleansing. See below, p.l33 n.87. 
68Sanders never specifies which elements of 1 Cor. 6: 9-11 he regards as part of a formula although, 
given that his interest is in Paul's use of OtKatoro, one assumes that it includes 6: 11. 
69There are not even other cases of the three verbs of 6: 11 standing in close association to one another. 
Commentators frequently cite 1 Cor. 1:30 where Paul applies a trio of terms to Christ, but these are 
nouns. One of them «X1toA u'tprocnC;) is not a cognate of any of the verbs of 6: 11 and the order is 
different, with OtKatOcruvll appearing first rather than third. One can speak of similar ideas or similar 
rhetorical structures, but scarcely of evidence of a formula. Even if one could, the test of employment in 
several apostolic circles would again be failed. 
70Martyn (1997a), pp.142-43. 
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rectification, but the concluding phrase EV 'tq:> 6vo/-Lcx,'tt 'tou Kupiou' Il1cmu 
Xptcnou Kcx,t EV 'tcP nVEU/-Lcx,'tt 'tou 8EOU 'h/-LcOv. Could this intriguingly 'trinitarian' 
phrase be a baptismal formula?71 
The words EV 'tcP 6vo/-Lcx,'tt 'tou Kupiou ' Il1cmu Xptcnou receive 
widespread use in the New Testament, are applied to a wide range of activities, and were 
clearly not coined by Paul. However, we have no other example of its combination with 
Paul's words concerning the Holy Spirit. Despite this, Fuller suggests that the entire 
phrase must be pre-Pauline since "Paul himself would have written into (eis, 1 Cor. 1: 13) 
the name. "72 It is true that all of Paul's other references to baptism suggest that he was 
familiar with its performance El~ 'to OVO/-Lcx,,13 but most New Testament references to 
baptism do the same. Acts 2:38 (Eni) and Acts 10:48 (EV) provide the only exceptions.74 
One could just as easily argue that Paul wrote EV here because although 6: 11 clearly 
evokes baptism through the presence of anoAouoo the verb j3cx,n'ti~oo does not 
appear,15 and EV 'tcP 6vo/-Lcx,'tt follows the verb OtKcx,tOOO with which El~ may have 
sounded inappropriate. 76 In other words, the context may not have provoked the use of 
an actual formula spoken at a baptism. 
Our conclusion regarding tradition in 6: 11 is therefore rather more 
sceptical than that regarding 6:9-10. Only the words EV 'tcP 6vo/-Lcx,'tt 'tou Kupiou 
, Il1O'OU XPtO''tou are clearly not original to Paul. One cannot even speak of a 
traditioning process of the weaker sort. Taken as a whole, 1 Cor. 6:9-11 does display 
71For a positive answer to this question see Godet (ET 1886), pp.300-01 and Goudge (1903), p.46. 
72Fuller (1986), p.l02. 
73Rom. 6:3; 1 Cor. 1:10,13,15; 1 Cor. 10:2; 1 Cor. 12:13, Gal. 3:27. 
74The New Testament speaks of only two other activities de; 'to 6vof..la - praying (Mt. 18:20) and 
believing (In. 3:18,1 In. 5:13), Paul of none. 
75Gal. 3 :27-28 supports this point. Here Paul uses de; in conjunction with l3a'lt'tl.~co, but the phrase Ete; 
eO"'tE fJL XPtO"'tcP ' lTpou when describing its consequences. Compare 1 Cor. 12: 13, ~ EV O"c.Of..la 
EJ3a.1t'tl craIlI.! EV 
76That de; was particularly associated with the verb l3a'lt'tl.~co is also indicated by Paul's use of it even 
when the baptism in question is not into Christ. At 1 Cor. 10:2 he says that the Israelites de; 'tov 
McotiO"llv el3a'lt'tl.O"aV'to. 
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traditional elements - the words just referred to, those concerning the inheritance of the 
kingdom, and a vice list - but without any indication that anyone before Paul had ever 
combined them as he does, even approximately. They contain no baptismal catechism, or 
fixed baptismal tradition, or Jewish-Christian rectification formula. To speak of these 
verses as formulaic is entirely without foundation, although it remains possible, as it does 
with any text, that Paul here uses prior ideas. It is clear that the supposedly traditional 
nature of these verses cannot be used to support the idea that in 6: 11 Paul uses 
8t Ka toO) in a manner different from usual, or that any of the contents of 6: 9-11 should 
be taken as peripheral to his 'real' concerns. Of course, neither does this prove the 
opposite in either case, but it does mean that the issues must be debated in relation to the 
contents of Paul's text not its imagined previous history. 
4.3.3 Reconstructing Moral Identity 
One of the principal features of these contents is the contrast Paul 
draws between who the Corinthians were before their conversion, and their current 
identity. The vice-list of 6:9-10 is not, strictly speaking, a catalogue of sins, but of types 
of sinner. Paul speaks not of those who commit sexual immorality, but of the sexually 
immoral and so on.77 To describe the Corinthians' conversion simply as having dealt with 
the guilt of past transgressions therefore fails to do justice to Paul's language. Because 
the Corinthians were washed, sanctified and justified they are no longer who they were, 
but have a new identity. Even though Paul criticises their current conduct (6:1-8), he 
expresses this in terms of what they have done rather than who they are. Their 
unrighteous behaviour (a8tKEo), 6:8) does not of itself place them among the 
unrighteous (Ot cl8tKOt, 6:9). Although he thinks that their new identity ought to find 
expression in their behaviour, its failure always to do so does not lead Paul to declare 
that new identity void. Indeed, his declaration of their new identity in 6: 11, heralded by 
the phrase Kat 'tau'td 'tlVEs Tl'tE cX.AAa, is the climax of Paul's argument and not its 
77Contrast Gal. 5:19-21. 
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starting point. Behaviour and identity are connected but separate and, although a 
contrast between types of behaviour is very strongly implied, the fundamental contrast in 
6:9-11 is between types ofpeople.78 
F or this reason, the tendency of commentators to discuss how far the 
Corinthians may once actually have been guilty of the sins included in the vice list 
entirely misses the point. 79 The words 'ta:u'td 'tlVE~ ll'tE do serve to establish a link 
between the list and the past lives of the Corinthians, but they cannot be read over-
precisely. On the one hand, Paul includes idolaters in the list, and it is hard to imagine 
any Gentile not having been such. One also wonders whether many Gentile males would 
have escaped falling into at least one of the categories of sexual sin which Paul names. 80 
Yet on the other, when Paul includes a term like ap1taYE~, which seems to imply 
robbery with violence,81 one doubts that he necessarily means that some of the 
Corinthians formerly lurked in the city's back alleys waiting to mug passers-by. One also 
wonders how many of the Corinthians really were thieves or greedy or drunkards or 
slanderers. The point is an important one because the sins one doubts that the 
Corinthians had actually committed are ones of which any individual, Christian or not, 
might be unhappy to be accused. Yet the sins which one feels all Gentiles or very large 
78See Winninge (1995) for a thesis which, although not discussing this passage in any detail, discerns a 
strong contrast between the act 'to sin' and the status 'sinner'. Thus, although Paul implies that 
continuing to behave as they have been will endanger the Corinthians' salvation, the basic flow of his 
argument is not that one is numbered among the saints on account of good conduct, but rather that one 
ought to behave well because one is a saint. 
79Further, 1:tv£~ is ambiguous enough to allow wildly different estimates of the Corinthians' pre-
conversion moral state. Barrett (1971b), p.141: "Not all the Corinthians had been fornicators, not all 
thieves, and so on, but in the Corinthian congregation a good assortment of such immoral and criminal 
persons was to be found." Compare Robertson & Plummer (1911), p.119: "Not all of them, not even 
many, but only some, are said to have been guilty; and it is all a thing of the past." See also Godet (ET 
1886), p.297 and Conzelmann (ET 1975), p.107. 
80CIark (1989), pp.22-23: "It was taken for granted that men (married or not) would make use of 
mistresses, or of slaves and prostitutes of either sex ... For married and marriageable women the rule was 
always the same: observe chastity, control sexual desire, and ignore your husband's extra-marital 
activities unless he actually brings a mistress into the house." See also Pomeroy (1975), pp.159-60. Of 
course, the majority of male members of the Corinthian church may not have been wealthy enough to 
own slaves or have frequent recourse to prostitutes, but the ethical standards shaping behaviour are not 
Jewish or Christian ones. Exceptions to this might perhaps have been those Gentile converts who had 
already been interested in or attached to the synagogue. 
81See Hering (ET 1962), pp.41-42. 
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numbers of them must have committed are ones which they would not have recognised 
as sins prior to their conversion. What Gentile regarded Graeco-Roman religion as 
'idolatrous'? Which Gentile male regarded all sexual relations outside of marriage as 
inherently wrong?82 Paul clearly believes that the Corinthians' conversion should have 
redefined their morality. 
It is therefore significant that Paul begins the vice list with what are, 
viewed from a Jewish perspective, characteristically Gentile sins (nopvEicx, 
ct8COAOAO:tpEiO} Mention of that of which the Corinthians really were guilty secures 
acceptance of the appropriateness of the remainder of the list. Labels which might then 
have been rejected as unjust, are now to be embraced as representing a true evaluation of 
the Corinthians' past. Paul is therefore not providing the Corinthians with a description of 
their pre-conversion lives which they would have recognised as such at that time. He is 
not suggesting that prior to their conversion they knew themselves as guilty sinners in 
search of a forgiving God. 83 Rather he is inviting them to reproduce an already familiar 
piece of biographical reconstruction which retrospectively defines their past lives as loci 
of sin. Conversion has changed who they are, transferring them from one category of 
person (Ot cl81K01) to another (Ot a:YlOl), and it is this event which now defines 
acceptable behaviour. 
In doing so, conversion redraws the boundaries of such acceptable 
behaviour. Idolatry and the sexual sins listed are now defined as belonging to the same 
sphere as other types of behaviour which the Corinthians, as members of Graeco-Roman 
society, would already have considered undesirable. The boundaries of immorality have 
been stretched in order to include items which would previously not have belonged there, 
and it is this boundary stretching function which 6:9-11 performs in relation to Paul's 
82This is not to suggest that Graeco-Roman society lacked well-defined boundaries in relation to sexual 
conduct, but simply that such boundaries were drawn in different places than by Paul. 
83 Although we will never know whether the Corinthians could have been termed 'religious seekers' in a 
broader sense, it does seem that in relation to sinls they moved from solution to plight. 
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condemnation of church members having quarrels which issued in court cases. At least 
some in the Corinthian church saw nothing objectionable in such behaviour, to which 
Paul bluntly says c!J.J,J ... ci UI-lE1.s ci8tKE1.'tE Ked ci1tOC5"tEPE1.'tE (6:8). The repeated 1\ 
OUK Ot8a'tE (6:2,3,9) expresses exasperation at the Corinthians' failure to recognise 
what should have been obvious to the saints who, it seems, are even now insufficiently 
sensitised to sin for them to recognise it in their midst. He categorises their conduct 
differently from the way in which they would do so themselves, and uses 6: 9-11 to 
emphasise what he considers to be its true nature. 84 The Corinthians are invited to 
identify the behaviour of some of their number in wronging one another as belonging in 
the same category as the vices listed in 6:9-10.85 Just as Paul expects their conversion to 
have redefined previously acceptable religious and sexual practices as unrighteous and 
sinful, so he now expects his argument to produce a similar redefinition with regard to 
their litigious quarrels. If they accept his position then such disputes will come to seem 
morally anomalous, stray pieces of behaviour from another world, namely their own past. 
The impact of conversion upon practical conSCiOusness IS therefore 
thrown into sharp relief. Barriers are erected between the converts' present and their 
past. The exposure of unrecognised sin means that conduct such as the worship of the 
gods, which would formerly have met with instinctive approval, ought now to strike the 
841 thus regard 6: 9-11 as well integrated into the argument of 6: 1-11 as a whole, something which has 
not always been acknowledged. See Zoas (1988), p.623 and Richardson, P. (1983), p.42 for support for 
my position, although one doubts that Richardson is correct when he uses this as a platform from which 
to argue that chapters 5 and 6 are so closely integrated that the court cases of 6: 1-11 must concern 
Sex.llal matters. 
85This connection is supported by Paul's use of eschatological motifs in both 6: 1-8 and 6:9-11. His main 
objection, indeed the only explicitly stated one, to going to court before the unrighteous is that the saints 
will judge the world (6:2-4), and the consequence of the behaviour of the unrighteous, condemned by the 
vice list, will be a failure to inherit the kingdom. Thus, present conduct is to be determined by 
eschatological roles. This point has been rather neglected in recent scholarship in favour of (i) concern 
over the formulaic/traditional nature of the phrase 'inheriting the kingdom', and (ii) concern to establish 
whether the Corinthian courts were corrupt and/or whether Paul was concerned as to the impact of court 
cases on the public reputation of the church. See above p.126 n.65 on (i), and Winter (1991) for an 
example of (ii). None of these concerns are illegitimate in themselves, but they add up to a concentration 
on the splinters of Paul's argument instead of the planks. 
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individual as a glaring lapse in behavioural competence.86 Further, these changes are not 
isolated pieces of moral reassessment but function as part of a wholesale reconstruction 
of moral identity. The recognition of former religious practices as idolatry and former 
sexual practices as immoral creates a moral divide in areas fundamental to the 
functioning of Graeco-Roman society. While Paul elsewhere displays a desire to sustain 
relationships across this divide (e.g. 1 Cor. 7:12-14, 10:27-30), the focus of 6:9-11 is 
upon its creation. As we saw in relation to calling (3.4.2), conversion means that the 
fundamental boundary of the social world is the believing community. Outsiders not only 
behave differently but belong to a different place, Paul's repeated mention of the 
kingdom of God (6:9-10) implying two mutually exclusive realms. The Gentile convert 
comes to thinks of friends and neighbours with whom he or she formerly identified as 
essentially other. The context within which practical consciousness is constructed is now 
that of the believing community. 
4.3.4 Effecting the Transformation 
In 6: 11, Paul describes how it was that the Corinthians experienced a 
reconstruction of their moral identity, employing three different verbs to denote 
conversion. They are cXnoAo-uco, ayuxSco and DtK<XtOCO. One might have thought that 
the decision to describe conversion using these three terms suggests a striving, conscious 
or instinctive, for conceptual richness. Paul senses that no single verb will suffice to 
describe the transformation of his converts' identity. Despite this, Sanders and Bultmann 
both argue in a way which makes the second and third verbs no more than repetitions of 
the first.87 About to quote 1 Cor. 6:9-11, Sanders writes that "in their present life the 
Christians have been sanctified in the sense of cleansed. "88 On the next page Sanders 
86Meeks (1983), pp.128-29 rightly emphasises that 1 Cor. 5&6 are organized around a concern to define 
the present boundaries of the community, but rather overlooks Paul's strong concern with conversion 
and the consequent establishment of sharp boundaries between the believers' present and their past. As 
well as 6:9-11, see 5:6-8 and 6:20. 
87Bultmann (ET 1952), p.136: "All three verbs describe the sacramental bath of purification." Sanders 
(1977), p.47l: "The point of all the verbs here, including Justified', is that the Christians were cleansed 
of the sins just enumerated. " 
88Sanders (1977), pp.450-51. His italics. 
134 
speaks of "a soteriology of cleansing, awaiting the coming salvation in a pure state. "89 
When one adds to this Justification' solely in the sense of 'the forgiveness of sins', it is 
difficult to see any objection to writing: 'In their present life Christians have been 
justified in the sense of cleansed.' The three verbs anoAouco, aYLCa;CO and chxcnoco 
have become synonyms. 
This is not what is suggested by the order of Paul's argument. Paul 
does not remind the Corinthians that they were purified (washed, sanctified and 
justified), that this signifies the forgiveness of their sins, and that therefore they should 
"remain pure and blameless until the Day of the Lord, "90 desisting from such sins as their 
litigious quarrels. Doubtless they should, and doubtless it is a proper inference from what 
Paul says, but in fact the order in which he puts things is rather different. First Paul 
criticises their current conduct in defrauding one another and taking one another to 
court, and then he tells them who they were, before telling them that by virtue of their 
having been washed, sanctified and justified that is no longer who they are. Instead of 
initiating the argument their conversion clinches it, making their sin not only wrong in the 
eyes of God, but also a self inflicted ll't'tl1f...la (6:7) upon themselves in their status as 
saints. Again we find confirmation that Paul's primary concern is with the Corinthians' 
identity, with who they now are. His anxiety reflects not simply the possibility of fresh 
sins requiring forgiveness, but the fact that in his view their conversion ought to have 
alienated them from sin. A description of conversion which has several dimensions fits 
the structure of Paul's argument. 
The grammar of 6: 11 also indicates that the three verbs are not 
synonyms. There is a triple aAAd, making each verb stand individually, as well as 
collectively, in opposition to what has gone before.91 Godet insists that the correct 
89Sanders (1977), p.452. 
90 Sanders (1977), p.45!. 
9lModern English translations (RSV, NRSV, NIV, GNB, REB) obscure this by only translating the first 
of the three, whereas the A V had given them all. 
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translation here is 'but, moreover',92 and this is certainly the way in which it was read by 
Chrysostom.93 tbtK<Xtw8rrtE thus becomes a rhetorical climax, something also 
indicated by its neat opposition to the mention of Ot dbtKOt in 6: 1 and 6:9.94 Far from 
being a mere repetition of the previous two verbs, tbtKCXtw8rrtE is prepared for by 
them. To say this is not to commit the opposite error and so segregate the meaning of 
the verbs that they come to seem like chronological stages in a process. Paul does not 
mean that the Corinthians were first washed, then sanctified and finally justified. The 
very opposition with the unrighteous of 6: 1 and 6:9, which places particular emphasis on 
justification, is itself probably the reason for the order of the three verbs. 95 The 
commentators on the right track are those who take the verbs as denoting different 
aspects of the same event of conversion.96 Each verb demands examination in its own 
right. 
There is no disagreement as to the mearung of CbWAOUCO, which 
implies exactly what Bultmannn and Sanders say that it does, namely that through 
baptism the Corinthians have been cleansed of their past transgressions. The only other 
92Godet (ET 1886), p.299. He draws attention to 2 Cor. 7: 11 as another text where a'A:)..d bears this 
sense. 
93Chrysostom (ET 1839), p.218: "Was this then all? Nay: but He hath also sanctified. Nor even is this 
all: He hath also justified. ( , Ap' OUV 1:0131:0 1l0VOV; OuOallcOC;, a')..')..d Kat fryiaCJcv· a')..')..' OUO£ 
1:0131:0 1l0VOV, a')..')..d Kat EOtKaicoCJc)" See also Fee (1987), p.246 n.34. 
94Fuller (1986), pp.98,101 argues that in 6:101. clOtKOt are simply outsiders, with no implication of 
immoral conduct. Winter (1991), p.90 suggests the opposite, i.e., that in 6: 1 Paul is not concerned by the 
fact that the judges are outsiders but by their moral character. One doubts such distinctions of meaning 
are sustainable since Paul's definition(s) of morality are sufficiently different from those of Graeco-
Roman society for outsiders to be immoral in his eyes without their having violated their own moral 
codes. To be an outsider and to be immoral thus amount to more or less the same thing. See Meeks 
(1993), p.69. Note also that 01. clOtKOt do not appear in Gal. 5: 19-21 where it is those who do the works 
of the flesh who will not inherit the Kingdom. Their appearance in 1 Cor. 6:9 therefore cannot be 
attributed to tradition, i.e., the opposition between 01. clOtKOt and EOtKatuSSrrcc does not appear 
accidental. 
95See 1 Cor. 1:30 where righteousness comes first in a similar sequence, on which see above, p.127 
n.69. 
96Fung (1980), p.251: "Thus we find presented here in juxtaposition cleansing, sanctification and 
justification as different aspects of a single act of grace at the outset of Christian life, as coincident facets 
of the believers' one experience of union with Christ." Fung argues that justification in 6: 11 is forensic, 
and even although what he means by 'forensic' seems closer to Bultmann than to Sanders, his final 
reference to 'union with Christ' is nonetheless strikingly participatory in tone. See also Robertson & 
Plummer (1911), P13.119-20 and Fee (1987), p.246. 
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use of the verb in the New Testament is at Acts 22: 16, where Ananias instructs the 
newly converted Paul to avaO''tcie; j3ci.7t'tlO'al Kat anOAouO'al 'tcie; cqlap'tiae; 
O'ou, EnlKaAcO'd~cvoe; 'to 6vo~a a1,)'tou.97 The connection of washing with 
baptism, its purpose in dealing with past transgressions, and the mention of the name of 
Christ all suggest that at 1 Cor. 6:9-11 the use of anoAouco as part of a description of 
conversion can be nothing other than a strong and clear reference to baptism.98 
Difficulties arise only when this idea of baptismal cleansing is allowed to dominate the 
context completely. If I am right that there is little evidence for the presence of a 
baptismal formula in 6: 11 b, and right that the three verbs of 6: 11 are not synonyms, then 
this is a mistaken interpretation. Had Paul wished to make baptismal cleansing his 
primary emphasis, then he could have spoken of baptism directly. As it is, his clear 
reference to it through the use of anoAouco means that it appears as one of three ways 
of describing conversion. 
The meaning of a:Yldt;co is therefore not reducible solely to the idea of 
cleansing and resultant moral purity. As elsewhere, it also denotes something about the 
community as the sphere of purity (see 3.3.4). "God's people should be sanctified 
because God's presence dwells with them. "99 This can be seen particularly clearly in 1 
Corinthians. At 1:2 the church is defined as 'hYlaO'~EVOle; EV XP10''tcP ' I11O'OU, 
KA 11'tOle; ayiole;, and at 7: 14, sanctification becomes an explicitly participatory 
concept, the unbelieving spouse of a Christian being sanctified by virtue of their union 
97 As here, CX1WAOUCl) appears at 1 Cor. 6: 11 in the middle voice, although there, as he does with the 
following two verbs, we might have expected Paul to use the aorist passive fonn. However, see Porter 
(1992), p.67: "Grammarians are undecided exactly how to characterise the Greek middle voice, but most 
are agreed that a reflexive middle sense ('he washed himself) .. .is not the predominant one in the 
Hellenistic period." Paul does mean 'you were washed' not 'you washed yourselves'. See also Barrett 
(1971b), p.141; Fee (1987), p.245 n.31 
98Contra Fee (1987), pp.246-47, who is concerned to accord as little significance as possible to baptism 
in the interpretation of these verses. Fee writes that although an indirect baptismal allusion is possible, 
"Paul is not here concerned with the Christian initiatory rite, but with the spiritual transfonnation made 
possible through Christ and effected by the Spirit." This seems to me an anachronistic holding apart of 
things which Paul, and early Christians in general, would have understood as belonging together. 
99Thielman (1994), p.99. 
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with a believer.1°o If in 6:9-11 Paul does speak of a transformation of identity, and 
criticises the current conduct of the Corinthians on the basis that it is incompatible with 
who they now are, then it is likely that he intends the sanctification received at 
conversion to be understood in terms of divine appropriation. In 6: 11 T)YlCxcr8111:£ 
means "You were claimed by God as his own and made a member of his holy people - in 
Paul's language a saint (eX.YlOc;)." 101 This appropriation certainly has strong ethical 
consequences, but it primarily denotes a change of status and identity. 
When one comes to 8tKCn6co it is clear that, in the general sense of a 
legal metaphor, the term is used forensically. To point out the obvious, 6:9-11 concludes 
Paul's criticism of the quarrels that have resulted in members of the church taking one 
another to court, and so a legal metaphor is particularly appropriate to the context. 
Further, much of the legal imagery in the preceeding verses has an eschatological 
orientation. Paul bases his objections to going to law before the unrighteous on the belief 
that the saints will judge (Kpivco) the world (6:2). The idea of inheritance could also be 
termed a legal concept, and Paul stresses that the unrighteous will not inherit 
(KAl1POVO~Eco) the kingdom (6:9,10). Viewed in eschatological terms, the contrast 
which Paul makes between two types of people is between those who will do the 
judging, and those who will be amongst the judged. The statement that the Corinthians 
were justified at their conversion therefore most naturally reads as an assertion that the 
Corinthians were acquitted in God's court, and as a result enjoy right standing before 
100CIearly this use of aytcU;co is exceptional in so far as purity and actual moral conduct are sharply 
separated. Sanctification here neither produces moral behaviour, nor demands it as a condition of its 
continuance. Yet this observation only serves to highlight the difficulties of categorizing Paul's thought. 
One speaks of 1 Cor. 7: 14 as 'participatory', but might not the sanctification described here also be 
termed 'imputed'? 
101Barrett (1971b), p.142. See also Hering (ET 1962), p.42. The eschatological nature of the other legal 
imagery in the context means that the label which Bultmann refuses to apply to 8tKatOCO in 6: 11, 
namely 'forensic-eschatological', might actually be thought a particularly appropriate way to describe 
this usage! 
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God. 102 Along with their cleansing and their appropriation by God, it IS this which 
qualifies them for their own eschatological roles as judges. 
Thus, Paul speaks of converSIOn III terms of the cleansing of 
transgressions, of divine appropriation into God's people, and of the acquittal by God 
which produces right standing before him. The three verbs of 6: 11 are distinct and, 
contra Bultmann and Sanders, their context indicates that the verbs ciyl(x~w and 
OlKcnow are not simply alternative means by which to express the idea of cleansing. 
Paul's description of conversion is not one-dimensional. Yet neither does this mean that 
these three concepts are divorced from one another. Paul uses them to provide a three-
dimensional description of a single event and, as different dimensions of one event, they 
too form part of the context against which each other is to be read. The three are 
certainly not identical but they are interdependent, each expressing an aspect of the 
transformation of identity experienced by the Corinthians at conversion. 
By collapsing all three verbs into one, Sanders and Bultmann eliminate 
both their distinctiveness and their interdependence. The problems arising from this are 
well illustrated by Sanders' categorisation of the concept of justification in 6: 11, which is 
somewhat confusing. Sanders argues both that justification is here intended in the sense 
of cleansing and that, as such, this usage is 'forensic' . Yet as we have already 
commented, cleansing is not a legal image. 103 The label 'forensic' seems to have become a 
useful catch-all term which Sanders can use to denote any use of righteousness 
terminology which he does not consider participatory. This confusion is a vital one since, 
in asserting that Paul's use of justification in 6: 11 is forensic in the sense that it is a legal 
image used to denote the gift of right standing before God, I am not using the term in 
opposition to the idea of participation. The interdependence of the three verbs in 6: 11 
forbids this, for the legal image of justification operates in relation to that of washing and 
102See Barrett (1971b), p.142; Fee (1987), p.247 n.37. 
103See above, p.l21 n.37. 
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that of sanctification, all three together expressmg the transformation of identity 
experienced by the Corinthians. That they were justified is only one of the bases of who 
they now are. Thus, DinkIer takes 6:9-11 as an example of the indicative and imperative 
in Paul's thought, and summarises their teaching with the words "Werdet heilig - denn ihr 
seid heilig! "104 In similar fashion Fee writes, "but that is what some of you were. Now in 
Christ Jesus you are something different, so live like it. Stop defrauding, living in sexual 
sin etc., because you are no longer among those who do."105 
This does not lead Paul to employ explicitly participatory terms in 6:9-
11, but if sin is a contradiction of who the Corinthians are then Paul clearly expects them 
to be free from the power of sin, the plight to which Sanders understands participation in 
Christ to be the answer. Paul uses legal imagery in abundance here, but the context in 
which he does so means that its sense does not remain exclusively forensic. The forensic 
imagery itself helps to express a fundamental change from one category of person to 
another, and it is this change of identity which empowers a change in behaviour and 
implies participation in Christ. Astonishingly, and in complete contradiction to his later 
arguments which I have already reported, this conclusion finds support from the younger 
Bultmann. In his classic essay on the indicative and the imperative in Paul he writes 
"Next to statements according to which the justified person is free from sin ... are those 
statements which admonish the justified person to fight against sin (main references: 
Rom. 6:1-7; 8:1-17; Gal. 5:13-25; 1 Cor. 6:9-11)."106 Bultmann makes it very clear that 
this involves more than simply the forgiveness of sins. For Paul, sinlessness is "freedom 
from the power of sin, "107 and "because the Christian is free from sin through 
104Dinkler (1992), p.149. 
105Fee (1987), p.245. See also Lietzmann (1969), p.27 n.7 and Conzelmann (ET 1975), p.107. 
106Bultmann (1924, ET 1995), p.195. My emphasis. This dramatic change seems to have been the result 
of the impact of existentialism upon Bultmann's theology. In 1924 he was happy to discuss justification 
in terms of mysticism, citing Reitzenstein's views on the subject. Yet in Theology of the New Testament, 
without acknowledging any change in his position, Bultmann explicitly criticises Reitzenstein and 
denies a mystical element in precisely those passages where he had discerned it in 1924. Compare 
Bultmann (1924, ET 1995), p.2IO and (ET 1952), p.278. Note the mention of 1 Cor. 6:11 in both cases. 
107Bultmann (1924, ET 1995), p.198. 
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justification, he is now to fight against sin."108 Indeed, such freedom from the power of 
sin stems from the forensic character of justification: "It can in no way be that 
justification concerns only the remission of sins committed prior to baptism, not having 
significance for the life of the justified following baptism. In that case its eschatological 
character - that justification is the ecrxcx1:0V (last thing), the definitive event - would be 
misunderstood."109 As Kasemann was later to argue, justification in 1 Cor. 6: 11 is "the 
reality of the transformed existence conveyed in the baptismal event. "110 At their 
conversion the Corinthians were not simply cleansed in order to await the eschaton in 
purity with their sins forgiven. They are not simply people who no longer commit the 
sins of idolatry etc. Instead, their existence has been transformed so that they are no 
longer idolaters etc. There has been a change of person as well as behaviour; who they 
are has changed as well as what they do. 
Thus, 1 Cor. 6:9-11 appears as a passage which, by means of the 
indicative and imperative,lll proclaims freedom from the power of sin, and implies 
participation in Christ. Justification in 6: 11 is primarily forensic but, given its context, 
this forensic justification itself hints heavily at participation. Further evidence of this is 
108ibid. 
109ibid. Weiss (1910), p.154, even as he notes the apparent contradiction between the Corinthians' status 
as saints and their actual conduct, writes that "man darf den Widerspruch nicht beseitigen wollen, 
indem man a1tEAoU(J(X,(JeE, Tyytci(Jell'tE, tOtK<X.toSell'tE nur von der Siindenvergebung und nicht von 
der faktischen Beseitigung der Siinde faBt. " 
lloKasemann (ET 1969), p.171. While this is a correct view of justification in 6:11, I regard baptism as 
simply one component of the wider conversion event. See also Lightfoot (1895), p.213 who comments 
on 6: 11 that "we are justified not simply by imputation, but in virtue of our incorporation in to Christ." 
Ironically, the role which the Bultmann of 1924 grants to justification in enabling the believer to fight 
against sin seems to anticipate Kasemann's view, formulated in oppostion to Bultmann, that the gift of 
righteousness has the character of power. 
111Seifud (1992), pp.52-53 alleges that Sanders fails to pay sufficient attention to the indicative and 
imperative in Paul. This failure e""presses itself in Sanders' refusal to countenance the idea that Paul 
understood righteousness as in any sense 'imputed.' While Sanders is undoubtedly right that there is no 
hint of any idea of a 'fictional' righteousness in Paul, there are other senses in which one can take 
'imputed.' Recognising the importance of the indicative and imperative opens the way to a righteousness 
that is 'real' since the boundaries of immorality have been redefined, and therefore the behaviour of 
converts actually changes on the basis of a change in their identity and their union with Christ. Yet this 
is also imputed in the sense that Paul did not teach 'perfectionism', and lapses such as the court cases in 
Corinth do not result in an immediate and automatic forfeiting of believers' status as saints. Paul 
proclaims a 'real' righteousness, but one with an eschatological reservation. 
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provided by Paul's use of 6: 11 as the launching pad for a discussion of prostitution in 
which participatory terminology is dominant. 112 The sharp distinction which Sanders 
develops between what he sees as Paul's two uses of blKcx,lOCO therefore begins to 
appear strained, even in what he claims as the clearest example of one of them. 113 This 
distinction will be subjected to further criticism in Appendix 2 but, in relation to 6:9-11, 
it should be observed that there is nothing so very surprising in Paul's blending of terms 
and concepts if what he intends is a demonstration that the Corinthians' behaviour stands 
in contradiction to their conversion. In order to provide such a demonstration he also 
provides a full and rounded picture of conversion. As we saw in relation to calling 
(3.4.1), Paul uses language in fresh and creative ways when describing conversion. 
4.3.5 Summary 
1 Cor. 6:9-11 is a text which can profitably be used to explore Paul's 
understanding of conversion. As a unit it cannot in any significant sense be termed 
'traditional'. Although it contains within it some traditional elements, there is no evidence 
that they had ever previously been brought together in anything approximate to this 
form. Tradition cannot be used to distance Paul from his own words here, and these 
verses have as much claim as any other single text to represent the 'real' concerns of 
Paul. In 6: 9-11 Paul concludes his criticism of the Corinthians' quarrels and court cases 
by reminding them of their conversion. Their current conduct is unacceptable because it 
stands in contradiction to who they now are, their identity having been transformed by 
their conversion. A vital component of their transformation was the recognition that their 
former lives were thoroughly polluted by sin, and the sinners catalogued in the vice list of 
6: 9-1 0 include those whose behaviour would previously have seemed perfectly 
acceptable to Paul's converts. Faith in Christ has stretched the boundaries of immorality, 
112Pee (1987), p.248 says of the indicative - imperative form of 6:9-11 that "it obviously functions as the 
basis for all the imperatives in this letter, including the one that immediately follows." See also 
Augustine (ET 1845), Sermon CXI and Sermon CXII, who repeatedly and specifically relates the vice 
list of 6:9-10 to 6: 15. 
113Por Sanders' categories see above, pp.120-22. Appendix 2 will discuss Rom. 6:7, where Sanders 
finds what he regards as the clearest example ofFaul's participatory use of 8tKCXt6oo. 
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and in areas crucial to its organisation and functioning, principally sex and religion, Paul's 
converts now reject the dominant values of Graeco-Roman society. 
This has considerable consequences III terms of practical 
conSCIOusness, implying both that behaviour which would formerly have met with 
instinctive approval should now strike the convert as a glaring lapse in behavioural 
competence, and that the boundary of the convert's social world is now the believing 
community, which provides the context within which practical consciousness is 
constructed. The complete and wide-ranging nature of this transformation of identity, 
and its place at the climax of Paul's argument, make it unlikely that he intends the three 
verbs which describe it (6: 11) all to mean the same thing. Instead, Paul provides a three-
dimensional description of conversion the elements of which are distinct but 
interdependent. When considered individually, the climactic verb 8lKCXlOCO is quite 
clearly forensic. Yet this legal imagery functions as part of the overall description of 
transformation in which Paul bases his criticism of the Corinthians' conduct on who they 
now are. This implies not only the forgiveness of sins but also freedom from the power 
of sin, so granting these verses a participatory flavour. 1 Cor. 6: 9-11 provides an 
example of Paul's interpretation of the different categories of his thought by each other. 
Its fruitful exegesis requires attention to the manner in which Paul brings these categories 
together rather than to the question of their relative importance. 
4.4 Conclusions 
As was suggested at the outset of the chapter, unrecognised sin has 
emerged from both 1 Cor. 14:20-25 and 1 Cor. 6:9-11 as a significant component of 
Paul's understanding of Gentile conversion. It is in the revealing of truth about previous 
conduct that the true position of men and women before God is apprehended, and the 
power of Christ to transform that position demonstrated. From this observation flow the 
following points: 
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(i) The evidence examined suggests that Paul did not conceive of the 
position of Gentiles before conversion as one in which they were unable to live up to 
their own moral expectations. Instead their difficulty is a false contentment stemming 
from their failure to recognise their sinful actions as such. This means that Gentile 
conversion is not the resolution of a pre-existing crisis, but is itself both crisis and 
resolution. The convert moves from false contentment to crisis to security in Christ. 
(ii) The crisis wrought by the realisation of unrecognised sin brings a 
transformation which is not only an inward affair of the conscience, but also involves a 
radical change of moral and social identity. Those actions previously accepted, but now 
recognised as sinful, are ones approved by Graeco-Roman society as a whole. Paul's 
converts are required to break with many of the dominant values of the society from 
which they come and in which they still live. This implies a reconstruction of practical 
consciousness, the social context for which is the believing community. 
(iii) Paul uses a variety of vocabulary to describe this transformation of 
identity, and in some cases blends terms and concepts in order better to express its 
various dimensions. This means that each of the terms and concepts warrant attention in 
their own right, but also that each of them serves the overall purpose. Their meaning in 
context is therefore also partly determined by it, and by each other. In 1 Cor. 6: 9-11 we 
saw that this produced an instance of 81KCX10CO which is both strongly forensic, and yet 
also has a participatory flavour. Paul himself, to some degree, seems to allow each 
category to interpret the other. One of the commonest category distinctions used by 
scholars to analyse Paul's theology is therefore under strain. 
5 
A Jewish Convert 
5.1 Introduction 
5.1.1 Questions and Selection of Evidence 
We have seen that while Paul prohibits a change of ethnic identity by 
those whom God has called, he also considers ethnic identity to be of no significance in 
determining who is called (3.3.6) Whether one is a Jew or a Gentile is something which 
Paul considers irrelevant to one's standing before God. We also saw that, both implicitly 
in 1 Cor. 14:20-25 (4.2) and explicitly in 1 Cor. 6:9-11 (4.3), Paul characterises the past 
lives of his Gentile converts in a negative way. Behaviour regarded as perfectly 
acceptable by Graeco-Roman society now has to be recognised as sinful, and therefore 
avoided. One might expect the corollary of such a negative portrait of the Gentile world 
to be a positive one of Judaism, and I entirely agree with Sanders when he suggests that, 
before his conversion, Paul "must have distinguished between Jews, who were righteous 
(despite occasional transgressions), and 'Gentile sinners' (Gal. 2:15)."1 However, if the 
post-conversion Paul were to maintain this distinction, how could this be reconciled with 
his insistence that ethnic identity is irrelevant to one's standing before God? Does Paul 
really discuss Jewish and Gentile conversion on the same basis? 
To ask this major question implies further component ones. What 
vocabulary does Paul use to discuss Jewish conversion? Is it the same as that which he 
uses of Gentile converts, and does he use it in the same way? How should it be 
classified? Does Paul regard unrecognised sin as equally important in the conversion of 
Jews? If so, does this imply that for the Jew who comes to Christ conversion is, in the 
first instance, the cause of a crisis rather than the resolution of one? Does this further 
lSanders (1977), p.499. 
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imply the same sort of criticism of the dominant values of Jewish society as he levels 
against the Gentile world? Does Paul expect the impact of conversion upon the practical 
consciousness of a Jew to be the same as with Gentiles, or are there significant 
differences? To answer such questions requires attention to passages discussing the only 
Jewish conversion about which Paul informs us in any detail, namely his own.2 This 
chapter will therefore explore Gal. 1: 11-17, Phil. 3 :4-12 and 1 Cor. 4: 1-5. The first of 
these has been selected because Paul there applies the concept of calling to himself, and 
the second because Paul there discusses his conversion in terms of contrasting types of 
righteousness. In both cases he directly contrasts his life before his conversion with his 
life after it, something we have seen him do in relation to his Gentile converts in 1 Cor. 
6:9-11. These two passages are customarily included in discussions of Paul's own 
conversion, but to place 1 Cor. 4: 1-5 alongside them is something of a departure. 3 Yet 
although Paul does not directly discuss his own conversion in this text he does speak of 
his own unrecognised sin, thereby enabling a comparison with what he has said of his 
Gentile converts in 1 Cor. 6:9-11 and 1 Cor. 14:20-25. 
5.1.2 The Status of the Selected Evidence 
In the course of exploring Paul's understanding of Jewish conversion, 
this chapter will argue that what Paul tells us of his own conversion suggests that his 
experience played a significant part in shaping important elements of his theology. For 
some, the attempt to demonstrate this employing Paul's accounts of his own conversion 
is methodologically suspect. Gaventa writes, "Paul does not construct his theology out of 
the content or experience of his conversion. Indeed, the reverse is true. It is Paul's 
2Some may object that Paul's call to be an apostle means either (a) that he is not a convert, or (b) that his 
conversion is therefore significantly different to that of others, be they Jew or Gentile. Point (a) will be 
directly disputed through exegesis of Gal. 1: 11-17, and on point (b) see 3.3.3. 
31 have chosen to discuss 1 Cor. 4: 1-5 rather than Rom. 7, another passage often included in discussions 
of Paul's conversion. This is principally because the former offered the chance to break fresh ground 
whereas the latter has received extensive discussion. 1 regard Rom. 7 as a piece of biographical 
reconstruction in which Paul discusses his pre-conversion life, but does so entirely from his new 
Christian perspective, i.e., he retrospectively discerns an inability to obey the commandments of which 
he was not aware at the time. 
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understanding of the gospel that brings about a re-construction or re-imagining of his 
past. "4 Paul's understanding of conversion shapes his accounts of his conversion and not 
vice versa. While providing excellent sources for Paul's understanding of conversion, his 
accounts cannot be relied upon to accurately reveal the impact of his conversion 
experience. Here we have the application to Paul of the view, discussed and criticised 
above (1.2.2),5 that conversion accounts are always unreliable. It is certainly true that 
converts invariably engage in biographical reconstruction. Paul's later theological 
understanding does inevitably influence his accounts of his conversion, especially those 
elements which evaluate his previous life. What he says about his conversion decades 
later is not necessarily an accurate reflection of what he thought about that experience a 
day, a week, or a month after it had occured. Yet to conclude from this that his 
conversion cannot have helped to shape his theology is a false deduction. Humans beings 
are interpretative creatures, for whom to have an experience is to interpret it. Raw 
experience is something to which the historian simply does not have access. Were we in 
the privileged position of being able to interview Paul the day after his conversion, we 
would still only have access to his interpretation of the experience, not to the experience 
itself Although that more immediate interpretation might be different from subsequent 
ones, it would not enjoy a privileged epistemological status by virtue of being an early 
one. Nor would it thereby be innocent of theological considerations. Whether it should 
be regarded as a fresh account in comparison to later stale ones, or as an immature ill-
considered response compared to later mature ones, would itself be very much a matter 
of interpretation. 
4Gaventa (1986a), p.313. A similar assertion is made in relation to Phil. 3:4-12 by Raisanen (1992), 
p.29 who, rejecting the idea that Paul derives his antithesis between justification by faith and 
justification by works of the law from his conversion experience, asks whether he does not "instead 
interpret his call experience in v.9 in retrospect in terms of the contrast between the two 
righteousnesses?" Interestingly, this does not seem to be a position that Gaventa maintained for long. 
She expresses a far more balanced attitude towards the significance of his conversion experience for 
Paul's theology in Gaventa (1986b), pp.18-21. 
5See especially, pp.16-18. 
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Thus, although the retrospective self certainly develops, it does not 
therefore necessarily distort, either with regard to the experience of conversion, or to its 
consequences for the beliefs of the convert. 6 If Paul provides us with accounts which 
suggest that his conversion experience had certain theological consequences, then there 
is no prior reason to doubt that the connection is genuine. His strong claim to have 
received his law free gospel 01' arcoKcxA;U\jfECOC; 'I11O'OU XP10''tOU (Gal. 1: 12) must 
be taken seriously. How great a period elapsed between the conversion experience itself, 
and the reflections upon it which gave rise to such consequences, is a related but 
different question. By arguing that elements of Paul's theology are derived from his own 
conversion experience, I am not thereby implying that the theology of his letters is 
necessarily the same in all important respects as that which he held in the immediate 
aftermath of his conversion. 7 Nor am I suggesting that subsequent experiences played 
little or no part in the development of Paul's theology. Doubtless the problems and 
practicalities of mission also influenced him but, whatever these were, one doubts that 
they were unique to Paul. Such problems and practicalities were also faced by others 
who did not respond by advocating a law free gospel. Paul's distinctive attitude is best 
explained in relation to his experience of conversion. 8 We therefore reach a similar 
6For an argument that it does, see Fredriksen (1986), p.33, quoted above on p.16. In relation to Paul, the 
same is rather implied by Watson (1986), p.30: "All we know of Paul's conversion is how he chose to 
understand it in polemical contexts many years later." 
7The assumption that such an implication does follow is one of the shared misconceptions marking the 
fierce debate between Seyoon Kim and Heikki Raisanen over the origins of Paul's theology. Kim argues 
that all the essential elements of Paul's theology can be attributed to his conversion and that they 
emerged in its immediate aftermath. Raisanen disputes this, especially in relation to Paul's views on the 
Law, assuming that if these views were the subject of development, then they cannot be regarded as in 
any significant sense a consequence of Paul's conversion. See Kim (1984) and Raisanen (1987b) and 
(1992), pp.17-44. However, should the different conversion accounts with which Paul provides us prove 
to be consistent, it would seem reasonable to conclude that that the elements of his theology influenced 
by his e}.'}Jerience had reached a settled form by the time he wrote his epistles. Apart from the possible 
exception of 1 Thessalonians, this is accepted by Raisanen (1987b), pp.404-06. 
8Nock (1933), pp.190-91: "The Twelve in Jerusalem, and no doubt most of their early adherents, had 
found in the Gospel of Jesus and the Gospel which took shape around Jesus the integration and 
completion of the religious traditions in which they had always lived. For them he came to fulfil, and not 
to destroy. Paul, on the other hand, had regarded them and theirs as apostates and had thrown himself 
heart and soul into the struggle to suppress them. For him to become a Christian meant in the first 
instance a complete change offace." Watson (1986), pp.31-36 argues that Paul began preaching a law 
free gospel to Gentiles in reaction to the failure of mission to Jews, but offers no explanation as to why 
the reaction of Paul and his colleagues was so different from that of other Jewish Christians. 
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conclusion with regard to the relationship between Paul's theology and his conversion 
experience as we did for converts in genera1.9 Whatever stages of development Paul's 
theology passed through, it is not credible to suppose that theology simply determined 
the interpretation of experience (or indeed vice versa). Rather, the two stand in a 
reciprocal relationship, each influencing, and being influenced by, the other. 
5.2 Paul's Conversion and His Attitude Towards Judaism - Gal. 1:11-17 
5.2.1 Call as Conversion 
I argued in a prevIous chapter (3) that the most distinctive and 
innovative aspect of Paul's use of the concept of calling is that it denotes conversion. Yet 
it is precisely the appearance of K(x'AEOO (1: 15) in Paul's own account of his experience 
which has been used by Krister Stendahl as the basis on which to argue that this 
experience was not a conversion. 10 In Stendahl's view Paul was called not converted, the 
two terms functioning as opposites rather than as equivalents. Asserting that "here is not 
that change of 'religion' that we commonly associate with the word conversion," 11 
Stendahl points to the undoubted fact that Paul's language in Gal. 1: 15 has its 
background in Is. 49: 1-6 and J er. 1: 5. "Paul describes his experience in terms of a 
prophetic call similar to that ofIsaiah and Jeremiah. He felt hand-picked by God after the 
prophetic model to take the message of God and Christ to the Gentiles." 12 This leads to 
the conclusion that "if, then, we use the term 'conversion' for Paul's experience, we 
would also have to use it of such prophets as Jeremiah and Isaiah. Yet we do not speak 
9See above, p.2l. 
10See Stendahl (1976), pp.7-23. 
l1Stendahl (1976), p.7. His italics. 
12Stendahl (1976), p.8. Kim (1984), pp.91-99 argues that Is. 6 is also directly relevant to Paul's 
understanding of his conversion. But the only supporting evidence which relates specifically to Gal. 
1: 11-17 is Kim's assumption that the terms arcoK<XA Urc'tEtv / arcoKaA U\jfl~ themselves imply that 
Paul had a vision of the enthroned Christ. 
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oftheir conversion, but rather of their call." 13 In Stendahl's view, Paul was not so much 
converted to be a Christian as called to be an apostle. 
That Paul did not change religions has been readily conceded by the 
vast majority of scholars,14 yet many have been reluctant to follow Stendahl in 
concluding from this that Paul was not a convert. The degree of transformation involved 
in Paul's about-turn from persecutor of the church to advocate of the gospel, and the 
change of community which resulted from this transformation, lead many to maintain 
that conversion is an appropriate term to describe his experience. 15 Stendahl's definition 
of conversion is an inadequate one. Further, as we saw in chapter 1, Paul applies the 
concept of calling not only to himself but to all those in the churches to whom he writes, 
twice specifically including both Jews and Gentiles (Rom. 9:24, 1 Cor. 1:24).16 Given 
that the latter have abandoned the Graeco-Roman gods for Christ, Stendahl would 
presumably have no difficulty in accepting them as converts who have changed 'religion'. 
Yet if that is the case, then it is far from clear how Paul, as a Jew, can have been called 
rather than converted. This would require the unlikely premise that when Paul refers to 
both Jews and Gentiles as called, the verb KaA£co simultaneously functions as an 
equivalent to conversion for Gentiles, but as its opposite for Jews. Instead one must 
accept either that these Jewish believers in Christ had changed 'religions,' or that a 
13Stendahl (1976), p.lO. 
14Perhaps too readily conceded. One wonders whether a proper awareness of Paul's continuing 
commitment to the Jewish people has not produced an underestimation of the distance which he puts 
between himself and his past. Certainly, Paul's phrase E~ ijv avaa1:po~rJV 11:01:£ EV 1:CP 'Iou8aia~cp 
(1: 13), usually translated as a reference to his 'former' or 'previous' life in Judaism (RSV, NRSV, NlV, 
GNB, REB), suggests something now left behind. 
ISOn the first of these points see Donaldson (1997), p.17 n.57; Gaventa (1986b), p.40; Sandnes (1991), 
p.58 n.36; Ziesler (1992), p.10. On the second see Segal (1990), p.6 & chapter 3. The significance of 
Paul's change of community was entirely missed by Betz (1979), p.64: "Strictly speaking, however, we 
cannot speak at all of a 'conversion' of Paul. As Galatians reports, Paul was 'called' to be a missionary to 
the Gentiles, and he changed parties within Judaism from Pharasaism to Jewish Christianity." That the 
same fact can be used to suggest both that Paul was a convert (Segal), and that he was not (Betz), 
indicates the degree to which the identification of a conversion is determined by the definition of 
conversion employed. See 1.1.2. Yet, as Segal points out, religious communities playa large part in 
defining conversion for their converts. To deny that a change of community is a significant indicator of 
conversion, especially in a sectarian environment such as first century Judaism, suggests that the 
definition used has been strongly shaped by the conclusion desired. 
16 See pp.85-86. 
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change of 'religion' is not the defining characteristic of conversion. Whichever of these 
options is chosen, then however much one stresses that in becoming an apostle to the 
Gentiles Paul received "a new and special calling in God's service,"17 and however much 
one considers that calling to be different from that given to other believers in Christ, this 
scarcely demonstrates that Paul was not a convert. 18 
Alongside these problems of definition, Stendahl's position also 
contains serious exegetical weaknesses. The key text is Gal. 1: 15 & 16a, where Paul 
specifically refers to the occasion of his conversion: U 01:E DE Eu06KTtcrEV 6 
a¢opicra<; !-LE EK KOlAia<; !-LTt'tp6<; !-LOU Kat KaAEcra<; Dux 't1l<; Xcipl'to<; 
au'tou arcoKaA t)\jfal 'tOV ulov au'tou EV E!-LOi. It is difficult to know from this 
statement at what point in time Paul places his call. The mention of his mother's womb 
makes it clear that he considers God to have set him apart from before birth and the 
reference to his call is grammatically parallel, KaAEco appearing in the form of another 
aorist participle. Some consider this to indicate that Paul thought of his call as a pre-natal 
event. 19 Were this view to be correct, then Paul would here be reflecting rather precisely 
the content of Is. 49: 1-6 where, as a precursor to a call to be a light to the Gentiles 
(49:6), the servant proclaims of God that EK KOlAia<; !-LTt'tp6<; !-Lou EKciAEcrE 'to 
6vo!-Lci !-Lou (49: 1). Stendahl might even be felt to have been overly cautious in 
asserting simply that "Paul has alluded to Old Testament passages in this account. "20 
Rather than simply alluding to Is. 49: 1-6, Paul might be thought to be modelling his 
17Stendahl (1976), p.7. He later says of Paul, p.12, that "the 'I' in his writings is not 'the Christian' but 
the Apostle to the Gentiles'." 
18 Although we should not diminish the significance of his apostolic task to Paul, it would, in fact, be a 
mistake to emphasise the distance between his calling and that of other Christians. See 3.3.4. If Paul had 
wished to emphasise the distinctiveness of his calling over and against that of other believers, why 
should he then appear to emphasise the connection between his calling and that of his readers by placing 
them in direct relation to one another. See Rom. 1:1 & 1:7; 1 Cor. 1:1 & 1:2. 
19Munck (1959), p.25: "Election and call point in advance to the moment when God revealed Christ to 
him on the road to Damascus." Also Nickelsburg, (1986), pp.203-04: "Parallel phrasing within Gal. 
1:15 suggests that God's choice of Paul from the womb and God's gracious call were one and the same." 
20Stendahl (1976), p.8. 
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statement upon it. 21 Yet at the same time, Stendahl's wider argument would be 
undermined. If Paul says that he was called before he was born, then KCXAECO is not the 
term which he uses to refer to the adult experience through which he came to know 
Christ. Instead, that experience is directly referred to only by the verb cX.1toKCXA U1t'tco in 
1: 16a, Paul having earlier stated that he received his gospel 8t' cX.1tOKCXA u'VECOC; 
'ITJo'O'u Xpt<nou (1: 12). One could certainly still speak in a general sense of Paul's 
being called to be an apostle,22 or, more specifically, of his experience as having marked 
the activation of his call, but one could not place a description of Paul's experience as a 
call in direct opposition to a description of that experience as a conversion. 
In fact, one doubts that KCXAECO should here be taken as a reference to 
a pre-natal call. The general influence of Is. 49: 1-6 upon Paul's words is clear but, while 
they may imply it, these verses do not contain the idea of being set apart, whereas Jer. 
1:5 does. 23 A reference to a pre-natal call would also be unique in Paul, who otherwise 
uses the concept of calling to denote the point at which believers came to be in Christ.24 
Paul draws on the scriptures in order to describe that experience, but not exclusively 
upon Is. 49: 1-6. In this instance Paul probably does so in a way that focuses not 
primarily on chronology, but instead on what God has done. 25 The reference to his 
having been set apart before birth naturally has chronological implications, but is first and 
foremost a means by which to emphasise the quality of God's grace, and the invincibility 
of God's purpose, which not even Paul's decision to persecute the church could deny or 
21Munck (1959), pp.25-26 argues that Paul's words resemble Is. 49:1-6 far more closely than Jer. 1:5, as 
does Sandnes (1991), pp.61-62, although, unlike Munck, he does not wish to conclude from this that 
Paul thinks of himself as having been called before birth. 
220f course, he himself does so at Rom. 1: 1 and 1 Cor. 1: 1. 
23 Although the Septuagint version of Jer. 1: 5 expresses the idea using the verbs ayl(:i~w and 'tierU.lt 
rather than a<l>opi~w. 
24See p.86 n.132. Note especially the position of KaAEw in the sequence of salvi:fic divine actions at 
Rom. 8:29-30. 
25Martyn (1997b), p.15?: "Paul does not speak, then, in a biographical fashion, as though it were his 
intention to say, 'Let me tell you about my life and experiences!' He speaks, rather, in a prophetic 
fashion, concentrating attention in the first instance on God: 'Let me tell you about God and about what 
he has done, singling me out before my birth and calling me in his grace to proclaim his good news!'" 
See also Longenecker, R. (1990), p.30; Sandnes (1991), pp.60-61. 
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overcome.26 Given this, both the aorist participle KCXAEcrCXC; and the aorist infinitive 
anoKaA U\jfCXl may be taken as referring to Paul's adult experience.27 The occasion on 
which Paul came to believe in Christ was also the occasion on which he was called. 
This conclusion may make it appear that Stendahl is at last on firm 
ground. Paul receives a call like that of the prophets of old. Yet despite the suggestion in 
subsequent research that, "all the essential elements in a prophetic call narrative ... are 
found in Gal. 1:15-16a,"28 one simple fact means that this is not so. The Septuagint 
contains not a single narrative relating the call of a prophet which contains the verb 
KaAEco. In all the places where one might have expected to find it such as Isaiah 6, 
Ezekiel 2, and, above all, Jeremiah 1, it is absent. God is said to 'call out' to Moses and 
to Samuel, but in these cases KCXAECO refers to the audible sound of God's voice rather 
than to the commission given to the prophet.29 There is, of course, the call to the servant 
in Is. 49: 1 but, as we have seen, this is indisputably a call given before birth. The 
complex questions of interpretation surrounding the identity of the servant also leave it 
unclear precisely to whom this call is given.30 Sandnes argues that one popular ancient 
interpretation, albeit far from the only one, understood Is. 49: 1-6 to refer to Isaiah 
himself but, as Sandnes admits, all the midrashic texts substantiating this are later than 
Paul's letters.31 While the concept of calling is clearly one which Paul draws from 
26But some do insist that a commission in two stages is intended, Paul having been set apart before birth 
and called as an adult. See Burton (1921), p.49; Calvin (ET 1965), p.20. 
27This conclusion is further strengthened if Paul's statement that God revealed his son EV EI-wi is 
rendered 'in me' rather than 'to me', and so as a reference to the beginning of God's revealing of Christ to 
others through Paul's ministry. It then becomes still more natural to take K<XAEo) as also referring to 
Paul's eAlJerience. So Dunn (1993), p.64; Lightfoot (1865), p.83. In favour of 'to me' are Burton (1921), 
pp.49-51; Calvin (ET 1965), p.21; Martyn (1997b), p.158. Other commentators approach the issue 
differently, assuming that 'in me' would indicate an internal experience, and 'to me' an eA1:ernal 
revelation. One doubts whether Paul would have been very much concerned as to the difference between 
the two. 
28Sandnes (1991), p.59. 
29See Ex. 3:4; 19:3,20 and 1 Sam. 3, where K<XAEo) is used eleven times to describe God speaking to 
Samuel. In Samuel's case the voice calling to him in the night says nothing of his future role, but simply 
conveys a message of condemnation for the family of Eli. 
30See above, pp.62-63. 
31Sandnes (1991), pp.62-63. 
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prophetic texts, especially second Isaiah,32 there is a severe shortage of prophets who are 
themselves said to have been called. 
This means that the logic of Stendahl's argument simply will not hold. 
It does not follow that if we take call and conversion as equivalent, and so term Paul a 
convert, then we would have to take the absurd step of using the same term of the 
prophets. For it to do so, the prophets would have to describe their experiences as calls, 
but they do not. Even if they did, one wonders if it would inevitably follow that because 
both the prophets and Paul use the same terms to describe their experiences, then we too 
must always use the same terms to describe those experiences. This logic would seem 
also to imply its opposite, namely that if the prophets and Paul use different terms to 
describe their experiences then we cannot apply the same terms to them both. This lands 
us in the truly absurd position of legitimately being able to speak of Paul's experience as 
a call, but not that of the prophets. Of course, no-one has ever objected to scholars 
speaking of the call of the prophets, and there would be no grounds for doing so. The 
only difference between the two cases is that to speak of Paul's conversion jars 
theological raw nerves in the post-Holocaust world, whereas to speak of the call of the 
prophets does not. Describing the experience of the prophets as a call and that of Paul 
as a conversion both involve the use of etic vocabulary, something which must be done 
carefully if it is not to conflict with ernic descriptions, but which, in and of itself, is a 
perfectly proper procedure. As he consistently does elsewhere, in Gal. 1: 15 Paul uses the 
language of calling to refer to conversion. 
5.2.2 A Jew Set Apart 
Yet if we are to term the experience Paul describes in Gal. 1: 11-17 a 
conversion, how are we to characterise the change involved? How are those who accept 
that it was not a change of religion to account for Paul's having made a statement which 
32See p.59 n.24. 
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suggests that it was? Paul's reference to E!-LrlV d:vcxcr'tPO<PrlV Ito'tE EV 'to 
'IoUbCXlcr!-L0 (1: 13) certainly sounds like a straightforward reference to Judaism as 
something in Paul's past, something which he has now left behind.33 This difficulty is met 
head on by Dunn, who points out how rare it is to find the term 'Judaism' in texts of this 
period, arguing that it had its origins in the Maccabean revolt and therefore carried 
particular connotations.34 "It was not simply a neutral description of 'the religion of the 
Jews' as we might wish to use it today. From its earliest usage it carried overtones ... of a 
religion which identified itself by its determination to maintain its distinctiveness and to 
remain free from the corruption of other religions and peoples. "35 When Paul uses it he 
does so in order to indicate the strength of his then desire to reinforce and protect the 
boundaries of Israel. The implication is that although Paul has indeed abandoned such 
'Judaism,' which is "characterized by the attitudes and life-styles documented in verses 13 
and 14,"36 this does not constitute what today would be termed a change of religion. 
Dunn attempts to strengthen his position further by showing that Paul's reference to his 
SllAU)'trlC; u1tdpxcov 'tcOv 1tCX'tptKcOV !-Lou 1tCXpcxbocrEcov (1:14) is an indicator of his 
Pharisaic committment to oral Halakhah, something which distinguished the Pharisees 
from their "less faithful contemporaries, "37 and evidenced "their desire to keep the law 
with scrupulous accuracy and exactness (akribeia)."38 The very concept of zeal is also 
33Burton (1921), p.44 understands it in precisely this way: "The very use of the term (Judaism) in this 
way is significant of the apostle's conception of the relation between his former and his present faith, 
indicating that he held the latter, and had presented it to the Galatians, not as a type of Judaism, but as 
an independent religion distinct from that of the Jews." 
34See Dunn (1993), pp.55-59 and Dunn (1998), pp.346-54. It is noteworthy that at (1993), p.65 Dunn 
specifically denies that Paul was a convert, but at (1998), p.348 allows that he was, and uses the term 
'conversion' several times in his discussion of Paul's experience. 
35Dunn (1998), p.348. In what follows I accept Dunn's characterisation of Paul's Judaism as separatist, 
but argue against him that, for Paul, separatist Judaism is 'the religion of the Jews.' My own use of the 
term Judaism in this context therefore embraces first century Judaism as a whole when viewed from 
Paul's perspective. This does not, in itself, conflict with the observation that Paul may have employed the 
term ' Iou8cxicr!-Lo~ here in order to emphasise discontinuity between his past and present life, whereas 
at Rom. 9:4 when he wishes to identify himself with the Jewish people he employs the term 
, Icrpcxll'" {'t1l~. 
36Dunn (1993), p.57. 
37Dunn (1998), p.349. 
38ibid. Not all scholars accept that Paul's reference to ancestral traditions refers specifically to Pharisaic 
observances. For the view that it is a reference to the Mosaic law in general see Calvin (ET 1965), p.19; 
Martyn (1997b), p.155. For the view that it embraces both Pharisaic regulations and the law more 
generally see Longenecker, R. (1990), p.30; Matera (1992), p.59. For the view that it refers to oral 
155 
portrayed as redolent of an overwhelming desire to maintain the separateness of Israel, 
Dunn citing a string of texts linking zeal with a willingness to kill in order to defeat 
threats to the boundaries ofIsraeP9 
Much of the detail of Dunn's exegesis is convmcmg. It makes very 
good sense that Paul, relating the experience which led him to consider himself the 
apostle to the Gentiles, should discuss his previous life in a manner which emphasises his 
then concern to maintain the boundaries of Israel. Such a contrast serves to highlight the 
dramatic nature of God's intervention in his life. Less convincing is the move from this 
observation to the conclusion that Paul's entire critique of Judaism relates primarily to 
the desire to maintain its separateness, a desire which constitutes "a misunderstanding of 
God and of God's promised (covenanted) intention to bless also the nations. "40 Dunn 
argues that the main focus of Paul's criticism of the law is on "its boundary-defining role, 
that is, as separating Jew from Gentile."41 This reflects the impact of Paul's experience, 
for "Paul did think of his conversion as a conversion from Judaism, but from Pharisaic 
Judaism, a Judaism which kept itself separate from other Jews, not to mention 
Gentiles."42 It is particularly striking that "in the same breath (Gal. 1:13-14) Paul voices 
consciousness of separation both of Judaism from the other nations and within Judaism 
from other Jews. "43 But if Paul really is primarily concerned to stress the error involved 
traditions, but not necessarily to specifically Pharisaic ones, see Burton (1921), pp.47-48. Others take 
the reference to ancestors in a more restricted sense and debate whether Paul refers specifically to that 
which he learnt in his family home. See Betz (1979), p.68 n.118; Bruce (1982), pp.89-91. Dunn's 
position is based on that of Lightfoot (1865), p.82 who cites parallel uses in Josephus (Antiquities 13.6, 
13.2) to support the contention that the ancestral traditions are oral Pharasaic ones. The reference at 
Antiquities 13.2 to the Pharisees having introduced teachings Ka'td 'tTtV na'tpcpav napci80CHv seems 
conclusive. The parallels between what Paul says here and what he says at Phil. 3:5, where he 
specifically mentions that in relation to the law he was a Pharisee, provide further support for Dunn and 
Lightfoot. 
39See Dunn (1998), p.351. The te>..1s include Gen. 34; Num. 25:13; 1 Kings 18:40; 2 Kings 10:16-17,30; 
1 Macc. 2:23-26. 
40Dunn (1998), p.366. Note that Dunn (1998), p.358 n.97 is careful not to argue that the 'works of the 
law' are only food laws, circumcision and sabbath observance. The issue at stake is that of where Paul's 
main emphasis falls. 
41Dunn (1998), p.353. 
42Dunn (1998), p.353. 
43Dunn (1998), p.350. His italics. 
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in this emphasis on separation, then it should surely follow that he now regards his 
former life as the very worst of Judaism, a source of disgust and loathing. To be part of a 
most separate sect within a most separate nation would represent the perfect example of 
religion gone wrong. Is this the way in which Paul portrays his former life in 1: 13-147 
Certainly Paul speaks of his persecution of the church, something of 
which he cannot now have been proud, and the proximity of this to the statement of his 
zeal for ancestral tradition suggests a link between the two. Yet the intervening clause is 
surprisingly positive in tone. Paul states that he had npoEKon'wv EV 1:4) 'Ioubcxi:a!-l4) 
unEp nOAAou<; auvl1A tKw5'CCX<; EV 1:4) 'YEVEt !-lou (1: 14). By saying that he had 
advanced within Judaism beyond many of his contemporaries Paul makes his former life 
appear not as the worst of Judaism, but rather as the best. His use of the term 'YEvo<; 
(race) means that Paul is evaluating his progress against that of the nation as a whole, so 
implying that, if it was as a Pharisee that he achieved this advancement, his Pharisaism 
represents not a lamentable piece of misguidedness but a distinction of which to be 
proud. As Stendahl points out, Paul regards himself as having been a very successful 
Jew, "even when he thinks about it from his Christian perspective. "44 Although there is 
abundant evidence, not least in Galatians itself, that the boundaries of Judaism, as 
instantiated in practices such as circumcision, food laws and sabbath observance, were 
flashpoints at which Paul's law free gospel came into conflict with more conservative 
strands of Jewish Christianity, Gal. 1: 11-17 does not support the view that it was a 
rejection of Judaism's concern to maintain its boundaries which provides the crucial 
underpinning of Paul's gospel. 
Paul does indeed describe his former self in terms which suggest that 
he had been greatly concerned to maintain the boundaries of Israel, but he does not on 
44Stendahl (1976), p.l3. Betz (1979), p.68 comments on 1:14 that "such conduct (paul's zealousness) 
was not extremist or a form of mindless fanaticism, but was in conformity with the contemporary 
expectations of what a faithful Jew ought to have been." 
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that account evaluate his former life as a travesty of Judaism.45 In Paul's mind the 
Pharisaism moulded by that concern remained the best which Judaism had to offer. This 
makes it clear why it is so difficult to determine whether, at his conversion, Paul changed 
religion. On the one hand, if he has now left behind a life representing the best of 
Judaism, there is no force to the observation that "if it is proper to speak of Paul 
converting from 'Judaism,' this was the Judaism he had in mind. "46 Paul may well have 
had this Judaism in mind, but as he regarded it as the finest variety of Judaism, then any 
criticisms of it implicitly include all the lesser varieties. It was Judaism per se that Paul 
left behind, and viewed from this perspective, Paul did change religion. On the other 
hand, Paul will not simply write off his past as worthless. There is no hint that he regards 
his former attainments as based upon a misunderstanding of what the law required, and 
this evaluation of his former life in terms of achievement implies that Paul's current 
attitude towards Judaism is not one of straightforward rejection. So too does his having 
been set apart from before birth, which places his former life in Judaism within God's 
purposes.47 There is something striking and unusual about a convert who refuses to 
denigrate that which has been left behind. In this sense, Paul did not change religion.48 
45Something also suggested by Paul's choice of the verb a~op{~c.o to describe God's selection of him as 
an apostle. Paul may well mean to contrast this type of separation for the sake of the Gentiles with his 
previous concern to maintain his separation from them but, if he regarded insistence on separation per 
se as the fundamental error of Judaism, then it would be odd to characterise his new role as an apostle 
using the same concept. 
46Dunn (1998), p.348. 
47Schiitz (1975), pp.133-34 helpfully captures the paradoxical nature of Paul's statements. These verses 
represent "a biography of reversal ... Paul has set up a direct contradiction to the present by viewing his 
past as itself a negative mission directed against, rather than for, the church. " Yet, "Paul regards both 
halves of the contrast to have been carried out under the sovereignty of and in loyalty to God. This 
corresponds to his view of the relationship of law and grace." 
48These ambiguities suggest that as with the term conversion, much here depends upon how one defines 
'religion'. Stendahl employs it in a somewhat slippery fashion, suggesting (1976), p.7 that Paul was not a 
convert because in the terms 'we' use today Paul did not change religion, and (1976), p.ll that Paul 
cannot have changed his religion since "people in those days did not think about 'religions'." Here is a 
similar failure to distinguish between etic and emic categories as we saw in relation to the terms 'call' 
and 'conversion.' 
158 
5.2.3 Summary 
In Gal. 1: 12-17 Paul describes his experience in a way which suggests 
that it can appropriately be termed a conversion. Stendahl's argument that Paul's use of 
KaAEco in 1: 15 indicates him to have been called rather than converted is entirely 
without foundation. Were it demonstrated that Paul here refers to his call as one given 
before birth then, in this instance, KaAEco would denote neither conversion nor its 
opposite, and Stendahl's position would be untenable on these grounds alone. Call could 
not be pitted against conversion. Yet even allowing that in 1: 15 KaAEco does refer to 
Paul's adult experience, Stendahl's position suffers from fatal weaknesses. Elsewhere 
Paul specifically refers to Jewish as well as Gentile Christians as having been called. 
Further, the absence ofKaAEco K'tA. from the 'call' narratives of the prophets means that 
the fact that they were not converted cannot be used to support the contention that Paul 
was not converted. In Gal. 1: 15 Paul uses KaAEco to denote conversion. When one asks 
how Paul characterises his life in Judaism prior to that conversion, the answer is that he 
combines an emphasis on his then concern to maintain the boundaries of Israel with an 
estimation of the Pharisaism which promoted that concern as achieving the best which 
Judaism had to offer. This combination means that Dunn is unlikely to be right that Paul's 
criticisms of the law and of Judaism focus primarily on the desire to maintain separation. 
Instead Paul's criticisms embrace Judaism in general, so indicating that, in one sense, his 
conversion did involve a change of religion. Paul does not conceive himself as simply 
having exchanged an inferior brand of Judaism for a superior one. Yet in another sense it 
did not, since Judaism is not simply rejected. Paul regards his achievements within 
Judaism as genuine, and sees his life as a Jew as part of God's purpose. 
One question which this summary provokes is how Paul's positive 
evaluation of his former life coheres with his connection of its zeal to his persecution of 
the church. His statements seem puzzlingly paradoxical. So too does the pattern of his 
argument. As we have seen, Paul (1) applies the concept of calling to himself in a way 
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which suggests that his call experience was a conversion, but (2) gives an evaluation of 
his previous life as a Jew which emphasises its achievements. The first of these seems to 
place his experience on the same footing as that of his Gentile converts, whose 
conversion he also describes using the concept of calling, but the second seems to 
differentiate between them, since he elsewhere describes the previous life of his Gentile 
converts in strongly negative terms. 
5.3 Recognising and Breaking the Power of Sin - Phil. 3:4-12 
5.3.1 A Blameless Jew 
When we turn to Phil. 3 :4-12 we find a similar, but perhaps even more 
paradoxical, pattern. For here there are even stronger indications that Paul continues to 
think of his former life in Judaism in positive terms. He insists that he has more reason 
than anyone else to place confidence in the flesh (3:4) and, having listed his advantages, 
he describes them as KEp8o<; (3 :7). Of course, confidence in the flesh is not itself a good 
thing as far as Paul is concerned, and the gain that he had immediately turns out to be 
worth little in comparison to knowing Christ (3 :8), but his positive statements should not 
on this account be evacuated of their force. Paul's purpose is to glorify Christ, and it is 
difficult to see how this can be done via a declaration that knowing Christ is better than 
something which is itself of little worth. The entire rhetorical force of the passage 
depends upon a genuinely positive estimation of Judaism, which then renders the 
description of it as crKuj3aAov (3 :8) all the more shocking. It may only be relatively 
positive in comparison to knowing Christ, but the force of the comparison is destroyed if 
we replace 'relatively positive' with 'negative'. When Paul says that he was blameless 
Ka'td 8tKcxWcruVllV 'trlV EV VO!-lq:> (3:6), we must take him seriously.49 
49This is something commentators often refuse to do, some perceiving a tension between this statement 
and the argument of Romans 1-3 which, by asserting both that those who do the law will be justified 
before God (Rom. 2: 13) and that Jew and Gentile alike are under the power of sin (Rom. 3 :9), seems to 
clearly imply that although a perfect observance of the law would bring salvation, such an observance is 
impossible. See Kruse (1996), p.257; Vincent (1897), p.99; Westerholm (1988), p.161 n.52. Others find 
160 
Yet this is not the whole story. As in Gal. 1: 11-17, there is something 
in among Pautts statements about his former life in Judaism that he could not now regard 
as genuinely positive, but would instead characterise as wholly negative. It would simply 
be perverse to propose that Paul the apostle attached any positive value, even a relative 
one, to his having been Kcx:tci STlAOC; OUOKCOV 'trlV EKKAl1aicx,v (3:6). What had then 
appeared necessary and good, is now revealed to be the opposite. The response of 
twentieth century scholarship to this paradoxical pattern in Pautts statements about his 
conversion has been to dissolve it. Bultmann simply ignores Pautts statement that he has 
better reason than any to put confidence in the flesh (3 :4), seeing Paul's preconversion 
attributes as expressions of "the self-reliant attitude of the man who puts his trust in his 
own strength and in that which is controllable by him. "50 Far from presenting a genuinely 
positive estimation of Judaism, Bultmann's Paul gives an entirely negative one. In 
contrast, Sanders simply ignores Pautts statement that he had been a persecutor of the 
church,51 and attributes his current estimation of his past life to a single and simple-
minded reversal of opinion. "Paul does not say that boasting in status and achievement 
was wrong because boasting is the wrong attitude, but that he boasted in things that 
were gain. They became loss because, in his own black and white world, there is no 
second best. "52 Unlike in Romans and Galatians, where he argues that there is no such 
thing as righteousness under the law, Paul here presents two types of righteousness of 
which only one is the right kind. "The only thing that is wrong with the old righteousness 
the thought of a sinless life incomprehensible and, taking aI-lEI-l1C'toC; as a cultic term, argue that Paul is 
here speaking of blamelessness in the context of a covenant which made provision for repentance and 
forgiveness. See Bockmuehl (1997), pp.201-02; Dunn (1998), pp.349-50; Fee (1995), pp.308-09; 
O'Brien (1991), pp.379-81, Silva (1992), pp.175-76. Seeing Paul's retrospective self-description as a 
piece of biographical reconstruction, I take Paul's statement to imply that he had indeed kept all the 
commandments of the law, but that from the perspective offaith in Christ he can now see that this does 
not imply that his life had been free from sin. His view of both sin and the law have changed. The rich 
young ruler (Mt. 19:16-30; Mk. 10:17-31; Lk. 18:18-30) provides another example of someone who has 
scrupulously observed every commandment, but whose life is not free from sin. 
50Bultmann (ET 1952), p.240. 
51Caird (1978), p.540: "In all Sanders' concentration on the transfer of Paul's allegiance there is no 
mention of one point which Paul himself never allows his readers to forget, that at the moment of his 
conversion he was engaged in persecuting the church. 11 
52 Sanders (1983), p.44. It is hard to know who is the more patronising, Bultmann of first century 
Judaism, or Sanders of Paul. 
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seems to be that it is not the new one; it has no fault which is described in other terms. "53 
Here we have a clear expression of Sanders' now famous dictum, "this is what Paul finds 
wrong in Judaism: it is not Christianity. "54 
One feels that both Bultmann and Sanders have gone astray here. We 
should not seek to dissolve the paradox inherent in Paul's statements, but instead 
emphasise and explain it. For Paul himself seems deliberately to emphasise the 
paradoxical nature of his past. At Phil. 3: 6 he directly juxtaposes his persecuting activity 
and his enthusiasm for law observance, without the intervening clause which appears at 
Gal. 1: 14a. It is also hard to imagine that the inclusion of his persecuting activity among 
Paul's abundant reasons for confidence in the flesh would not have raised eyebrows in the 
Philippian congregation, or that Paul would have been unaware of this. His persecution 
of the church is the one sin which Paul includes in his description of his past. Apart from 
this, Paul's characterisation of his life in Judaism is entirely positive. By placing his 
statement that it was a product of his zeal between his claim that he had been a Pharisee 
and his claim to have been righteous EV VOJl'!?, Paul makes it clear that his persecuting 
activity had been an expression of his commitment to Judaism. In this lies the terror of 
these verses: it was the best and not the worst of Paul which had lead him into sin. 55 
That Paul's persecution of the church had been the "climax of his 
dedicated obedience to his Jewish faith"56 points us both to a vital similarity between 
Paul and his Gentile converts, and to a significant difference. The similarity is that by 
exposing the connection between his committment to Judaism and his persecuting 
activity, Paul implicitly recognises that as a Jew he, like his Gentile converts, had been 
under the power of Sin. The greater had been his devotion to the law, the stronger had 
53Sanders (1983), p.140. 
54Sanders (1977), p.552. His italics. Also quoted above, p.4l. 
55Hawthome (1983), p.134: "Not because Paul was evil, but precisely because he was 'good', ... he did 
what he later came to lament, namely, persecute the church." 
56Stendahl (1976), p.89. 
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become the impulse to sin by persecuting the church. The difference is that this does not 
lead him to speak of his past life in terms of unrighteousness because it was his 
'righteousness' that had been at the root of his sin. Even the best of him, that which was 
genuinely good, had been infected by sin. This suggests that Sanders is only partially 
correct when he concludes that, for Paul, what was wrong with Judaism is that it is not 
Christianity. The error into which his Judaism had led him was that of opposition to the 
Gospel, and so the pre-conversion Paul may, in obvious distinction from Jewish 
followers of Jesus, have perceived Judaism and following Christ as mutually exclusive 
options. His view would then have been that what was wrong with Christianity was that 
it was not Judaism, and this view his conversion simply reversed. 57 However, this is 
probably an over-simplification, since Paul had not only himself refused to accept the 
Gospel, but precisely out of his very zeal for Judaism had persecuted the church. What is 
wrong with Judaism for Paul is not only that it is not Christianity, but also the related 
problem that his devotion to it had not only failed to prevent him from falling into the sin 
of persecuting the church, but had actively prompted it. This concrete individual sin thus 
demonstrates the power of Sin,58 for it was the same individual who had blamelessly kept 
all the commandments of the law who had fallen into this transgression of the will of 
God. So, paradoxically, the more Paul maintains the genuinely righteous character of all 
other aspects of his life as a Jew, the more Judaism stands under that power. As Seifrid 
comments, "It would have been possible for Paul to assume the stance which other 
Jewish Christians took, that the messiah's death was a supplement to Torah, if he had 
been willing to look upon his earlier zeal as somehow incomplete or insufficient. Yet he 
57Expressing it in this way should help us to see the flaws in Sanders' position. The argument that 
before his conversion Paul persecuted the church solely because its faith was not Judaism is dubious. 
Those who later became the Christian opponents of Paul the Apostle clearly saw themselves as within 
Judaism, and it is often argued on the basis of Acts that Paul's persecution was directed at the 'Hellenists' 
rather than at Christians in general (for a detailed case see Hengel (1991), pp.63-86). If this is correct it 
was something more specific which had so offended Paul. The fact that both Gal. 1:13-14 and Phil. 3:6 
mention Paul's scrupulousness in law observance in connection with his persecuting activity suggests 
that the offence centred on the question of law observance. If Sanders' position is too simplistic when 
applied to Paul the Pharisee, then it is also likely to be too simplistic when applied to Paul the Apostle. 
58Paul does not say this directly in Philippians but see the argument of Rom. 5:12-21, where Paul argues 
that Adam's single misdeed produced the reign of sin and death. 
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was apparently not willing to pass this judgement on himself or the Pharisaic movement 
of which he had been a part. "59 
Ironically, it is therefore his earlier zeal for the law which at least partly 
explains why Paul's critique of the law is so strong. His desire to obey the law had led 
him into sin, so retrospectively demonstrating its inability to save. It is quite possible that 
had Paul struggled with the Law prior to his conversion, had he known a guilty 
conscience, had he been less certain about the possibility of righteousness under the Law, 
then he may well have been less radical in his attitude towards the Law afterwards. As it 
was, the impact of the realisation that he had been sinning without knowing it, that there 
were things about himself which had been hidden from him, produced a total revaluation 
in which the Law was replaced by faith in Christ. Such a connection between Paul's 
recognition that his committment to the law had lead him into sin and his law free gospel, 
has previously been proposed by Kim, and criticised by Raisanen. 6o The latter writes 
that: 
Paul never hints at this connection between law and sin in connection with his 
conversion or his person. The assertion that sin is increased or even brought about 
by the law crops up in conjunction with a more theoretical dilemma: if the law does 
not lead to salvation, why did God give it in the first place? ... Paul never refers to 
his pre-Christian activities in this connection. Perhaps he realised what his 
expositors do not always realise: that his fanaticism for the law was not a fault of 
the law itself61 
59Seifrid (1992), p.l77. 
60See Kim (1984), pp.285-88. As is often the case, Kim does not provide a sufficiently specific 
exegetical base for his argument, but simply asserts that the connection follows from Paul's belief that 
no-one is justified by the works of the law. He also overstates his case, and Raisanen convincingly rebuts 
Kim's assertion of a direct link between Phil. 3:9 and the justification of the ungodly in Rom. 4:5. 
Raisanen (1992), p.41 correctly says of Rom. 4:5 that "the 'ungodly' is here one who is not able to 
produce the works in question rather than a zealous legalist." As I read Phil. 3 :4-12, it is Paul's 
recognition that he had sinned despite the fact that he was not ungodly which is decisive. 
61Raisanen (1987b), p.412. 
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Yet unless Paul still regards his persecution of the church as not having 
been sinful,62 then in Gal. 1: 13 -14 and Phil. 3: 6 he does provide heavy hints of a 
connection between law and sin. Further, Paul's fanaticism for the law is fanaticism in our 
eyes not his. Such an assessment is our value judgement. As Phil. 3:6 and the above 
quotation from Seifrid imply, even as a Christian, Paul regarded his previous attempt to 
keep the law as rather a successful one. Had he come to regard his performance of the 
law as poor, then he might well have made the distinction which Raisanen suggests 
between the law itself and his own conduct. Actually regarding his pre-conversion 
conduct as a faithful reflection of the law, he does not make such a distinction. 63 
Finally, the fact that an issue is discussed in a theoretical manner does 
not of itself exclude the influence of experience upon one's conclusions. Indeed, there is 
one text in which Paul explicitly connects the law and sin without raising the theoretical 
question which Raisanen poses. At 1 Cor. 15:56 Paul concludes his discussion of 
resurrection with the statement that 'to OE KEV'tpOV 'tou 8aveX.''CO'U 1] cq . .lap'tla, 1] OE 
OUVCq.ll~ 'til~ d:J.lap'tla~ 6 v6J.l0~. Commentators have always been puzzled by the 
sudden appearance of such a strong statement connecting the law with sin in a context 
where the law is not under discussion, especially as it is true of 1 Corinthians as a whole 
that "nowhere do the issues that have arisen, either between him and them or between 
them internally, reflect concern over the law."64 Virtually all cite Rom. 5:13 and 7:7-25, 
so connecting the content of what Paul says to the more theoretical consideration that 
law increases the seriousness of sin by making it a matter of active rebellion against 
62Surely not likely given his statement at 1 Cor. 15:9 that OUK E'q.d. tKaVoc; KaAEt<J8m 
d,1tO<J'tOAOC;, DtO'tt £8{(J)~a 'tT\v £KKAll<JtaV 'tou 8eou. 
63Thus, Stendahl (1976), pp.80-81 gets things entirely the wrong way round when he uses Paul's robust 
pre-conversion conscience as a basis on which to argue that Paul's critique of the law is limited. 
64Fee (1987), p.806. It is purely the element of surprise in this statement which leads some 
commentators to tentatively suggest that 1 Cor. 15:56 may be a gloss, but there is no teAiual evidence to 
support this claim. See Conzelmann (ET 1975), pp.292-93; Hering (ET 1952), p.182; Moffatt (1938), 
p.268. 
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stated commandments,65 but none argue that the question of the purpose of the law is 
what provokes 1 Cor. 15:56b. Rather, Paul's statement is "a theological construct,"66 a 
settled opinion which he here applies to another issue. Given that that this opinion is that 
the law is the power of sin, and given that in Gal. 1: 11-17 and Phil. 3: 4-12 we have seen 
Paul connect his persecution of the church to his zeal for the law, then it is difficult to 
see a valid case against there also being a connection between Paul's theological opinion 
and his conversion experience. It is true that in his biographical remarks at 1 Cor. 15:8-
10 Paul does not connect his persecuting activity to his zeal for the law. However, we 
should note his statement that despite the unworthiness resulting from his persecution of 
the church, God's grace towards him was not in vain (KEV6~), and that as a result he can 
say that nEplcrcr6tEPOV CX:l)'tcOV ncX.v'tcov EKonlacra (15: 10). This should be 
compared to 15: 5 8 where, having assured the Corinthians that Christ gives them the 
victory over sin and death, Paul goes on to urge them to persevere, E186'tE~ CS'Cl 6 
K6no~ U!lcOV OUK £crnv KEVO~ EV Kupicp. What is true of their labour as Christians 
has been true of his as an apostle. If their labour can be effective because Christ has 
given them victory over the power of sin that is the law, then presumably the same is also 
true of Paul. 67 
Thus although Paul does not explicitly connect the law and sin in 
relation to his own experience, it is clearly implied by what he does say. In his former life 
in Judaism he had been under the power of sin. This conclusion makes it clear that 
65Barrett (1971b), p.383; Godet (ET 1886), p.446; Goudge (1903), p.160; Hering (ET 1952), p.182; 
Moffatt (1938), p.268; Robertson & Plummer (1911), p.378; Witherington (1995), p.31l. 
66Fee (1987), p.806. Note especially Rom. 7:8b where Paul expresses the same point negatively: xcopi<; 
yap VOIl0'\) allap'da vf.Kpd. 
67The sequence of Paul's references to sin in 1 Cor. 15 also repays observation. Conzelmann (ET 1975), 
p.293 n.43 says of 15:56 that "in content it is prepared for by vv.3-5; the hearer, when it is read out, 
hears the creed in the background; then v.17." Thus there is first a statement that Christ died for 
concrete sins (15:3), and finally a statement concerning the power of sin (15:56), with an intervening 
statement which seems to bridge the two by stating that if Christ has not been raised then the 
Corinthians are still in their sins (15:17). This corresponds to the sequence of the argument of Romans 
1-8, which first deals primarily with sin as transgression (chapters 1-4), and finally with sin as power 
(chapters 6-8), but has chapter 5 as a bridge between the two. Note also the similarity between Paul's 
exclamation of thanksgiving at 1 Cor. 15:57, and that at Rom. 7:25. 
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Kasemann understood, or perhaps rather misunderstood, something important about 
Paul's theology when he argued that it portrays the Jew as the representative type of 
religious humanity.68 In retrospect Paul can indeed see that even as he had believed his 
religion to be taking him closer to God, it had in fact been taking him further away. Yet 
Kasemann's type-casting of the Jew is offensive, and even dangerous,69 because he links 
it with a particular and pejorative definition of 'religion' as something bad. For Kasemann 
piety is always something entirely negative, but it is not so for Paul. By any reasonable 
measure Graeco-Roman society was religious and yet Paul certainly does not equate 
Judaism with it, for passages like 1 Cor. 6:9-11 implicitly contrast Judaism with the 
idolatry of Graeco-Roman religion. For Paul, Judaism was good religion when compared 
to paganism. The Jew thus functions for Paul not as the abstract representative of a 
corrupt religious humanity, but as the concrete historical embodiment of that which is 
good. He knew that he was not a Gentile sinner (Gal. 2: 15), but one who had every 
reason to be confident in his status as a Jew (Phil. 3:4-6). By understanding all piety as 
alike Kasemann too dissolves the paradox which Paul establishes in Phil. 3, namely that 
evil came even out of that which was genuinely good. That even the very best of human 
life should turn out to be under the power of Sin is what makes it possible for Paul to 
regard it all as crKuj3aAov compared to knowing Christ (3:8). In his eyes it is imperative 
that human beings should cast aside all that they understand as gain in order to know 
Christ, for all such gain is inevitably infected by sin. 
Phil. 3 :4-12 is therefore a paradoxical pIece of biographical 
reconstruction. The things which now appear as nothing more than confidence in the 
flesh, then appeared the things of greatest value. Yet Paul will not condemn his own 
Jewish past in the same way as that of his Gentile converts. In Paul's view, his 
68See Kiisemann (ET 1971), pp.70-78. Ironically, this unfortunate characterisation is closely connected 
to Kiisemann's hostility to salvation history, a hostility based on the consciousness that Nazism had 
developed its own secularised salvation history. Kiisemann has been criticised for speaking of Jews as a 
kind of timeless paradigm of human piety rather than as flesh and blood historical beings. See Way 
(1991), p.188. 
69See the sharp criticisms ofBoyarin (1994), pp.209-14. 
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righteousness had been as real as their unrighteousness. In this respect his past and their 
own could not have been more different. In a passage like 1 Cor. 6:9-11 Paul pushes his 
Gentile converts to the recognition that the whole of their past lives were polluted by sin, 
and that they had then numbered amongst Ot cl8tKOt, but this is not what he says of 
himself as a Jew. The status of Jew and Gentile apart from Christ is therefore that of the 
righteous and the sinner. Yet these differences mask what Paul can retrospectively see is 
a more fundamental similarity. As has often been pointed out, there is nothing in Phil. 
3 :4-12 to support the notion that before his conversion Paul had struggled with a guilty 
conscience. What is more, there is nothing in 1 Cor. 6:9-11 or 1 Cor. 14:20-25 to 
suggest that Paul's Gentile converts had done so either. They had not recognised their 
sins of unrighteousness for what they were and Paul had not recognised his zealous 
persecution of the church as a transgression, despite the fact that he had been guided by 
the law. Unrecognised sin is a problem in both cases.7° It is his earlier failure to recognise 
as sin the one concrete transgression that he can now retrospectively name as such which 
helps lead Paul to the conclusion which he maintains so vigorously elsewhere, namely 
that 'lou8ed-oue; "CE Kat uEA,A:TWae; nciv"Cae; u¢' cq.lap"CtaV Elvat (Rom. 3:9).71 
5.3.2 Two Types of Righteousness 
Paul's devotion to the law led him into the sin of persecuting the 
church, and recognising this activity as sin retrospectively demonstrated his life to have 
been under the power of sin. His criticism of his Jewish faith is therefore not simply that 
it is not Christianity, and the contrast between two types of righteousness has a wider 
7oUnrecognised sin is part of what it means to be under the power of Sin. That Paul sees no 
contradiction between this and human responsibility for transgressions committed can be seen from 
Rom. 1 where the willful transgressions of the Gentiles (Rom. 1:19-23), cause God to hand them over to 
Sin (napa8i8colu - Rom. 1 :24,26,28). This handing over implies a loss of self-control such that what 
ought to be plainly apparent as sin is no longer apparent as such (Rom. 1:32). See Westerholm (1997), 
pp.29-30: "Sin affects human minds. To sin against the light one has can only lead to the darkening of 
one's powers of perception (no doubt because, in the inevitable process of justifying their conduct to 
themselves and others, sinners skew their own moral and religious sensibilities)." 
71Seifud (1992), p.179: "It was not Paul's 'introspective conscience' which led him to a fresh 
understanding of righteousness. Rather, it was Paul's very boldness of conscience regarding his earlier 
practice of Judaism which allowed him to come to a new understanding of righteousness. " 
168 
basis than that. Such a summary invites us to explore further the nature of these two 
types of righteousness.72 Beginning with that which he has now abandoned, what does 
Paul mean by btK<xocn)Vl1v 'trlV EV VO!-l'P (3:6b) and E!-lrlV btK<xwcruvl1v 'trlv EK 
VO!-lOU (3 :9)7 The vast majority of commentators answer this question by expounding 
the content of Paul's description of his life as a Jew in 3 :5-6. Here Paul speaks both of 
status (circumcised, Israelite, B enj amite ) and of accomplishment (zealous and 
blameless).?3 Paul himself seems to have recognised this distinction between the 
categories of status and accomplishment,74 also making clear, by a further reference to 
the law in 3:9, that his own righteousness is indeed the righteousness under the law 
referred to in 3 :6. At one level, this distinction between status and accomplishment 
makes it very clear what Paul does and does not mean by this kind of righteousness. He 
cannot intend to portray Judaism as a crude religion of works righteousness since this 
would render redundant all those items in the status category. To be circumcised, to be 
an Israelite, and to be a Benjamite are not Paul's accomplishments. Far from his having 
worked for them, they are circumstances which have been appointed by God.75 Yet 
neither can Paul intend to portray works as peripheral to Judaism. He includes his 
72Sanders (1977), p.505 does not explain the two types of righteousness but instead finds it significant 
that here there are two, whereas elsewhere Paul argues that there is only one. This indicates that "the 
only thing wrong with the old righteousness seems to be that it is not the new one; it has no fault which 
is described in other terms." Yet both mentions of Paul's former righteousness are qualified. In relation 
to his past Paul does not speak of righteousness per se or righteousness from God. For Paul to speak of 
'righteousness under the law' and of a 'righteousness of my own' is itself an indication of the double-
edged nature of this righteousness. Sanders' point would only have force if Paul spoke of his previous 
righteousness in an unqualified way, but still rejected it because it did not involve faith in Christ. 
73Sanders (1983), p.44 notes this, but does not explain it or why it should be ignored. Dunn (1998), 
p.370 argues that "we should also beware making a distinction in kind between the first and second 
halves of the catalogue in 3:5-6," but also fails to explain why. Ifwe do ignore the distinction between 
status and accomplishment, then the description of 3 :5-6 simply becomes a very longhand way for Paul 
to say that he had been a devout Jew. This is unlikely, for Paul's point is not that he had been as good a 
Jew as those advocating circumcision, but that he had been a better one. He had more reasons for 
confidence in the flesh, and describes them in detail. 
74Fee (1995), p.307 says of Paul's claim to be a 'Hebrew of Hebrews' that "this is the 'swing' term, 
summing up the preceding three and setting the stage for the final three." Whether this summing up is 
primarily genealogical, i.e., a claim to be a Jew born of exclusively Jewish stock, or primarily cultural, 
i.e., a claim to belong to a family which maintained the Jewish culture and the Aramaic language even 
in a diaspora setting, is much contested. Fee opts exclusively for the former. In favour of the latter see 
Bruce (1983), p.108; Martin (1976), p.128; O'Brien (1991), p.371; Silva (1992), pp.176-77; Vincent 
(1897), p.97. 
75Seifrid (1992), p.174: "Consequently, when he refers back to 3:6 ... he does not imply that such a 
personal righteousness was entirely self-acquired." 
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Pharisaism, his zeal and his blamelesssness in a specifically soteriological comparison 
between his own righteousness and that which comes from God through Christ. 76 These 
are his achievements attained through his devotion to the works of the law, and he 
previously regarded them as contributing to his salvation. Paul's own righteousness under 
the law was one in which it was assumed that salvation was reached via a combination of 
grace and works, but Paul now insists on justification by faith alone. 77 The "true 
circumcision place their confidence not in human worth and work but in the Spirit of 
God. "78 
Yet what is less clear is how Paul can include those items in the status 
category as part of his own righteousness. True, they are personal to him in that they are 
what he was. But, given that they were appointed by God, how could they produce a 
righteousness which was his own as opposed to that righteousness which comes from 
God (3: 9)? The answer lies in the virulence of sin, which has infected the whole of 
creation. Under the impact of his recognition that all which was wholesome in his pre-
conversion existence had served to promote his persecution of the gospel, Paul now 
believes that no circumstance within that creation, even that of being Jewish, can 
contribute to salvation. There is nothing about his life, whether it be by birth or by 
achievement, which can do any good. It all belongs to the sphere of the crdp; (3:4), and 
salvation requires a fresh act of God from outside which creates citizens of heaven 
(3:20). To rely for salvation on such righteousness of one's own is therefore folly, hence 
the weight of attitudinal language within the passage.79 'My own righteousness' is a self-
reliant attitude, but there is nothing distasteful or abnormally corrupt about the self relied 
upon.80 The error lies solely in the reliance for, as an obedient Jew, Paul stood at the 
76That the comparision is specifically soteriological is made clear by the fact that the ultimate benefit of 
knowing Christ is resurrection from the dead (3:11). 
77See above, p.48. 
78Bockmuehl (1997), p.194. 
79See Gundry (1985), pp.13-l4 and O'Brien (1991), pp.395-96. Paul speaks of boasting (l(a.uXd.o~<X.t), 
oftrust or confidence (1tE1toiST}O"tC;), and of deeming or considering (TrYEO~a.t). 
8°One wonders whether prior to his conversion Paul would then have understood righteousness under 
the law as 'my own righteousness.' Is this how a devout Pharisee would have wished to characterise his 
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pinnacle of human status and achievement. 81 He regards its infection by sin, and its 
consequent inability to save, as the ultimate demonstration of the human need of Christ. 
Yet how is this need to be satisfied? As it is expressed in 3 :9£, what 
does Paul intend by justification by faith? What does he mean by 'trlV EK 8EOU 
olKCXlOaUVllV Ent 'til nta'tEt which comes old nta'tEco~ Xpla'tou? Here the 
student faces a bewildering range of opinions as to the dominant terms and categories in 
the context. Some argue that righteousness itself is the dominant term and interpret it 
using forensic categories. It is a "status which brings vindication, not a behavioural 
righteousness. The context of eschatological expectation and the exhortation to live in 
the light of this hope, which characterizes the whole of Phil. 3, inclines one towards a 
forensic interpretation from the start."82 Others deny that the term righteousness is of 
prime significance, but disagree as to which terms and categories provide the best 
alternative. For Fee, the dominant idea in the context is that of knowing Christ (3:8). 
"The aim of everything is 'to know Christ' relationally .. .it seems highly likely that the 
obedience to God's law? The phrase sounds rather like a negative value judgement delivered from Paul's 
new perspective of faith in Christ, a statement to the effect that 'this is what my former convictions and 
those of my current opponents amount to, this is where it all leads.' Another example of an argument 
from Paul which has a 'this is where it all leads' quality about it is Gal. 2: 11-21, where what begins with 
Peter withdrawing from table fellowship with Gentiles ends with Christ dying in vain. Dunn (1998), 
p.369 may therefore be correct when he writes that "the need to attain one's own righteousness was no 
part of traditional Jewish teaching" but wrong to conclude from this that Paul cannot mean what he 
appears to say in Phil. 3:9. Paul's letters may subsequently have helped to prompt a parallel process. 
Brown (1967), p.345 observes, '''See where it leads to ... ' is a constant refrain ... that will be repeated 
throughout Augustine's writings of the nex1: years. Indeed, Pelagianism as we know it, that consistent 
body of ideas of momentous consequences, had come into existence; but in the mind of Augustine, not of 
Pelagius." 
81Calvin (ET 1965), p.273: "Paul did not reckon it necessary to abdicate from his tribe and from the race 
of Abraham, and make himself an alien, that he might become a Christian; but he had to renounce trust 
in his descent ... Paul, therefore, divested himself, not of works, but of that perverted confidence in works 
with which he had been puffed up." This illustrates a difficulty inherent in Sanders' decision to compare 
Judaism and Paul's Christianity through their soteriologies. Paul's exclusivist soteriology does not 
necessarily mean that he denies value to Judaism in other respects. This is obscured if one says simply 
that Paul regards his only error as placing confidence in something other than Christ. To put one's faith 
in the Graeco-Roman gods would be to place confidence in something other than Christ. Paul believes 
that neither Judaism nor paganism can save, but this does not mean that he regards paganism as of equal 
. worth with Judaism. 
82Seifrid (1992), p.175. 
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... theme (righteousness) exists primarily for the sake of the theme of 'knowing Christ. "'83 
In further contrast, Sanders stresses not the category of relationship but that of 
participation. "The soteriology of the passage - being found in Christ, suffering and dying 
with him and attaining the resurrection - could have been written without the term 
'righteousness' at all. "84 On this view, Paul's reference to righteousness is firmly in the 
service of dominant ideas about participation in Christ. But while it is theoretically 
possible that Paul does operate here with a single dominant term and/or category, the 
very disagreement as to what that is suggests a different explanation. Is it not possible 
that Paul may have employed concepts rather more freely, using all the resources 
available to him in order to express the glory of gaining Christ?85 And if meaning is at 
least partly determined by context,86 then may not the meaning of anyone single concept 
be influenced by that of the others? I will test this hypothesis with regard to Paul's use of 
forensic and participatory terms and categories, examining first the nature of the vital 
phrase EUPESci3 EV Cdy'Cc9 (3:9a), and then that of saving righteousness itself 
Adopting a position which partly foreshadows that of Sanders, Ziesler 
observes that "grammatically, all the statements about righteousness are subordinate to 
the clause 'be found in him'. "87 He takes this to indicate that the dominant clause 
determines the meaning of the subordinate clause, and that righteousness is therefore a 
83Fee(l99S), p.314. Against this note O'Brien (1991), p.393: "The three e}..llressions tva XPtcJ'tov 
Kcp8rlO"co (v.8), cupc800 tv a1>'t0 (v.9), and'tou yvoovat a1>'tov (v.lO) are regarded as parallel and 
overlapping expressions of Paul's ultimate aims, that is, he desires to gain Christ completely, to be found 
in him perfectly, or to know him fully." 
84Sanders (1977), p.SOS. 
85Sanders (1977), pp.S04-06 discusses this passage as one in which the terminology is mixed, but 
proceeds to argue that the participatory terms determine the point of the passage, not the concept of 
righteousness. Yet as Fee's highlighting of Paul's relational language makes clear, these are not the only 
two categories of vocabulary used. Does the idea oflaying hold (Ka'taAd,~j3avco - 3:12) really fit 
neatly into any of the three categories we have outlined? Note also the concept of calling at 3:14. One of 
the striking features of this passage is the vast array of vocabulary Paul uses to make his point. 
86See Appendix 2. 
87Ziesler (1972), p.148. See also Raisanen (1987b), p.409 who, employing the same observation rather 
differently, notes that "an interpretation couched in Juridical' vocabulary interrupts a description of 
Paul's Christian existence which is given in 'participationist' terms." On this reading the main point is 
not that the dominant participatory clause determines the meaning of the subordinate clause, but simply 
that it is dominant, and the juridical vocabulary of the subordinate clause less significant. 
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participatory category. The believer "participates in it by faith. "88 There are two 
difficulties with this. Firstly, to be grammatically subordinate is not necessarily to be 
theologically subordinate. Having righteousness from God certainly explains what it 
means to be found in Christ but, since Paul does not explicitly say that this righteousness 
results from being found in Christ, the assertion that to be found in Christ is to have 
righteousness from God could equally well indicate the equivalence of the two ideas. 
Secondly, is EUPESro EV 0:\)'"(;4) itself an entirely participatory phrase? Seifrid certainly 
does not think so since he argues that "the EUPESElv of 3:9 is absolutely eschatological 
in its orientation, "89 thereby alluding to the last judgement and making clear the forensic 
nature of righteousness from God. Whether Seifrid is correct in asserting an exclusively 
eschatological orientation is doubtful, since when Paul talks of o"UI-lI-l0P¢lS0I-lEVOC; 1:4) 
ScxvcX'tq:l CXU1:0U (3: 10), he is presumably speaking of what it means to be in Christ in 
this life. Yet the resurrection from the dead of 3: 11 is certainly a future hope, and the 
whole thrust of Paul's argument in 3:12-16 is towards this future. Further, if one asks by 
whom Paul expects to be found in Christ, the only possible answer is surely God. There 
is an eschatological reference. The phrase EUPESro EV CXU1:4) is neither exclusively 
participatory, nor exclusively forensic, in meaning, but contains elements ofboth.90 
Given this, what of the righteousness with which one is found in 
Christ? If the two are equivalent, then may this righteouness also have both forensic and 
88Ziesler (1972), p.149. He does not argue that there are no forensic elements in what Paul here means 
by righteousness (see p.150 n.2) but there can be no doubt as to where the emphasis lies, which is 
strongly on righteousness as participation. 
89Seifrid (1992), p.175 n.155. That is, when Paul speaks of being found in Christ, he solely means being 
found there at the parousia, not being found there in this life. In Seifrid's view v.3 :9a is thereby further 
distinguished from the other participatory terminology in the passage, which he accepts has both a 
present and future orientation. 
90 A point missed by Sanders (1977), p.506 who arguing for the dominance of participatory categories 
says of Paul, "he tells us that over and over again: the goal of religion is 'to be found in Christ' and to 
attain, by suffering and dying with him, the resurrection." Winninge (1995), p.229 spots the problem: 
"The participatory connection should not be unoticed (cupc800 £v a:\l'tcP), as Sanders rightly has 
observed. However, Sanders has overlooked a problem here, because it is not entirely clear whether the 
reference in Phil. 3 :8f. is to present participation or to final vindication. The expression E1'lpc800 £v 
(Xu'tcp is ambiguous and the following verses seem to speak against the idea that it refers to present 
participation. " 
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participatory elements? That it is a righteousness from God (EK eEOt) OlKcxwcruvl1v), 
and something which Paul can speak of having (EXCOV), irresistibly suggests that it is a 
forensic righteousness, a gift conferred upon the believer by GOd.91 One could say simply 
that Paul has moved from a righteousness based on status by birth and subsequent 
accomplishments (3: 5-6), to one based exclusively on a status gifted by God through 
faith. 92 Yet Paul goes on to say that to have this righteousness is to know Christ and the 
power (OUVCXfl.lC;) of his resurrection. As Kasemann argues, 3: 12 is an example of Paul's 
"dialectic of having and not quite having, "93 whereby the righteousness of God has a 
double aspect so that "salvation and the things which salvation brings appear sometimes 
as already present by faith and baptism, sometimes as only to be realised at the end 
through the parousia. "94 There is something here which can not be captured by speaking 
of a change of status alone. To convey what Paul means by righteousness at 3:9 one 
cannot talk in terms that are either exclusively forensic or exclusively participatory. Phil. 
3: 9 is an example of that which I suggested in 2.2, namely Paul's tendency to allow the 
forensic and participatory themes of his theology to interpret each other.95 Righteousness 
in 3: 9 is forensic, but the context in which it is placed means that for us to speak of it in 
exclusively forensic terms becomes misleading. This forensic use of the concept of 
righteousness is interpreted by the surrounding participatory terminology,96 just as in 
3: 9a the participatory concept of being in Christ is interpreted by the forensic idea of 
being found there by God at the parousia. 
91For a summary of the arguments in favour of a forensic righteousness, see Silva (1992), p.186. 
920ne might argue for a behavioural righteousness from God conferred as a gift upon the believer, but 
the link back to the righteousness of the law in 3:5-6 and Paul's shift to justification by faith alone, make 
his primary meaning in this instance clear. 
93Kasemann (ET 1969), p.170. 
94ibid. He also ponts to Phil. 1: 11, where Paul speaks of KUpnOV OtKUl.OcruvllC;. All agree that this 
means 'fruits of righteousness' and not 'the fruit that is righteousness,' but there is much dispute as to the 
nature of the righteousness which bears fruit. Ziesler (1972), p.151 argues that it means 'general good 
living' which produces more specific ethical fruits. See also O'Brien (1991), p.80; Silva (1992), p.60. 
Beare (1959), p.55 argues that it is forensic justification which then has ethical consequences. Rather 
than either of these, Paul's parallel concept of fruits of the Spirit leads one to think, like Kasemann, of a 
gift that is also a power. 
95See above, pp.51-52, and Appendix 2. 
96 Although not necessarily only the participatory terminology. See above, p.171 n.85. 
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The balance between Paul's forensic and participatory terminology 
would be significantly altered if those who take the reference to nicr'tt<; Xptcr'tou (3:9) 
as a subjective genitive were proved correct. Supporters of the reading 'faithfulness of 
Christ' regularly make the point that in consequence the believer participates in the faith 
of Christ, and that justification therefore is participation. Forensic concepts are 
apparently not significant for Paul's meaning.97 In fact, given the forensic elements we 
have already seen in 3:9, this is too sweeping a conclusion. A subjective genitive would 
not obliterate these elements. It would, however, take an important stage further Paul's 
interpretation of forensic concepts by participatory ones, making it more accurate to 
characterise Paul's technique in this way rather than as the interpretation of forensic and 
participatory concepts by each other. 
However, while a reference to the faithfulness of Christ is certainly 
possible,98 I doubt that it is the correct reading. Its proponents often point to the 
redundancy involved in two references to human faith, which is alleged to mean that 
nicr'tt<; Xptcr'tou more naturally refers to Christ's faith. This still leaves Ent 'tTl nicr'tEt 
referring to human faith, in qualification of EK SEOU OtKawcruv'Tlv.99 Yet, given that 
advocates of the subjective genitive are often wary of the theological consequences of 
what they regard as an over-emphasis on human faith,100 there is something anomalous 
97Hooker (1989), p.341: "Justification is a matter of participation; so, too, is believing." See also Hays 
(1983), pp.247-54 and (1997), p.60. 
98Possible in those cases where the phrase mente; XP1<YtOU actually occurs (Rom. 3:22,26; 
Gal.2:16,20; Gal. 3:22; Phil. 3:9). The argument that at Rom. 1:17 and Gal. 3:11 Paul intends his 
citation of Hab. 2:4 to be taken messianically is unconvincing in the extreme. For a zealous attempt to 
suggest otherwise, see Campbell, D.A. (1994). As Achtemeier (1997), p.85 points out, the immediate 
context of Rom. 1: 17 focuses not on Christ, but on "the universality of a divine salvation open to faith 
(1:16); it is that point, as the yap shows, v.17 is to illustrate." The argument of which Gal. 3:11 is a part 
flows from a discussion of the faith of Abraham through whom all nations are to be blessed (3:8). Christ 
is only mentioned after the citation, and not as an illustration of it. Paul's frequent phrase EK nicr'tcwe; 
is therefore not a shorthand reference to the faith of Christ. In relation to Gal. 3 note Hays (1997), 
pp.52-53, and his retraction of his earlier view that the faith of Abraham exclusively foreshadows the 
faith of Christ and not that of believers. 
99So Bockmuehl (1997), pp.21O-12; Hooker (1989), pp.331-33, 336; O'Brien (1991), pp.392-400. 
100Hays (1997), p.56: "The besetting danger of the anthropological (objective genitive) interpretation 
... is its tendency ... to turn faith into a bizarre sort of work, in which Christians jump through the 
entranceway of salvation by cultivating the right sort of religious disposition." Achtemeier (1997), 
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about this reading of 3:9. What does it mean to say that 'righteousness from God' is 
'based' or 'depends' on human faith?lOl This difficulty is seen both by Ian Wallis, who 
argues that tnt should be translated 'leads to' (human faith), 102 and by Bruce 
Longenecker, who takes the phrase as a second reference to the faithfulness of Christ. 103 
But the first of these suggestions relies on a strained translation, while the second 
reintroduces redundancy and leaves unexplained the means by which righteousness 
comes to the individual. 104 Theological balance and clarity can be restored to Paul's 
statement if (i) nicr1:v; Xptcr1:0U is taken as an objective genitive, and so as a reference 
to human faith, the means through (Otd) which righteousness is received, and (ii) the 
faith upon which this righteousness from God is based is taken not as human faith, or as 
Christ's faithfulness, but as God's own faithfulness. 
The first of these proposals does not rely solely upon general 
arguments in favour of the objective genitive,10S but also on factors specific to this 
passage. The adjacent genitive construction in 3: 8, 1:11~ YVcOcrECO~ Xptcr1:ou, is plainly 
objective, as is made abundantly clear to all by the subsequent reference to knowing 
Christ in 3: 10.106 Further, Christ's faithfulness is notable by its absence from the narrative 
of his saving work in Phil. 2:5-11.107 Given that the narrative and what Paul says of 
responds that "it is also clear that the subjective genitive urges Christians to imitate the self-giving 
faithfulness of Christ. Why is that not also an attempt to cultivate the right sort of disposition?" 
101So RSV, NRSV, GNB. O'Brien (1991), p.394, and Bockmuehl (1997), p.212, both soften the 
difficulty by translating En! as 'on the basis of, and by supplying the verbs 'received' and 'derived' 
respectively. 
102Wallis (1995), p.ll8. 
103Longenecker, B. (1998), pp.98-99 clearly takes 'tn as the article of renewed mention, a possibility 
considered but rejected by O'Brien (1991), p.400. 
104Longenecker, B. (1998), p.99 n.14 anticipates this criticism by suggesting that the means is e>qJlained 
by the "participationistic note of EV (Xu'tqJ in 3:9." However, the substantially future orientation of the 
phrase 'found in him' makes this unlikely. 
10SPor a summary see Dunn (1998), pp.379-85. 
106Even to all proponents of the subjective genitive, except for Wallis (1995), pp.122-23, who proposes 
'being known by Christ.' 
107Given that Hays (1983) took his inspiration in launching the subjective genitive proposal from 
narrative theology, the omission is significant. The tendency of advocates of the subjective genitive to 
avert its impact by eliding Christ's faithfulness and his obedience is a methodological aberration. One 
cannot demonstrate the importance of a theological motifby its absence. The possibility that Phil. 2:5-11 
is pre-Pauline complicates the issue slightly, but see Bockmuehl (1997), p.ll9: "The exegete is duty-
bound to accept that Paul uses all his material because in his opinion it says what he wants, and that he 
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himself at 3 :4-12 may correspond in other ways,108 this absence tells against the 
subjective genitive at 3:9. The second proposal is, as far as I am aware, an original 
one.109 Yet once one asks to whom the faith in question belongs, the fact that God is the 
last person mentioned makes a reference to his faithfulness the likeliest of the three 
possibilities. Further, whereas Paul's only possible references to the faithfulness of Christ 
are the disputed genitive phrases,110 he elsewhere refers to the faithfulness of God in 
unambiguous fashion. He speaks of it explicitly at 1 Cor. 1: 9, 1 Cor. 10: 13 and 1 Thess. 
5:24 (1ttcr't6~), and at Rom. 3:3 (1ttcr'tl~). This last instance is particularly significant 
since Paul here links God's faithfulness with His righteousness, contrasting it, and His 
truthfulness, with human unrighteousness and falsehood.l11 Dunn characterises Paul's 
meaning as "righteousness from God's faithfulness." ll2 The reference in Phil. 3:9 to a 
righteousness from God E1tt 'tn1t1cr'tEt displays a similar pattern of thought. Paul's 
description of the righteousness with which he hopes to be found in Christ should be 
understood as 'that (which comes) through faith in Christ, the righteousness from God 
based on (his) faith(fulness).' 
5.3.3 Summary 
Through our exploration of Gal. 1: 11-17 we saw that Paul applied the 
concept of calling to his own conversion just as he does to that of his Gentile converts 
but that, compared to what he says of their former lives, he evaluates his previous life in 
Judaism positively. These two observations appeared to pull in opposite directions, the 
means what he says." Had Paul wished to introduce the faithfulness of Christ into the narrative he could 
have done so. 
108For a discussion of these parallels, see Hooker (1989), pp.331-33. 
109 Although Chrysostom (ET 1843), p.l31, speaks of true righteousness as "that which is from the faith 
of God (1'1 ana ntc)1;coo<; 'tou 8c.ou)." The difficulty, of course, is that it is again unclear whether this 
is a subjective or an objective genitive. 
110See above, p.174 n.98. 
lllKasemann (ET 1980), p.79: "Paul identifies ntc)'tl<; and 81KalOcruVll 'tou 8cou by making them 
parallel, as is possible from the OT understanding of God's righteousness as his prevailing covenant 
faithfulness. " 
112Dunn (1988), p.l39. Rom. 3:3 therefore unfolds a key element (,from faith to faith') in the thematic 
statement of 1: 17. Note that Hays (1997), pAl agrees with Dunn, and against Campbell, D.A. (1994), 
that the phrase £K ntcr'tcoo<; c.t<; ntcr'tlv (1: 17a) means 'from God's faithfulness for our faith.' 
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one suggesting an identical understanding of Jewish and Gentile conversion to Christ, the 
other a rather different understanding of the two. Examining Phil. 3 :4-12 has helped us 
to explain these tensions. Although his life as a Jew was not marked by the multiple 
transgressions of the Gentiles, Paul can retrospectively see that the one sin he can name 
resulted from his devotion to Judaism and his zeal for the law. Evil had come forth from 
good, so demonstrating that, as a Jew, he too had been under the power of sin. Thus, the 
two dimensions of sin which Paul speaks of in his letters were one in his own experience. 
In the failure to recognise his transgression for what it was lay his enslavement to the 
power of sin. As in the case of Gentiles, unrecognised sin is of considerable importance. 
Real differences mask even more fundamental similarities between 
Jewish and Gentile conversion, and it is these similarities which allow Paul to use the 
same vocabulary in relation to his own conversion as he does in relation to that of 
Gentiles. As with calling, Paul applies the concept of righteousness to both. This concept 
addresses the problem of sin in at least two ways: 
(i) In his use of righteousness in Phil. 3 :4-12 Paul integrates two 
aspects of his thought, allowing forensic and participatory terms and concepts to 
interpret each other. Although the balance would be tipped towards participatory 
categories were the phrase 8td n::icr'tECOC; Xptcr'tou (3 :9) taken as a subjective genitive, 
this is not the correct reading. Thus, to answer a human plight consisting both of the 
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burden of transgressions and of enslavement to the power of sin,113 Paul speaks of a 
righteousness that is at once both forensic and participatory. 114 
(ii) Righteousness by faith provides an answer to the dilemma of 
unrecognised sin. Even although he recognises he is not perfect, and so presumably 
could no longer speak of himself as blameless, Paul can still look forward with 
confidence on the grounds that KCX:tEA TU.l¢811v uno Xptcr'tou 'I l1crou (Phil. 3: 12). 
The righteousness by which he is now possessed is not his own, and is therefore not 
vulnerable to his lapses. 
5.4 The Necessity and Limits of Self-Knowledge - 1 Cor. 4:1-5 
5.4.1 Examining the Self 
This last point is confIrmed by a passage where Paul speaks of the 
possibility of unrecognised sin in his Christian life. At 1 Cor. 4:3-4 Paul states: EI-loi 8E 
EtC; EAdXtcr'tov Ecr'ttV, tva u¢' UI-lOOV eXvcxxpt800 11 uno eXv8pconivl1C; 'hI-lEpCXC;· 
eXAA' ou8E EI-lau'tov eXvaKpivco. ou8EV yap EI-lCXU't~ cruvot8a, eXAA' OUK EV 
'tou'tq:l 8E8tKaicol-lcxt, 0 8E eXvaKpivcov I-lE KuptOC; Ecr'ttv.1 15 Reading what 
scholars have to say about this, one is struck by a failure to take the statement at face 
value. If it is the claim of innocence (ou8EV yap EI-lCXU't~ cruvot8cx) which is felt to 
cause difficulties then it is proposed either that Paul meant his assertion that he has a 
1 13 Sanders incorrectly asserts (1977), p.499 that "Paul actually came to the view that all men are under 
the lordship of sin as a reflex of his soteriology: Christ came to provide a new lordship for those who 
participate in his death and resurrection." It may be true that Paul did not deduce the lordship of sin 
from the observation that everyone transgresses, but passages like Gal. 1: 11-17 and Phil. 3 :4-12 suggest 
that he recognised the lordship of sin in his own experience, once he analysed that experience in the 
light of Christ. Even though he had not transgressed when judged by the commandments of the law, this 
had not saved Paul from the lordship of sin. See also Martyn (l997a), p.144 n.S. 
114Thus I do not follow Sanders in seeing the forensic aspects of Paul's theology as an answer to the 
problem of transgressions and the participatory aspects as an answer to the problem of enslavement to 
the power of sin. Rather, both solutions together provide the answer to both problems. 
115 As we have already seen, pp.1l2-13, the vocabulary of Paul's subsequent statements in vs.4:4b-5 and 
its close resemblance to that of 1 Cor. 14:20-25 leaves no doubt that this is indeed a reference to the 
possibility of unrecognised sin. 
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clear conSCience to be taken merely hypothetically,116 or that he is asserting his 
innocence only in relation to the exercise of his ministry as an apostle. 117 The first of 
these proposals simply lacks all support from the text, and does not deserve to be taken 
seriously. The second can at least appeal to the fact that it is indeed Paul's ministry as an 
apostle which is under discussion, but rather overlooks the point that if it is possible to 
be free of all knowledge of sin in one area of life, then presumably it is also possible in 
every other area of life. Thus, we have to allow Paul's statement of a lack of 
consciousness of sin its full impact. Yet, we should surely also do the same for his 
assertion that this lack of consciousness of sin does not mean that there is none (d)J\: 
OUK EV 1:0151:'-9 O£Ot KCX iCO!lCX t). Stendahl quotes 1 Cor. 4: 1-5 in order to support his 
point that "Paul, the Christian, is just as sure of himself as Paul, the Jew,"118 but his 
translation into English simply omits v.4a, so that his text reads "I do not even judge 
myself, but I have not been justified by this, but it is the Lord who judges me." This 
overlooking of OUOEV yap E!lCXU1:~ crUVOtOcx means that the question of unconscious 
sin simply does not arise.1 19 Elsewhere Stendahl explicitly addresses v.4a, but simply 
regards Paul's statement that his clear conscience does not justify him as hypothetical. In 
reality, a positive verdict from God is assured. 120 
For his part, Theissen too seems to want to deflect the impact of Paul's 
countenancing of the possibility of unconscious sin, even though its existence is crucial 
to his own argument. He writes, "we must not view Paul in the light of this (Protestant) 
culture of guilt and conscience. What we find in Paul is that he recognises unconscious 
motives - but even so does not feel guilty. "121 This statement is satisfactory as far as it 
goes. Paul's calmness in the face of unconscious sin is indeed striking and deserves to be 
explored, but surely we must first acknowledge that 1 Cor. 4:4 is rather good evidence 
116Lightfoot (1895), p.198; Plummer & Robertson (1911), p.74; Barrett (1971b), p.102. 
117Calvin (ET 1960), p.88; Fee (1987), p.162 n.21. 
118Stendalll (1976), p.14. 
1l9Stendalll (1976), p.15. 
l20Stendalll (1976, original 1963), pp. 90-1. 
121Theissen (ET 1987), p.62 n.8. 
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for the notion that Paul did indeed examine himself in order that he might avoid sin. 122 
Against this view might be pitted v3b, a/ ... :).,,' ouoe EI-lau'tov avaKpivOJ (but I do not 
even examine myself), which could be taken to prove the direct opposite. Yet in its 
context, the emphasis here is not that Paul refuses to examine himself, but that, like the 
Corinthians, he is not competent to do so with certainty.123 This is a competence 
possessed solely by God. Indeed, unless v.3b is read in this way, then this statement and 
that ofv.4a, ouoev yap El-lau'tcP cruvotoa, simply cancel one another out, as for Paul 
to say that he knows nothing against himself requires that he first ask himself the 
question. A declaration of innocence can only follow an examination. Thus Paul 
examines himself in order to avoid sin, but does not consider that such examinations are 
inevitably successful. A clear conscience does not necessarily imply an absence of sin. 
Although Paul was certainly not unique III examining himself, this 
approach to the practice does seem distinctive. In his discourse On Anger, the 
philosopher Seneca gives an account of his daily self-examination. Each night before 
sleep he examined his conduct during the day in minute detail with the end result that 
"the soul has either praised or admonished itself." 124 Here there is no hint of the 
possibility that the judgements Seneca reaches about himself could be wrong, whereas 
Paul flatly refuses to accord objective status to the verdict of his self-examination. 125 He 
may have sinned in ways that he does not realise, and so he is not competent to make a 
certain examination of himself, a feeling which we have already seen expressed in v.3b. 
Thus, Paul appears to have a quite finely balanced attitude towards self-examination. The 
possibility of unrecognised sin grants self-examination significance in the attempt to 
122Despite the quite proper reaction against its misuse in order to prevent Christians from receiving the 
sacrament, it is surely also difficult to explain 1 Cor. 11:27-34 as anything other than a demand to 
develop an interior life. See 1 Cor. 11:31 in particular. 
123Chrysostom (ET 1839), p.136; Godet (ET 1886), p.209; Robertson & Plummer (1911), p.76; 
Conze1mann (ET 1975), p.82n.5; Weiss (1910), p.99. 
124Seneca, On Anger, 3.36.2. If this does not count as introspective then what does? The notion that 
Paul, or for that matter Augustine, had the first introspective conscience therefore seems mistaken. See 
also Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, 5.11 who states that one should always ask to what purpose one is 
presently using one's soul: nap' E'KaO"'ta 't01)'t0 tnaveponav £<X1)'tov Kat t~e'td.~etv. 
125See Sevenster (1961), pp.97-102. 
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avoid it, but simultaneously places a limit on that significance since one cannot be certain 
that one has succeeded. It counts for something, otherwise it could not form part of 
Paul's defence to the charges levelled against him by some of the Corinthian Christians, 
but it certainly is not everything, since it cannot be entirely trusted. If we ask why not, 
then the answer is that in refusing to accept his own estimation of his conduct as an 
objective one, Paul is refusing to repeat an old mistake. Reflection upon his own 
conversion has made him aware of the possibility that he may have committed sins 
without recognising them as such. It is therefore no accident that one can find parallel 
statements of innocence in other ancient texts, or one can find parallel statements of 
God's ability to discern sins of an individual hidden from others, but they do not display 
Paul's awareness of the possibility of sin hidden from the self.126 The degree to which he 
conceives of human moral judgement as frail and fallible is distinctive. 127 
This conclusion has been reached by means of an examination of 1 
Cor. 4:4 which insists upon taking seriously both parts of Paul's statement there. 
However, we must also pay heed to v.S which, even as it speaks of the bringing to light 
of things now hidden in the darkness and of the disclosing of the purposes of the heart, 
concludes with the expectation that the Lord's return will result in each one receiving 
praise (bta.tvoC;) from God. One might have expected Paul to have allowed that this 
exposure of things hidden could bring criticism for some and, as our earlier quotation 
from Theissen suggested, this failure to do so indicates that he does not feel either guilty 
at, or threatened by, the thought that he could have committed unconscious sins. 128 This 
126 Theissen (ET 1987), pp.81-95 has a helpful discussion of these. As he notes, Philo stands out as a 
little different from the others. Philo argues that the soul (\lfUXtV knows everything about the rest of a 
person, but is not itself fully known. However, this is not specifically related to knowledge of sin. See On 
the Cherubim 113-15, On the Creation 69. 
127Barrett (1971b), p.102: "A good conscience is an invention of the devil. Paul has one, but sets no 
store by it." Although this puts things a little starkly, it is consistent with Paul's frequent attacks in 1 
Cor. upon wisdom and knowledge. It seems that for Paul all purely human insight is inherently flawed. 
See in particular the attack upon wisdom he has just made in 1 Cor. 3: 18-23. 
128This apparent tension has led some German commentators to suggest that the earlier part of 1 Cor. 
4: 5 (Kaz: .... KapOUUV) appears formulaic, and must be a quotation from an apocryphal writing. See 
Weiss (1910), p.99 and Lietzmann (1969), p.19. 
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freedom from guilt or anxiety is compatible with what Paul has recently said of Christian 
leaders in 1 Cor. 3: 15, but also seems to go beyond it, for there, although the inadequate 
worker is saved, there is scarcely any question of active praise. While it is not stated 
directly in 1 Cor. 4 itself, Theissen is doubtless correct when he argues that Paul's 
confidence is rooted in his relationship with Christ, and he uses the discussion in Rom. 
8:26ff of God's intimate knowledge ofthe individual through the Holy Spirit to support 
this. Here, the fact that God knows each one so well is an entirely positive thing for the 
Christian, indicating that guilt is overcome. 129 It would therefore appear that, for Paul, 
conversion does not only bring a revelation of the true position of one's life and the true 
nature of one's conduct, thus raising the question of guilt; it also answers that question 
by dealing with it through Christ (Rom. 8:33-34).130 To say this is essentially to restate a 
conclusion we reached in relation to 1 Cor. 6:9-11 and 14:20-25. Conversion is in a 
sense a process of judgement which anticipates the final one, but which leads to the 
possibility of a new life rather than to condemnation. 131 
This tells us the sense in which we should understand Paul's use of 
D1KalOCO in 4:4. The language of 4:5 makes it abundantly plain that Paul is thinking of 
the day of judgement. 132 When he says he is not justified by the fact that he is not aware 
of anything against himself, he means that it is not this lack of awareness of sin which 
will secure him a favourable verdict on that day. Yet the form of the verb is perfect 
passive (OUK EV 1:0151:'9 DeD1KCXiCOI-lCX1), hence literally 'I have not by this been 
justified,' and the first reference to God's judicial activity in 4:4b takes the form of a 
present participle (avaKpivcov). As we have already seen in relation to 14:24, an 
129See Theissen (ET 1987), pp.l11-l4. 
130Bultmann (1924, ET 1995), p.212: "If man only has a positive relationship with God when he knows 
God's Xdptc;, that is to say when he knows himself to be a sinner, then it follows that man can only 
understand himself in a real sense as a sinner before God when he knows of God's grace." 
131 See 4.2.1. 
132Whatever the precise details of one's understanding of righteousness here, the meaning is clearly a 
forensic one, since the imagery used by Paul is entirely legal. This is not an occasion when he interprets 
forensic concepts using participatory ones or vice versa. 
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eXVdXPlcrl~ was originally a preliminary pre-trial hearing or investigation.!33 Paul 
therefore also thinks of justification as something which a person either has or does not 
have in this life. As well as looking to the parousia, his statement has a present 
orientation.134 He implies that the right standing which he enjoys with God is not the 
result of a clear conscience but of something else.135 If his justification were on the basis 
of his deeds, then he could not be confident, since the possibilty of unrecognised sin 
renders his conscience an unreliable guide. As it is, relying upon his relationship with 
Christ, he is confident of praise when God judges (4: 5), whatever the outcome of the 
present eX VdXPlcrl~ (4:4b) .136 
An examination of 1 Cor. 4: 1-5 therefore confirms that righteousness 
by faith answers the dilemma of unrecognised sin. What Paul says here of himself as a 
Christian is consistent with he says in Gal. 1: 11-17 and Phil. 3 :4-12 of his life as a Jew 
and his subsequent conversion. It also suggests that Paul discerns a significant, if also 
clearly limited, role for self-examination in the Christian life. This brings us to the one 
question set at the beginning of the chapter which we have not yet considered, namely 
that of the impact of conversion upon the practical consciousness of Jewish converts. 137 
133See p.1l4. Thus when Paul uses this term he refers to preliminary judgements made in the present. 
Note that when warning the Corinthians not to pass judgement on him before the parousia (4:5), he 
switches to Kpivcu. They would be attempting to bring forward something which ought to be reserved 
until then. 
134Something denied by Godet (ET 1886), p.2IO and Winninge (1995), pp.231-32, who takes these 
verses as a 'particularly significant' example of the use of 8tK<xt6cu to refer to final vindication. 
135 For a specific denial of this, see Robertson & Plummer (1911), p.77. Fee (1987), p.162 n.24 
cautiously suggests that the idea of right standing with God may not be entirely absent; Barrett (1971b), 
p.l02 writes as if it is self-evidently the dominant idea in the context, citing Rom. 4:5 and the 
justification of the ungodly. Perhaps because opinion is so split, most other commentators simply ignore 
the issue. 
136Sanders (1977), pp.515-18 misses this when he cites these verses to illustrate a distinction between 
Paul's use of the term 'righteousness' to mean saved by grace, and to mean punished or rewarded 
according to deeds. Taking 4:1-5 as an illustration of the latter, Sanders says that in contrast "when the 
question concerns righteousness as the goal of religion, Paul insists that Christians have been justified 
by faith in Christ." But since not having been justified by a clear conscience is precisely what Paul refers 
to in 4: 4, then either Sanders has 4: 1-5 on the wrong side of his contrast, or Paul here straddles both 
sides of it. 
137We have seen an impact on both Jewish and Gentile converts in terms of assumptions relating to 
ethnic and social status (3.3.6,3.3.7). The former is confirmed by the argument of this chapter, 
especially in relation to Gal. 1: 11-17. However here I focus on wider moral issues, comparing what Paul 
says of himself to that which we have seen him advocate in relation to Gentile converts (4). 
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In line with Paul's positive estimation of Judaism there are fewer changes required in how 
behaviour is assessed than in the case of Gentile converts. He can identify an 
unrecognised sin in his pre-conversion life, but there is nothing comparable to the 
expansion of the boundaries of immorality which he urged on his Gentile converts (see 
4.3.3). The conduct which they would previously have accepted but are now to shun is 
conduct which Paul, as a Jew, would already have regarded as sinful before his 
conversion. In this respect, conversion to Christ would bring little change to his Jewish 
practical consciousness. 
Further, when an apparent suggestion of misconduct (4:1-3) forces 
Paul to reflect and to discuss his behaviour at the level of discursive consciousness, he 
can discern no divergence between his actual conduct and his practical consciousness, no 
lapses in competence. Yet, despite this, he refuses to consider himself justified by this. 
Paul does not perceive a need for change in his practical consciousness, nor any failure 
on his part to comply with it but, even so, he distrusts his practical consciousness. Such 
distrust is understandable given his pre-conversion clear conscience, which presumably 
reflected a practical consciousness to which persecuting the church was a display of 
competence. So too is Paul's distrust of what had then been the principal source of his 
practical consciousness, namely the law. Hence, perhaps, the value of the introspective 
conscience for Paul. Although much of his ethical teaching is entirely compatible with the 
law, the law is not now its basis. Without such a guide there is a greater need for self-
conscious self-examination, a greater need to subject practical consciousness to 
reflection at the level of discursive consciousness. Yet this too has limitations, as 4: 1-5 
shows. For all Paul urges correct behaviour, and strives for it, it is not this which Paul 
relies upon but Christ, and this reliance is the same for Jew and Gentile. 
5.4.2 Summary 
In 1 Cor. 4:1-5 Paul both clearly states that he has a clear conscience, 
and that, despite this, there is the continued possibility of his committing sins without 
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recognising them as such. This suggests that he accords self-examination a significant, if 
limited, role in the Christian life, and that Stendahl is wrong to dismiss it as unimportant 
to Paul. On the one hand Paul uses his clear conscience as part of his defence of his 
conduct, on the other such a conscience is not necessarily a reliable guide. Remarkably, 
Paul does not feel threatened by this, but confidently expects to receive praise from God 
at the parousia. The basis of this confidence is that, while his lack of awareness of sin has 
not justified him, Paul nevertheless has been justified, the present tense of the discussion 
indicating that he does not here conceive of justification in entirely future terms. His 
clear conscience at this point is consistent with Paul's descriptions of his earlier pre-
conversion life, and suggest that the impact of conversion upon his practical 
consciousness is far less than in the case of Gentiles. As a Jew, his reflexive assessments 
of his own behaviour stand in little need of reconstruction. Yet the fact that a clear 
conscience is not a reliable indicator of the absence of sin also suggests a considerable 
distrust of practical consciousness. Important as correct and competent behaviour is for 
Paul, it is Christ who is to be relied upon. 
5.5 Conclusions 
Throughout the chapter we have repeatedly observed the same 
paradoxical pattern of differences and similarities. Paul characterises his pre-conversion 
life as a Jew very differently from that of his Gentile converts, expressing himself 
considerably more favourably in relation to the former than the latter. Yet despite these 
differences, there is a more fundamental similarity. Paul's experience of conversion and 
his realisation of the problem of unrecognised sin have taught him that even what is 
genuinely good in human life is infected by sin. All have transgressed and are under the 
lordship of sin, a common plight which is answered by Christ. The following points can 
be made in support of this summary: 
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(i) In both Gal. 1: 11-17 and Phil. 3:4-12, when contrasting his past and 
his present, Paul does not denigrate his former life in Judaism but characterises himself as 
a successful Jew. 
(ii) In both passages Paul specifically mentions his persecution of the 
church in a way which connects it with his devotion to the law. Had he regarded his 
persecuting activity as sinful he would not have undertaken this activity, but he only 
came to recognise it as such after his conversion. Through this recognition, Paul also 
realised that sin had enjoyed dominion over his life without his knowledge. 
(iii) This connection between the law and unrecognised sin played a 
significant part in shaping Paul's insistence that all are under the power of sin, and that 
justification by faith and justification by works of the law are mutually exclusive 
alternatives. Paul's own conversion experience was an important influence upon his 
theology. 
(iv) In Gal. 1: 11-17 and Phil. 3 :4-12, Paul applies the same vocabulary 
to his own conversion as he elsewhere applies to that of Gentiles. There is nothing in his 
use of the terminology of calling, or that of righteousness, to suggest that it is 
appropriate to describe Gentile Christians as converts, but Jewish Christians as 
something else. 
(v) As in his application of the concept to Gentiles (1 Cor. 6:9-11, 
Rom. 6:7), the righteousness of which Paul speaks in Phil. 3 :4-12 is neither exclusively 
forensic, nor exclusively participatory, but one in which each of these categories 
interprets the other. 
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(vi) The content of 1 Cor. 4: 1-5 is consistent with this, suggesting on 
the part of Paul the Christian an awareness of the continued possibility of unrecognised 
sin, and a consequent, but limited, role for self-examination. Both these imply what 
could, in terms of structuration theory, be characterised as a mistrust of practical 
conSCIOusness. 
6 
Conclusions to Part 2 
Having explored Paul's understanding of conversion, it is now possible 
to return briefly to the three broad questions posed at the outset. 1 The conclusions 
reached are as follows: 
(i) Paul's theology of sin, and his insistence on justification by faith, 
were significantly influenced by his own conversion experience. The role played by 
unrecognised sin in both his own conversion, and that of Gentiles, enables Paul to assert 
the fundamental equality of Jew and Gentile before God. It does so despite the fact that 
it is only in the case of Gentiles that conversion demands a transformation in the ethical 
dimensions of practical consciousness. 
(ii) Forensic categories matter to Paul, and recent attempts to suggest 
otherwise have been misguided. However, they do not matter to him at the expense of 
participation in Christ, or of other aspects of his thought. To play the different categories 
of his thought off against each other is a mistake. Paul is prepared to be creative in his 
attempts to describe conversion, and he sometimes allows forensic and participatory 
terminology to interpret each other. 
(iii) It does not follow that because the communal and cosmic levels of 
his thought are important to Paul, the faith of the individual is less so. In the human 
plight characterised by unrecognised sin, it is ignorance of concrete individual 
transgressions which demonstrates the power of sin. Since this plight concerns all levels 
of human existence, so too does the solution offered by Christ. It is an error to play the 
different levels of Paul's thought off against each other. 
lSee above, pp.49-50. 
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In terms of further research on Paul's understanding of conversion, 
these conclusions suggest the need for studies which examine the means by which Paul 
combines the various categories and levels of his thought. One focus of this might be a 
search for other occasions, beyond those I have identified, on which Paul allows different 
categories of his thought to interpret each other. Here the details of how Paul performs 
this operation could be examined more precisely than has been possible within the scope 
ofthis study. To what degree does Paul fuse the terms and categories which he allows to 
interpret each other? More generally, such studies may require greater attention than has 
been customary of late to the individual, to religious experience, and to forensic 
categories. This is not because these are the truly central elements of Paul's thought 
which render others subsidiary, but because Paul is, in my opinion, a synthetic thinker. 
To neglect these elements of his thought in favour of others, or vice versa, is to distort 
his thought. What he joined together in his attempts to express the truth that had 
shattered and remade his world, contemporary scholarship has put asunder. I do not 
mean to imply by this that Paul is a systematic thinker. He is not, but an examination of 
the frayed ends of a hacked-apart Gordian knot provides only poor solutions to its 
puzzle. Given that Paul was an advocate of a new faith in a cross-cultural context, it is 
not surprising that he should bring together disparate existing intellectual resources in 
order to express his message. If we wish to understand and interpret him, then our focus 
should be primarily on that process, on the tying together, and not on breaking his 
synthesis apart in an attempt to identify its component parts and assess their relative 
importance. 
PART 3 
THE CORINTHIANS' UNDERSTANDING OF 
CONVERSION 
7 
Corinthian Conversion and Graeco-Roman Culture 
7.1 Indigenisation and Practical Consciousness 
Even those advocates of conversion whose endeavours meet with 
success discover that their ability to control the process is limited. Converts bring their 
existing cultural resources to the task of interpreting the new faith, and the degree to 
which this interpretation matches that of the advocate varies. A measure of 
indigenisation is inevitable,l and Paul and the Corinthians are no exception.2 Paul's 
teaching is not the only factor influencing the Corinthians' understanding of their 
conversion and its consequences. The Graeco-Roman society and culture within which 
the Corinthians live is also important. That 1 Corinthians consists largely of attempts to 
'correct' their conduct in relation to various issues is, in part, a tribute to this influence. 
Yet if the existence of such influence is plain, tracing its patterns is not easy. We are able 
to reconstruct the Corinthians' understanding of conversion only through Paul's words. 
Mirror-reading is unavoidable and essential, although undeniably hazardous. 3 Further, 
simply to identify a distinctively Corinthian position or attitude is not to account for it. 
The many varied and complex components of Graeco-Roman culture and social life 
cannot have influenced the Corinthians' understanding of their new faith in equal 
proportion. Identifying which factors are significant is a necessary preliminary to 
exploring them. 
10n the inevitability ofindigenisation see Russell (1994) and Cusack (1998) who, in their studies of the 
conversion of Germanic peoples in the early middle ages, emphasise that alongside the Christianisation 
of these peoples there was also a Germanisation of Christianity. 
2This is not to say that Paul and the Corinthians provide an extreme example. Paul was fluent in Greek, 
and Jews had formed a significant minority within Hellenistic society for centuries. The gap between the 
cultural resources operative on both sides of their encounter was far narrower than, for example, that 
between western missionaries and African peoples in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
Nevertheless, despite his advocacy of a law-free gospel aimed at the creation of communities which cross 
ethical and cultural boundaries, Paul displays considerable antagonism towards Hellenistic culture. See 
Barclay (1996), chapter 13. 
3Por a discussion of these hazards, along with a defence of the propriety of mirror-reading, see Barclay 
(1987). 
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This introduction will therefore ask (i) what were the main contours of 
the Corinthians' understanding of their conversion and its consequences, and (ii) which 
elements of Graeco-Roman culture and social life significantly influenced this 
understanding? Yet before doing so, comment must be made upon the level at which 
such influence operates. Paul may be prepared to label the Corinthians as vTj1tiot EV 
Xptcr'tq) (3: 1), but he nowhere calls into question the genuine nature of their 
conversion. He appears confident that they are indeed in Christ. There is also little to 
suggest that Paul's teaching about Christ has been explicitly rejected. Even in response to 
a denial of the resurrection of the dead, Paul argues as if the raising of Christ is common 
ground (15:12). Paul and the Corinthians share a common set of religious symbols, and it 
is not in their choice of symbols that Paul finds fault with his converts. Instead, he is 
disturbed by the different manner in which the Corinthians construe the significance of 
these shared symbols. On the one hand, Paul frequently criticises the Corinthians' failure 
to draw from their faith ethical implications which to him seem obvious. Seven times he 
frames questions with the somewhat exasperated expression OUK OtOCX'tE on ... ;4 On 
the other, he finds overconfident the Corinthians' sense that their conversion has granted 
them an exalted spiritual status (4:8-10). It is in the significance granted to specifically 
Christian symbols, not their replacement with others, that factors in their Graeco-Roman 
environment influence the Corinthians. 
Given this, structuration theory provides a particularly appropriate 
resource for the exploration of these influences. At the level of discursive consciousness, 
the primary influence upon the Corinthians is the Christian faith advocated to them by 
Paul. They have converted, and they have adopted a new set of religious symbols. Here 
transformation dominates. However, the Corinthians construe the significance of these 
symbols somewhat differently from Paul, and this suggests that, at the level of practical 
41 Cor. 3: 16, 6:2, 6:3, 6:9, 6: 16, 6: 19, 9:24. Paul also uses this expression in Romans, but less 
frequently. See Rom. 6:3, 6: 16, 7: 1. 
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consciousness, things are rather more complicated. It will be remembered that social 
practices simultaneously reproduce the largely implicit rules and resources (structures) of 
social life and lay them open to transformation (1.4.2.2). Both are possibilities and, if 
reproduction is the stronger, then the rules and resources which enabled and constrained 
familiar social practices before conversion will be applied to the new set of religious 
symbols. As it defines competent and appropriate behaviour in relation to any given 
social context, the Corinthians' practical consciousness will reflect the norms of Graeco-
Roman society as well as those of Paul's gospel. For example, the rite of the Lord's 
Supper is one that expresses the profound transformation of the Corinthians' identity 
wrought by conversion. Yet, I will suggest, their implicit understanding of what 
constitutes appropriate conduct in that context is largely shaped by the assumptions of 
Graeco-Roman society as to appropriate conduct at communal meals (8.3). The 
Corinthians' practical consciousness has not been transformed to the degree necessary to 
render their conduct acceptable to Paul (11: 17-34). Thus, it is at the level of practical 
consciousness that the influence upon the Corinthians of their Graeco-Roman 
environment can be traced. 
7.2 Dominant Features of the Corinthians' Understanding of Conversions 
The difficulties involved in reconstructing the OpInIOnS of the 
Corinthians mean that detail is largely beyond us. The most we can speak of is a broad 
theological pattern into which Paul's criticisms seem to fit. In outlining this pattern I find 
myself entirely in agreement with John Barclay, whose reconstruction accounts for the 
available evidence in as economical a manner as possible. 6 In particular I would draw 
from his discussion the following three points: 
SOf course, there may have been more than one understanding of conversion current at Corinth. 
References to 'the Corinthians' throughout part 3 are not meant to deny this, but rather to refer to the 
dominant ethos against which Paul directs his criticisms. Even in 1: 10-12 Paul does not criticise single 
groups in isolation, but addresses factionalism as a problem afflicting the whole church. 
6See Barclay (1992), pp.61-65. 
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(i) The Corinthians consider their converSIon to have gIven them 
access to knowledge (yvcOO't;) and wisdom (O'o<pla).7 "Paul does not clearly describe 
what content the Corinthians give to it; but we know that it concerns the understanding 
of mysteries (13:1-2) and it seems to include some conviction of the oneness of God and 
the insignificance ( or non-existence) of d8coACX (8:4-6). "8 This last two items are of 
considerable interest since Paul might be expected to applaud such monotheist 
sentiments, and yet this knowledge is subject to scathing attack (8:1-3). Here is one 
confirmation of my suggestion that Paul and the Corinthians share a common set of 
religious symbols, but construe their significance differently. 
(ii) Perhaps most importantly of all, the Corinthians identified the 
source of their insight as the possession of the SpiriP Received at conversion in baptism 
(12: 13), and displayed by the dramatic exercise of its gifts during worship, it is the 
experience of the Spirit which convinces the Corinthians that they now enjoy an exalted 
religious status, set far above other inferior mortals. They are 1tvEUf..lcx'UKol, whereas 
those outside the church are ordinary 'VUXtKOl (2:6-16). 
(iii) The Corinthians do not hold a 'realised' or 'over-realised' 
eschatology. From Paul's perspective "the freedom, knowledge and spiritual ecstasy 
enjoyed by the Corinthians constituted a falsely claimed pre-emption of eschatological 
glory (4:8-10)."10 But the Corinthians simply do not share Paul's sense of an apocalyptic 
disjunction between present and future. Instead the strength of their emphasis on the 
present possession of the Spirit means that their perspective is non-eschatological. "Their 
Spirit-filled lives are not an early experience of the future; they simply consider 
7See 1:18 - 2:5; 3:18-23; 8:1-6; 13:1-12. 
8Barc1ay (1992), p.61. See also Barrett (1971b), p.18; Fee (1987), pp.8-9; Horrell (1996), p.121. 
9See also Fee (1987), pp.lO-ll 
lOBarc1ay (1992), p.64. 
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themselves to have reached the heights of human potential. "11 The Corinthians' denial of 
the resurrection of the dead (15:12), often taken as symptomatic of an 'over-realised' 
eschatology, is better explained not as a denial of immortality in general, but of bodily 
resurrection in particular. 12 
To these essentially theological characteristics, I would add the 
Corinthians' disposition towards factionalism. While interpretations which take the four 
'parties' of 1: 12 as the key to understanding the whole letter have rightly fallen out of 
fashion, there remains every reason to suppose that factions were a significant feature of 
the life of the Corinthian church. "When we add in further allusions to 'quarrels' (1:11), 
Jealousy and quarrelling' (3:3), 'these arrogant people' (4:19), 'boasting' (5:6), 
'grievances' and legal proceedings between members (6: 1), 'factions' (11: 19) and 
'disorder' (14:33), it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the Corinthian church was riven 
with disagreement." 13 Particularly significant is the further mention of factions in 11: 19. 
For, from the beginning of chapter 5 onwards, Paul deals with a range of specific issues, 
but does so without relating particular problems to particular groups. His criticisms are 
directed at all, and that factions should appear again in chapter 11 suggests that they 
existed within the dominant ethos outlined by Barclay. Perhaps, indeed, they were 
stimulated by it. If the Corinthians considered their conversion to have granted them an 
exalted status far above that of the inferior \jfux,tKoi, then efforts to demonstrate 
superiority amongst themselves might well follow. Certainly status seems a pressmg 
concern. 
11 ibid. Although he uses the label 'realised' eschatology, Fee (1987), p.12 seems to agree that this 
represents an assessment reached from Paul's perspective: "It is doubtful ... whether they also have a 
Jewish apocalyptic view of the End; rather, they have probably translated such a view into their 
framework of 'spirituality' ... they are now experiencing a kind of ultimate spirituality in which they live 
above the merely material existence of the present age." His italics. 
12Here Barclay suggests that Paul's perspective on the Corinthian church has controlled our description 
of them. I will make a similar suggestion in relation to the proposal that the Corinthians were 'magical 
sacramentalists' (Appendix 3). It does not follow that because Paul perceives there to be great dangers 
inherent in participation in idol-feasts (10: 14-22), the Corinthians also do so. The available evidence 
concerning their attitude can be more economically accounted for in other ways. 
13Dullll (1995), p.27. 
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7.3 Influences upon the Corinthians' Understanding of Conversion 
Having outlined the distinctive contours of the Corinthians' 
understanding of conversion and its consequences, we may now consider which aspects 
of Graeco-Roman religion and social life may have been significant in shaping it. I will 
suggest two significant influences, one that of voluntary associations, the other that of 
mystery cults. In relation to the former, I explore the hypothesis that on a range of issues 
- patronage, conduct at the Lord's Supper, court cases between believers, the Jerusalem 
collection - the differences between Paul and the Corinthians can be illuminated by 
analogy with the voluntary associations. This is not to suggest that in some sense the 
Corinthian church was a voluntary association, or that voluntary associations provide the 
only appropriate analogy to the Pauline churches within the Graeco-Roman 
environment. 14 Instead, I examine the possibility that, as they grapple with the task of 
defining what it means to belong to their new community, the Corinthians instinctively 
draw upon patterns of belonging familiar from the voluntary associations. At the level of 
practical consciousness, some of the rules and resources structuring the life of voluntary 
associations are applied to the church. In some areas, conversion does not alter the 
Corinthians' practical consciousness to the degree necessary for their conduct to please 
Paul. 15 
One form of voluntary association was that composed of initiates into 
mystery cults. With regard to the mystery cults, I first clarify important questions 
surrounding their nature which have long distorted the exploration of their significance 
14The others regularly proposed are the household, the synagogue and the philosophical school. For a 
general discussion of the virtues and limitations of each suggestion, see Meeks (1983), pp.75-84. 
15This does not imply that every criticism Paul directs at the Corinthians can be attributed to what is, 
from his perspective, an insufficiently dramatic change. In some respects, their understanding of 
conversion is more dramatic than Paul thinks proper. We have already noted their extremely high 
assessment of their new spiritual state, and their apparent impulse to celibacy, even within marriage, is 
both unusual in their Graeco-Roman environment and something which Paul seeks to restrain and 
channel (7: 1-7). 
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for early Christianity. In particular, the mystery cults did not shape the Christian belief 
that, in baptism, the believer dies and rises with Christ. Although the mystery cults may 
help to clarify much about the Corinthians' attitudes towards the sacraments, their 
influence did not tend in this direction. Even were it demonstrated that the Corinthians 
were 'magical sacramentalists,' the influence of the mystery cults could not account for 
such an attitude. 16 More positively, I examine the idea that it is the significance granted 
by the mystery cults to initiation which influences the Corinthians. Their attitude towards 
baptism displays similar patterns. This is not a proposal that the Corinthian church was, 
in effect, a mystery cult, or that the Corinthians turned baptism into a mystery initiation. 
Instead, I consider whether, in order to understand what happens at baptism, the 
Corinthians draw upon already familiar attitudes towards the significance of initiation. 
Can the Corinthians' sense that their conversion has resulted in a new exalted status, 
prompted by possession of the Spirit received at baptism, be illuminated by analogy with 
initiation? If so, then this forms another example of the application of the rules and 
resources structuring existing social practices to new Christian ones. Once again, it is at 
the level of practical consciousness that their Graeco-Roman environment exerCIses 
influence upon the Corinthians' understanding of their own conversion. 
7.4 Compatible and Incompatible Alternative Proposals 
In proposing to explore the influence upon the Corinthians of voluntary 
associations and mystery cults, I am not suggesting that they were the only factors in 
their Graeco-Roman environment which help to account for the Corinthians' 
understanding of their conversion and its consequences. It is entirely possible that, 
perhaps especially at the level of practical consciousness, different influences reinforced 
each other. To paint a rounded picture of the impact of their social and religious 
environment upon the Corinthians might require a substantial palette. For example, the 
16In Appendix 3 I argue that the Corinthians were not 'magical sacramentalists'. 
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suggestion that the Corinthians believe possession of the Spirit to grant them c::m¢ia is 
compatible with an emphasis on the influence of the Graeco-Roman rhetorical tradition 
in shaping what they considered wisdom to be. The recent studies of Litfin and Pogoloff 
on that tradition are therefore, in these broad terms, compatible with my ownP 
Similarly, my decision to explore analogies between patronage within the voluntary 
associations and patronage within the Corinthian church cannot be divorced from the 
exercise of patronage in general. The functioning of patronage within both the voluntary 
associations and the Corinthian church is shaped by its broader context within Graeco-
Roman society as a whole. The recent studies by John Chow and Andrew Clarke,18 both 
of whom urge the importance of patronage practices for understanding the Corinthian 
church, are therefore also, in very broad terms, compatible with this one. Finally, the 
issue of patronage itself feeds into the wider one of social status, the theme which has 
dominated study of the Corinthian church since the publication of a series of articles by 
Gerd Theissen in the mid-1970s. 19 Here too, there is broad compatibility with my own 
argument, and in my discussions of 1 Cor. 1:10-17 (9.3.1) and 11:17-22 (8.3.2) I will 
argue that the factionalism of the Corinthian church is best explained in relation to social 
stratification. Theissen's portrait of the Corinthian church as composed largely of those 
of low social status, but with a few influential members who enjoyed a significantly 
higher social standing, continues to be convincing. 
It does so despite the recent assault launched upon it by Justin Meggitt. 
In his Paul, Poverty and Survival, Meggitt argues that Paul and all his converts shared in 
the poverty experienced by 99% of the population of the Roman Empire.20 They were 
part of the vast population who lived at or near subsistence level and whose lives were 
characterised by struggle for the basic means of survival such as food, shelter and 
17Litfin (1994), Pogoloff(1992). 
18Chow (1992), Clarke (1993). 
19See Theissen (ET 1982). 
20Meggitt (l998a), p.75: "Neither the apostle nor any members of the congregations he addresses in his 
epistles escaped from the harsh existence that typified life in the Roman Empire for the non-elite." 
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clothing.21 Whether this forms an accurate portrayal of economic conditions within the 
empire is itself a matter of some controversY,22 but Meggitt's argument that all Pauline 
Christians endured such conditions founders upon the evidence of 1 Corinthians. He 
suggests that the ou nOAAot wise, powerful and well-born of 1 :26 were "a small group 
of literate, ingenui, artisans - who amongst the urban poor would have appeared 
relatively more privileged but whose lives would still have been dominated by fears over 
subsistence. "23 While Meggitt does demonstrate that the term EU'YEV"'~ can apply to 
those not of noble birth, he offers no explanations of how such artisans might be 
described as wise and powerful and, more importantly, no instances of comparable 
combinations of terms applying to those struggling for subsistence. If anything, Meggitt's 
exegesis of 11: 17-34 is even less convincing.24 His book provides us with a timely 
reminder that not every issue in 1 Corinthians is to be explained with reference to social 
status,25 and should cause us to reflect that the social profile of the Corinthian church 
may not be typical of others, but that is all. Social stratification was one significant factor 
in the life of the Corinthian congregation. 26 
The Graeco-Roman rhetorical tradition, patronage and social status are 
therefore all factors within the Corinthians environment whose influence upon them is 
compatible with my own proposals. They might interact with, and even reinforce, the 
21See Meggitt (1998a), p.5. 
22Some of Meggitt's strongest arguments against Theissen et al seem to contradict this extremely bleak 
view of prevailing economic conditions. It may be true that one did not need to be a member of the elite 
to own a house, to own slaves, to travel, or to undertake litigation against a social equal, but are these 
really activities characteristic of those whose daily lives are dominated by a struggle for food, shelter and 
clothing? 
23Meggitt (1998a), p.106. 
24See below, p.222 n.79. 
25 Approached on this basis, minus the insistence that every Pauline Christian suffered abject poverty, 
Meggitt's work makes several valuable points. For example, on the interpretation of 1 Cor. 4:10 (pp.106-
07), on food sacrificed to idols (pp.107-13), and on litigation between believers (pp.122-25), he 
convincingly argues that social status is not a key factor. 
26This view in fact pre-dates Theissen considerably. See Weiss (ET 1937) YoU, p.293: "It (the 
Corinthian church) was quite predominantly composed of the dregs of the population, the lower 
elements of which were without culture and social importance; slaves and labourers were in the vast 
majority ... Members of the upper classes were not however entirely lacking." Weiss goes on to identify 
Chloe, Stephanas, Gaius, Crispus and Erastus as probable members of this minority. 
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influence exercised by voluntary associations and by the mystery cults. Other hypotheses 
which have figured prominently in Corinthian studies are incompatible with my 
proposals. One is that the Corinthians' Christianity was 'gnostic'.27 Here there are broad 
problems with the concept of Gnosticism itself One is that it is far from clear that 
Gnosticism or even proto-Gnosticism existed in the first century. Too many 
demonstrations of the vitality of Gnosis in the first century and of its availability to 
influence the New Testament are circular, since they are based on the New Testament 
documents themselves.28 More likely is the suggestion that Paul's letters themselves 
shaped later Gnostic thought, since the Naassenes and the Valentinians revered Paul 
rather than repudiating him as an opponent. 29 A further problem is that those proposing 
the influence of Gnosticism upon the Corinthians have indiscriminately mixed their 
sources. In particular, the false assumption is often made that Gnosticism and the 
mystery cults are essentially the same phenomenon. 30 Although it is easy to see that 
Gnosticism, perhaps the syncretistic religious movement par excellence, owed something 
to the mystery cults,31 the two were different, and Gnostic texts contain few specific 
references to them. 32 It is such difficulties which have even led to calls for the complete 
abandonment of the term 'Gnosticism' as "a word, a 'sick sign,' that has come to mean 
27 Schmithals (1971) represents the high water mark for this hypothesis. Ironically, it was perhaps his 
presentation of Gnosticism as the key element in more or less every issue in Corinth which began to turn 
minds against it. 
28See Rudolph (ET 1983a), pp.294-308 and (1983b), pp.26-32. Lohse (ET 1976), p.268 provides 
another example of this. 
29See Pagels (1975), p.l. 
30Reitzenstein (ET 1978), p.443 writes that "Paul is a gnostic." Bultmann (ET 1969) VoU, pp.70-72 & 
(ET 1952) Vol. I, pp.164-175 considers 1 Cor. 2:6-16. In the first piece he discerns the influence ofthe 
mystery cults, in the second that of Gnosticism. The German original of the former was written in the 
1920s, that of the latter in the 1940s. 
31perhaps especially in organisation and secrecy. See Rudolph (ET 1983a), p.213-15. This fact is 
exploited by Yeo (1995), p.119 in order to argue that although the Corinthians' theology is shaped by 
proto-Gnosticism, the mystery cults in Corinth provided "environments conducive to ... acceptance of the 
proto-Gnostics' conception of freedom and right." Of course, whereas Yeo, pp.l0 1-19 can demonstrate 
the presence of mystery cults in first century Corinth as a matter of archaeological and literary record, he 
cannot do so for 'proto-Gnostocism.' Once again, the mystery cults serve as a pro}..), for Gnosticism. 
32See Wedderburn (1987b), p.122. Only the Naassenes are an exception. Of their Gnostic 
reinterpretation of the mysteries and of NeoPlatonist ones, Wedderburn writes, p.129, that "they would 
not necessarily have suggested themselves at all times to the devotees of the mysteries ... even when they 
were in fashion it is certainly not the case that all would have interpreted the mysteries in such ways." 
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too much, and therefore very little. "33 Added to these broad problems is the more 
specific one that the Corinthians' YVcOcrtC; seems to have emphasised God's role as 
creator (8:4-6, 10:26), something which does not fit with the anti-cosmic dualism 
regarded by many as the most prominent feature of Gnosticism. 34 The Corinthians were 
not influenced by Gnosticism. 
An alternative proposal is that Corinthian Christianity was strongly 
influenced by Hellenistic Judaism, in particular by the philosophy of Philo of Alexandria. 
Birger Pearson argues that the background to the Corinthians use of the 1tVEU!-lcx,'tlKOC; 
- \jfUX1KOC; terminology, reflected in 1 Cor. 2:6-16 and 1 Cor. 15:44-54, is to be found 
in Philo's use of1tvEu!-lcx, and \jfUXn in his exegesis of Genesis 2:7.35 Pearson's argument 
was taken up and further developed by Richard Horsley, who sought to show that it was 
also capable of providing an explanation for wider features of Corinthian theology. 
Horsley argued that the link between Philo and the Corinthians is not so much their 
common language, but a shared anthropological dualism which pitted earthly against 
heavenly, mortal against the immortal, body against soul, blood against spirit.36 Against 
this suggestion there are three main points to be made.37 Firstly, Philo nowhere uses the 
specific terms which appear in 1 Corinthians. Horsley himself admits that "only the 
specific terminology, 'pneumatikos - psychikos' is missing. "38 Secondly, the proposal 
rests upon an extremely narrow exegetical base within 1 Corinthians itself, since it is only 
in 1 Cor. 15:44-54 that a case can be made for Paul's argument reflecting interest on the 
part of the Corinthians in the exegesis of Genesis. One might also doubt whether Paul's 
33Williams, M.A. (1996), p.5. 
34See Rudolph (ET 1983a), p.60. See also Rudolph (1983b), p.29 and Williams, M.A. (1996), p.4. Nor 
is such anti-cosmic dualism a feature of the mystery cults. See Wedderburn (1987b), pp.121-25. 
35For the core of his argument see Pearson (1973), chapters 2-4. 
36Unlike Pearson, Horsley does not identify what Philo intends by the terms n;vEullC(, and \jfUXr1 with 
that intended by the Corinthians. Horsley instead suggests that, for Philo, these terms refer to higher and 
lower parts of the immortal soul, whereas, for the Corinthians, they denote opposite sides of a contrast 
between soul and body. Horsley nevertheless maintains that these are essentially similar contrasts. See 
Horsley (1976), pp.270-80. 
37See also the criticisms offered by Barclay (1992), p.64 n.29. 
38Horsley (1976), p.280. 
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argument here really reads as if he is countering a Philonic ontological distinction 
concerning the origins of two different kinds of humanity.39 Finally, both Pearson and 
Horsley suggest that Philonic influence was transmitted to the Corinthian church through 
Apollos. It does not follow that because Apollos was an Alexandrian Jew he was an 
advocate of Philo's views, or even necessarily aware of them. We only know that he was 
an Alexandrian Jew from Acts 18:24-26, verses which also record that, on arrival at 
Corinth, Apollos knew only the baptism of John. This scarcely fits the image of him as an 
enthusiastic advocate concerning the things of the Spirit with strong opinions to impart.4o 
Thus, as with Gnosticism, the suggestion that the Corinthians were 
influenced by Alexandrian Jewish philosophy suffers from an inability to demonstrate that 
these influences were present in the local environment. In contrast, voluntary 
associations were so endemic throughout the Roman empire, and involved so many 
sections of society, that participation in them by at least some members of the Corinthian 
church is a reasonable inference (8.1.2). It can also be demonstrated from the 
archaeological record that the mystery cults enjoyed a significant presence in first century 
Corinth (9.5). Among the wide range of possible influences upon the Corinthians' 
understanding of conversion, and its consequences, they are worthy candidates for 
exploration. 
39Horsley (1976), p.277 argues that Paul's insistence in 15:46 that the natural must come before the 
spiritual is "a pointed transformation of his 'opponents' view of the priority. " But, as Weddderburn 
(1973), p.302 suggests, "the Corinthians erred in holding to a one-stage soteriology, rather than in 
reversing the order of a two-stage one." 
40Pearson (1973), p.18 n.23 suggests that Acts 18:24-26 is wrong in alleging that Apollos knew only the 
baptism of John. Pearson thus implies, without grounds on which to do so, that the information offered 
about Apollos is simultaneously reliable (he was an Alexandrian Jew) and totally false (he knew only the 
baptism of John). 
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Corinthian Conversion and Voluntary Associations 
8.1 Introduction 
8.1.1 Understanding Voluntary Associations 
Voluntary associations were extremely widespread in the ancient 
world. "Where two neighbours at a corner pub today will raise their glasses and at most 
exchange a friendly 'Cheersl' the two in antiquity seem to have said, 'Be it resolved to call 
ourselves the society of .. ' "I Yet this very popularity and the great variety of forms 
which it spawned make voluntary associations difficult to define. The label itself is an etic 
one, and covers groups that were called collegia in Latin, and a whole host of names in 
Greek (8LeXO'Ol, K01Vci, 6pYEcOVE~, epavol, O'UV080l and others). It distinguishes 
them "from institutions such as the state, city, or family, where membership was 
automatic - a question of birth rather than choice, "2 and also from "the official collegia 
and sacred sodalities run by the state. "3 This form of association is distinguished from 
others by the fact that, generally speaking, a decision to join was necessary. Further, 
many associations had statutes which were "in reality private contracts whose validity 
depended upon the voluntary, expressed consent of the members. "4 
Yet while this distinction between voluntary and automatic 
membership is broadly valid, it must not be pressed too hard.5 This is clear from even the 
simplest classification of types of voluntary association. "We arrive at three groupings: 
those associated with a household, those formed around a common trade (and CIVIC 
lMacMullen (1974), p.82. 
2Wilson, S. (1996), p.l. 
3ibid. 
4Boak (1937), p.220. See also Nock et al (1936), p.43. PMich. Tebt. 243, 244 and 247 are association 
statutes in which all the members have appended their signatures or marks in order to indicate 
acceptance of the contents. 
50f course, no human decisions are independent of the constraints and opportunities presented by social 
structures. The term 'voluntary' is a relative one, and in relation to ancient associations it denotes a 
greater degree of individual choice when compared to other forms of social belonging in that society. 
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locale), and those formed around the cult of a deity. "6 In certain circumstances 
membership in a household association or a trade guild may have been difficult to avoid. 
The degree to which associations are 'voluntary' varies, and it is perhaps with the cult 
associations that it is at its greatest. Unlike household or trade associations, the basis of 
association was not any pre-existing social or economic connection amongst the 
members, but shared devotion to a particular deity.7 One might be born into a household, 
or one might effectively be born into a trade, and therefore inherently likely to join a 
particular association, but one was not, by and large, born into a cult association. The 
bulk of the evidence cited in this chapter is drawn from such cult associations. 8 
The decision that we are justified, despite all the necessary 
qualifications, in applying the label 'voluntary' to these associations is supported by their 
social location. Associations characteristically occupy a social space between those 
institutions of which individuals automatically find themselves a part. There is 
widespread agreement that they existed neither in what can properly be called the public 
sphere, nor in the private domain, but instead acted as part of a bridge connecting the 
two. They are an instance of those collective activities which "are part of the koina 
which define a city without constituting its political requirements. "9 Arnaoutoglou speaks 
of "a vacuum in the social continuum"10 which was filled by cult associations. Arguably, 
this role had become increasingly important during the Hellenistic era when the cities 
ceased to be the organising centres of religious life, and associations had enjoyed a 
6Kloppenborg (1993), p.26. Although it must be emphasised that individual associations often 
simultaneously belonged to more than one of these groupings, this threefold classification does at least 
provide us with a rough guide as to types of association. 
7Household cult associations provide a partial exception here, and others offered preferential fee rates to 
children of existing members. 
8In what follows I have largely ignored the cult association which is perhaps best known among New 
Testament scholars, namely that recorded in SIG 985, and discussed by Barton and Horsley (1981). I 
have done so because its ordinances do not seem to me to be those of an association, but instead purity 
requirements laid upon any who would enter the temple to which they refer. See Nock (1933), pp.2l6-
17, and (1972) VoLl, pp.65-66. 
9Schmitt-Pantell (1990), p.208. 
10 Arnaoutoglou (unpublished), p.2. 
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corresponding surge in popularity.!1 We shall exarrune in turn how the associations 
related to either side of the vacuum which they filled, firstly to the public sphere, to the 
polis, and then to the private sphere, to the household and the family. 
The associations were "a polis writ small," 12 imitating the cities in that 
the titles given to their officials were the same as those given to civic ones,13 and 
honours were given and received in the same way as at the civic level. The difference 
was often in the range of social status found amongst those giving and receiving, with 
the associations providing the opportunity of participation in such activities to many who 
would always have been excluded at the civic level. They became a somebody in their 
own smaller world, even though they never could be in the larger one and yet, 
significantly, that smaller world, as a totality, was given recognition by the larger one. 
"No one found their honorific decrees .. .in the least ridiculous ... the arrogation of fancy 
titles raised no laugh. "14 It did not do so because often at the very pinnacle of the 
association hierarchy sat a genuinely rich patron. Thus, the associations were an effective 
force for social integration, for they "provided not only an effective means by which to 
structure social relationships within the mass of the urban poor, but ... also served the 
equally crucial function of mediating relationships between the enormous body of non-
elite and the tiny aristocratic elite in the cities of the empire." 15 
If the associations reached towards the city by aping its honours and 
rewards, in what ways did they reach back towards the household and the family? Some 
argue that associations did rather more than simply reaching back towards the family and 
actually conceived of themselves as such. As Nock puts it, "The cult association is 
primarily a family. Its head is called pater, not merely by worshippers of Mithras, but 
llFor an attempt to combat this view by arguing that associations had been equally important in earlier 
periods see Parker (1996), p.333f. 
12Kloppenborg (1996a), p.26. 
13Kloppenborg (1996a), p.26 gives several examples. 
14MacMulien (1974), p.75. Also quoted in Pogoloff (1992), p.253. 
15Kloppenborg (1993), p.27. 
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also by devotees of Cybele, the Syrian Belela, and the Theos Hypsistos in the Bosporus 
'" The cult association, then, is a family and feels itself such. "16 Yet others challenge this 
view. For while the use of familial language is common in the relevant Latin inscriptions, 
it is rare in the Greek onesP Further, it is not always clear what precisely the Latin use 
of familial language implies. Meeks suggests that it is largely a question of honorifics for 
patrons rather than a genuine family structure. "This quite formal usage should warn us 
against assuming an intimate association everywhere that such terms appear." 18 Clearly 
much depends here on what is implied by the term 'family'. Meeks may be right that 
associations which employed familial language were not necessarily intimate, but not all 
families are cosy and intimate. Some are formal, and require members to know their 
place. A good example of this is provided by the Dionysiac household cult association 
which erected an inscription to its priestess Pompeia Agripinilla. 19 The basis of this 
association is clearly the familia, and yet all its members are formally assigned to ranks. 
It is therefore difficult to know what precise significance to accord to 
either the presence or absence of familial language. We may not make the simple 
equation that where it is present cult associations resemble an intimate family, and where 
it is absent they do not. On the whole, the mixed nature of the evidence suits the 
16Nock (1924), p.105. 
17Poland (1909), pp.54-55: "Vergebens hat man meist bisher diesen Titel sicher nachzuweisen gesucht 
... Gerade in dem FeWen dieser gemiitlichen Bezeichnungen besteht eine der merkwiirdigsten 
Verschiedenheiten vom romischen Brauch, der, wie er von Vater und Mutter spricht, so vor allem 
Bruder in den Kollegen sieht." As Poland and Nock note, there are Bosporan inscriptions in Greek 
honouring Theos Hypsistos which employ familial language. However, the identity and origin of Theos 
Hypsistos remain obscure and it is clear that his cult was moulded by non-Hellenic influences. See 
Ustinova (1991). 
18Meeks (1983), p.87n.73. 
19For a discussion of this association, and of the inscription on which our knowledge of it is based, see 
McLean (1993), pp.240-45. He provides the most accessible edition of the text, which is not contained in 
any of the major collections. Fox (1986), p.85 uses this inscription to support an overly sharp distinction 
between Latin and Greek cult associations: "In the West, religious associations tended to assume the 
character of extended families and hence, like the Roman family, they sometimes included slaves and 
freedmen among their membership. In the Greek East slaves were rarely members beside free men; the 
sexes, too, were almost always segregated." But, while Agripinilla's association included slaves and its 
inscription comes from the Roman Campagna c.1S0 CE, the language used is Greek, the majority of 
names listed are Greek (323 out of 402), and she had established the association while resident at 
Mitylene on Lesbos, the ancestral home of the family. 
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characterisation of associations as occupying an ambiguous social space between the 
private domain and the public sphere. This point is neatly made by an example from an 
earlier era. The members of the Attic 6pYEroVE~ were all male, but their sacrifices and 
festivals were attended by their families. Although their formal basis suggests something 
different, when these associations actually met they appeared as collections of inter-
locking households.20 Further, the rules of associations often establish obligations 
between members. Many associations make provision for burial,21 others stipulate that a 
member provide the necessary cash, or its liquid equivalent, for the whole association to 
celebrate births, comings of age, honours etc. 22 Significant events in the life of a 
member's family were also made of account in the life of the association. Associations 
reflected the concerns of the family as well as those ofthe city. 
8.1.2 Voluntary Associations and the Corinthian Church 
We have little direct evidence of voluntary associations in Corinth, two 
fragmentary inscriptions providing our only references to them.23 However, the condition 
of inscriptions from Corinth is generally so poor,24 and evidence of the activity of 
voluntary associations in the ancient world so widespread, that we have no reason to 
suppose that Corinth was any different in this respect from other major cities of the time. 
That there were a a large number of more or less flourishing associations, and that some 
of the Corinthian Christians will have belonged to them, both seem reasonable 
assumptions. Of the different types of association, it is perhaps cult associations which 
20This feature of their life is sufficiently central for Ferguson (1944), p.l1Sf. to specifically discuss the 
exception. The 6pycoovcC; of Dionysus stand out because their activities only involved men. 
21This is so widespread that it has sometimes been assumed that the primary purpose of many 
associations was to provide for the funerals of members. Kloppenborg (1996a), p.21 disputes this: 
"during the first century, collegia tenuiorum did not exist as such, although, to be sure, many, perhaps 
most, associations took care of the burial of their members. It was only with Hadrian that the notion of a 
collegium established solely for the sake of burial entered the realm of Roman law." 
22 See P.Mich. Tebt. 243, P.Lond. 2710, SIG. 3.1109. 
23Kent (1966), Nos. 62, 308. The first of these is in Latin, dates from c. 120 CE, and honours two 
leading members of an association of the Lares of the imperial house. The second is in Greek, and is 
probably a fragment of the statutes of a cult association. Its date is uncertain, but it is only in the reign of 
Hadrian that Greek inscriptions first appear in any number in the new Corinth. 
24Kent (1966), p.17: "It is difficult to think of any other ancient site where the inscriptions are so cruelly 
mutilated or broken." 
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are the most relevant since here, as already noted, personal preference was a stronger 
consideration, relatively speaking, than with household or trade associations. Similarly, a 
decision was required to join the Corinthian church,25 a community composed entirely of 
those who had decided to enter it. 26 Without implying that all or even most members of 
cult associations qualify as converts,27 it may be that their 'voluntary' aspect makes these 
associations a particularly suitable comparative tool for probing questions related to 
conversion.28 They 'fit' this task particularly well. 
How might voluntary associations have influenced the Corinthian 
church? What is the nature of the comparison being made between them? Enthusiasts 
have sometimes claimed that the early churches in effect were voluntary associations. In 
relation to Corinth, such claims were convincingly dealt with long ago by J. Weiss.29 He 
pointed out that there is no evidence for the existence at Corinth of a permanent 
common fund, and therefore no evidence that provisions for the common meal were 
purchased from such a fund; no evidence that the community possessed officers and, 
above all, no evidence of any statutes governing its existence and the conduct of its 
members. Given that these were all common features amongst voluntary associations, 
Weiss felt that their absence told decisively against the supposition of any conscious 
attempts to imitate forms and institutions. The Corinthian church was not a voluntary 
association. However, while considering that the Jewish Diaspora communities provided 
equally valid comparative material, Weiss left open the possibility of employing our 
knowledge of voluntary associations in another way. 
25This in no way implies that all such decisions were individual ones, or that allegiance to Christianity 
was unaffected by household or professional ties, cf. the household of Stephanas (1 Cor. 1: 16, 16: 15), 
and the tent-making connection between Priscilla and Aquila and Paul (Acts 18:3). 
26To state the obvious, there can at this stage have been no adult members of the Corinthian community 
who had been born into the church. Anyone in that position would still have been a young child. 
27See the understanding adopted on p.lO. 
280ne could make a similar case on behalf of philosophical schools, but whereas very few people had 
experience of belonging to such a school, associations appear to have involved a substantial proportion 
of the population. There is a far greater probability of Corinthian converts having previously belonged to 
associations than to philosophical schools. 
29See Weiss (1910), pp. xxii-xxv. His position is discussed by Kloppenborg (1993), pp.219-20. 
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Ferner bedenken wir, da/3 doch gewi/3 viele Gemeindemitglieder fiiiher solchen 
Vereinen angehort hatten, z.1. auch noch angehorten, wenigstens solchen mehr 
burgerlichen Charakters - lag es nicht in der Natur der Dinge, da/3 sie in manchem 
einzelnen Tun, in manchem Brauch, in mancher praktischen Anordnung einfach 
handelten, wie es in jenen Sitte war, naturlich mehr unbewujJt, aus der 
Notwendigkeit der Sache heraus?30 
Thus, I am not argumg that the Corinthian church was a cult 
association. There are areas where the differences are so striking and overwhelming that 
any conscious general intention to imitate is simply implausible. Instead, I am suggesting, 
along with Weiss, that in some actions, customs and practical arrangements the 
Corinthians instinctively draw on patterns of behaviour familiar from the voluntary 
associations. As they grapple with the application of their new set of religious symbols to 
daily living in Graeco-Roman society, the Corinthians re-use elements from old patterns 
of religious belonging in order to construct a new one. There is a common sensibility, a 
common feel for what is an appropriate way to proceed when confronted with certain 
problems. But what Weiss identifies as unconscious imitation, I would regard as 
belonging to the realm of practical consciousness. Some of the rules and resources which 
structure the life of voluntary associations come also to structure aspects of the life of 
the Corinthian church. Further, and equally unsurprisingly, this practical consciousness 
does not always match that of Paul. In such cases is revealed the inevitable divergence 
between the ability of the convert to break free from familiar social structures and the 
desire of the advocate of conversion to replace them with new ones. It is in some of 
those areas where Paul is least happy with the Corinthians' behaviour that one can detect 
most clearly a practical consciousness similar to that which structured the life of 
voluntary associations. 
30Weiss (1910), p.xxiv. My italics. 
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This influence can take two forms. In one form, the social attitudes 
found in the Corinthian church and the voluntary associations seem close (e.g. in relation 
to litigation, the Jerusalem collection). Old practices are not given up, and new ones not 
taken on, despite the fact that Paul considers these steps to be desirable. The way in 
which the Corinthians behave reflects quite closely what we would expect to find among 
voluntary associations. The Corinthians' approach is so structured by their existing 
practical consciousness that their conversion has brought little change. In the other form 
of influence, conversion has brought changes in social practice. Here the social practices 
of the Corinthians and those of the voluntary associations seem quite different (e.g. in 
relation to patronage, the Lord's Supper). Yet, from Paul's perspective, the Corinthians' 
behaviour is also highly unsatisfactory in these areas. In such cases, it may be that the 
very differences in social practices are part of the problem. Paul is requiring different 
practices in equivalent areas of social life, but the Corinthians' practical consciousness 
has not been transformed to the necessary degree. A new, rather different, set of 
practices are, in part, structured by existing rules and resources,31 and the result can be 
considerable confusion. In both forms of influence, the significant feature is continuity in 
practical consciousness. Assessed from Paul's perspective, there has been either little 
change or insufficient change. 
Thus, the use of structuration theory enables material drawn from the 
voluntary associations to illuminate the life of the Corinthian church both where there are 
striking similarities in social practice and where there are differences. Voluntary 
associations become an analogy for the church. This is significant because while 
acknowledging that the churches were genuinely new and innovative social forms, and 
therefore not to be explained by simple identification with any prior institutions, an 
31Here it is important to remember Giddens' central point that social structures are both reproduced and 
transformed in social practice. Degrees of reproduction and transformation vary. Thus, even although in 
these areas social practices have changed, and hence also practical consciousness, that change has not 
been of the magnitude required by Paul. 
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analogical approach also avoids the opposite trap of assuming them to be utterly original. 
It can deal with both differences and similarities. As Kloppenborg argues, "the point of 
analogical comparison is to identify similarity within difference in such a way that various 
aspects of the phenomena under consideration become intelligible. "32 Yet the actual 
attempts to pursue analogical comparison have not always lived up to this statement of 
intent. 33 By employing structuration theory in pursuit of an analogical approach, I hope 
to make a small contribution towards overcoming certain methodological problems 
which other proponents of analogy have tended to ignore. 
Most discussions treat the early church as a whole and take early 
Christianity as a stable given factor upon which to base comparison. Yet both are 
doubtful assumptions. Although the variety of forms disguised behind the blanket 
descriptive term 'voluntary associations' is considerable, they did have a significant 
history behind them in Graeco-Roman society. Both insiders and outsiders knew what 
they were; is the same true of early Christianity?34 At the date at which Paul wrote his 
letters, and it is Paul's letters from which evidence for comparison is most frequently 
drawn, was not Christianity still in the process of defining itself? Had it yet been 
determined which of the social forms available to it Christianity was most going to 
resemble? Might not the discussions and disagreements between Paul and his Corinthian 
converts offer us glimpses of this process of definition in progress? Further, might not 
their discussions and disagreements be significantly different from those between Paul 
and his converts in other places? Thus, when making comparisons with the Corinthian 
church, we need not be committed to voluntary associations as the only appropriate 
32Kloppenborg (1993), p.230. 
33In relation to voluntary associations there often appears to be some confusion as to precisely what is 
being argued. Kloppenborg (1993), p.228 states that "not only did Christian organisations appear to be 
collegia; there is a strong likelihood that they thought of themselves as such. " Yet in the same article he 
subsequently uses the language of analogy. Similarly, Wilcken (1984), p.44 seems to suggest that the 
early churches effectively were burial societies, but at (1971), p.280 he had stated, "I do not think that, 
strictly speaking, it (the Christian movement) was either a philosophical school or a burial association." 
34Generalising about voluntary associations therefore also risks distortion, but it is perhaps not so great 
a hazard as with early Christianity, precisely because the guiding hand of precedence, much weaker in 
the latter case, could hardly fail to influence those founding new associations. 
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analogue for that community, nor to the view that the most appropriate analogue for that 
community will automatically be so for other Pauline communities.35 Some may prove to 
share more in general with the early churches than others, and therefore to be generally 
superior vehicles for comparison,36 but such conclusions should emerge from studies of 
individual communities, not provide their starting points.37 A more detailed and more 
nuanced approach is required than has hitherto been typical. 
8.2 The Role of Patronage 
8.2.1 Patronage in the Voluntary Associations 
There can be no doubting the vital significance of patronage in the life 
of the associations. As with patronage at the civic level, both sides benefited from the 
relationship; the association gaining materially, and the patron receiving honours in 
return. One of the most striking and interesting examples of this process which survives 
is found in the inscription known as the Rule of the Iobacchop8 In April 176 C.E.39 this 
Dionysiac group in Athens secured a new patron, and voted at a meeting to revive their 
statutes, a minute of the proceedings forming our inscription. The patron was one 
Claudius Herodes, who is perhaps to be identified with "the famous orator and 
35It would hardly be surprising, for example, if a community containing a high proportion of Jewish 
Christians and/or offormer Jewish sympathisers resembled the synagogues rather more closely than one 
that did not. However, the complexity of such questions is illustrated by the fact that, from some 
perspectives, a synagogue might appear as a particular form of association. Richardson, P. (1996), 
p.104: "Early synagogues, both in the Diaspora and Palestine, were collegia." 
36Meeks (1983), p.84 suggests that the Pythagorean and Epicurean schools resemble the Pauline 
communities "just to the e:;...1:ent that they take the form of modified households or voluntary 
associations. " 
37Nevertheless, the analogy of voluntary associations does raise a range of interesting questions about 
the early church in general. Can it help us to understand the formation and organisation of early 
Christian groups? Confronted by this new religious movement, would collegium/Siuao", etc. have been 
familiar labels for which the average Greek or Roman, convert or outsider, might have reached in order 
to categorise it and comprehend it? In what ways and how closely did the old resemble the new? 
38SJG 3.1109. For translations see Tod (1932), pp.86-91; Danker (1982), pp.156f.; Meyer (1987), pp.95-
99. 
39These events can be so precisely dated because the inscription states that the meeting took place on the 
eighth day of the month Elaphebolion in the archonship of Arrius Epaphroditus. We know from archon 
lists that Epaphroditus held that position in 175/76 CEo See Rotroff (1975), p.407. 
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philanthropist Herodes Atticus. "40 Whatever his precise identity, the members recognised 
that they had made an important catch. Claudius Herodes became their priest, the present 
incumbent Aurelius Nicomachus accepting demotion to the position of vice-priest after 
all of forty years' service. This was clearly unusual since it is remarked upon that he had 
given up his priesthood while sti11living, but he is described as doing so EtC; KOcrJ.lOV 
Kat 8o~av 'tOU BaKXElou (line 8). Further, when this arrangement and the reviving 
of the statutes were acclaimed by the members, one of them called out, vuv EU'tUXEtC;, 
vuv nctv'toov npoo'tot 'toov BaKXEloov (lines 27-28). All present clearly felt that the 
unusual demotion of Aurelius Nicomachus was justified by the honour and prestige 
which accrued to them collectively as a result of having Claudius Herodes as their new 
priest. By receiving him as patron, and by using the occasion to revive their statutes, they 
felt that they had put themselves head and shoulders above other Dionysiac associations. 
One suspects that Aurelius Nicomachus may have been the architect of the whole affair. 
"Associations thus resembled the whole social context they found themselves in and 
imitated it as best they could. Like everyone else they sought status. "41 One of the ways 
they secured it was by honouring the right patron. 
The lengths to which this could be taken were considerable. On Delos 
in the second century BCE the Posieidoniastai of Berytos, an association of merchants, 
shippers and warehousemen honoured Marcus Minatius, a Roman banker. 42 In return for 
his benefactions he received the right to erect both his statue and his portrait on the 
association's premises, a seat of honour at all meetings, a special day in his honour once a 
year at the time of the feast of Poseidon, the proclamation of a gold crown on that day 
and at every monthly meeting and, finally, an ox to be led for him annually in the 
procession held on the festival of Apollo. There was no coyness about the function of 
such honours for the inscription reads, "let many become eager to seek honour for the 
40Danker (1982), p.161. 
41MacMullen (1974), p.253. 
421D 1520. For a translation see McLean (1996), pp.197-200. At this date the island of Delos occupied a 
strategic position on international trade routes, and so attracted a cosmopolitan population. 
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synod os, knowing that it (the synodos) is useful, and not only votes fitting honours for 
benefactors, but also promotes (benefaction), which is most necessary so that the 
honours being given to benefactors may continue forever. "43 Honours are given as a 
reward for benefactions in order to encourage potential patrons, and further benefactions 
are needed in order to sustain the honours that have been voted to existing patrons. The 
system has its own inner, self-perpetuating logic which serves the same connected aims: 
the greater social prestige of the patron, and that of the association. 
Clearly, the lubricant of this system was hard cash, or the wherewithal 
to provide material benefits in kind. Thus, while members of more humble social status 
might find what they would regard as a creditable place within the complex hierarchy of 
offices characteristic of the associations, the most prominent positions would be 
occupied by the rich.44 The Agrippinilla Inscription provides a good example of this.4s 
Dating from c.1S0 CE it honours Pompeia Agrippinilla, priestess of this association of 
Dionysiac initiates, and wife ofM. Gavius Squilla Gallicanus, "one-time senator, consul 
and later proconsul of Asia Minor. "46 The inscription lists, according to internal rank, the 
402 names of those members who had contributed to its erection. The association was 
primarily a household one,47 with a substantial proportion of the membership comprised 
by the slaves of Agrippinilla and Gallicanus. B.H. McLean has established that 141 of the 
Greek names on the inscription are known to have belonged to slaves elsewhere. This 
does not prove that all of these 141 were slaves or that others named on the inscription 
could not have been slaves, but it does provide us with a rough guide to servile status. 
Those bearing slave names are concentrated in the lowest ranks of the association,48 
43McLean (1996), p.199. 
44Meiggs (1973), pp.361-62 comments upon associations devoted to Cybele in Ostia that, "the patrons of 
these two guilds, and particularly of the dendrophori, included men of great distinction in the town ... but 
the officers and members of the guilds and the priests of the cult do not seem to have been men of great 
standing." 
4sFor details see above, p.205 n.19. 
46McLean (1993),p.239. 
47 Although some friends of the Jamilia seem also to have been included. See McLean (1993), pp.254-55. 
48McLean (1993), p.256. Confusingly, the numbers given by McLean in relation to each office total 163 
not 141. No e;\.'planation is offered. 
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although McLean points out that the rest are spread throughout most of the other, higher 
offices, roughly in proportion to the total numbers occupying each rank. 
Yet it is difficult to see how this justifies McLean's claim "that 
hierarchical distinctions were relativized. "49 An ex-consul, his family and social 
acquaintances were indeed participating in a religious association with their slaves and 
freedmen but the association itself, with its many ranks, is extremely hierarchical, and it 
is difficult to imagine that Agrippinilla and her immediate family did not determine the 
awarding of positions. To be sure, a favoured slave or freedman might be rewarded with 
a position within the association which all would recognise as a significant social advance 
for the individual concerned but, as with the manumission of slaves, rewards can serve to 
sustain a hierarchical system without relativizing it. The fact remains that it was 
Agrippinilla and her immediate family who were in control. She was priestess, her 
husband and possibly also his father were priests, of her brother and nephew (who are 
indistinguishable as they are both named Macrinus) one was a priest, and the other 
occupied the highest rank of heros, while her daughter Cornelia Cethegilla was 
appointed dadouchos, a rank second only to that of heros. 50 Finally, it was, after all, 
Agrippinilla who was honoured with an inscription. 
Thus, our earlier claim that associations served to mediate relationships 
between the elite and the very much larger body of non-elite is justified. 51 They 
performed the delicate trick of asserting a connection between their wealthy patrons and 
their often somewhat humbler members while, simultaneously, reinforcing the gulf 
between them. The bulk of the members no doubt took pleasure in their collective 
connection with those in the elite, and on occasion obtained support for their group 
interests. Similarly, some individuals from amongst the non-elite achieved a prominence 
49ibid. 
50McLean (1993), p.24S. 
51See p.204. 
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within an association which they could not have attained in society at large. However, 
the hierarchy remained. It was the rich who were the greatest benefactors and who 
therefore received the greater honour. Yet the existence of such a hierarchy does not 
mean that it was resented or that there is any reason to regard the gratitude expressed 
towards patrons in inscriptions as merely a matter of form. Even the humblest member of 
an association might enjoy the conviviality it provided and the privileges it brought. As 
Robin Lane Fox observes when commenting upon the admissions procedure set out in 
the Rule of the Iobacchoi, "The minor Iobacchus, ... had his Iobacchic vote and once a 
month he could exclude the people he hated most from the company which he most 
enjoyed. "52 Those on the inside of a club, whatever their rank, could feel themselves 
superior to those excluded, particularly if they knew it to be a good club.53 
8.2.2 Patronage and the Corinthian Church 
How does the pattern of patronage we have discerned in the 
associations compare to the practices and attitudes which we find in the Corinthian 
church? The most striking and obvious difference is the absence of office-bearers at 
Corinth. Despite rather clear evidence that the minority in the Corinthian church who 
enjoyed higher social status than the rest rendered services to Paul and to the rest of the 
church,54 and despite the existence of substantial recent studies on the impact upon the 
Corinthian church of contemporary patronage practices,55 there appears to have been no 
identifiable mechanism within the church by which such benefactions could be honoured. 
Indeed, status seems to have been sought and obtained by the display of the gifts of the 
Spirit, although the course of Paul's argument in 1 Cor. 12-14 suggests that there is a 
52Fox (1986), p.88. 
53Note that this sense of superiority, based on success in competition for honour, is quite different from 
Paul's sense of separation from outsiders, which is based on the fear of moral pollution and of a dilution 
of his gospel's alternative ideology. 
54See Theissen (ET 1982), pp.87-91 and Meggitt (1998a), pp.128-35. Although I agree with Meggitt 
that services rendered to the church, and/or any of the other indicators of personal status employed by 
Theissen, do not necessarily indicate elite status, they do, particularly when several apply to a single 
individual, suggest something other than a struggle for subsistence. See above, p.198 n.22. 
55Chow (1992), Clarke (1993). 
216 
connection between the respect for tongues prevalent in the Corinthian church and more 
general ideas about social status. 56 Those most able to provide material benefactions may 
have tended to be those best equipped to demonstrate themselves spiritual. Nevertheless, 
a question remains to be answered. Does the absence of offices within the church 
indicate that those who provided services to it, and to Paul, were expected to do so 
without receiving any recognition or honour? 
The factionalism of the Corinthian church, clearly instanced in Paul's 
condemnation of four 'parties' in 1: 12, suggests otherwise, as the rivalry between these 
groups is best explained as a struggle for ascendancy between their local leaders. 57 Since 
Munck, in a piece of rhetorical exaggeration, entitled a chapter on Corinth 'The Church 
Without Factions,'58 it has been widely accepted that the slogans of 1: 12 are not the key 
to the complete understanding of the situation at Corinth. In particular, there is no 
evidence available from anywhere in the Corinthian letters as to the doctrinal position of 
the 'parties.' From the beginning of 1 Cor. 5 onwards Paul seems always to be addressing 
the church as a whole. However, others have pointed out that the existence of 'parties' 
does not necessarily imply doctrinal dispute; people can quarrel over other things also. 59 
Welborn wishes to discern the background to 1 Cor. 1-4 in ancient politics,60 and he 
argues that political groupings in Graeco-Roman society were essentially personal rather 
than ideological. Parties or groups were networks of personal allegiances, which were 
56See Martin (1991), pp.563-69 and (1995), chapter 4. 
57For more detail on the slogans themselves, and for the connection between them and baptism implied 
by the argument of 1: 13-17, see 9.3.1. The suggestion that the 'parties' had local leaders best explains 
the link Paul implies between 'party' membership and who baptised whom. Of the four figures named at 
1: 12 only Paul and Apollos had certainly been to Corinth, and Paul had baptised so few that if the actual 
'party' leaders are those named then it becomes difficult to account for the connection with baptism. 
58Munck (1959), chapter 5. 
59Clarke (1993), p.95: "The distinctions between the parties are not the theological distinctions between 
Hellenistic and Jewish Christianity, but rather the personality distinctions based upon reputation in 
secular terms." See also Horrell (1996), pp.1l2-17; Litfin (1994), pp.181-85; Mitchell, M. (1992), 
pp.71-72. 
60Welbom (1987), pp.85-90 analyses Paul's language, demonstrating that the same terms are used as 
those employed by ancient historians to describe political conflict in a city. Mitchell, M. (1992), pp.71-
80 provides extensive parallels in support of the same conclusion. 
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always known by the name of their leader,61 and social inequalities helped to sustain this 
situation. "The bondage of the poor to the rich is the breeding ground offaction. Poverty 
creates dependence, a relationship that ambitious aristocrats readily exploit in their 
struggle for power. "62 Something similar has happened in the Corinthian church, with its 
handful of relatively wealthy members, and its majority of poor ones (1:26). The 
wealthier minority struggle amongst themselves for control and influence, but as they do 
so they draw groups of social inferiors into allegiance to them. 63 The 'party' mascots of 
1: 12 are just that, mascots, and "the real party leaders are thus local Christians who seek 
to legitimate their power by appealing to renowned figures in the church. "64 They receive 
recognition and honour from those within their own group. 
Another passage which sheds some light on this question is 1 Cor. 
16:15-18. Here Paul unreservedly commends the household of Stephanas who El~ 
8lCx.Kovlav 'tol~ ciYlot~ E'ta~av ea'\)'tou~ (16:15). At first glance our attention not 
unnaturally falls on Stephanas himself 65 It was, after all, his household, and if all its 
members engaged in certain activities as a unit, then it is natural to suppose that he was 
the instigator. All the information we have about him indicates Stephanas to have been 
one of the relatively wealthy minority in the church.66 In commending him, Paul seems to 
be extending the sort of recognition a wealthy patron might receive within an 
association, albeit offered without the public display of statues, inscriptions, 
proclamations, gold crowns etc. Yet Paul's grammar remains plural throughout. He really 
does seem to mean to commend the whole household for their actions, and not merely by 
virtue of their association with Stephanas. The other Corinthians are urged to 
61Welbom (1987), pp.90-93. Mitchell, M. (1992), pp.83-86 agrees, but doubts that the slogans of 1:12 
reproduce the precise form of political slogans. 
62Welbom (1987), p.99. 
63Theissen (ET 1982), p.138: "It is just such Christians of higher social status who bring with them a 
larger household unit. It is just such Christians who have been influential." 
64Welbom (1987), p.98 n.64. 
65McCready (1996), p.62 fails to see beyond this, and simply includes the attitude towards patronage 
displayed here in a list of similarities between the churches and the associations. 
66Theissen (ET 1982), pp.94-95. Stephanas has a house, renders services to the church, and travels. 
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1)Jto'tcX.crcrT]cr8E 'tOt~ 'towu'tOt~ (16: 16), and when they are told, E1ttYWcOcrKE'tE 
ouv 'tou~ 'towu'tou~ (16:18), Fortunatus and Achaicus are included along with 
Stephanas. "Fortunatus is a common Latin name meaning 'blessed' or 'lucky'; it appears 
to have been common especially among slaves and freedmen ... Achaicus means 'one who 
is from Achaea.' This name, too, appears to be the kind that is given to slaves, or taken 
sometimes by freedmen. "67 It is therefore possible, although not provable, that these two 
men were the slaves of Stephanas. 
If this is correct, then one wonders how Stephanas might have felt at 
being offered equal recognition with his slaves. Even if it is not, Paul's plural grammar 
implies the same point. The members of the church are to make themselves as subject to 
the other members of the household as they are to Stephanas himself He may be able to 
do most by virtue of his greater resources, and even thereby to facilitate the service of 
the other members of his household, but Paul makes no quantitative measure of the 
services provided. What he praises is the fixity of purpose displayed by them all. 68 Thus, 
Paul is prepared to honour those who make provision for the needs of the church, and he 
is prepared to do so in a manner which implies the existence of some sort of hierarchy, 
for those commended are to be submitted to by others. However, in Paul's view there is 
no necessary correlation between one's position in the hierarchy of society and one's 
position in the hierarchy of the church, between the material scale on which one is able to 
make provision, and the degree of honour which one is to be accorded. The same respect 
is to be shown 1ta v'tt 'tc9 crUVEPyOUV'tt Kat K01ttcOV'tt (16: 16). What determines 
67Fee (1987),p.831. Theissen (ET 1982), p.92 finds it difficult to conceive of Paul urging the 
Corinthians to be subject to slaves, and so suggests that Fortunatus and Achaicus were members of 
Stephanas' family. Given the nature of their names this is surely the least likely possibility. That they 
were his freedmen (and perhaps therefore upwardly mobile) or simply not connected to Stephanas' 
household are better counters to our hypothesis that they were his slaves. 
68The verb in 1: 15 is -cdcrcrco, which means 'place, assign, appoint.' The A V strikingly renders it, 'they 
have addicted themselves to the ministry of the saints.' 
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status in the church is the service of the saints, something which Paul's language in 
16:15-18 has suggested is open to al1.69 
The existence of the factions suggested by 1: 12 indicates that such 
ideas may not have been ones which the Corinthians readily assimilated. Caught up in a 
competition for honour and status among local leaders, they may have been much more 
inclined to measure the service of the saints quantitatively. If so, then the practical 
consciousness which structures their attitudes towards benefaction is very different from 
Paul's and, in certain respects, much closer to that found in the associations, where the 
material scale of what was provided and the honours voted in return were closely related. 
Paul's approach eschews such specific rewards, and the recognition and submission 
which he wants the church to extend to those who have served it seems to take the form 
of a general attitude of respect. It is much more intangible than a statue or a seat of 
honour, and therefore offar less utility as a means by which to display status. It probably 
also implies much more in the way of personal contact between those commended and 
those they served. It is possible to imagine, for example, that both a patron and an 
association could have obtained what they wanted from their relationship without any 
more than his or her occasional attendance at their gatherings; 70 but it is impossible to 
imagine something similar in the church. Even if not all the Corinthian Christians knew 
Stephanas well personally, they must have been able to observe and assess his conduct, 
and that of his household, at their regular meetings for worship. The pattern we find in 
the church is thus more open, more personal, and less ostentatious than that typical in the 
associations. 
69See Smith (1981), p.330. Smith notes clearly Paul's acceptance of status distinctions within the 
church, coupled with an insistence that status be determined by a different set of values from those 
current in society. 
70The point being made here is about the minimum necessary for both sides to have their requirements 
fulfilled, not about what actually happened in all or even most cases. For instance, Claudius Herodes is 
appointed priest by the Iobacchoi (see above, pp.211-12) and as such has a role to perform in their 
regular worship (line ll1f.). 
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As such it is more appealing to modern sensibilities, yet it may have 
had some weaknesses in its contemporary cultural context. By tying the degree of 
honour accorded to patrons to the scale of their benefactions, the pattern of patronage in 
the associations at least serves to regulate the pursuit of status and honour amongst their 
members. There is much more of a clear pecking order. People do indeed know their 
place, and the place of others. Yet was this so in the church? Fee, for one, has his doubts 
as to whether all at Corinth shared Paul's high regard for Stephanas.71 The Corinthians 
may not have allocated everyone to ranks, or rewarded those who benefited the 
community with displays of honour, but does that mean that conversion had eradicated 
from amongst them the social impulse which gave rise to these practices amongst the 
associations? Although the Corinthians' social practices are here rather different from 
those found in the associations, the practical consciousness which structures the 
competition for honour and status among their leaders and supporters displays strong 
similarities. May not the absence of these familiar mechanisms of reward simply have 
produced a competition for honour which was no less intense, but which was a great deal 
less clearly channelled and regulated? One obvious forum for such competition is the 
common meal of the community. 
8.3 The Common Meal 
8.3.1 Common Meals in the Voluntary Associations 
The statutes of associations display a strong concern with the 
regulation of conduct at common meals, a ubiquitous and central feature of their 
existence. As always with rules, it is difficult to tell whether they exist because poor 
conduct was an actual and frequent problem, or whether their existence was a sufficient 
71Fee (1987), p.832. The injunction ofv.18 has the odd effect "of being a 'letter of commendation' for 
the very ones who came to Paul from the church in the first place." If Paul regards them so highly then 
presumably the tensions between him and some in the church are also tensions between these latter and 
Stephanas, Fortunatus and Achaicus. 
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sanction to deter such conduct. Whichever was the case, there remains much to be 
gained from an examination of exactly what was outlawed. Dennis E. Smith has drawn 
up a summary of typical rules, which unsurprisingly includes injunctions against 
quarrelling and fighting, and also against speaking out of tum or without permission. 72 
Amongst the Iobacchoi, offenders were liable to be physically removed from the meeting 
by Bacchic bouncers appointed by the priests, Ot l7utot (lines 140f.). The potential 
causes of such incidents are also clear. In Egypt in the first century BCE the Guild of 
Zeus Hypsistos73 forbade its members to form factions (O'X:i.J.lo:tcx., line 13),14 and it also 
prohibited members from entering into one another's pedigree (yevecx.A.0YT10'EtV, line 
15) at table, a hint of the sort of thing that might have formed the content of the abusive 
and insulting language forbidden in the meetings of the Iobacchoi (line 74f.).15 Further, 
the rules of some associations display sensitivity over seating arrangements at meals. It is 
a breach of the rules to attempt to occupy the place of another amongst the Iobacchoi 
(line 70), in the funerary society of Diana and Antinous (lines 2.25-28),76 and in an 
unidentified association at Tebtunis in Egypt (line 7).77 Smith argues these rules suggest 
"that some kind of ranking system of the places at table was in effect, thus explaining 
why such movement would take place and why it would cause a disturbance. "78 
Common meals do indeed seem to have been occasions when association members were 
strongly aware both of their own proper status and of that of others, and the rules seek 
to prevent the disharmony that could arise should competition for honour become too 
intense. 
72Smith (1981), p.323. 
73P.Lond. 2710. See Nock:, Roberts and Skeat (1936) for the text and translation of this papyrus together 
with a commentary. 
74Nock et al. (1936), p.5l take this to be a misspelling ofaxta/la1;(x. 
75 Although Nock et al. (1936), p.53, having speculated that the guild belonged to Philadelphia, suggest 
that the mixed racial conditions of such a Fayum town may have rendered the question of genealogy 
particularly sensitive. 
76CIL XlV. 2112. This is an Italian funerary society of the second century CEo 
77p.Mich. Tebt. 243. The identity of the association is unknown since the opening lines of the text are 
lost. The rule dates from the reign of Tiberius. 
78Smith (1981), p.324. 
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8.3.2 The Lord's Supper in 1 Cor. 11:17-22 
8.3.2.1 A Neglected Problem of Interpretation 
Was competition for honour also a factor in the difficulties surrounding 
the celebration of the Lord's Supper at Corinth? Paul certainly found much cause for 
dissatisfaction in the way in which the Corinthians organised these occasions, and yet 
recent exegesis of the relevant passage, 1 Cor. 11: 17-22, has paid little attention to 
competition for honour as a possible cause of the problems. The content ofw. 18-19, 
which speak of crXlcr!-lcx:ta and atpEcrEtc.;, seems positively to invite comparison with 
the rules of associations, but scholarly attention has instead focused on w. 20-22 where 
Paul offers more detailed criticisms. These have been convincingly interpreted by 
Theissen as indicating different treatment at the meal for the rich and the pOOr.79 
Different amounts of food and drink are being consumed by different people, and this 
may be either because the type and quantity of food served to individuals was determined 
by their social status, an apparently common dining practice at the time, and/or because 
some came later than others and missed most of the meal. In this latter case, it would be 
those members with least free time and least control over their own timetables, especially 
poorer members and slaves, who arrived last. 80 The difficulty is that while this 
reconstruction is genuinely convincing in relation to w. 20-22, it is not obvious that it 
79Theissen (ET 1982), pp.145-174. This is denied by Meggitt (1998a), pp.118-22, pp.189-93 who 
attacks the assumption that 1 Cor. 11: 17 -34 refers to a eucharist accompanied by a common meal. He 
instead suggests that Paul's criticisms are directed at those who treat the elements as though they are the 
constituents of a normal meal and gorge themselves on the bread and wine, so denying others the 
opportunity to participate in the rite. The crucial phrase '"Coue; !-Lrl t.xov'"Cae; (11:22) does not mean 'the 
have nots' in a general sense, i.e., the poor, but refers specifically to those who do not have the elements. 
There are enormous difficulties here. It is not clear how anyone could treat the single loaf and single cup 
presupposed by Meggitt as a normal common meal, for the unusual presentation of the food would itself 
signal that this was a very different occasion. The verb 7t£t vcioo is taken literally in 11: 3 4, but 
metaphorically in 11 :22. Those who gorge themselves on the elements do so out of physical hunger and 
should eat at home beforehand so as to avoid this temptation, but those excluded hunger simply to 
participate in the rite. One senses that the metaphorical sense ascribed to the verb in 11:22 is simply 
special pleading to avoid the granting of a literal sense to the verb !-LE8uoo for, of course, a single cup of 
wine cannot cause actual drunkenness. Even if Meggitt is right that in most uses of 01 !-Lrl t.xOV'tEe; the 
substantive participle has a specified object then the most likely candidate in 11 :22b is not the elements, 
but the houses (11:22a) which those whose behaviour offends Paul have (t.XOO). Thus, even if 11:22 does 
not necessarily imply a general contrast between rich and poor, it does imply a status distinction based 
on home ownership. On the question of the size and style of these houses see below, p.225 n.91. 
80See Horrell (1995a), pp.197-98 for an excellent short summary of Theissen's position. 
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makes best sense of vv. 18-19. Theissen connects the two by interpreting the 
crxicrj..la"Ca and the atpEcrEt~ in the light of what follows. "The plural form 
crxicrj..la"Ca, however, leaves open the question of how many groups are involved in the 
contention surrounding the Lord's Supper. It is only from 1 Cor. 11 :22 that we learn that 
there are two groups opposed to one another, those who have no food, the j..l rl 
exov"CE~, and those who can avail themselves of their own meal, U5tov DElnvov."81 Yet 
, 
this limiting of the divisions and sects to two groups sits uneasily with Paul's puzzling 
remark in v.19 that there must be factions amongst the Corinthians in order to disclose 
which of them are genuine (Ot DOKtj..lOt). Theissen's straightforward division between 
the rich and the poor assigns to the poor an essentially passive role, and to the rich an 
unworthy one. Thus, from Paul's perspective, the rich have been discredited, but which 
group have been revealed (q,avEpoco) by their actions as genuine? 
This difficulty in reconciling the interpretation ofvv. 18-19 with that of 
v.20f. is not a new one. Calvin wrote ofv.18 that the terms used there "are not suitable 
and apposite for describing that disorder (i.e., of v.20f.)."82 In the nineteenth century, 
Godet proposed on grammatical grounds that the problems of vv. 18-19 were different 
from those ofvv.20-22.83 The only scholars who have attempted to address this problem 
recently are those who want to use the meals of the associations to aid our understanding 
of vv. 18-19. Taking as their starting point the evidence of competition for honour at the 
common meals of voluntary associations, Smith and Pogoloff argue that Theissen is 
wrong to see the basic problem revealed in 11: 17-34 as the treatment of the poor by the 
rich. Instead, it is competition between individuals which concerns Paul. In support of 
this position, Smith suggests that those referred to as "CO'u~ j..lrl exov"Ca~ (v.22) are not 
81Theissen (ET 1982), pp.147-48. 
82Calvin (ET 1960), p.237. 
83Godet (ET 1886), pp.136-38. Paul's npoo'tov !-LEV in v.18 sets up the expectation of a 'then again' 
which never appears. Godet takes it to be implied by the ouv ofv.20, but other commentators take it to 
refer to the contents of chapters 12-14. See Barrett (1971b), p.260; Hering (1962), p.Il2. 
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literally pOOL 84 The phrase reflects not social reality, but the fact that conflict between 
rich and poor at a meal was a literary tapas in the Graeco-Roman world. Smith is 
supported by Pogoloff, who argues that v.22 could refer to upper class persons down on 
their luck. 85 The problems have arisen "not among the highest or lowest levels of society, 
but among those with social pretensions who were most concerned with gaImng a 
greater share of honour and most sensitive to insults which brought shame. "86 
Unfortunately, such arguments are unconvincing. While it is possible 
that the 'rich' of the Corinthian church consisted predominantly of those aspiring to the 
highest social status rather than actually possessing it, the poverty of the majority is 
strongly suggested by 1:26f. Further, 'tOUC; Jlrl Exov'tac; and 6C; 1tEtv~ (11:21) seem 
stubbornly concrete descriptions of the condition of this majority at the meal. 87 Smith 
and Pogoloff have simply reversed Theissen's strategy of allowing the interpretation of 
11 :22 to determine the interpretation of 11: 18& 19. There is a need for an interpretation 
of vv.18& 19 which does justice to their own content, and which takes account of the 
analogy with competition for honour at the meals of associations. However, this 
interpretation must cohere with, not contradict, the solid exegetical conclusions reached 
by Theissen in relation to vv.20-22. 
8.3.2.2 Competition for Honour at the Lord's Supper 
In fact, this problem is a specific instance of a larger difficulty affecting 
the interpretation of 1 Corinthians as a whole. In 1: 12 Paul mentions four crxtcrJlcx'tcx, 
but in the various problems and questions which he addresses from the beginning of 
84Smith (1981), p.328: "That is not to say that meal customs did not provide for rigid distinctions 
among the guests according to their status. But those levels of status could all be within the same basic 
economic and cultural level, and often were." 
85pogoloff (1992), pp.254-55. That Smith and Pogoloff should, with an intent entirely at odds with his, 
join Meggitt in attempting to relativise the significance of the phrase ot J..lrl £XOV'tEC; illustrates the 
oddity of the latter's position. In order to maintain that every single one of Paul's converts were poor, 
Meggitt rejects a piece of evidence which supports the contention that the vast majority of them were. 
86ibid. 
87See above, p.222 n.79 for my critique of Meggitt's attempts to suggest otherwise. 
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chapter 5 onwards he always seems to suggest at the most two positions. 88 While 
Theissen may argue convincingly for the priority of the second of these facts, and explain 
the two 'sides' as basically composed of the rich and the poor,89 there is still a need to 
explain the presence of the crxlcr!-LO'/co:. I believe that they are simply another facet of a 
situation where social status is a significant factor in the life of the church. The richer 
members of the Corinthian church do indeed regard themselves as superior to those who 
are poor, but competition between richer and poorer as social groups is not the primary 
cause of the difficulties discussed in 11: 17-22. The main problem is rather that those of 
higher social status compete amongst themselves for honour and influence. The Lord's 
Supper is one of the arenas in which they do so, hence the divisions described in 11: 18-
19. Yet the effects of this competition amongst an elite are what Paul describes in vv.20-
22. As the elite focus on the distribution of honour amongst themselves, the poorer 
members of the church are neglected. 11 :20-22 describe not the problem but its 
symptoms; not a competition between richer and poorer, but the consequences of a 
competition for honour between the richer members.90 It is at this point that the 
archaeological evidence to which Murphy-O'Connor draws our attention is of value, 
since if he is right that a small prestigious group dined in the triclinium, while the 
majority were outside in the atrium, then those with nothing may not even have been 
visible to those with plenty.91 While some worried about the status implications of the 
place they were allocated inside the triclinium, others outside went hungry. Compatible 
with this reconstruction is Stephen Barton'S view that the divisions here "are between 
88See above, p.192 n.5. 
89Theissen (ET 1982), p.l38 does nuance this position. He notes that "it is just such Christians of higher 
social status who bring with them a larger household unit. It is just such Christians who have been 
influential. " 
90 I thus agree with Theissen that social status is of great significance here, but understand that 
significance in a rather different way. 
91Murphy-O'Connor (1983), pp.153-61. This presupposes a large villa-type house. Meggitt (1998a), 
pp.120-22 is right to caution against the assumption that, in the first century, numbers would always 
have necessitated such large accommodation. As Meggitt notes, for example, Acts 20:9-12 seems to 
indicate a tenement flat. However, Acts 18:8-10 implies that the Corinthian church was unusually large. 
See Weiss (ET 1937) VoLl, p.293. In Rom. 16:23, Paul finds it noteworthy that Gaius was host both to 
himself and to OAlle; 'tile; £KKAllcriae;. See Horrell (1996), p.96. The assumption of a large house is 
therefore defensible in relation to the Corinthian church even if not in relation to others. 
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households or groups of households, with the pace set by the rich household heads 
competing for dominance. "92 For Paul, o't 80KLIl0l are those who are able to step back 
from such competition and look beyond their status concerns to recognise the needs of 
the whole church. They eat the Lord1s Supper 81CX.Kpiv(Ov 'to cnolla (11 :29). Perhaps 
the commended Stephanas (16: 15-18) was regarded by Paul as one such. 
Thus, one can plausibly interpret the problems surrounding the 
celebration of the Lord1s Supper at Corinth in a way which both accepts the thrust of 
Theissen1s work on the subject, and yet which leaves room for a competition for status 
similar to that governed by the rules of associations. The crxicrlla'ta93 and a'tpEcrEl~ 
which were unacceptable to Paul at the Lord1s Supper were also unacceptable at the 
meals of associations. Yet it is noticeable that Paurs response is not to provide a set of 
regulations by which to control the competition for status signalled by the existence of 
such divisions and factions. Instead he demands its abandonment by asserting the priority 
and unity of the whole church. What ought to be the focus of concern is that the practice 
ofthe Lord1s Supper at Corinth should reflect one of its primary spiritual effects, i.e., that 
those who eat of the one loaf are one body (10:17). As we have already seen implied in 
our discussion of 16: 15-18, Paul believes that it is, paradoxically, those who are least 
concerned with their own position and most concerned with serving all who ought to be 
accorded the greatest honour by the community. 
That this is a high-risk strategy on Paurs part is confirmed by the very 
existence of the problems which he has to confront. While the members of associations 
may have been carefully graded according to status, and while officers of an association 
might receive preferential treatment in the distribution of food,94 it is difficult to imagine 
92Barton (1986), p.238. 
930f course it is the forming of crxicrJ.lcx:ta that is expressly forbidden in the guild of Zeus Hypsistos 
(P.Land. 2710). See above, p.22l. 
94See statutes of the society of Diana and Antinous (elL XIV. 2112), lines 2.18-25. Quoted by Pogoloff 
(1992), pp.251-52. 
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that at their meals there could have been members who would have received so little as 
to remain hungry (11:21). One of the purposes of their rules was to ensure that those 
worthy of honour received it without this bringing shame and dishonour to others. It may 
have been necessary to know your place, and to display deference to those who enjoyed 
a higher rank than your own, but the member of an association was included by virtue of 
being a member. The payment of a membership fee brought certain entitlements.95 Paul's 
angry words in 11 :22 suggest that in the church at Corinth the poor were in danger of 
being effectively denied even this privilege of belonging. By asking for a rather more 
radical social adjustment from his richer converts than would have been expected of 
them in an association, Paul ran the risk of receiving rather less. Far from being 
eliminated at the common meals of the community, competition for status and honour 
were proceeding unrestrained. A new social practice, i.e., the Lord's Supper, was partly 
shaped by the practical consciousness relevant to an equivalent older one, i.e., the 
common meals of associations. The absence, at the level of discursive consciousness, of 
a formal set of statutes granted full force to the implicit rules and resources which 
prompted competition for honour and status at such occasions.96 At least at this stage in 
the life of the Corinthian community, Paul's desire to abolish such competition was 
actually granting it free rein. By comparison, the attempts of the associations to regulate 
and channel such competition through their statutes are likely to have been rather more 
successfu1.97 
95Danker (1982), p.156 observes that "there is no evidence that any Christian group had a schedule of 
initiation fees or regular dues, with fines for non-payment. Indeed, it may rather be assumed that 
Christian views of God as the supreme Benefactor, who grants salvation without fee and sets into motion 
the generosity of his benefactors, would preclude such carefully defined procedure. " 
96Theissen (ET 1982), pp.154-55: "In distinction from other kinds of associations in antiquity, there 
were in this case apparently no formal regulations, no bylaws or procedures by means of which conflicts 
could be avoided ... When, by contrast, everything is left to the free sway of the 'Spirit', those who are of 
privileged status are much more likely to have things their way." 
97Paul does imply that he has given the Corinthians' instructions as to how worship is to be conducted 
(11:2,17). Yet one doubts that they contained such advice as not getting drunk or making sure that all 
had something to eat! The rhetorical question 'tt d~C!) u~v; (11:22) suggests that, for Paul, such 
conduct was self-evidently unpraiseworthy, and that avoiding it is therefore unlikely to have been the 
subject of an explicit command. But what was self-evident to Paul may not have been so to many of the 
Corinthians. 
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8.4 The Courts 
8.4.1 The Courts and the Voluntary Associations 
One of the parallels most frequently drawn between early Christianity 
and the associations is in their attitude towards members pursuing court cases against 
one another. It is often argued or implied that Paul's prohibition, in 1 Cor. 6:1-8, of 
litigation between believers is essentially similar in scope and motivation to the 
provisions concerning litigation between members contained in many association 
statutes. Danker notes the occurrence of such a prohibition in the Rule of the Iobacchoi 
(line 94), directly referring his readers to 1 Cor. 6.98 In addition to the Iobacchoi, Smith 
cites the Egyptian guild of Zeus Hypsistos (line 17) and invites his readers to compare 
this with 1 Cor. 6: 1-8.99 Similarly, Kloppenborg cites a string of other association rules 
from Ptolemaic and early Roman Egypt.100 But is this comparison a valid one? Is the 
motivation and scope of Paul's prohibition of recourse to the courts the same as that 
found in the association statutes? What do the answers to these questions imply about 
the Corinthians' own approach? In order to have a sound basis on which to pursue these 
issues we must first examine the relevant provisions in association statutes. 
The motive for these provisions is clear. As Kloppenborg puts it, "the 
context of these rules suggests that the prohibition of members using the courts has ... to 
do with ... the concern to contain the rivalry and competition for honour and status that 
was typical oflife in the circum Mediterranean world ... Taking a fellow member to court 
belonged on a spectrum of agonistic behaviour that also included challenges to the 
98Danker (1982), p.163. 
99Smith (1981), pp.321-22. He also includes accusing one another before a public court in his summary 
of activities commonly forbidden by association statutes. 
100Kloppenborg (l996b), p.257 n.45. P.Lille dem 29, P.Cairo dem 30605, P.Cairo dem 30606, P. Cairo 
dem 31179, P.Mich. Tebt. 243. I confess that I am not equipped to examine the demotic teA1:s. However, 
with the exception of P. Cairo dem 31179, they all date from the second and third centuries BCE. In 
contrast, all the texts which I discuss below date from the first century BCE to the second century CE, 
i.e., they were all composed within approximately 100 years of 1 Corinthians. 
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integrity of another's household, attempts to assume his place at a banquet, and physical 
insults. "101 The rules aimed to forestall public disputes which could sour the internal life 
of associations while passing outside their control, and which might also damage their 
public reputation. 
The scope of the relevant prohibitions is less clear cut. Danker, Smith 
and Kloppenborg seem to assume that these statutes forbid all court cases between 
association members. Yet, in the rule of the Iobacchoi,102 the prohibition is plainly 
limited and specific. The individual struck at a meeting is forbidden from pursuing a 
court case rather than making a complaint to the President (lines 91-94). Nothing is said 
about quarrels which arose in a forum other than the meetings of the association. Nock, 
Roberts and Skeat comment upon the guild of Zeus Hypsistos103 that "no one is to hale a 
fellow-member into court for anything arising out of their association in the synodos (cf. 
Plato, Leges, 11, p. 915E), all such causes of offence being under the jurisdiction of the 
president " . neither here nor in native Greek associations do we find any tendency of the 
guild to exercise such jurisdiction over other matters." 104 It seems that, in these cases, 
quarrels which arose elsewhere were of no concern to the associations, so long as their 
meetings were not used by the parties as a battlefield on which to prosecute their 
disputes. In P.Mich. Tebt. 243 the prohibition of court cases may be more general, since 
an obligation is laid on members to assist any of their fellows in trouble with the 
authorities or imprisoned for private debt (lines 7,11). However, even here, the 
outlawing of litigation comes immediately after a rule governing conduct at meetings 
(lines 8-9), and the editors comment that "the slander might well occur within the 
101Kloppenhorg (1996b), pp.257-58. 
102SIG 3.1109. See p.211 n.38. 
103p.Lond. 2710. See p.22l n.73. 
104Nock et al. (1936), p.53. Here the connection between a dispute at a meeting and the forbidden legal 
action is not quite as explicit, but the latter follows immediately after rules aimed at preventing the 
former: "It shall not be permissible ... for men to enter into one another's pedigrees at the banquet or to 
abuse one another at the banquet or to chatter or to indict or accuse another." 
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association itself "105 On balance, the available evidence strongly suggests that 
associations prohibited litigation between members only when their disputes arose In 
meetings. 
8.4.2 Litigation Between Believers in 1 Cor. 6:1-8 
When one turns from the associations to look at the situation in 
Corinth discussed at 6: 1-8, differences between the two are apparent. The motives for 
Paul's prohibition did include the need to forestall disputes which could sour the life of 
the church and damage its public reputation. He does wish "to avoid the shaming of one 
member by another, "106 but his language suggests that something else was at the 
forefront of his mind. 107 Paul seems to have been disturbed by what he regarded as the 
inappropriateness of believers presenting their cases before unbelievers. 11 OUK 018cx'tE 
(hl 01 a:ywl 'tov KOO"f..lOV KPlVOUO"lV; Kcxl E1 EV uf..l1.V KP1VE'tCXl 6 KOO"f..lOC;, 
civd~wl EO"'tE KP1'tllP1COV EACXX10"'tcov; (6:2). It is the eschatological function of 
believers as judges, and the eschatological division between believers and the 
unrighteous, which render their indicting of one another before the world so offensive to 
Paul. He is as concerned as the Corinthians with the correct display of status, but the 
status which he wishes to be displayed is their collective eschatological one as saints. 
This demand for a shift of focus away from individual social status onto collectiv~ 
eschatological status is rather different from anything to be found among the 
associations. Paul plays off the latter against the former whereas the associations, with 
their ranks, and their honours in return for patronage, did not question the desire for 
individual social status, but instead simply harnessed it to the interests of the group. 108 
105Husselman, Boak & Edgerton (1944), p.94. P.Mich. Tebt. 244 contains a similar obligation to help a 
fellow member imprisoned for debt, but has no prohibition of court cases between members. 
106Kloppenborg (1996b), p.256. 
107Winter (1991) also emphasises the corruption of the Corinthian courts. See above, p.l32 n.85 and 
p.l35 n.4. 
108Kloppenborg (1996b), p.255 is therefore only partially correct when he argues that Paul seeks to 
"counter the status concerns of some of the Corinthians by transposing them to another leve1." Paul 
seeks to change the nature of these concerns as well as to shift their level. Mitchell, A.c. (1993) argues 
that the particular status dynamic relevant to 6: 1-8 is richer Christians taking advantage of their 
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The scope of Paul's prohibition is also different. Although he is 
prepared to contemplate a system of internal arbitration (6:4-5), presumably similar to 
that found amongst the associations, it is clear that this is not his preference. 109 It is the 
existence of quarrels between Christians as such which dismays Paul, and he thinks that 
the Corinthians should prefer to be wronged and defrauded by one another rather than 
go to law (6:7b). H&rt !-LEv ouv OACOC; Tl't'tll!-La U!-L1V eO"'ttV o'tt Kpt!-La'ta £X£'t£ 
!-L£8' £(1)'tcOv (6:7a). Thus, Paul's concern extends to lawsuits between members of the 
church wherever the quarrels prompting them have arisen. Those which originate other 
than at meetings of the church are as great a problem as those that do. Paul forbids court 
cases which would be permissible, if undesirable, under association statutes. This is 
significant, since his expectations as to the proper approach to such matters are also 
clearly different from those of at least some of the Corinthians. Three times he begins 
questions with the phrase OUK oioa't£, as if what he is about to say ought to have been 
obvious to his readers (6:2,3,9). A possible explanation for this mismatch is that the 
Corinthians' expectations were shaped by the narrower scope of the prohibition of 
litigation found among voluntary associations. 11o They assumed that a dispute between 
believers which arose in contexts other than a church meeting could be pursued through 
the courts like any other. 111 
privileged position within the legal system to prosecute poorer ones. However, both Kloppenborg 
(1996b), p.254 and Meggitt (1998a), pp.122-125 correctly point out that it was possible for social equals 
to compete with each other in the courts. 
109Mitchell, AC. (1993), p.567 correctly insists that Paul was serious about internal arbitration, but 
understands this, and Pau1's demand that quarrels be avoided, as either/or solutions. I see no need to play 
these two aspects of Paul's advice off against one other. His teaching on marriage is another area where 
Paul has strong preferences, but also alternatives. See 1 Cor. 7:8-1l. 
II°Previous attempts to illuminate 6: 1-8 using association statutes have not noted the fact that, if both 
Paul and the associations forbid all litigation between members, then Paul's attitude is like that ofthe 
associations but the Corinthians' attitude is not. My suggestion reverses this position. The Graeco-
Roman associations influence the Corinthians, but Paul's approach may be more influenced by the 
common, although not universal, Jewish practice of settling all disputes without recourse to Gentile 
courts. See Barrett (1971b), p.135; Fee (1987), p.231n.11. 
l11Mitchell, M. (1992), pp.151-52 suggests that Paul's renewed mention of O'XtO'J..Lcx'tcx at 11:18-19 is 
explained by his desire to emphasise that such divisions are in evidence when the Corinthians come 
together in assembly. Previously he "has dealt with manifestations of community disunity and strife 
which take place in the arena of relations among Christians within the larger social context of the city of 
Corinth. " Disputes in contexts other than meetings may have been less likely among the associations. 
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Thus, it may be that Paul's condemnation of all their court cases against 
one another took the Corinthians by surprise. Their practical consciousness suggested a 
much narrower range of circumstances in which litigation between fellow believers might 
be unacceptable. Paul's demand that such disputes be avoided altogether asked for a 
more radical social adjustment than it was obvious to the Corinthians was necessary. 
Their practical consciousness moulded by the practice of associations, they viewed their 
obligations to one another as real, but also as more limited and more sharply defined than 
Paul is prepared to allow. The parallels between this difference of perception, and those 
which we saw in relation to questions of patronage and to competition at communal 
meals are obvious. Paul's vision for the life of the church sharply diverges from the norms 
of Graeco-Roman society, norms which we have seen embodied in the life of the 
associations, but he finds that his Corinthian converts are unable or unwilling to 
instantiate this vision in their behaviour to the degree that he would desire.1 12 The 
difference is that, on the issue oflitigation, the Corinthians are, if anything, even closer to 
the associations than in their patronage practices or in their celebrations of the Lord's 
Supper. There new social practices had been taken on but were shaped by existing 
practical consciousness; here, if they prohibited only litigation arising from disputes in 
church meetings, even the practice has remained the same. 
Here there were membership fees, and if the Iobacchoi are any guide, then it may have been common for 
membership applications to be voted on by all the existing members. A potential social rival of an 
existing member may therefore have been unlikely to be admitted, whereas baptism is open to all. 
112In this case, although it is clearly not Paul's preference, he is prepared to suggest a means by which 
legal conflicts within the community could be regulated when their elimination proves impossible. The 
instruction to appoint an arbitrator from within the community (6:4-5) means that Paul avoids the risk of 
removing such battles from the public courts only for them to poison the life of the church for the want 
of a means of resolution. In relation to patronage and common meals he offers no such system of 
regulation, even as a second best solution. 
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8.5 Money 
8.5.1 Translocal Relationships Among the Voluntary Associations 
Apart from the question of Paul's own support, the only financial 
matter referred to in the Corinthian correspondence is the Jerusalem collection (1 Cor. 
16:1-4,2 Cor. 8-9). That Paul and his converts should seek to aid another congregation 
of fellow believers so many hundreds of miles distant seems to confirm what has been 
accepted, even by the advocates of voluntary associations as an analogy for early 
Christianity, as the most striking dissimilarity between the two. The churches are 
connected to each other to a degree, and in a way, alien to the voluntary associations, 
which were predominantly local affairs. 113 However, in a recent article, this consensus 
has been questioned by Richard Ascough, who wishes to emphasise those translocallinks 
which did exist between voluntary associations, so that "Christian congregations and 
voluntary associations can both be seen as locally based groups with limited translocal 
connections. "114 The elimination of what he regards as a false dichotomy will allow for "a 
more profitable use of the voluntary association as an analogy for understanding the 
formation and organisation of early Christian groups. "115 The nature and degree of 
translocal connections among voluntary associations is therefore a crucial preliminary 
question to the central one of how far early Christianity and the associations resembled 
one another in this respect. 
Some types of association clearly did have translocal links, most 
notably the Dionysiac artists,116 and the athletes. Both artists and athletes who won 
contests at sacred games were eligible to join the lEPOVtKCX1, an association of victors. 
There is evidence from the province of Asia that the victors of each city met regularly, 
113See Barton and Horsley (1981), p.28; McCready (1996), pp.63-64; Meeks (1984), pp.78-80; Tod 
(1932), p.81; Wilcken (1984), p.35; Wilson, S. (1996), p.3. 
114Ascough (1997), p.223. 
115 Ascough (1997), p.241. 
116 Ascough (1997), pp.233-34. 
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but none as to whether they federated and, elsewhere, there is no evidence of such 
meetings at all. 117 The lEPOVtKCXl simply came together at the games themselves, and 
effectively disbanded once they were over. Like the artists, the athletes also had guilds 
open to all professionals, whether or not they had ever won a victory. Some of these 
guilds did have federated chapters, with each member affiliated to the chapter in his 
home city, but equally typical were temporary guilds "of the athletes who happened to 
come together as participants in a given festival. "118 This complex and somewhat 
confusing situation only changed in the second century CE when an athletic 
headquarters, the athletarum curia, was established in Rome, its officials providing 
administrative continuity between the meetings of the temporary guilds at the games.119 
There is thus clear evidence of translocal links among the guilds of artists and athletes, 
but the impulse to federate exists alongside that to make the basis of association into a 
local one (e.g. the victors of a particular city), and alongside that to meet only on a 
temporary basis at the games themselves. The translocal links which do exist associate 
members from different localities solely on the basis of profession, i.e., being an artist or 
an athlete. 
Ascough also claims translocal relationships in the case of cult 
associations made up of those who continue the worship of their homeland despite 
residency in a foreign city.120 Here there is even an example of financial assistance being 
sought and granted within a triangular relationship between an association of Tyrian 
merchants in Puteoli, one in Rome, and their home city. When the association in Puteoli 
found itself unable to pay the rent on its building, an appeal for help was sent to the 
117Forbes (1955), pp.240-42. 
118Forbes (1955), p.243. 
119Forbes (1955), pp.243-50. The officials of the curia also gradually assumed responsibility for 
organising the games, working alongside the traditional locally appointed officials such as the 
agonothetai at Isthmia. 
120Ascough (1997), pp.228-30. As well as the association ofTyrian merchants discussed below, 
Ascough draws attention to associations of foreign merchants in classical Athens, and to an association 
of Roman traders on Delos around the turn of the eras. 
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Tyrian senate, which instructed the association in Rome to give financial aid. 121 That this 
is indeed a translocal relationship seems undeniable, but we should also note on what it 
was based. The association in Puteoli was dedicated to Helios Saraptenos, "a deity of the 
Phoenician coast," 122 and the letter home to Tyre was written in 174 CE, a full ninety 
five years after the association's foundation. This is a testimony to the tenacious 
maintenance, across time and space, of a sense of local identity, of belonging to Tyre and 
to no other city. Assistance is granted because of a shared ethnic and geographical 
identity. Paradoxically, a translocal relationship is maintained through a highly localised 
sense of religious belonging. 
One must conclude that while Ascough succeeds in demonstrating the 
existence of translocal relationships among some types of voluntary associations, the 
nature of these relationships should also be noted. They are based on common itinerant 
professions like those of artist or athlete, or on shared ethnic and geographical 
identity.123 Outside of these confines there is little to suggest that voluntary associations 
typically enjoyed translocal relationships.124 With these conclusions in mind, we turn to 
examine the Jerusalem collection and the Corinthians' attitude towards it. 
8.5.2 The Jerusalem Collection and Translocal Relationships 
Paul gIves confident instructions concerrnng the collection for 
Jerusalem in 1 Cor. 16: 1-4, and there appears to be no question in his mind that the 
Corinthians will contribute. However, by the time he wrote 2 Cor. 8&9, it is clear that 
l21CIG 5853. 
122White, L.M. (1990), p.32. 
123To the degree that they may be regarded as voluntary associations, the regular temple tax makes 
diaspora synagogues another example of translocallinks on the basis of a shared ethnic and 
geographical identity. For a discussion of the tax, see Nickle (1966), chapter 3. 
124Ascough (1997), pp.230-33 also argues that the cults ofIsis and Sarapis remained strongly Egyptian 
in content and were controlled by Egyptians. While Egyptian priests were certainly common, and the 
atmosphere surrounding these cults appealingly exotic, their ceremonies of initiation came to conform to 
the Eleusinian pattern (see 9.1.1). It is also not clear whether, and to what degree, associations of 
initiates in different localities regarded themselves as connected. Lucius leaves his ceremonial robes in 
the temple at Kenchreai (Apuleius, Metamorphoses XI.29) and he only becomes a member of the 
collegium of pastophori in Rome after further initiations (XI.30). 
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problems had arisen. 125 "There is nothing to suggest that Paul has yet received a penny 
piece to transmit from Corinth to Jerusalem. II 126 Thus, Paul finds himself in the awkward 
position of once again having to persuade the Corinthians to contribute, aware, as he 
does so, that to do this too forcefully may be read as open criticism of his readers' 
current inaction, and hence only serve to provoke further resentment. One suspects that 
his lavish praise of the Macedonians' efforts (2 Cor. 8:1-5) is a means by which to keep 
his criticisms indirect. The curious turns of phrase in 8: 10-11 through which the 
Corinthians are described as having the desire to give (eEAco) but not the action 
(1tOtEco) are further evidence of this. "He (Paul) wishes to avoid direct criticism of their 
failure to make good on their commitment to the project and at the same time to praise 
their professed desire to take part in it. "127 
All of this careful cajoling raises the issue of what had gone wrong. 
The immediate cause is obvious. liThe cause ... was almost certainly conflict with Paul 
and disaffection with him in the congregation, in particular the painful visit which caused 
Paul such grief and led to his withdrawal from Corinth (2 Cor. 2:1-11)."128 However, 
one wonders whether Paul did not also detect certain doubts amongst the Corinthians 
about the collection itself Certainly he moves onto territory which seems to have more 
to do with justifying the collection as such,129 rather than with any particular set of 
arrangements for it. He reminds the Corinthians of the example of Christ (8:9), but he 
also feels it necessary to stress that collecting in Corinth for Jerusalem is not an 
indication of partiality on his part towards the Jerusalem Christians (8:13-15). His 
125It is a matter of some controversy as to whether 2 Cor. 8&9 belong to the same letter. Betz (1985), 
pp.129-40 concludes that they do not, and that 2 Cor. 9 was addressed not to the church at Corinth, but 
to the other churches of Achaea. Whether or not Betz is correct is a matter which need not detain us, but 
we shall restrict our discussion to 2 Cor. 8, which all agree is addressed to the church at Corinth. 
126Barrett (1973), p.242. 
127Furnish (1984), p.418. 
128Horrell (1995b), pp.74-75. 
1291 agree with Horrell (1995b), pp.75-76 that Paul had a variety of motives in undertaking the 
collection. It would playa role in salvation history by symbolising the fulfilment of the prophets' vision 
of the entry of the Gentiles into the people of God, it would promote church unity, and it would alleviate 
poverty. 1 also agree that in 2 Cor. 8 it is the alleviation of poverty which is emphasised. 
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intention is not that they should be relieved to the distress (SA1"\jflC;) of the Corinthians, 
but simply that there should be equality (lO'o"CllC;). In the case of a future hypothetical 
need on the part of the Corinthians the process would be reversed. "Those who have 
plenty in the present should supply those who lack, aware that at some point, or in some 
different way, the reverse may occur. "130 Finally, Paul quotes Exodus 16: 18, so as to 
suggest that by inspiring the generosity of his people, God will ensure that none are in 
need, and none enjoy a surplus. Instead, there will be a perfectly equitable distribution, 
and enough for alL 
All of this suggests some anxiety on Paul's part lest the Corinthians 
resent the collection. Whether such resentment had ever been expressed, or whether Paul 
merely suspected its existence, cannot be determined. Yet the very fact that it was in the 
air requires explanation, when the whole project had apparently been greeted by the 
Macedonian churches with the utmost enthusiasm (8:1-4), and as an opportunity to give 
themselves to the Lord (8:5). Why might the Corinthians feel differently? It is possible 
that they did not share Paul's sense of the church as universal as well as local, i.e., the 
collection expressed a sense of connection among the contributing churches, and 
between them and the Jerusalem church, which the Corinthians simply did not feeL Given 
that the only solid evidence for translocal relationships between associations concerns 
those based upon a common itinerant profession or upon ethnic identity, then this may be 
another case where the expectations of the Corinthians as to what it means to belong to 
the church are influenced by a practical consciousness which owes much to the voluntary 
associations. Cult groups in which the basis of association was devotion to a deity did 
13oHorrell (l995b), p.78. Betz (1985), p.68 erroneously interprets 8:14 in the light of Rom. 15:27. As it 
is unlikely that the Corinthian church would ever be worse off than the Jerusalem one, Paul must intend 
"to speak of the spiritual wealth of the Jerusalem Christians to which the Corinthians were deeply 
indebted." But Paul's point is surely to emphasise that only equality is intended. That the Jerusalem 
church should at some future date provide the Corinthians with aid is indeed hypothetical, but is not 
thereby necessarily a spiritual hypothesis as opposed to a material one. Meggitt (1998a), pp.158-60 goes 
further, arguing that there is a real possibility of the collection being reciprocated at a future date. Given 
the somewhat tense relationship between Paul and the Jerusalem church one doubts this, but the terms in 
which Paul commends the Jerusalem collection strongly suggest that he would favour other mutual aid 
projects between congregations. 
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not support each other financially, so why should those groups devoted to Christ? The 
Corinthians expected the church to be, like these associations, essentially local, and 
evinced only lukewarm support for the collection because they did not accept its 
rationale. 
Perhaps ironically, Ascough accepts that the Corinthians "remained 
unconvinced that they had a social and religious obligation to an otherwise unknown 
group. "131 Yet he holds this to suggest that translocal links between the churches were 
not as well developed as has usually been thought. Just as scholars have underestimated 
the extent of translocal relationships among voluntary associations, so they have 
overestimated their extent among the churches. There are considerable methodological 
difficulties here. Ascough uses the Corinthians' failure to understand the rationale behind 
the collection to support his case, but never mentions the enthusiasm of the 
Macedonians. Further, he admits that Paul may have thought of the churches he worked 
with as connected, but depicts this as largely wishful thinking on the part of the 
apostle. 132 This simply reverses the more common error of assuming that Paul's 
descriptions of how he believed churches ought to be reflect the way they actually were. 
Ascough replaces the priority of Paul in determining the nature of early Christianity with 
that of the Corinthians. He has joined the premature rush to generalisation which has 
afflicted so much work in this field, overlooking the possibility that the analogy between 
Christianity and the voluntary associations may be more fruitful for understanding some 
early Christians than others. 
However, the very lack of nuance in Ascough's argument does serve a 
useful purpose. If his elimination of the differences between early Christianity and the 
voluntary associations in the matter of translocal links is too simplistic, it does at least 
suggest that merely to note the existence of a contrast is to fall into the same failing. 
l3lAscough (1997), p.237. 
132Ascough (1997), p.237; p.239 n.82. 
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There were translocal links among voluntary associations, but they were different in 
nature from those which we find in early Christianity.133 Paul's converts lacked any 
ethnic, geographical or professional ties with Jerusalem. All that connected them was 
Christ, and this raises an interesting, if hypothetical, question. Would the Corinthians 
have had similar reservations if they had been asked to send financial support to a group 
of needy Corinthian or Achaean Christians who had migrated to another city? Perhaps 
not. 134 For Paul, religious belonging and mutual obligation depend simply upon common 
devotion to Christ, irrespective of origins, but perhaps to the Corinthians it was no more 
obvious that they had an obligation to aid another group of his worshippers with whom 
this was their sole connection, than it would have been to worshippers of Dionysus that 
they had a general obligation to one another. Paul has asked them to take on a new social 
practice in offering aid to the poor of the Jerusalem church but the Corinthians, their 
practical consciousness shaped by the implicit rules and resources governing translocal 
relationships among the voluntary associations, are hesitant. 
8.6 Conclusions 
We have traced, across a range of issues (patronage, the Lord's 
Supper, litigation and money), considerable differences in expectation between Paul and 
the Corinthians as to the consequences of conversion. That which strikes Paul as obvious 
is not so to the Corinthians. These differences can be attributed, in part, to the influence 
upon the Corinthians of the voluntary associations. While the Corinthian church was not 
a voluntary association, there are features of the Corinthians' behaviour and attitudes 
133 A parallel here would be our discussion of the courts (8.4.2). There we found prohibitions against 
taking a fellow-member to court both among voluntary associations and from Paul, i.e. a genuine 
similarity, and we found that the motivation and scope of these prohibitions diverged, i.e., a striking 
difference. 
134This is not to deny that Jewish Christians at Corinth may have had a strong sense of connection with 
Jerusalem, although it is to suggest that this sense had a strong ethnic component. Nor is it to deny that 
some of the Corinthians identified strongly with individual Christian leaders from other places, possibly 
including Jerusalem (c.f. the four 'parties' of 1 Cor. 1:12 and the super apostles of2 Cor. 12: 11). My 
suggestion here refers solely to translocal relationships between congregations as congregations. 
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which can be illuminated by analogy with the associations. With their practical 
consciousness shaped by the implicit rules and resources moulding the life of the 
voluntary associations, the Corinthians structure distinctively new Christian modes of 
practice (patronage, the Lord1s Supper) along lines familiar from parallel aspects of the 
life of the associations. Here transformation has been accompanied by a greater degree of 
reproduction than Paul finds comfortable. The Corinthians also fail to abandon old 
practices (litigation between members), or to take on new ones (the Jerusalem 
collection), because their practical consciousness suggests that such steps are no more 
necessary now that they belong to a church than they would be had they belonged to an 
association. Here reproduction has outweighed transformation to a considerable degree. 
The following points in particular should be noted: 
(i) The Corinthians do not perpetuate the system of honours in return 
for patronage so clearly visible among the associations. Yet neither do they adopt Paul1s 
attitude, which accords honour informally, and in proportion to the fixity of purpose 
displayed, not in proportion to the material value of services rendered. Instead there is 
competition for status and honour every bit as strong as that found in associations, but 
without any clear regulation or limits. 
(ii) One forum where such competition takes place is the Lord1s 
Supper. Here those heads of households who enjoy a higher social status than the vast 
majority of the Corinthian congregation compete for honour and status in a way which 
leads to the neglect and exclusion of others. The Corinthians have not perpetuated the 
typically precise rules of conduct at table found among the associations, but neither have 
they abandoned the ethos which made those rules necessary. Again, competition rages 
unrestrained. 
(iii) It is not obvious to the Corinthians that litigation between 
believers is wrong in all circumstances. This reflects the approach found within voluntary 
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associations where, despite suggestions to the contrary, prohibitions of litigation are 
limited to disputes which arise at meetings of the group. For the Corinthians, the 
questions of individual social status which might prompt litigation remain important 
whereas, for Paul, conversion ought to have produced an alternative focus on their new 
collective eschatological status. 
(iv) The Corinthians hesitate when asked to contribute to Paul's 
Jerusalem collection. It is not obvious to them that they have obligations of mutual aid to 
another group with which they have no ethnic, geographical or itinerant professional ties. 
Again, this reflects the life of the voluntary associations where, despite arguments to the 
contrary, translocal relationships were limited to those groups which possessed such ties. 
For Paul, conversion creates an obvious, and reciprocal, obligation of aid to all fellow 
believers in Christ. 
It is hoped that the above conclusions serve to establish a 
methodological point. By approaching the influence of the voluntary associations upon 
the Corinthian church from the perspective of conversion it has been possible to move 
away from the too general discussion of whether, and to what degree, early Christianity 
resembles the voluntary associations. The use of structuration theory to analyse 
divergence in expectations between Paul and the Corinthians, between an advocate of 
conversion and his converts, reveals two important points. Firstly, not all early Christians 
will have been susceptible to the influence of the associations to the same degree and, 
secondly, even with the Corinthians it is not always a straightforward question of 
resemblance or its absence. In some cases their practices do resemble those of the 
associations, but in others it is their inability, when viewed from Paul's perspective, to 
cope with new practices very different from those of the associations which demonstrates 
most clearly the influence of the latter upon them. 
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There are also some general points which emerge from the above 
conclusions and which help to characterise the differences in expectation between Paul 
and the Corinthians as to the consequences of conversion. One is that the Corinthians 
feel far more comfortable than does Paul with the norms and structures of Graeco-
Roman society. As we saw above (8.1.1), the associations served as a bridge between 
the private and public domains, and as a means of social integration. They asserted a 
connection between the socially superior and the socially inferior while at the same time 
maintaining the gulf in status between them. The Corinthians seem happy for their 
Christianity to perform similar functions. 135 Paul, for all he is no social radical, does not 
view the church as a vehicle for this sort of social integration. The integration which he 
desires is that of the believers, in whose common life he wishes outsiders to find an 
alternative vision of reality. This means that status patterns and concerns within the 
church ought to be different from those within society, something which may require the 
abandonment of old social practices, and structures, and the adoption of new ones. 
Further, the Corinthians regard conversion as establishing a narrower 
range of obligations towards other Christians than does Paul. This can be seen most 
clearly in their lack of a sense of financial obligation to Christians outside their own 
group, their acceptance of the propriety of some court cases between believers, and their 
failure to award honour within the church on the basis of desire to serve rather than on 
that of social prestige. Like the associations, the Corinthians have a rather more 
segmented sense of religious belonging than does Paul.136 For both, conversion 
established a set of obligations towards fellow Christians, but for Paul the scope of those 
obligations was wider. 
135Barclay (1992), pp.57-60. 
136See Meeks (1983), pp.78-79. One could have the same discussion in terms of 'intensity', but this 
could imply a necessarily more fervent devotion on the part of Christians than that to be found on the 
part of association members. For this reason metaphors of breadth are to be preferred to those of depth, 
as there is no reason to doubt that associations could inspire deep group loyalty among their members. 
The difference is that it was expressed through a narrower range of mutual obligations. 
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Finally, the very breadth of the mutual obligations which Paul regards 
as a consequence of conversion makes it difficult for the Corinthians to comply with his 
wishes. Although he did not leave them completely without instructions or traditions on 
which to base their common life,137 Paul's sense of religious belonging could be regarded 
as a dangerously under-defined one to urge upon a group of new converts. In 
comparison, the associations provided their members with a much stronger system of 
regulation in which rules served as mechanisms by which to channel and control 
potentially disruptive social impulses. If Paul had offered the Corinthians a more 
precisely defined set of rights and responsibilities, his wishes may have been better 
received and more closely followed. However, even as they define mutual 
responsibilities, rules also limit them. Had Paul provided his converts with a set of 
statutes in the manner of an association, one wonders how much of an achievement he 
would have considered their observance to be. His understanding of conversion required 
a resocialisation that was" extraordinarily thoroughgoing. "138 
137See above, p.125 n.58. 
138Meeks (1983), p.78. 
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Corinthian Conversion and Mystery Initiation 
9.1 Introduction 
9.1.1 Understanding the Mysteries 
The more the available evidence concerning the mysteries has been 
subjected to critical scrutiny, the more elusive they have become. In his Ancient Mystery 
Cults, perhaps the best available general work on the subject, Walter Burkert describes 
the way in which earlier, apparently solid, conclusions have crumbled. 1 That the 
mysteries belonged to late antiquity, that they were Oriental in style, spirit and origin, 
and that they represented a basic change in the outlook of Graeco-Roman religion,2 are 
all assured results of scholarship which now appear simply to have been mistaken. Of 
those mysteries which achieved widespread appeal,3 only that of Mithras, and the 
particular taurobolium form of initiation into the cult of Cybele make their first 
appearances in the Graeco-Roman world during the common era, while the mysteries of 
Demeter and Kore at Eleusis can be traced back to the sixth century B.C.E., and those of 
Dionysus to only slightly later. This venerable pair were certainly not meaningfully 
Oriental in origin,4 and although the mysteries of Cybele, Isis and Mithras were, they 
underwent a process of Hellenization following their introduction into the Graeco-
Roman world. Broadly speaking, this process was one by which the newer arrivals 
IBurkert (1987), pp.l-ll. Wedderburn (1987b), p.vii comments that the non-specialist in the field must 
to some degree "depend upon the work of others and hope that he or she has picked the right 
mystagogues to follow." I have inevitably done so in order to establish a picture of the mysteries with 
which to then approach the evidence provided by 1 Corinthians, but hope that I have made informed 
choices. 
2Takacs (1995), pp.I-5 also launches an attack on this third point, which he couples with criticism of 
the idea that the mystery cults held particular appeal for the lower classes. The terms of this argument 
sound remarkably familiar to anyone acquainted with debate among N.T. scholars concerning the social 
status of early Christians. 
3There were others whose appeal was more restricted but nevertheless significant. See Burkert (1987), 
p.4 n.16. Archaeological and literary evidence suggests the existence of a localised mystery cult at 
Isthmia. See below pp.66-71 
4Their origins are lost in the mists of the archaic period, so an eastern birth cannot be ruled out. See 
Koester (1982), p.197. 
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conformed to the pattern of the Eleusinian cult. 5 Although the content of myths and 
details of rites often remained Oriental, and in doing so provided exotic appeal, it was 
Eleusis which provided the rite of initiation with all that it signified. 6 F Of, "though it is 
evident that Mater Magna is the Phrygian Goddess for both Greeks and Romans, and 
that Isis is Egyptian and Mithras is Iranian, the institution of mysteries cannot be traced 
to either Anatolia, Egypt, or Iran. "7 That these deities only became associated with 
mysteries in the Graeco-Roman world illustrates the point that their arrival does not 
mark a religious revolution. Although we shall argue that the mysteries did influence the 
Corinthians' understanding of Christianity, they did so from within the conglomerate of 
'native' Graeco-Roman religion not, as has often been argued, as fellow new arrivals from 
the east offering similar and competing messages of redemption. 8 
Recognition of this embededness within wider Graeco-Roman religion 
means that it is no longer appropriate to speak of mystery religions. Undergoing one 
initiation did not preclude others, and nor did it preclude offering worship to other 
deities whose cults did not have mysteries. Throughout what follows the term used will 
therefore instead be mystery cults. However, even this designation requires qualification, 
since by no means every worshipper of the mystery deities had been initiated. Many 
worshipped these deities in just the same way as they did other gods and goddesses, 
bringing petitions and promises in times of anxiety or danger, and gifts and donations in 
response to successful outcomes. For example, not every seafarer who asked Isis for 
protection under her aspect as Isis Pelagia will have been an initiate.9 Indeed, it may well 
5Nock (1972) Vol. II, p.797 makes a similar point. 
6 Apart from those of Demeter, the mysteries of the deities mentioned in this paragraph could be 
performed anywhere. Farnell (1907), p.199f. gives details of centres other than Eleusis which had 
mysteries of Demeter. A number of these have legends which claim early 'authorisation' from Eleusis, 
and it is unclear whether this has any basis in fact, or whether it is a later fiction to justify their 
continuing existence once Eleusis had been accepted as the centre for the mysteries of Demeter. 
7Burkert (1987), p.2. Also Koester (1982), p.197. 
8Nock (1972), Vol. I, p.345: "The truth is that among the so-called Oriental mystery-religions 
Christianity was the only one which was Oriental in its nature in spite of the fact that it was less 
Oriental and exotic in its trappings .. .Its rivals had all been translated into Greek terms. " 
9In Apuleius' description of a public procession to honour Isis at the start of the sea-going season, 
initiates appear to be one specific, if sizeable, group within a greater mass. Metamorphoses XI.W. 
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be that in the worship of these deities, initiation was but the tip of an iceberg of such 
votive religion, and represents principally an intensification of its search for effective 
protection from the hazards oflife and death.1° Yet ifto speak even of mystery cults runs 
the risk of implying too monolithic a phenomenon, it also captures that which makes it 
possible to speak of a single phenomenon at all, for it is the fact that they have mysteries 
which distinguishes these deities as a group. They have secret rites of initiation in which 
individuals see and experience the mysteries, whereas other cults do not. The term 
mystery cults is therefore an appropriate one, if used with the foregoing qualifications in 
mind. 
If initiation is what makes mystery cults, then some discussion of it is 
required. 11 It too is elusive, since these rites were secret, and given that they were 
conducted over a period spanning around a thousand years, the taboo against divulging 
their contents was remarkably effective. However, if their details remain obscure, we do 
know something of their intention. Initiation was expected to be an extraordinary 
experience, providing the individual with an immediate and transforming encounter with 
the divine. This encounter was a visual one. Ritual objects might be revealed, and the real 
blessing which initiation provided lay in the individual having seen the divine. 12 The 
expected result was "a pathos in the soul, or psyche, of the candidate ... at the final stage 
of the mysteries there should be no more 'learning' (mathein) but 'experiencing' (pathein), 
and a change in the state of mind (diatethenai)." 13 The initiate emerged having attained a 
spiritually exalted state, the best known and most striking description of which is 
provided by Plutarch who, using the mysteries as a metaphor for death, writes that by the 
climax of the rite the initiate "walks at large in new freedom, now perfect and fully 
10The exception here is Mithras, whose cult had no public worship, his devotees and his initiates 
forming identical groups. See Beck (1996), pp.176-77. 
11 See Burkert (1987), chapter IV. 
12 Apuleius Metamorphoses XI,23: "In the middle of the night I saw the sun flashing with bright light. I 
came face to face with the gods below and the gods above and paid reverence to them from close at 
hand." 
13Burkert (1987), p.89. He is here referring to Aristotle,fr.15. 
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initiated, celebrating the sacred rites, a garland upon his head, and conversing with pure 
and holy men; he surveys the uninitiated, unpurified mob here on earth, the mob of living 
men ... herded together in mirk and deep mire."14 
Perhaps remarkably, given this strong sense of a change in spiritual 
status, initiation seems to have had little or no social consequences. It was certainly not 
by the Common Era in any sense a counter cultural act,15 but rather perfectly 
respectable, yet nor did it automatically lead to an improvement in the social status of the 
initiate. Each initiate no doubt hoped that the deity would be generous, and that 
prosperity and social advancement would follow, but this was a matter between the deity 
and the individual, not a significance attached by society to initiation as a rite. What it did 
do was to provide entry to a 8icxcroC; of the deity, and we have no reason to believe that 
associations composed solely of initiates were any different from others in terms of the 
sort of opportunities they offered for individual social advancement, or the reinforcement 
they provided for the existing social order. 16 Cult associations certainly competed for 
honour, and membership of certain associations may sometimes have carried greater 
prestige than membership of others. In such cases social prestige may have acted as a 
motive prompting initiation. Yet the very fact that different associations of initiates might 
enjoy different degrees of prestige makes the point that, even where initiation was the 
route to sharing in such prestige, it was not its source. 
14Plutarch,fr.168. Quoted by Burkert (1987), pp.91-92; Wedderburn (1987b), p.152. While he is quite 
clear that the philosopher is far superior to the performer of mystic rites, Plato (Phaedrus 248DE) 
nevertheless uses initiation as a metaphor by which to stress the enlightenment enjoyed by the 
philosophical soul, exalted far beyond the comprehension of the masses (Phaedrus 249-50). He also uses 
the metaphor of initiation to argue that philosophy is a Kd8apcn<; which fits the soul to dwell with the 
gods after death (Phaedo 69CD). In contrast, the uninitiated will lie in the mire. 
15 Although this had not always been true, especially in the case of the Dionysiac mysteries, which were 
infamously and brutally suppressed in Rome in 186 B.C.E. Yet by our period such events lay in the 
distant past. It is true that the cult of Isis was not definitively established in Rome itself until the reign of 
Caligula, but its earlier expulsion seems to have been due to the scandalous conduct of individual priests 
and devotees. See Josephus, Antiquities 18.65-80. Further, as Koester (1982), p.365 points out, "even if 
imperial Rome was still opposed to the introduction of new cults into the city of Rome itself, there were 
no official restrictions pertaining to the expansion of these religions in the provinces of the Roman 
empire." 
16See above, p.204. 
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The question of what, if any, consequences initiation had for morality 
is a complex one. On the one hand, the picture drawn by Christian apologists of the 
mystery cults as epicentres of sexual immorality is certainly false. 17 On the other, there is 
little evidence that initiation implied category changes in moral attitudes. Certain 
Augustan poets do express frustration at the periods of celibacy undertaken by their 
mistresses as a preparation for Isiac worship, but Isis neither made them mistresses nor 
caused them to cease from being so.18 One might conclude from this that initiation had 
no impact on morality, but the periods of celibacy are not without their own significance. 
In Apuleius, Mithras, priest of Isis, declares that prior to his transformation into an ass, 
Lucius had fallen into slavish pleasures (seruiles voiuptates),19 a reference to his affair 
with Photis. This condemnation is not an attack on the relationship as such, but rather on 
the controlling influence which sexual desire had then exercised over Lucius. In a life of 
service to Isis, involving arduous periods of celibacy,20 desire will be put in its proper 
place, which is subordinate to religious concerns. While initiation did not set initiates at 
odds with the norms of Graeco-Roman society through a change in moral categories, it 
might, in certain circumstances, imply a change in moral priorities.21 
The curiously neutral impact of initiation upon social status and its 
somewhat limited impact upon morality is a reflection of the degree to which 
undertaking it was understood as a specifically individual decision and experience, 
something which, "given the underdeveloped state of introspection in the ancient world, 
17See Heyob (1975), chapter 5. 
18Tibullus 1.3.26, Propertius 2.33.1f., 4.5.34. 
19 Apuleius, Metamorphoses XI. 15. 
20 Apuleius, Metamorphoses XI.19. 
21I therefore disagree with Shumate (1996), pp.12-13 who presents the reader with a sharp choice 
between understanding Lucius' conversion in either epistemological or moral terms, arguing in favour of 
the former. Closer to the mark is Walsh (1994), p.xxxii who links the two in the suggestion that "Lucius' 
avid curiosity to explore the realm of magic, attained by way of sexual encounter with Photis, was 
punished because it was a perverted path to universal knowledge." The moral component of Lucius' 
conversion is very different from that found in conversion to Judaism or Christianity, but it is 
nevertheless present. 
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as seen from a modern vantage point .. .is remarkable. "22 Initiation did not confront 
society with any overt consequences because society burdened nobody with the 
expectation that they be initiated, and nor did it discourage them. Although the influence 
of family, friends or colleagues might naturally playa part in a decision to be initiated, it 
is an influence which such close associates might exercise over any major decision in an 
individual's life. There is no general connection between initiation and family, clan, or 
trade. Rather, initiation had a voluntary character, and undertaking it represented a 
decision to enter into a considerable personal commitment to the deity concerned. The 
only restriction upon undertaking it was the expense involved, which could in some cases 
be considerable. 23 Whether this was so in every time and place is not clear, but one could 
be too poor to be initiated. 
If initiation was voluntary, and did not bring with it any automatic 
improvement in social status, the question arises of what those being initiated hoped to 
achieve through it. What were the hoped-for benefits? Success in life has already been 
mentioned, and we find an example of this in Lucius' attribution of a successful legal 
career to the goodwill ofIsis and that of her consort Osiris.24 In effect, the divine couple 
became his patrons, granting blessings in return for continued devotion. In Lucius' case 
22Burkert (1987), p.89. 
23See Apuleius, Metamorphoses XI.23,27,28,30. Here successive initiations are portrayed as using up all 
Lucius' resources despite the fact that his family enjoyed considerable social status (Metamorphoses 
11.3). Examining the evidence of inscriptions relating to associations ofIsiac initiates, Vidman (1970), 
p.127 concludes that their memberships were not large "da die Mysterien bei allen orientalischen 
Mysterienreligionen der Kaiserzeit sehr kostspielig waren." He also suggests, n.11, that this contrasts 
with the older Greek mysteries which were "nicht alle kostspielig." This depends rather on how one 
defines 'kostspielig'. We know that in the fourth century B.C.E. the initiation of two slaves at Eleusis 
cost 15 drachmas each (I.G. II.2, 1672). Mitchell, A. (1940), p.l31 and Parke (1977), p.61 seem agreed 
that this sum then represented 1-2 weeks wages for a skilled workman in the building trades. Vidman 
and Wedderburn (1987b), p.102 n.31 assess this as cheap; Parke and Dillon (1997), p.168 and 
Richardson, N.J. (1974), p.21 think the expense considerable. Kerenyi (ET 1967), pp.59-60 points to the 
case of one Lysias who, in the same period, paid for the initiation of his slave-girl lover, perceiving it to 
be an impressive gift. See Demosthenes, In Neaeram LIX.21. Perhaps the key to assessing this 
contradictory evidence is numbers. The very large numbers of initiates there suggests that the cost of 
initiation at Eleusis, while considerable, was not prohibitive. Plato, Resp.378A seems to wish that it 
were. Yet if Vidman is right that the number of Isiac initiates was comparatively small, the cost of 
initiation into some cults in a later period could indeed be prohibitive. People who could have afforded 
Eleusis several centuries earlier might not have been able to afford Isis in the Common Era. 
24Apuleius, Metamorphoses XI.6,28. 
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there is also a clear promise of longevity. So great is Isis' power that she can prolong 
Lucius' days beyond those appointed for him by fate. 25 What she promises him beyond 
death is less concrete. Certainly there is a promise of blessedness, but the details are 
vague, and the very promise of longevity indicates something. The thought that death 
might be gain (Phil. 1 :21) would be an alien one in this context. Indeed, the degree to 
which Graeco-Roman religion as a whole extended hope for the life to come is a subject 
of some controversy. Ramsay MacMullen has suggested that it was scarcely prominent 
at all,26 and certainly the mentions we have of it in the context of the mysteries are 
allusive. There is nothing that might be compared and contrasted with the sort of 
discussion of the specific details of continued personal existence provided by Paul in 1 
Cor. 15. "A redirection of religion towards other-worldly concerns, contrary to what is 
often assumed, is not to be found with the 'Oriental' gods and their mysteries. At best 
they continue what was already there. "27 
Yet as the allusions show, there was already something there, existing 
alongside such expressions of indifference as the famous epitaph 'I was not, I am not, I 
care not.'28 If this were not so in relation to the mysteries then there would be no point to 
Diogenes' criticism of Sophocles' certainty that blessedness awaited initiates but not 
others.29 However vague the references, hope for the hereafter does appear to have 
played a part in initiation, even if not a central one. Some in the ancient world did not 
believe in life after death, but others did, and we can expect to find that initiates were 
among those who believed. Yet the degree to which they enjoyed what Christians would 
term assurance is unclear. Burkert draws attention to a funerary inscription for a seven 
year old boy from third or fourth century CE Rome. His parents had ensured his 
25 Apuleius, Metamorphoses XI.6. This also appears to be the benefit of the taurobolium ritual in the cult 
of Cybele. See MacMullen (1981), p.55. 
26MacMulien (1981), pp.53-57. 
27Burkert (1987), p.28. 
28See MacMullen (1981), p.57. 
29Plutarch, Moralia I.21F. For other evidence that the mysteries might grant hope for the after-life see 
Homeric Hymn to Demeter 480-82, Isokrates 4.28, Pindarfr. 137a, Sophoclesfr. 837, Cicero De 
Legibus 2.14.36. 
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initiation into the cults of several deities, but now their frank advice is 'forget ... the 
mysteries. '30 It seems that instead of the mysteries providing them comfort in the face of 
tragedy, the premature death of the child has destroyed their hopes for life beyond death. 
If the power of the gods could not ensure longevity, then neither could it be effective 
after death. The one would have been proof of the other, but the failure of one means the 
failure of the other. Presumably when the child was initiated they had entertained hopes, 
it was simply that events had falsified them. Such relentless pragmatism perhaps accounts 
for the mixed messages which we seem to receive about the mysteries and life after 
death. Not all who had been initiated could enjoy good fortune in this life, and therefore 
not all could trust to the protection of the gods for the next. In relation to life after death, 
it seems that initiation did imply some sort of hope, but it could often be rather an 
experimental one. We might expect successful lawyers like Lucius to be more certain 
than others of the power of the gods, and of the effectiveness of initiation in securing 
their goodwill. 
Whatever was hoped for, how was it to be achieved? What was the 
nature of the relationship between the individual and the deity created by initiation? Here 
it has traditionally been argued, particularly within the History of Religions School, that 
the initiate was understood to share the sufferings of a dying deity, and thence also to 
share their rising again to new life.31 If we are right that hope for life after death through 
the mysteries could be vague and experimental, then the notion of the centrality of dying 
and rising is perhaps a doubtful hypothesis from the start. Yet even allowing a maximalist 
estimation of the evidence for life after death as a concern of initiation, there remains the 
problem of an overwhelming lack of evidence for the specific idea of sharing in the dying 
30Burkert (1987), pp.28-29. It is true that Plutarch, in a letter to his wife on the death of their child, does 
refer to their Dionysiac initiation in connection to hopes for the after-life. However, it was the parents 
and not the child (aged 2) who had been initiated, and the after-life Plutarch speaks of is a general one 
to be enjoyed by alL He and his wife have been taught such hope by tradition and by the initiation rites. 
Cons. ad. uxorem 611d. 
31See Bousset (ET 1970), p.192: "the participant in the cult actively and imitatively takes part in the 
destiny of the god in frenzied grief and exuberant joy." Also Weiss (ET 1937) VoUI, pp.S20, 638: 
"union with the deity is accomplished by imitating his experiences." Also Lohse (ET 1976), p.234f. 
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and rising of a deity. While it is true that, for the initiate, the mysteries could be thought 
of as a sort of voluntary death and rebirth,32 there is no evidence that this was conceived 
as a reflection of the experience of the deity. For instance, Lucius was initiated first into 
Isis and then later into Osiris in different ceremonies, but in all the versions of their myths 
that we possess, Isis merely mourns the death of Osiris and secures his return to life. She 
remains resolutely alive throughout.33 Similarly, what little we know of the content of the 
Eleusinian rites suggests that the emphasis was on imitating the actions of Demeter, who 
once again was the grieving member of that particular divine family, not the one that had 
died. 34 The most that could be suggested was that the power of the bereaved deity to 
restore their loved one to life might be taken as an encouragement to initiates that the 
same could one day be done for them. The emphasis was on the patronage of the deity, 
and his or her power to protect the initiate in this world and beyond.35 
9.1.2 The Corinthians and the Mystery Cults 
It therefore seems that the concept of sharing the experience of a dying 
and rising deity has simply been a projection back onto the mystery cults of Christian 
ideas about the sacraments. Paul's statements that baptism involves dying and later rising 
with Christ are not a result of the influence of the mystery cults over his theology, but 
instead mark a considerable divergence between Paul's ideas and theirs. "The mysteries 
were not saying the same thing as Paul, nor was Paul borrowing his ideas from the 
mysteries. "36 Yet what of the Corinthians? If the understanding of the mystery cults and 
of initiation which I have outlined above is substantially correct then, at first sight, my 
32 Apuleius, Metamorphoses XI.21. For evidence of the taurobolium ritual in the cult of Cybele being 
understood in this way see elL 6.510. Wedderburn (1987a), p.373 suggests that some of the imagery in 
the frescoes at the Villa of the Mysteries in Pompeii can plausibly be taken as portraying ritual 
enactments or anticipations of death. Vermaseren (1963), pp.131-35 argues the same in relation to the 
Mithraeum at Sta Maria Capua Vetere. 
33Wedderburn (1987a), pp.57-64. 
34Wedderburn (1987a), pp.62-64. 
35Wedderburn (1987a), pp.56-57. Ziesler (1990), pp.14-15: "The idea of death and subsequent rebirth 
(let alone resurrection) with the god is not to be found in these cults ... what they did promise was life 
under the power of the god, life here and hereafter." His italics. 
36Wedderburn (1987b), p.396. 
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own view that the Corinthians were influenced by the mystery cults appears dubious. For 
previous attempts to discern such influence have located it in precisely those 
'sacramental' ideas which are now found to be notably absent from the mystery cults. 
According to this view, Paul's emphasis on dying and rising with Christ in baptism 
reflects his acceptance of a mystery-influenced 'sacramentalism' already current within 
Gentile Christianity. He did, however, modify it, arguing against notions of automatic 
efficacy in which the rite itself guaranteed salvation irrespective of subsequent conduct. 
Paul introduces a moral element.37 Thus, Paul's sacramentalism is influenced by the 
mystery cults; that of his Gentile converts, such as the Corinthians, even more so. But, if 
the concept of sharing the experience of a dying and rising deity was in fact absent from 
the mystery cults, then the idea that the Corinthians were influenced by the mystery cults 
appears to perish along with the idea that Paul himself came under such influence. 
In this chapter, I attempt to break this apparent connection. I do not 
believe that Paul's understanding of baptism or the Lord's Supper was influenced by the 
mystery cults. However, I do believe that the Corinthians' understanding of these rites, 
especially baptism, did come under such influence. This influence helps to account for 
some of the differences between themselves and Paul, over baptism and the Lord's 
Supper, to which 1 Corinthians bears witness. Further, and crucially, this influence is that 
of the mystery cults as understood above (9.1.1), not that ofthe cults of dying and rising 
deities pictured by the History of Religions School. For it is precisely the Corinthians' 
failure to take on the sort of understanding of baptism expressed by the idea of dying and 
rising with Christ that helps to account for the differences between themselves and Paul. 
37Kasemann (ET 1964), p.1l9: "Paul shares the premises of his time and yet draws different conclusions 
from them." See also Bultrnann (ET 1952), pp.311-14. This argument is already present in embryonic 
form in Weiss (ET 1937) VoUI, pp.636-39, who thinks it obvious that mystery concepts are "wrought 
into the structure" of Paul's notion of dying and rising with Christ in baptism, but who nevertheless 
concludes that "a tendency of Hellenistic piety thrusts its way into his own religion without thereby 
becoming fundamental." 
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The Corinthians have an alternative understanding of baptism influenced by the ideas 
of the mystery cults about initiation. 38 
I explore this understanding through an examination of the other 
passages III 1 Corinthians where baptism is discussed (1:14-17, 12:13, 15:29). As in 
relation to voluntary associations, it is important to establish the type of influence which 
is being argued for. I am not suggesting that the Corinthians saw no differences between 
baptism and initiation, or somehow turned baptism into a mystery initiation. For one 
thing, the rite of baptism was very probably much shorter, less elaborate, and involved 
much less in the way of preparation than did initiation.39 Further, there is no evidence 
that anything like baptism existed among the mystery cults. There are purificatory 
washings in abundance, as in other cults, but nothing which suggests "immersion into a 
river or basin as a symbol of starting a new life. "40 The rituals themselves are quite 
different. Yet, if the ceremonies looked quite different, what of their significance? As 
with voluntary associations, my argument suggests that the Corinthians instinctively 
draw on certain familiar patterns in order to make sense of their new faith. The 
Corinthians have accepted baptism as a result of the teaching of Paul and/or his fellow-
workers, but at the level of practical consciousness they have made sense of the rite not 
only in terms of that teaching, but also in terms of the most comparable rite within their 
38My position therefore implies that, far from embracing participatory ideas about baptism with a 
greater enthusiasm than Paul wished, the Corinthians found such ideas difficult. This turns a current 
consensus on its head, for all major recent commentaries suggest that the Corinthians were 'magical 
sacramentalists' who believed that participation in the sacraments provided a complete guarantee of 
future salvation irrespective of any immoral conduct in which they might indulge. See Barrett (1971 b), 
pp.220,224; Conzelmann (ET 1975), pp.167-68; Fee (1987), p.443; Schrage (1995), pp.381,385-86,396. 
I believe this consensus to be an exegetical fantasy, and do not consider that their supposed 'magical 
sacramentalism' forms a credible objection to my own arguments as to the influence of the mystery cults 
on the Corinthians. I set out the case against 'magical sacramentalism' in Appendix 3, but use this 
chapter to put the positive arguments in favour of my own view. 
39This was to change in the fourth century when the vocabulary used to describe baptism came to 
resemble quite closely that used of initiation. Nock (1972) Vol. II, p.818: "The free application of 
mystery terminology to the Christian sacraments ... belongs essentially to the period of the triumph of the 
church .. .It was a matter of diplomatic and pedagogic technique and involved a fairly conscious effort, 
which is made very clear in various sermons to catechumens awaiting baptism on Easter Eve, to evoke 
the right sentiments and to maintain these sentiments thereafter." 
40Burkert (1987), p.lO!. 
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existing culture. Like initiation, baptism was a voluntary act. However much individuals 
undertaking it may have been influenced by those close to them, here too, neither family, 
clan nor trade was the basis of entry. It is perhaps therefore not surprising that the 
Corinthians should construe the consequences of baptism along lines familiar from 
initiation into the mystery cultS.41 
What evidence is there that they in fact did so? There are two general 
features of the Corinthians' attitude towards the consequences of baptism for which the 
influence of initiation may help to account: 
(i) We have already seen that, while no social revolutionary, Paul does 
expect social status within the church to be relativised (3.3.7). Despite this, the import of 
12: 14-26 seems to be that wealthier Corinthian Christians still expect to be accorded 
positions of leadership as would naturally have been their due according to the habits of 
society at large.42 Do they expect baptism, like initiation, to have no direct consequences 
for social status? 
(ii) Similarly, Paul expects that, having been purified in baptism (6: 11), 
the Corinthians make moral category changes which instantiate, in their behaviour, the 
fundamental distinction between their current selves as believers and their former selves 
as members of Graeco-Roman society (4.3.3). Yet the Corinthians still use their city's 
law courts and eat in its temple dining rooms (6:1-8, 8:10). Some visit the brothels 
41This suggestion does not require that the majority of Corinthian Christians had been initiated into a 
mystery cult prior to their conversion. Some may have been, but all that is necessary is awareness of the 
religious and social significance of initiation, not knowledge of the secret details of any particular 
initiation rites. Evidence for the likely diffusion of such awareness among the population can be found in 
an excursus (9.5) detailing the archaeological evidence for the presence of mystery cults in first century 
Corinth. 
42This would seem to be the context demanded by 12:14-26 where Paul uses the image of the body to 
represent the church and to stress the importance of its weaker members, whereas Graeco-Roman 
authors often used the body as an image to represent society and to stress the dependency of the weak 
upon the strong. See Martin (1991), pp.563-69. 
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(6:12-20), others indulge in sexual abstinence (7:1-7).43 Do they expect baptism, like 
initiation, to bring changes in moral priorities, but not in moral categories? 
These two suggestions concern absences in the Corinthians! 
understanding of conversion which Paul finds distressing. Yet the influence of initiation 
can also help to account for the form taken by one of the most dominant presences in the 
Corinthians! understanding of their new faith, namely their possession by the Spirit (7.2). 
This suggestion may appear surprising given that one cannot find within Graeco-Roman 
religion "precise parallels to the idea of the ritual bestowal of the Spirit. "44 Further, this 
absence holds true for initiation and, indeed, the sort of ecstatic behaviour through which 
the Corinthians expressed their possession by the Spirit is typically episodic within 
Graeco-Roman religion. It is not a continuous feature of individuals! existence, or of 
worship, as it is within Christianity.45 Yet while the Corinthians conceive of their 
possession of the Spirit as permanent, identifying themselves as n:VEU!-lCX:tlKOi (9.2.2), 
they once again do not perceive this to have implications for their behaviour in the way 
that Paul does. He frustratedly asks aUK OtOCX'tE C),,;l vcxoe; 8EOU EO"'tE KCXt 'to 
n:VEU!-lCX 'tau 8EOU 01,KEl EV U!-l 1 v (3: 16);46 The Corinthians apparently do not 
appreciate that their union with God through possession by the Spirit implies a daily 
conforming of their character and conduct to His. 
In this they behave more as if possession by the Spirit denotes simply 
that God has extended to them his patronage and his power (6:12; 10:23). This seems to 
echo the understanding of union with the divine found within the mystery cults. There 
the initiate can even be said to become identified with the divine, but not "in the sense 
43Given the example of the mistresses of Tibullus and Propertius (see above, p.248 n.18), it is clear that 
both types of conduct might be possible for an initiate into a mystery cult. The observance of periodic 
and stringent temporary celibacy so as to grant priority to worship did not rule out sexual relations 
outside of marriage at other times. 
44Wedderburn (1987b), p.290. 
45Wedderburn (1987b), p.268f. 
46See also 1 Cor. 6:19. 
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that the initiate becomes one of the gods that already exist or even that his role and 
status are completely equivalent to theirs, but only in the sense that he shares the powers 
which that god makes available to his devotees. And that involves not so much a change 
of nature or substance as a change of status and potential. "47 What is missing here is any 
equivalent to the participatory categories which are so important to Paul. Thus, while the 
receipt of the Spirit does, in itself, mark a difference between baptism and initiation, the 
way in which the Corinthians understand their possession of the Spirit seems to reflect 
the significance granted to union with the divine by the mystery cults. As with initiates 
into the mystery cults, the Corinthians perceive baptism as the entry point to a new 
exalted personal religiOUS status. 
To summarise, the History of Religions School's presentation of the 
mystery cults, as characterised by dying and rising deities, is thoroughly discredited. The 
mystery cults therefore simply cannot have exercised influence upon Paul or his Gentile 
converts in this direction. Yet, perhaps ironically, this does not mean that initiation into 
the mystery cults failed to influence the Corinthians' attitude towards baptism in other 
ways. When considered from the perspective of practical consciousness, there are 
grounds for proposing that initiation influenced the Corinthians' understanding of the 
consequences of baptism. The absence of any perceived impact on social status, and of 
moral category changes, is suggestive. So too is the construal of baptism as the entry 
point to a new exalted personal religious status, understood more in terms of divine 
patronage and protection than of the participatory categories important to Paul. 
47Wedderburn (l987b), p.341. 
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9.2 The Spirit 
9.2.1 Baptism and the Spirit - 1 Cor. 12:13 
One of the reasons why the Corinthians construe baptism as the entry 
point to a new exalted personal religious status is that it was at baptism that they 
received the Spirit. It was this experience which confirmed that they had indeed 
progressed to a higher level of existence under God's patronage and protection, and 
which prompted their assessment of the significance of baptism in similar terms to that of 
initiation. It is therefore vital to my argument that the Corinthians did understand baptism 
to be the point at which they received the Spirit. Were the connection between the two 
to be severed, then it might become difficult to maintain a connection between the 
Corinthians' practical consciousness in relation to baptism and that in relation to 
initiation. Fortunately however, a connection is made between baptism and the receipt of 
the Spirit at 1 Cor. 12: 13: Kat. yap EV EVt. nVEUJ.1,CX'tt TtJ.1,E1C; ndV'tEC; EtC; EV crooJ.1,a 
EJ3an'ticr81lJ.1,EV, EhE 'Iouoal01 EhE"EAAllvEC; EhE OOUA01 d'tE EAEU8EP01, 
KCXt. ndV'tEC; EV nVEUJ.1,a Eno'ticr81lJ.1,EV. Having argued in 12:4-11 that there are 
varieties of gifts given by the same Spirit, and having listed what they are, Paul here 
establishes that this diversity does not violate the unity of the body. Although the body 
has many members it is still one, and is so because they were all baptised into one body 
by the one Spirit (12: 13a). Thus the unity of the body is here "not what Paul will argue 
jar, but what he will argue from, "48 and for Paul's argument to be effective, what he 
argues from must be something with which he knows the Corinthians will agree. We are 
therefore on safe ground in assuming that if Paul here connects baptism and the receipt 
of the Spirit, the Corinthians did so also. 
48Fee (1987), p.602. See also Conzelmann (ET 1975), p.212. The argument of chapter 14 suggests that 
some at Corinth have been asserting the importance of tongues to the detriment of the exercise of other 
gifts. 
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Until recently we could have ceased our discussion of 12: 13 here. All 
major commentators agreed that this verse indicated a connection between baptism and 
the receipt of the Spirit.49 However, reviving a position taken earlier by Dunn, both Fee 
and Witherington argue that Paul here uses the verb j3cxTt'tit;c.o as a metaphor for 
conversion. 50 The basis from which Paul argues is not that the Corinthians all received 
the Spirit at baptism, but that they all did so at conversion. This case is put most fully by 
Fee, who points out that the statement of 12: 13c, that all were given the one Spirit to 
drink, is both clearly parallel to 12: 13 a, and clearly metaphoricaPl That this alternative 
way of stating the same truth as contained in 12: 13a is itself metaphorical "argues most 
strongly for a metaphorical, rather than literal, meaning for 'baptism' in the first clause. "52 
He also alleges that Schnackenburg, who takes 12: 13a literally, and who uses it and 6: 11 
to suggest a connection between baptism and receipt ofthe Spirit, is engaging in circular 
argument, since "that (the connection) is precisely what is to be doubted in both cases. "53 
Fee's arguments are not convincing. Barrett, who takes the reference to 
baptism in 12: 13a literally, comments on the parallel clause in 13c that "the new figure is 
a necessary supplement to the statement that we were baptised (that is, immersed) in the 
Spirit; the Spirit not only surrounds us but is within us. "54 While it is parallel, this second 
clause does develop the meaning, and it is therefore not self-evident that because it is 
metaphorical, the first clause must be. It is also doubtful whether Fee's own argument is 
any less circular than that of those whom he criticises. The only occasions on which Paul 
49Barrett (1971b), p.288; Calvin (ET 1960), pp.264-65; Conzelmann (ET 1975), p.212; Godet (ET 
1886), p.209; Goudge (1903), p.112; Hering (ET 1962), p.l30; Moffatt (1938), p.186; Robertson & 
Plummer (1911), p.272. 
50Dunn (1970), p.l30; Fee (1987), p.604-06; Fee (1994), p.175-83, 853-63; Witherington (1995), p.258. 
One suspects that the adoption of this position has rather less to do with first century Corinth than with 
an anachronistic desire to vindicate Protestant positions within post-Reformation debates. 
5 1 Calvin (ET 1960), pp.265-66, and Conzelmann (ET 1975), p.212 n.17, both argue that 12:l3c refers 
to the Lord's Supper, but the aorist tense of the verb suggests a single past action rather than one 
repeated many times. 
52Fee (1987), p.605. 
53Fee (1987), p.604 n.25. See Schnackenburg (1964), p.83. 
54Barrett (1971b), p.289. 
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may have used l3a1t'ti~co metaphorically are here and 15:29, and in each case this is 
precisely what is to be doubted. Further, although ignored by Fee et aI., 12: 13b, where 
Paul outlines the social consequences of baptism, is relevant. The slogan, 'whether Jews 
or Greeks, whether slaves or free', contains very similar language to Gal. 3 :26£, where 
Paul uses these same categories in order to assert unity in Christ on the basis of both 
faith (3:26) and baptism (3:27).55 Here there can be no doubt that baptism is intended to 
be understood literally, since Paul says EtC; Xpt(r'tov tl3a1t'ticr8'Tl'tE (3 :27), an almost 
identical phrase to that used at Rom. 6:3. Here, as in 1 Cor. 12: 13, Paul has used the 
verb l3a1t'ti~co and has outlined the consequences of baptism for ethnic and social 
divisions. It is simply not credible to suppose that in Gal. 3 :27 Paul intends the verb 
literally, but in 1 Cor. 12:13 metaphorically. 56 12:13 continues to suggest most strongly 
that the Corinthians did connect baptism and the receipt of the Spirit, and that, therefore, 
it remains credible to suggest that their understanding of the significance of baptism was 
influenced by the significance of initiation in the mystery cults. 
9.2.2 A New Status in the Spirit - 1 Cor. 2:6-16 
At 2:6, Paul's argument undergoes a sharp change of tone. For having 
portrayed his gospel as a God-given foolishness antithetical to all human wisdom (1: 18-
2:5), he makes an unexpected statement: I.o¢iav DE AaAOUf.lEV tv 'tolC; 'tEAe-LOtC;. 
This dramatic shift in his argument has produced widespread agreement among 
commentators that, in 2:6-3: 1, Paul adopts some of the Corinthians' own language, 
especially the 1tVEUf.la'ttKOC; - \jfUXtKOC; terminology. 57 This is significant for my own 
55See Horrell (1996), pp.83-84.In regard to 12:13 Fee argues that there it is the Spirit and not baptism 
which is the basis of unity. He is certainly correct that there one Spirit is directly equated with one body, 
not one baptism directly with one body. However, the one loaf of the Lord's Supper is very directly 
equated with one body at 10:17, and so it is difficult to see how this objection can carry any weight. 
56Dunn (1970), pp.109-13 astonishingly attempts to argue that metaphor is what is intended in both 
Rom. 6:3 and in Gal. 3:27. Horrell (1996), p.83 n.126 & p.84 n.127 gives a polite, but incredulous, 
response on Gal. 3 :27. 
57Lillmnann (1965), p.l13: "Es ist deutlich, daB Paulus hier eine ihm sonst fremde Sprache spricht." 
Also Barrett (l971b), p.77; Horsley (1976), pp.269-70; Orr & Walther (1976), p.165; Pearson (1973), 
pp.38-39; Wilckens (ET 1971), p.521. Nearly all accept the pair of terms as Corinthian, although Fee 
(1987), p.1l6 & p.785 n.42 regards 'V'\)XtK6~ as Paul's own. Given that the two appear jointly only here 
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argument since, if the receipt of the Spirit at baptism did help the Corinthians to construe 
baptism as the gateway to a new exalted personal religious status, then 'spiritual one' is 
exactly the sort of self-description we might expect them to favour. It fits well with the 
suggestion that, at the level of practical consciousness, the Corinthians have understood 
the significance of baptism in terms similar to the significance of initiation within the 
mystery cults. Some exploration of this terminology is therefore necessary, and the 
following questions will be examined: (i) Is there any other vocabulary in 2:6-16 which 
Paul has taken over from the Corinthians? Is there an identifiable source for the 
terminology which the Corinthians apply to themselves? (ii) How does this terminology 
function for the Corinthians? In particular, what for them is the difference between a 
1t:V£u~a'tlK6~ and a \jfuXlx6~? 
9.2.2.1 The Language of 1 Cor. 2:6-16 
Whether Paul borrowed from the Corinthians terminology other than 
the 1tv£u~a'tlK6~ - \jfUXLK6~ contrast is a difficult issue. Alongside the fact that it is 
only in 1 Corinthians that Paul uses the terms together, it is the complete lack of genuine 
parallels in other contemporary or earlier literature which makes the case for his having 
borrowed this pair of words so strong. 58 A contrast between the nouns 1tv£u~a and 
\jfUXtl is common, but not the development of corresponding terms to designate two 
different types of person. The 'tEA£W~ - Vtl1tW~ terminology (2:6,3:1) satisfies merely 
one of these criteria. It is only in 1 Corinthians that Paul uses these two terms together, 59 
and this occurs only in contexts where the main subject under discussion is the Spirit, but 
the contrast between adult maturity and infanthood is a universal metaphor. It would be 
rash to assume on this basis that Paul's use of it specifically reflects that of the 
and in 15:44-54, and that it is nVEul.L<X:ttKOC; which Paul uses elsewhere (Gal. 6:1), this argument 
seems ill-founded. 
58Horsley (1976), p.270: "For this distinctive language so important for understanding the Corinthian 
situation ... there is no convincing terminological parallel whatsoever in contemporary comparative 
material." 
59 1 Cor. 13:9-11, 14:20. 
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Corinthians. 60 If they did use it, then we can be sure that they did not share his estimation 
ofthem as Vllniot EV Xpt(j'tcP (3: 1). 
As regards single words, such as /l'\)(j'trlPWV (2:7), or single phrases 
such as 'td, j3clSll 'tou Scou (2: 10), it is difficult to see any way of determining whether 
they were favoured by the Corinthians as terms to describe their own religious 
experience. All one can do is note that Paul's use of /l'\)(j'trlPWV is heavily concentrated 
in 1 Corinthians, with 6 of its 8 occurrences being found there,61 something which may 
suggest that, whether or not the Corinthians used it, Paul had a specific purpose in 
drawing it to their attention. The only genuine parallel to 'td, j3clSll 'tou Scou in the 
entire New Testament comes at Rev. 2:24 in the letter to the church at Thyatira, where 
the opponents of the author are said to know 'td, j3aSecx 'tou (jCX'tCXV(X. The 
introduction of Satan makes it rather clearer with John than with Paul that a specifically 
polemical point is being made, but it may be one based on adapting a shared idea, i.e., 
that Christians penetrate the deeps things of God, rather than on a specific claim from 
John's opponents to be able to penetrate the deep things of Satan and remain 
unharmed.62 Certainly the Corinthians cannot have failed to find congenial the idea that 
the wisdom of the nVc'\)/la'ttKoi extends even to the deep things of God. 
Related to this question, of which other Corinthian terms Paul adopts 
and uses, is that of whether a source can be identified for such vocabulary. It has often 
been argued that the terms we have discussed are drawn from the mystery cultS. 63 Such 
arguments have been unimpressive,64 for the examples given of genuinely parallel usages 
6°Rash also to assume, as does Pearson (1973), pp.28-29, that, because Philo employs the same contrast, 
he must be the source behind its appearance here. The term 'tEA-HOC; is used widely by philosophers to 
denote individuals who have advanced to the pinnacle of the philosophical life. See Weiss (1910), p.74. 
A particularly good example of the two terms used as a contrast is provided by Polybius 5.29.2: The 
enemies of Philip V of Macedon hope to find a nat8iov vTpnov, but discover instead a 'tEA-HOC; avrlP. 
61 1 Cor. 2: 1,7; 4: 1; 13:2; 14:2; 15:51. The other two uses come at Rom. 11:25; 16:25. 
62See Mounce (1978), p.105. 
63E.g. Hering (ET 1962), p.15f.; Conzelmann (ET 1975), p.57. 
64Nock (1972) Vol. I, p.343 concludes of early Gentile Christianity in general that "certainly there is no 
indication of an appropriation of pagan religious terms." 
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normally come from later Gnostic texts65 and, as we have seen, there are good grounds 
for thinking that Paul is their source rather than vice versa.66 TEAEWC; provides a 
perfect example of this lack of corroborating evidence. We have ample proof that in the 
language of the mystery cults, the verb 'tEAECO can definitely refer to initiation, as can 
'tEAOC;, since an initiation is a consummation, and 'tEAE'trl can refer to a ceremony of 
initiation. However, there is no example where 'tEAEWC; itself carries similar mystery 
connotations.67 The best that can be argued is that when so many terms in the same 
group can carry such connotations, it would be unwise to rule it OUt.68 Given that in 2:6 
'tEAEWC; stands in such obvious opposition to vrlnwC; in 3: 1, it begins to seem fairly 
doubtful whether this term reflects the vocabulary of the mystery cults. 
Paul's use of /-luO"'trlPwv in 2:7 presents a different challenge for, as 
the title implies, the term obviously was part of the vocabulary of the mystery cults, and 
so the argument is only about whether or not it carries mystery cult connotations in this 
context. In a clearly argued article on the use of mystery language in the Bible, A.E. 
Harvey concludes not. He points out that the literal meaning of a term may be to denote 
a religious rite, but that from this literal meaning there may develop a rich vein of 
metaphorical meanings as happened, for example, with the term 'sacrifice'.69 In the case 
of /-luO"'trlPwv, one such development of a metaphorical meaning can be found in the 
Septuagint where it translates the Aramaic word raz. "This Aramaic word was, and 
remained, almost a technical term in apocalyptic for the 'secrets' of God, in the sense of 
65See Conzelmann (ET 1975), pp.60f. who provides an unfortunately fine example of this 
indiscriminate mixing of sources. In discussing ~ ucr'trlPWV he lists all the contexts in which it occurs 
and asserts, p.62, that "the common factor is their esoterism." 
66See above, p.199. 
67See Pearson (1973), p.27. 
68Kennedy (1913), p.132. "When we find ~Ucr'ttKOU 'tEAoue; (=mystic rite) in Aesch. Fr. 387 (Nauck, 
ed.2), and the plural 'tEAT] (e.g. Eur., Hipp., 25, 'tEAT] ~ucr'tT]pi(J)v) constantly employed with this 
meaning, it is surely hazardous to say that 'tEAewe; cannot be used with this technical connotation." 
69Harvey (1980), p.320. 
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God's ultimate purposes which were revealed only to a privileged seer or a privileged 
people. "70 
For Harvey, this apocalyptic sense of !luO''tTtPWV is quite devoid of 
any direct reference to the mystery cults and, in cases such as 1 Cor. 2:7 where Paul 
clearly uses it to denote the revealing of God's secrets, the pursuit of such a reference is 
futile. Yet Harvey is content to allow that in other cases an ambiguous double meaning 
might suit Paul's purposes very well, and these cases include 1 Cor. 4:1, 13:2 & 14:2.11 
He is certainly right that at 2:7 Paul uses !luO''tTtPwv in a thoroughly apocalyptic sense. 
Here it refers not to a rite as in the mystery cults, but instead to the revelation of God's 
pre-ordained plan of salvation. Yet does this rule out a particular type of double 
meaning? If Paul is here attempting to restore what he understands to be a proper degree 
of emphasis on the apocalyptic content of God's wisdom, then his purpose may be to 
provoke the Corinthians to thought precisely by using the term in a different manner 
from that with which they might be familiar in their own environment. They think 
primarily of a rite, Paul of a revelation. 72 
To summarise, there is no substantive evidence that in 2:6-16 Paul has 
borrowed from the Corinthians any terminology other than the nVEU!lcx,1::1KOC; -
\lfUX1KOC; contrast. It has been suggested that other vocabulary within the passage is 
borrowed from the mystery cults, but this too seems doubtful. Even if such borrowing 
had taken place, our doubts as to whether this other vocabulary is the Corinthians' own 
means that it would probably represent the influence of the mystery cults upon Paul 
rather than upon them. The most that can be allowed is that Paul may have sought to 
make a point by deliberately using the term !l uO''tTtPiov in a way which runs counter to 
its normal usage within the mystery cults. Given my own hypothesis that the Corinthians' 
70Harvey (1980), p.326. 
71Harvey (1980), pp.331-332. 
72This is a difference of emphasis rather than an absolute distinction, since initiation rites did include 
'revelations'. 
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understanding of the significance of baptism was influenced by the mystery cults, it is 
tempting to reach different conclusions. However, there is, in truth, very little in 2:6-16 
to suggest that the mystery cults provide the source of its vocabulary. The only 
terminology we can be reasonably certain was the Corinthians' own is the 1tVcU~CX:tlXOC; 
- \jfUX,tKOC; contrast, and it has no known contemporary parallels. 
9.2.2.2 The Function of the 1tVcU~CX/ttKOC; - \jfUX,tKOC; Terminology 
Yet to expose the origins of language is not to provide a complete 
explanation of its meaning.73 How it functions in the context under consideration is of at 
least equal importance. It is in its function, not its derivation, that we find grounds on 
which to base the suggestion that the 1tvcu~a'ttKOC; - \jfUX,tKOC; terminology reflects 
the influence of the mystery cults upon the Corinthians. When they received the Spirit at 
baptism (12: 13) they, like initiates into the mystery cults, entered into a new exalted 
personal religious status. It is this self-understanding which is reflected in the designation 
'spiritual one', and for which 2:6-16 provides evidence.74 When that evidence is 
examined, what emerges IS a consistent pattern of superiority and inferiority. The 
73See Martin (1995), p.xii. 
74My argument clearly depends upon the 1tVeU/la'ttKol and the baptised forming identical groups. A 
possible objection is therefore that they are not, and that Paul and/or the Corinthians use the designation 
'spiritual one' to refer to a separate Glass of believers. For the view that this is Paul's intention see 
Conzelmann (ET 1975), p.57; God~t (ET 1886), p.132; Hering (ET 1962), p.15. That this is not what 
Paul intends is indicated by the fact that although he labels them VJ'rttat (3:1), and (><XPKtKOl (3:1), he 
does not term the Corinthians 'lfUXtKOi. As Reitzenstein (ET 1978), p.435 comments, Paul "cannot 
very well use 'lfUXtKO<;, for the Corinthians are after all baptised, they are EV Xpw't0 and thus are 
already partakers in the 1tVeU/la but they are not yet 'teA-dOt." Paul's words are therefore those of 
someone who expected all his converts to be mature and spiritual, but found them to be neither. 
Robertson and Plummer (1911), p.36 rightly suggest that Paul's desire is for "the raising of all such 
imperfect Christians to the normal and ideal standard." The designation 1tVeU/la'ttKo<; is one that he 
would sorrowfully deny to the majority at Corinth, but it reflects what he wished them all to be. For the 
view that the Corinthians regarded the 1tVeU/la'ttKol as a separate superior class of believers see 
Wilckens (ET 1971), p.519: spiritual and charismatic utterance was "restricted in principle to the 
exclusive circle of the 'teA-etat and 1tVeU/la'ttKoi." Both Wilckens and Liihrmann (1965), pp.133-40 
think that Paul has here taken over a Gnostic redeemer myth and adapted it. But there is also no 
indication in 2:6-16 that the Corinthians would have used the terminology found there any differently 
from Paul. The polemic which Paul launches against them depends for its effectiveness upon their 
wholehearted agreement with his description of what it is to be a 1tVeU/la'ttKo<;. This then makes all 
the more devestating his assertion in 3: 1 that they are not 1tVeUlla'ttKoi. Paul builds the Corinthians up 
only to knock them down. We are therefore on safe ground in using 2:6-16 as evidence for the manner 
in which the 1tVeUlla'ttKO<; - 'lfUXtKO<; terminology functioned for all the Corinthians. 
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TCVEU!lCX"C1KOi can know the things of God (2: 12), understand spiritual teaching (2: 13), 
and discern/examine all things without themselves being subject to the same probing 
(2:15). Knowing the mind of God was formerly beyond human beings, but the 
TCVEU!lCX"C1KOi now have the mind of Christ (2:16). In contrast, the \lfUX1KOi simply do 
not receive the things of the Spirit (2: 14a). In this context this appears not a result of 
perversity, but of their inability. The \lfUX1KOC;; simply ou 8UVCX"CCXl YVcOVCXl (2: 14),75 
and is not therefore malignant, but "merely inferior and unprivileged. "76 What determines 
this gulf in capabilities is the possession of the Spirit, for the things of the Spirit 
TCVEU!lCX1:tKcOC; ciVCXKpivE"CCXl (2: 14). One understands spiritual things solely by virtue 
of being TCVEU!lCX1:tKOC;; oneself. It is the Spirit which reveals God's plan of salvation 
(2:10), and the Spirit of God which understands His thoughts (2:11) is the same Spirit 
EK "C01) 8E01) which has been received by the TCVEU!lCX"C1KOi (2: 12). 
The TCVEU!lCX"C1KOC;; - \lfUX1KOC;; terminology thus functions to assert 
the Corinthians' sense of their superlative personal religious distinction. They are 
different from the rest of humanity, who languish as mere \lfUX1KOl. Given that this 
distinction results from their possession of the Spirit, poured out on them at baptism 
(12: 13), then the parallels with initiation are significant. There too the special experience 
conferred through the rite is the point of entry to a new mode of existence.77 The 
passage from Plutarch which was quoted earlier carries just such a sense of distinction. 
Here too the initiate is set apart from the rest of humanity and granted an innate 
superiority. He "surveys the uninitiated, unpurified mob here on earth, the mob of living 
men ... herded together in mirk and deep mire. "78 Here too the uninitiated do not so much 
suffer from moral shortcomings, as from an ignorance which means that they "in their 
fear of death cling to their ills." The initiate has now risen above all this to a state 
75Conzelmann (ET 1975), p.60: "The nonpneumatic simply cannot understand." Fee (1987), p.1l6-17 
denies this. 
76Barclay (1992), p.69. 
77See above, pp.256-57. 
78Plutarch,fr.168. See above pp.246-47. 
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characterised by perfection and freedom, able to "converse with pure and holy men" just 
as Paul knew that he would be able to teach 1tVEU~CX,'tlKOi in a manner that involved 
1tVEu~a"C1Kol~ 1tVEU~anKd cru'YKpivOV"CE~ (2: 13). Both baptism and initiation 
confer the ability to see and to hear (2:9) that which is incomprehensible to those who 
have not shared the experiences they offer. 
The evidence provided by 1 Cor. 2:6-16 thus fits well with my 
suggestion that it is at the level of practical consciousness that the Corinthians' 
understanding of baptism has been influenced by the mystery cults. Direct influence at a 
discursive level is unlikely given that permanent possession by the Spirit lacks clear 
parallels within Graeco-Roman religion. Further, the 1tVEU~anKo~ - \jfUX1KO~ 
contrast, the only vocabulary in the passage which can securely be attributed to the 
Corinthians, is not derived from the mystery cults. Yet the Corinthians do describe 
themselves as 1tVEU~cx."C1KOi, a term which functions to express a sense of exalted 
personal religious status. This suggests that they construe their identity, as ones filled by 
the Spirit, in ways similar to those who have been initiated into the mystery cults. That 
the Spirit was received at baptism (12: 13), and that baptism is therefore the gateway to 
this new exalted status, further strengthens the plausibility of this suggestion. For the 
Corinthians, the same implicit rules and resources of social life operate in relation to 
baptism as to initiation. It remains to test this hypothesis in relation to those passages in 
1 Corinthians where baptism itself is discussed (1:10-17, 15:29). 
9.3 Baptism: The Tie that Binds 
9.3.1 Baptism and the Creation of 'Parties' - 1 Cor. 1:10-17 
In these verses Paul rebukes the Corinthians for factionalism, criticising 
their tendency to identify themselves with one or other prominent figure within early 
Christianity (1: 12). Paul seems to associate such divisions with baptism, asking if the 
Corinthians had been baptised into his name (1: 13 c) and giving thanks that he had 
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baptised so few at Corinth tva !-tTl 'tl~ ElItn on Et~ 'to E!-tOV 6vo!-ta E13a1t't1aSll'tE 
(1:15). The standing of the person by whom one had been baptised therefore seems to 
have been a source of prestige and division among the Corinthians. Many have argued 
that this reflects the influence of the mystery cults, where initiation was held to create a 
special tie between the initiate and the priest performing the rite.79 Given that there is 
evidence of the creation of such a special bond from several cults this suggestion is not, 
like so many made by the History of Religions School, based on unsupported 
generalisations about the mysteries. It has a firm foundation. 80 The test which it faces is 
simply therefore that of relevance to the situation at Corinth. Does the suggestion of 
influence from the mystery cults cohere with all the information provided by Paul in 
1:10-177 
9.3.1.1 Accounting for Paul's Rhetoric 
If the Spirit was received at baptism, then there would certainly be 
every reason for the Corinthians to hold in particular esteem the baptiser who had been 
its channel. 81 Paul seems to fear that had he personally baptised a greater number, they 
79Barrett (1971b), p.47; Conzelmann (ET 1975), p.35; Hering (ET 1962), p.7; Lietzmann (1969), p.8; 
Moffatt (1938), p.ll; Wedderburn (1987b), pp.248-49; Weiss (1910), p.19. Of course, I would not agree 
with the majority of these interpreters that this belief indicates the Corinthians to have held a magical 
view of the sacraments. I would suspect rather that the relationship established between those baptised 
and their baptisers to have been one of loyalty and support in return for patronage. 
80Merkelbach (1995), p.168 says of this special bond that "diese Symbolik findet sich in vielen Kulten." 
In relation to Isis we find Mithras, the priest of Apuleius' Metamorphoses, referred to by Lucius as 
'father', himself emphasising that the goddess determined which priest initiated which candidate. See 
XI.25,21. We also have reference in inscriptions to the 'fathers' ofIsiac collegia, see SIRlS 384, 698 
(some also include 438 and 439, but Vidman (1970), pp.88-89, considers them to belong to Mithraism). 
For the same in the cult of Cybele, see CCCA Vol.III, 246, 404, 411. In the cult ofMithras, those who 
achieved the highest grade were termed 'fathers'. Here the references in inscriptions are so extensive that 
those interested should consult the indices of CIMRM. Vermaseren (1963), p.153 says of one who has 
reached this grade, "he is a Father to his initiates ... and guards over the interests of his community 
(defensor) ... he ... has been chosen by his fellow initiates (consacranei syndexi) as the lawful Father 
(pater nominus - ~a'tTtP VO~t~OC; 'tcOv 'tEAE'tcOV 'tou 9£OU) at the mysteries and as such he carries 
the responsibility for dispensing initiation to the different grades and for accepting new members." In 
the cult of Dionysus, all those conducting initiations in Egypt were required by Ptolemy IV Philopater to 
register not only the name of the person who had initiated them, but also the names of the previous two 
generations of initiators. See Hunt & Edgar (1934), no. 208. Finally, Tertullian twice, when referring to 
the mysteries in general rather than those of any specific cult, speaks of the father of the rites of 
initiation. See Apology 8, Ad. Nat. 1.7.23. 
81Wedderburn (1987b), p.248 implies that the analogy of initiation into the mystery cults and the receipt 
of the Spirit by laying on of hands reinforced each other. 
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would have become partisans of the group which used him as its mascot (1:12,14). 
However, there are difficulties with this argument. Of the four names mentioned in 1: 12, 
we can only be sure that two of them had the opportunity to baptise anyone in Corinth. 
Paul and Apollos certainly visited Corinth, but Christ certainly did not, and we have no 
way of knowing whether Peter had been there. 82 If there are those who say 'EyoS DE 
K l1¢a, ' Eyoo De XPlcr'tOU (1: 12),83 how can they do so on the basis of a special bond 
between themselves and the person who baptised them? Further, would not the Paul 
'party' have been remarkably small if becoming part of it depended upon having been 
baptised by him? Neither can one sensibly suggest that, although they did not conduct 
the ceremonies, it was the 'party' mascots into whose name individuals were baptised, for 
the rhetorical question dC; 'to 6vo~a IIauAou ej3a1t't1cr811'tE; (1: 13 c) depends for 
its force entirely upon the certainty that the answer must be negative. 
In the face of these difficulties one might be tempted to abandon 
altogether the idea of a special bond between the baptised and their baptisers. On this 
view, the thankfulness of vv.14-15 is not a reflection of any actual danger but merely a 
rhetorical ploy on Paul's part, designed to illustrate the absurdity of their factionalism. 
"Was Paul skittish here, as though by now he would put nothing beyond the Corinthian 
be1ievers?"84 Certainly the anxiety that some might claim to have been baptised into 
Paul's own name (1: 15) does seem a rhetorical exaggeration for, as we have already 
noted, the question of 1 : 13 relies for its force on the recognition that they have all indeed 
been baptised in the name of Christ. Does baptism therefore have no part in their 
divisions? One doubts it, for then the contents of vv.14-17 seem simply excessive. Why 
the concern on Paul's part to remember exactly who it was he had baptised in Corinth, 
82Conzelmann (ET 1975), p.35n.36 sees 1: 10-17 as evidence that Peter must have been to Corinth, but 
the mention of a Christ 'party' renders this a false deduction. 
83This inclusion of a Christ 'party' has given rise to no end of speculation as to its nature. What does 
Paul mean by accusing those who say they belong to Christ of factionalism when he himself demands 
that Christ be the basis of their unity (1:13)7 Perhaps what he means is just that, i.e., he believes that 
there are those who have turned even Christ himself into a cause of division by asserting that they have a 
closer connection to him than others. 
84Pee (1987), p.62. 
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and not to leave anyone out (1:14,16)? Why the insistence that to baptise is not the 
essence of his commission from Christ (1: 17)? If such statements do not reflect a genuine 
anxiety over the Corinthians' understanding of baptism then they are redundant. The 
question of 1: 13c alone would have sufficed to make Paul's point. Further, even a 
rhetorical exaggeration requires some basis from which to exaggerate, unless it is itself to 
lack all force. The fear that Corinthians would say that they were baptised in the name of 
Paul is not a real one, but it does provide a caution as to where their present attitudes 
towards baptism could lead. Paul is presenting the Corinthians with the logical 
conclusion to be drawn from what they do say, but offering it in the expectation that the 
Corinthians will recognise its undesirability. 'Look where you are heading,' says Paul, 'it 
would be better to change direction now.' 
9.3.1.2 'Party' Leaders as Baptisers 
We may therefore agree with Fee that "it is possible - probable, it 
would seem to me - that 'who baptised whom' was part of their divisions. "85 What 
remains to be clarified is how this relates to the 'parties' of 1: 12. If it was not the 'party' 
mascots who actually did the b apti sing, how was 'who baptised whom' part of the 
Corinthians' divisions? What role did the creation of a special bond between baptised and 
baptisers fulfil? The key to answering these questions lies in discerning the nature of the 
'parties'. As has already been suggested (8.2.2), the 'parties' do not seem to represent 
distinct theological positions.86 Instead, they are led by local Christians who legitimate 
their own power by appealing to renowned figures in the wider church. Exploiting their 
relatively greater wealth and status, these local leaders draw groups of poorer Christians 
into allegiance to them and compete with each other for honour. 
If this picture is right, then it is easy to see how baptism could have 
fitted into it. By creating a close bond between the baptised and the one who baptised 
85Pee (1987), p.63. 
86See pp.216-17. 
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them, baptism drew people into one 'party' or another right from the moment they joined 
the church. When this began to happen in the Corinthian church is not clear. Its overt 
expression probably dates from after Paul's departure, but it could also be that its seeds 
were sown while he was still there. "Moglich ist ... daB, nachdem einige Getaufte da 
waren, es diesen uberlassen blieb, andere in ihren Kreis aufzunehmen. "87 Given that in 
1: 14 Paul says that he baptised Crispus, probably the erstwhile synagogue ruler (Acts 
18:8), and Gaius, an individual with a home large enough to be 6 ~£vo~ J..lOU Kat 
6Al1~ 'tll~ EKKAl1cria~ (Rom. 16:23), there would seem to be something of a match 
between the social status of those whom Paul baptised, and the profile of the local 'party' 
leaders provided by Welborn. To suggest that these two specific individuals were 
therefore local 'party' leaders would be to overstate the case, but what we know of them 
does help us to paint a credible picture of how the 'parties' of 1: 12 developed. 
So too does Paul's sudden recall that he had baptised the whole 
household of Stephanas (1: 16). "The baptism of households offers a further clue as to 
how divisions developed; the head of the household thereby had a ready-made group of 
supporters. This group could expand to include other slaves, freedmen, hired labourers, 
business associates - the whole clientela. "88 Thus, the creation of a special bond between 
baptised and baptiser did indeed play a part in the formation of the 'parties' of the 
Corinthian church, and the creation of that special bond betrays an understanding of 
baptism which reflects the influence of the understanding of initiation found in the 
mystery cults. What is perhaps especially fascinating about 1: 10-17 is the way in which 
this influence feeds into a situation also shaped by other factors in the social environment 
of the Corinthians. It was the combination of their particular view of baptism with 
87Weiss (1910), p.2l. Chrysostom (ET 1839), p.27 argues that Paul attacks "the folly of those who were 
puffed up at having been baptisers~: Another possibility is, as Weiss acknowledges, that baptisms were 
carried out by Paul's assistants, whom Acts 18:5 suggests were Silas and Timothy. 
88Horrell (1996), p.117, in part quoting Welborn (1987), p.IOO. While therefore not agreeing with 
Dahl's suggestion that the quarrels at Corinth were caused by the question of which notable figure in the 
wider church to write to for advice (peter, Paul, Apollos etc.), it is entirely credible that, in a situation 
where factions existed, this became a contentious issue. See Dahl (1967),p.325. 
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behaviour expressmg the assumptions of Graeco-Roman society about politics, 
patronage, rhetoric etc. which moulded the factionalism of the Corinthian church. Our 
exploration of 1: 10-17 therefore supports the suggestion that to paint a credible picture 
of the impact of their social and religious context upon the Corinthians' interpretation of 
their Christian faith requires a substantial palette (7.4). The significance of initiation into 
the mystery cults is an important influence upon the practical consciousness of the 
Corinthians, but far from the only one. 
9.3.2 Baptism for the Dead - 1 Cor. 15:29 
, E1tEl 'tl 1tOlrlcrO'UCHV 01 j3a1t'tl1;6~EVOl U1tEP 'tcov VEKpCOV; El 
6ACO~ VEKPOt OUK E'YElpOV'tal, 'tl Kat j3a1t'tl1;ov'tal U1tEP au'tcDv; This most 
difficult of verses has spawned a vast array of proposed solutions,89 none of which has 
succeeded in convincing a majority of scholars. Perhaps none is likely to do so, and Fee's 
counsel of despair is a realistic one: "The best one can do in terms of particulars is point 
out what appear to be the more viable options, but finally to admit to ignorance. "90 
However, even determining what is viable raises several groups of questions, each of 
which we shall examine in turn. (i) Do Paul's words in 15 :29 necessarily imply a rite of 
vicarious baptism? Are there credible alternative explanations? (ii) Whatever Paul means, 
how does this verse relate to the wider issues at stake between himself and the 
Corinthians? Are those who practise baptism for the dead amongst those who say that 
there is no resurrection of the dead (15: 12), or are they a different group? (iii) If the 
Corinthians did literally baptise on behalf of the dead, what could such a rite have meant 
for them? Why is there no other contemporary evidence for the practice? 
89Estimates of the number range from several tens to hundreds. See Fee (1987), p.762; Conzelmann (ET 
1975), p.276 n.120. 
90Fee (1987), p.763. What follows is therefore inevitably speculative. One cannot, as in happier 
circumstances, attempt to distinguish between the speculative and the probable, but merely between 
conceivable and inconceivable speculation. 
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9.3.2.1 Alternatives to Vicarious Baptism 
Since Foschini's comprehensive review articles half a century ago,91 
there have been three significant attempts to provide meanings for 15:29 which do not 
involve conceding an actual vicarious baptism.92 The only one of these which 
understands Paurs words literally is that of Raeder. Taking urcep to mean 'because of,' 
she proposes that the dead in v.29a are deceased Christians, and those baptised their 
surviving relatives who receive baptism in the hope of joining their loved ones at the 
resurrection.93 However, ingenious as this is, it is hard to see why Paul should single out 
this group, as for him all baptisms were a pledge of future resurrection (Rom. 6:5). He 
might as well have said that if the resurrection of the dead was denied then there was no 
point in any baptism, especially as he has already argued that if the dead are not raised 
then Christ has not been raised (15: 16), implying that the entire Christian faith is 
therefore invalid. 
Others have sought explanations which take Paurs words 
metaphorically. The best attempt has been made by Joel White, who rejects the widely 
held view that 15 :29 represents an ad hominem argument. White instead seeks to 
integrate this verse with what follows in 15:30-32, where Paul points out that the present 
sufferings of the apostles will be pointless if there is no resurrection of the dead. 
Apostolic suffering is under discussion in 15 :29 also, where 'tcOv VEKPcOV refers to the 
apostles.94 This ties in with Paurs statement that Ka8' ll!lepav cXrc08vno"Kco (15:31), 
and leaves Ot j3arc'ttSO!lEVOt of 15 :29a as nothing more problematic than those who 
9lFoschini (1950-51). 
920ther attempts include O'Neill (1980), Reaume (1995). 
93See Raeder (1955). Also Jeremias (1955). 
94Murphy-O'Connor (1981) grants a similar integrating function to the concept of apostolic suffering 
but, drawing on a rare classical usage of the verb, takes Ot /3an'tts6~EVOt as a metaphorical reference 
to the apostles. 15:29a should therefore read 'What will they do who are being destroyed (i.e., the 
apostles) on account of (the resurrection of) the dead.' This translation faces grammatical difficulties. 
Paul does not use /3an'ttsW metaphorically elsewhere. See 9.2.1. Also, the elision in v.29a required by 
Murphy-O'Connor's translation is dubious. Robertson & Plummer (1911), p.359: "If S1. Paul had wanted 
to abbreviate unEp 't1lC; <xvacnacrEwc; 'toov VEKPOOV, he would have left out 'toov VEKPOOV, not'tllC; 
<Xvacr'tacrEwc;. " 
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have become Christians being baptised at the outset of their Christian lives. Thus, White's 
translation of 15:29 reads "Otherwise what will those do who are being baptised on 
account of the dead (that is, the dead, figuratively speaking; that is, the apostles)? For if 
truly dead persons are not raised, why at all are people being baptised on account of 
them (that is, the apostles)?"95 Such an accusation, i.e., that some are baptised on 
account of the apostles, fits into the attitude towards baptism which we saw displayed at 
1: 1 0-17. "Certain groups in Corinth were brought to faith and baptised 'on account of 
some of the apostles, especially Paul and Apollos, to whom they subsequently and quite 
naturally felt an affinity, but their preferences resulted in the development of competitive 
allegiances to one or other of the apostles .. .if there is no resurrection from the dead, 
then the Corinthians' allegiances to the apostles under whose ministries, respectively, 
they were converted is all the more ludicrous since the apostles, figuratively speaking, 
are already dead. "96 
It is tempting to accept this argument. It turns 15:29 into another 
reference to the situation created by the close bond between baptised and baptiser (1: 10-
17), once again reflecting the influence of the mystery cults upon the Corinthians' 
practical consciousness. Yet one fears that there are weaknesses which must ultimately 
overwhelm it. Although 15:29 makes an ad hominem point, one doubts that it is as out 
of place in the structure of Paul's wider argument as White alleges. In 15:1-28 Paul seeks 
to establish the necessity of faith in the resurrection of the dead, in 15:35-58 he deals 
with the nature of the body that the resurrected will enjoy and, in the interlude, he draws 
attention to the consequences of a denial of the resurrection of the dead for the 
Corinthians' present conduct, i.e., baptism on behalf of the dead, and then for his own, 
i.e., enduring apostolic suffering, both of which will be rendered pointless (15:29-34). It 
is hard to see any reason why this structure requires that the content of 15:29 be the 
95White, J. (1997), p.494. As in Murphy-O'Connor's proposal, this translation takes the OACOC; in 29b to 
qualify veKpoi rather than tyeipov't<Xt. Thus, the dead in 29a are metaphorical, those in 29b literal. 
96White, J. (1997), p.498. 
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same as that of 15:30-32. A further objection is that Paul never refers to the apostles as 
'the dead' elsewhere. Although the theme of apostolic suffering is a strong one in the 
Corinthian correspondence, it appears to be a point of contention between Paul and his 
readers (4:8£). They would not have wanted to refer to the apostles as 'the dead.' If Paul 
had meant what White alleges, surely he would have found it necessary to explain himself 
rather more clearly if his questions in 15 :29 were not to receive the puzzled response, 
'But we were not baptised on behalf of the dead.'97 Finally, White's translation requires 
that the a:tytcOv of v.29c refer not to the literal dead in the same sentence, but to the 
metaphorical dead of the previous one, something that seems decidedly forced. 98 Even 
this best of attempts to provide an alternative explanation to vicarious baptism fails. Paul 
intends his words literally. 
9.3.2.2 Baptism for the Dead and Resurrection 
If 15 :29 does refer to vicarious baptism, then the point Paul is trying 
make is clear enough. In his view the practice makes no sense unless there is a 
resurrection from the dead. He is highlighting what he regards as Corinthian 
inconsistency. Yet this is in itself puzzling. Why would those who deny the resurrection 
of the dead wish to perform rituals on their behalf at all? The inconsistency seems so 
obvious and overwhelming that one is hard-pressed to imagine how it could have 
escaped the attention of the Corinthians themselves. One might therefore suggest that 
those referred to in 15:29 are a different group from those referred to in 15:12, but in 
that case why does Paul appear to be arguing against the same target, i.e., denial of the 
resurrection of the dead? The fact that another group within the church did something 
which implied a belief in the resurrection of the dead would scarcely be a good argument 
to have employed against those who denied it. This latter group could simply have 
97Thus Paul's argument is rendered convoluted and opaque. This is a general problem with all attempts 
to find an alternative explanation to a literal vicarious baptism. Would these alternatives have occurred 
to anyone if the apparently plain meaning of Paul's words were not felt to cause so many historical and 
theological difficulties? 
98See White, J. (1997), p.494 n.44 for his attempt to cope with this problem. 
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responded that the practice was sadly misguided. Further, to argue that Paul 
misunderstood what was being said about the resurrection at Corinth is a desperate 
proposal given that he had Stephanas, F ortunatus and Achaicus on hand to provide him 
with information (16: 17). We require a solution which explains why the practice of 
baptism on behalf of the dead appeared to Paul inconsistent with a denial of the 
resurrection of the dead, yet which simultaneously also explains why it did not appear so 
to the Corinthians. 
This criterion is met by the suggestion that although the Corinthians 
did not believe that death was the end, they did have difficulty in accepting the 
desirability of continued bodily existence. For those who thought of themselves as 
nVeul-lcx:ttK01, it was a post-death spiritual existence that they looked forward to, not a 
bodily one. "Thus for them life in the Spirit meant a final ridding oneself of the body, not 
because it was evil but because it was inferior and beneath them. "99 Paul's talk of a 
crWI-lcx, nVeUI-lcx,nKov is an attempt to convince them that a continued bodily existence 
can fulfil their expectations. Against this view some pit 15:19,100 which argues that if 
Christ has not been raised then there is hope only for this life. However, this statement is 
the climax of a section in which Paul seeks to demonstrate that the resurrection of Christ 
and the resurrection of the dead are inextricably linked. Acceptance of one implies 
acceptance of the other, denial of one denial of the other. Paul is thus exploiting to his 
own advantage the common ground of belief in the resurrection of Christ (15:1-2) as the 
basis of hope for life after death, and 15: 19 is a statement of what Paul sees as the 
consequence of the Corinthiansl position. Denial of the resurrection of the dead implies 
denial of the resurrection of Christ which, in tum, implies denial of any possible after-life, 
and so Ot KOtI-l1l8EV'te<; tv Xptcr'tcP ancOAov'to (15:18). Paul's argument is 
99Pee (1987), p.7l5. See also Lietzmann (1969), p.79; Barclay (1992), p.63; Martin (1995), p.105-108; 
Wedderburn (1987b), pp.6-37. Wedderburn, p.30, argues that the Corinthians regarded the body as 
"something transitory and therefore unimportant." His discussion, and those of Barclay and Martin, also 
serve to counter the view that the Corinthians believed the resurrection already to have taken place. 
100E.g. Poschini (1950-51), pp.263-64. 
277 
structured in such a way as to eliminate any possibilities other than non-existence or 
bodily resurrection. lOl The Corinthians must choose one or the other, and if this is so, 
then the practice of baptism on behalf of the dead makes no sense when performed by 
those who deny the resurrection. This is the inconsistency to which Paul refers but 
which, from the perspective of those who reject the terms of the choice laid out by Paul, 
does not exist. They can deny the resurrection of the dead, but practise baptism on behalf 
of the dead, whom they believe enjoy a continued, but non-bodily, existence. 
9.3.2.3 Vicarious Baptism 
Having established that 15:29 probably refers to vicarious baptism, and 
having suggested that it does so as part of an argument directed against belief in a non-
bodily after-life, it remains to attempt some explanation of the details of the situation. 
What might motivate the Corinthians to undertake such a practice? One possible 
explanation is that the dead on whose behalf others received baptism were household 
members who had died before hearing the gospe1.102 Although it has been expressed in 
different ways, there have certainly been other cases in Christian history where converts 
have displayed anxiety as to the eternal destiny of their unconverted dead. 103 Such a 
suggestion would also explain the lack of any other contemporary evidence for the 
rite. 104 Any who had been alive when Paul first arrived in Corinth would have had the 
lOlPaul's vocabulary itself - avcicr'tacn<; vcKPci:iv, £ycipctv £K vcKPci:iV - probably carried the 
specific connotation of bodily resurrection. See Martin (1995), p.122; Wedderburn (1987b), pp.181-83. 
102Fee (1987), p.767 also sees deceased household members as one of the likeliest possible groups on 
whose behalf some Corinthians might be baptised. Witherington (1995), p.305 n.58 suggests something 
similar when he refers to "ancestors who have never heard the gospel. " Might this suggestion also go 
some way towards explaining Paul's failure to condemn the practice, something which has always 
puzzled commentators? For him, does the baptism of deceased household members fall within a similar 
logic to that found in 7: 14 where he asserts that unbelieving spouses and children are sanctified by their 
relationship with a believer? See Schweitzer (ET 1931), p.285 for the suggestion that it could. 
103Fletcher (1997), pp.405-06 records that, about 960 CE, Harold of Denmark had his parents' remains 
removed from their pagan burial mounds and re-interred inside his new church. 
104White, J. (1997), p.490 n.14: "Later references to baptism for the dead in Marcionite or Gnostic 
circles are irrelevant; they are all influenced by our text. " 
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opportunity to hear for themselves, and so one 'round' of baptisms on behalf of the dead 
might provide for all the deceased considered eligible to benefit. 105 
Yet although this might explain the identity of the dead on whose 
behalf some Corinthians were baptised, it does not explain how those who underwent 
vicarious baptism thought it would help the deceased. 106 On this point the word 'magic' is 
once again much in evidence among scholars, as is mention of the mystery cultS. l07 
Again, while regarding the influence of the mystery cults as significant, one doubts that 
the introduction of the term 'magic' is helpful, especially as we do not know how those 
who undertook the rite believed it to work. If we are right that the attitude towards 
death displayed in the mystery cults was rather more experimental than has usually been 
supposed,108 then those baptised on behalf of the dead may have approached the rite in 
this manner. They reasoned that there was nothing to be lost by seeking, on behalf of 
deceased members of their households, the aid of the God who poured out the Spirit at 
baptism. If so, their innovation would not be a tribute to some mechanistic view of the 
rite of baptism, but rather to the vitality of the religious experience which they associated 
with it. The God who at baptism had very publicly declared them amongst the 
1tvEUf...lCX:ttKOi might well be one whose power was sufficient to grant such exalted 
status and blessedness to the dead, as well as to the living. If He was prepared to grant 
them His power and patronage, then why not their deceased loved ones? 
1051 therefore disagree with DeMaris (l995b), who views baptism on behalf of the dead as a funerary rite 
designed to ease the transition of the newly dead from this world to the next. DeMaris suggests that the 
practice arose in Corinth partly because we find there, in the first century, Greek and Roman funerary 
practices appearing side by side, and that it disappeared because Greek inhumation finally altogether 
replaced Roman cremation. But how, even speculatively, are we to discern the connections between this 
archaeological datum and baptism for the dead? For further criticism of DeMaris, see White, J. (1997), 
p.490 n.15. 
106The following suggestion implies that Paul's reasons for finding baptism for the dead tolerable, and 
the Corinthians' motivation in undertaking it were rather different, and reflect the divergence in attitude 
towards the 'sacraments' discussed above. See 9.1.2. Paul's participatory logic makes it possible for him 
to tolerate the rite in certain circumstances (see p.277 n.102), but it is generated amongst the 
Corinthians by another, quite different pattern of thought. 
107Barrett (1971b), p.364; Chow (1992), p.160; Conzelmann (ET 1975), p.276; Fee (1987), p.767; 
Wedderburn (1987b), p.288. 
108See above, pp.250-51. 
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Baptism for the dead is therefore best seen as some sort of intercessory 
rite, prompted by anxiety as to the fate of household members who had died apart from 
Christ. While the mystery cults have no specific rites for the dead which can be adduced 
as parallels,109 there are two reasons why the influence of initiation on the Corinthians' 
understanding of baptism as a whole may have helped to prompt its application to the 
dead. One is the concept of symbolic death and rebirth attached to initiation. 110 This may 
have made baptism appear a peculiarly appropriate rite to offer on behalf of the dead. It 
is certainly easier to see how this rather looser, more general, concept of coming through 
death to life might stimulate such a development than it is to see how it might result from 
Paul's more specific baptismal theology of dying and rising with Christ. Here there is a 
strong emphasis on a future bodily resurrection (Rom. 6:5,8) which the Corinthians 
would not have found congenial. The second is the whole pattern of votive religion on 
which initiation into the mysteries formed a variation. III Although there is nothing to 
suggest that baptism for the dead involved an offering, such an attempt to secure the 
protection and patronage of the deity mirrors the basic concern of votive religion. In this 
context, the comments of Chow on 15:29 are suggestive.1 12 He points to the existence 
within Graeco-Roman religion of sacrifices for the dead conducted by public officials 
performing a priestly role. Those in the Corinthian church who occupied, and aspired to, 
positions of leadership, may well have perceived officiating at such a ceremony to be 
prestigious. This suggestion is highly speculative, but it does accord with our 
understanding, drawn from 1: 10-17, that 'who baptised whom' contributed to the 
109Wedderburn (1987b), pp.289-90 sets out evidence concerning rites for the dead, although as he freely 
admits, these are not baptisms or even washings. See Plato, Resp. 2.364E - 365A, and Orph. Fr. 232. 
More interestingly, Wild (1981), pp.102-03, 123-26 draws attention to a series offunerary inscriptions 
employing the formula 'May Osiris give you cool water.' He suspects, p.103, that libations of Nile water 
were poured out for the dead, and that Nile water was believed to be the source "not only of a bountiful 
earthly life but also ajoyous life beyond the grave." However, as the earliest of these inscriptions dates 
from the end of the first century CE, it would be unwise to employ them as evidence for baptism on 
behalf of the dead in mid-century Corinth. 
110See above, p.252 n.32. 
111Burkert (1987), p.15: "The practice of personal initiation, in motivation and function, was largely 
parallel to votive practice and should be seen against this background as a new form in a similar quest 
for salvation." See above, pp.245-46. 
112Chow (1992), pp.157-66. 
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factionalism of the Corinthian church. One can imagine that those who undertook the 
baptisms of converts might also do the same for their dead, thereby entwining the divine 
patronage sought by means of the rite with their own human patronage, so that the 
former was accessed through the latter. 
9.4 Conclusions 
Having considered those texts in 1 Corinthians which discuss baptism, 
we are now in a position to draw some conclusions. In what follows, (i) - (ii) clarify the 
nature of the mystery cults and therefore also the nature of their potential to influence 
either Paul or the Corinthians, (iii) - (vi) trace the impact of initiation upon the practical 
consciousness which the Corinthians display in relation to baptism: 
(i) The History of Religions School misunderstood the potential 
influence of the mystery cults upon early Gentile Christianity. Far from involving a share 
in the sufferings of a dying and rising deity, initiation was understood as a granting of the 
power and protection of the deity. In return for continued service and devotion, the deity 
became the patron of the individual concerned, typically promising success in this life, 
longevity beyond the years appointed by fortune, and perhaps also blessedness in the life 
to come. 
(ii) Consequently, the influence of the mystery cults upon early Gentile 
Christianity cannot account for those elements of Paul's sacramental theology which 
speak of union with Christ, and of baptism as dying with him in order also to rise with 
him. Neither can the influence of the mystery cults be held to account for the supposed 
'magical sacramentalism' of the Corinthians (see Appendix 3), which has often been 
regarded as an exaggerated and false deduction from the 'mystery cult element' in Paul's 
own thought. 
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(iii) The Corinthians in fact understand their relationship with Christ in 
the terms outlined at point (i), that is, those typical of the relationship between deity and 
initiate in the mystery cults. In both cases the point of entry to such a relationship is a 
rite, on the one hand baptism, on the other initiation. The Corinthians understand the 
significance of baptism in a parallel way to that of initiation, construing it as an 
extraordinary experience of the divine which grants the individual undergoing it a new 
exalted religious status. 
(iv) The Corinthians understand baptism primarily in terms of 
experience because it was at baptism that they received the Spirit. Despite arguments to 
the contrary, the evidence of 1 Cor. 12: 13 confirms this connection between baptism and 
the receipt of the Spirit. Similarly, 1 Cor. 2:6-16, with its contrast between those who 
are nVEu!-HX1:1KOt and those who are \jfUX1KOt, demonstrates that the Corinthians did 
indeed believe themselves to have received a new exalted religious status. Whereas Paul 
perceives this confidence as misplaced, the Corinthians see no reason to suppose that 
God might be about to withdraw from them his protection and patronage. 
(v) As with initiation in the mystery cults, 1 Cor. 1: 10-17 suggests that 
the Corinthians believe baptism to create a special bond between the person baptised and 
the one who baptises. Just as baptism brings the convert into a relationship with God 
where He grants the individual His power and protection, so at Corinth it brings the 
convert into a relationship with a 'party' leader constructed on a similar basis. 
(vi) The enduring puzzle that is 1 Cor. 15:29 permits of no confident 
conclusions, but it may be that 'baptism on behalf of the dead' reflects a similar 
interweaving of divine and human patronage. Its existence is a tribute not to any magical 
view of the sacraments held by the Corinthians, but to the vitality of the religious 
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experience which they associate with baptism, and to their belief in the effectiveness of 
the power and protection of their God. 
(vii) The credibility of conclusions (i) - (vi) is enhanced by 
archaeological evidence which demonstrates the presence of the mystery cults at Corinth 
in the mid-first century CEo They were a significant presence in the social and religious 
environment of the Corinthian Christians. 
9.5 Excursus - The Mystery Cults in First Century Corinth ll3 
It seems that several mystery cults flourished in Corinth during the 
early years of its church. Detailed evidence is available for three of them, that of Demeter 
and Kore, that of a local hero PalaimonlMelikertes, and that of Isis. The first of these 
was situated at Corinth itself, the second and the third at Isthmia and Kenchreai 
respectively, both a handful of miles to the east. Each of them warrants investigation in 
its own right, but something must also be said about the collective status of mystery cults 
within Corinthian religion since some scholars have suggested that it was low. It is true 
that no temple in the central forum area, the scene of impressive first century temple-
building projects, was dedicated to a mystery deity.1 14 Donald Engels regards this as 
evidence that the elite of the city were not much interested in the mystery cults and that 
they were the preserve of the poor. 115 Dennis E. Smith is thinking along the same lines 
when he suggests that the establishment of a small shrine to Sarapis in two shops in the 
South Stoa during the late second century reflects a lower class response to this 
113The only other recent survey of the archaeological evidence for the presence of the mystery cults in 
first century is that provided by Yeo (1995), pp.101-19. However, without explaining why Yeo includes 
the cults of several non-mystery deities in his discussion. 
114The heaviest investment was in the imperial cult. The majority of dedications were to it, and 
Claudius' conquest of Britain was honoured with its own cult. See Engels (1990), pp.lOl-02 and Chow 
(1992), pp.61,46 respectively. Williams, c.K. (l987b), p.29 correlates the archaeological evidence with 
Pausanias in order to argue that Temple E, the largest new temple in the forum area, was dedicated to 
Octavia. 
115See Engels (1990), pp.106-107. 
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exclusion. 116 However, such interpretations seem ill-founded. Whatever the status of the 
adherents of the mystery cults, it may simply be that locations in the forum area were 
reserved for cults of a less personal and a more public and civic nature. 
The sacking of Greek Corinth by the Romans in 146 BCE, and its 
subsequent refounding as a Roman colony in 44 BCE, meant that new temple buildings 
were needed. All our evidence suggests that although no attempt was made to retain the 
design or architectural style of the temples of Greek Corinth,117 or to recreate earlier 
Greek ritual, the temples of the Roman city were built on the same sites whenever 
possible. 118 In the case of those temples dedicated to mystery deities which we know 
existed, this is exactly what we find. The sanctuary of Demeter and Kore was located 
with the help of Pausanias some distance along the road to Acrocorinth,119 and, upon 
excavation, proved to have been used in both periods of the city's history. Pausanias also 
placed the sanctuaries of Isis and Sarapis on the same roadside a little nearer to the city. 
Although no attempt has been made to definitely locate or excavate these temples, a 
small marble tripod base, of the second or third century BCE, dedicated to Isis, has been 
found in a manhole 400 metres down the slope from the sanctuary of Demeter and 
Kore. 120 Nancy Bookidis and Ronald Stroud are confident that, along with other pieces 
of circumstantial evidence, this find indicates the location of the temples. 121 If they are 
correct, then the worship of these deities in the Roman period also took place on the 
116See Smith (1977), p.228. 
117Williams, C.K. (1987b), p.26. As distinct from architectural style, the building techniques found in 
first century Corinth reflect neither Italian methods nor those of Hellenistic Corinth, but those of 
contemporary Athens. See Haskell (1982), p.269. 
118Williams, C.K. (1987b), p.26,32. An example of a change in ritual can be found in the cult of 
Aphrodite. Along with Poseidon, she is the deity featured most often on the coins of Roman Corinth, but 
the image of her found there suggests a cult statue on the Acrocorinth different in form from that of the 
Hellenistic period. The Roman Aphrodite uses her shield as a mirror to reflect her beauty, i.e., the accent 
has moved away from her earlier role as warrior protectress of the city and more exclusively onto her 
position as goddess oflove. See Gadberry (1992) and Soles (1982). 
119Pausanias, Descriptions of Greece, 2.4.6-7. 
l20Smith (1977), pp.216-218. 
121Bookidis and Stroud (1997), pp.5-6. 
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same sites as it had done in the Hellenistic period. Exclusion of the mystery cults from 
the forum area of the city as a result of aristocratic disdain therefore seems unlikely. 122 
9.5.1 The Sanctuary of Demeter and Kore123 
This site has been extensively and carefully excavated during the last 
few decades, and evidence found of occupation as far back as the eleventh century 
BCE.124 The first definite evidence of cultic activity appears in the seventh century 
BCE,125 with the temple remaining in use down to the end of the fourth century CEo We 
are thus dealing with a site of worship used as such for at least 1100 years. Looked at in 
this way the story of the sanctuary is one of impressive and massive continuity, but closer 
inspection significantly alters that picture. There was a substantial break in occupation 
following the sack of Corinth by the Romans in 146 BCE, and all are agreed that, while 
the buildings were not destroyed, they fell into complete disuse. What happened 
subsequent to the re-founding of the city as a Roman colony in 44 BCE is far less clear. 
Kathleen Slane, the excavation's pottery expert, believes that the site was not reoccupied 
until the middle of the first century CE,126 but Bookidis and Stroud, authors of the 
official volume on topography and architecture, date the reoccupation to early in the first 
century CE.127 They base their position on the discovery of a small amount of early 
Roman pottery, some clearly ritualistic, and of30 bronze coins which date from the reign 
of Augustus to that of Galba, but which predominantly belong to Augustus and Tiberius. 
Slane believes that the pottery "probably represents pieces casually dropped in the area 
122Especially given that the centre of Corinth may have been on a different site in the Hellenistic period. 
Williams, C.K. (1987a), p.474: "Prom the evidence that now exists, one might strongly argue that the 
Greek centre of the city has not been found. " 
1230ne assumes in the absence of evidence to the contrary that no initiations into this cult took place at 
Corinth. However, the proximity ofEleusis would have made it relatively easy for Corinthian devotees 
of Demeter to become initiates. Although there is no direct evidence to support it, the idea of a eiuaoc; 
of initiates seems not unreasonable. 
124Bookidis (1974), p.270. 
125DeMaris (1995a), p.107. 
126See Slane (1990), pp.4-5. 
127See Bookidis and Stroud (1997), pp.273-74. 
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by passers-by," 128 and presumably feels that the coins alone are an insufficient basis on 
which to posit a resumption of worship. 
Despite this disagreement, it appears that, even if the sanctuary was 
back in use as a place of worship before the mid-first century, the early years of the 
Corinthian church saw a quickening of activity at the sanctuary of Demeter and Kore. 
For the first time since the re-founding of Corinth, there is evidence of building work, 129 
and the quantity of finds increases dramatically. In relation to the entire Roman period, 
there is a preponderance of pottery from the second half of the first century in general, 
and from the third quarter of it in particular. This is due to "the construction fills and 
contemporary materials associated with the three buildings on the Upper Terrace and 
Building K-L:21-22 on the Lower Terrace."130 In other words, the middle of the first 
century saw the start of a considerable building programme. This may indicate the first 
resumption of worship at the site but, even if this had happened earlier, it is in the middle 
of the first century that considerable resources begin to be invested in the cult of 
Demeter and Kore. 
Perhaps not surprisingly after such lengthy disuse, the evidence from 
the sanctuary also suggests a change in the religious orientation of the cult. One of the 
most striking features of the sanctuary complex in the Hellenistic period had been an 
extensive range of dining rooms, many complete with kitchen and bathing facilities, 
numbering in excess of 40.131 Apart from one building, these were simply never rebuilt in 
the Roman period, and it "was so extensively remodelled that even the tops of the dining 
couches lay under the earliest Roman floor." 132 In his study of the issue of food 
sacrificed to idols in 1 Corinthians 8-10, Peter Gooch discusses these dining rooms in his 
128S1ane (1990), p.5. 
129Bookidis and Stroud (1997), p.273, suggest open-air worship prior to this date. 
130Slane (1990), p.4. 
131Bookidis (1974), p.267. 
132DeMaris (1995a), p.107. 
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consideration of the background of the texts. In doing so he openly acknowledges that 
the dining rooms no longer existed in the first century CE, but seeks to overcome this 
problem by pointing to evidence that the preparation of food remained a significant 
activity within the temple.133 This is undoubtedly true,134 but it also unfortunately gives 
the impression of greater continuity in the forms of worship offered than is actually the 
case. What is most striking is that, livery little Roman pottery that safely may be assumed 
to have had a purely ritual function was found in the sanctuary of Demeter ... this 
situation differs substantially from that of the Greek period, when votive pottery and 
other objects of normal and miniature size were abundant. A considerable change in cult 
practice between the Greek and Roman periods is thereby attested. II 135 Although the 
precise nature of these changes remains obscure,136 it seems clear that, in the mid-first 
century CE, the cult of Demeter and Kore at Corinth experienced innovation as well as 
revival. 
9.5.2 The Cult of PalaimonlMelikertes 
Isthmia and its games were associated with the cult of Poseidon, and 
his temple there was one of the greatest of the ancient world. It is not clear whether the 
temple building suffered much damage in 146 BCE, but it is certain that the cult was 
disrupted for the very large 'long altar/ which stood immediately next to the temple in 
the open air, was removed and a cart road run across its foundations.137 However, 
Poseidon was not the sole proprietor, for the games were also associated with the boy 
god Palaimon, also known by the name ofMelikertes. According to myth, Palaimon was 
133Gooch (1993), pp.3-4. 
134Slane (1990), p.72: "Vessels for use over a fire or in an oven form a significant proportion of the 
Roman pottery found in the Demeter sanctuary, and most show marks of heavy use." 
135Slane (1990), p.64. See also Bookidis and Stroud (1997), p.435. 
136DeMaris (1995a) attempts to explore the nature of the innovation involved. He draws attention to the 
discovery in the sanctuary of curse tablets (dejixiones) and mosaics featuring snakes, and the finding 
both there, and at Isthmia, of open vessels (kraters) with snake decoration applied to the handles. He 
argues that, collectively, these artefacts indicate a shift of attention from Demeter to Kore, and from the 
fertility aspects of the cult to more chthonic ones, with a new stress on the underworld and on funerary 
concerns. Bookidis and Stroud (1997), p.434 n.67 are not convinced by his argument. 
137Broneer, (1973) Vol.lI, p.68. 
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the drowned son of the mad king of Orchomenos, and his funeral at Isthmia had led to 
the holding of the first games.138 It thus seems that the games were understood as being 
held in his honour. By the time that Pausanias visited Isthmia sometime in the period 
155-170 CE, a smaller temple dedicated to Palaimon stood immediately adjacent to that 
of Poseidon, and Pausanias records that it was in an underground chamber (adyton) 
associated with the Palaimonion that athletes underwent rituals involving the swearing of 
oaths to abide by the rules of the games.139 Oath-taking does not seem to have been 
restricted to athletes, since Aelius Aristides (Orations 46.40) mentions the pleasure of 
taking Palaimon's oath and participating in his rites and ceremonies. In addition, Plutarch 
(Theseus 25) speaks of Palaimon's rites as secret nocturnal ones, and so does 
Philostratus (Imagines II.16). The vocabulary all three use to describe these rites, 
'tEAE'trl (Plutarch and Aristides) and opyux (Philo stratus and Aristides), leaves little 
doubt, when combined with the emphasis on secrecy, that the cult of Palaimon was in 
fact a local mystery cult. 140 
When the cult began, and whether it had always had mysteries are 
questions shrouded in obscurity. Evidence that the cult existed at all in the Hellenistic 
period is somewhat thin although, on balance, one must conclude that it did. 141 In stark 
contrast to this uncertainty, the archaeological evidence from the Roman period expands 
the knowledge of the rites gleaned from literary sources. Within 20-30 metres south-east 
138Broneer, (1962), pp.25-28. 
139Pausanias, Descriptions of Greece, 2.2.1. Broneer is convinced that he and his team found this 
adyton, but others seem less convinced. See Broneer (1973) VoUI, pp. 11 1-112 and Koester (1990), 
p.364. 
140For discussions of the literary evidence see Burkert (ET 1983), pp.196-99 and Koester (1990), 
pp.362-364. 
141Broneer (1973), VoUI, p.99 records that although he and his colleagues had expected to find an 
ancient cult place, "the findings in our trenches did not fit this conception of the shrine ... all the material 
remains of the Palaimonion turned out to be of Roman date." The remains of an enclosure (temenos) 
dating to the mid fifth century BeE have subsequently been discovered immediately south of the temple 
of Poseidon (the Roman Palaimonion is immediately south-east), and it could be that this enclosure was 
that of Pal aim on. See Gebhard (1987), p.476, who also draws attention to a Scholiast to Pindar (Snell 
6.5[1] ) which suggests "that the child was ritually mourned as a part of the Isthmian festival. A wreath 
of pine and then later of wild celery crowned the victors, a sign of mourning for the dead child. " Even 
so, as Koester (1990), p.359, points out, it would be impossible to reconstruct even Palaimon's story on 
the basis of the pre-Roman evidence. 
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of the temple of Poseidon were found three sacrificial pits. All of them were stone lined 
and showed clear evidence of heat damage. "All three pits contained much ash and many 
burned bones of sacrificial animals, all cattle, in some cases at least young bulls, which 
had been burned whole. This is of interest as confirmation of Philostratos' statement 
(Imagines, II. 16) that black bullocks were sacrificed to Palaimon. "142 The three pits were 
dug successively and, although there may have been some chronological overlap in use 
of the first and second pit, the basic pattern is that a fresh pit was dug as the previous 
one became full. Apart from a series of steps next to the third pit, perhaps used to 
support seating, the pits and their enclosure constituted the entire cult apparatus in the 
first century. 143 
The dating of these three pits has proved controversial. In the official 
volumes written by Broneer, pit A is described as coming into use during the first half of 
the first century, pit B around 50 CE, and pit C from around 75 CE.144 Thus, 
presumably, the worship of Palaimon resumed when the games returned to Corinthian 
control from that of Sikyon sometime between 7 BCE and 3 CEo However, in a 1989 
article, D. Geagan announced that he had obtained new information from the member of 
Broneer's staff responsible for the original datings. "Dr. John Hayes of the Royal Ontario 
Museum has communicated by letter recent revisions to his earlier chronological 
observations. "145 Crucially, Hayes now believed that pit A had not come into use until 
142Broneer (1973) VoUI, p.102 n.8. As well as these pits, archaeologists found large numbers of an 
unusual type of lamp with no handles, peculiar to this site. The lamps were therefore cult vessels, 
designed exclusively for the sanctuary of Pal aim on. See Broneer (1977), Vol.III, p.35-42 who suggests 
that they were in use at all stages in the development of the Palaimonion during the Roman period. 
Gebhard et al. (1998), p.445 are more cautious: "While no certain examples are present in the early Pit 
A, the type seems to have been first introduced during the period of Pal aim onion I (i.e., before ca. A.D. 
80), though it is not common until the latter part of Pal aim onion II." Koester (1990), p.366: "What was 
the significance of the nocturnal rites, illuminated by strange lamps, in which bulls were sacrificed in a 
secret ritual and burned in a pit?" 
143See Broneer (1973) VoUI, pp.lOO-04. A temple building was not constructed until well into the 
second century, and inscriptions honouring the benefactor responsible for it suggest that it had not long 
been completed when Pausanias saw it. See Geagan (1989), pp.358-60. 
144Broneer (1973) Vol.II, pp.lOO-lOl. 
145Geagan (1989), p.359 n.25. 
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the middle of the first century CE, and this view was confirmed by fresh excavations at 
Isthmia. 146 The worship of Pal aim on did not resume at Isthmia until around 50 CE. 
This is somewhat puzzling. Was there a period of around half a century 
when the games were held at Isthmia, but Palaimon was not worshipped? Elizabeth 
Gebhard finds this implausible and proposes that, although during this period the games 
were under Corinthian control, they were not held at Isthmia. Instead they were 
celebrated in the city stadium at Corinth. 147 The return of the games to Isthmia itself is 
perhaps commemorated by coinage of Nero from 57/58 CE or 58/59 CE, which has the 
name 'Isthmia' encircled by a wreath of selinon. 148 On the basis of such slender evidence, 
the only safe verdict is not proven. A vital inscription which might have settled the 
argument is sadly fragmentary. 149 Gebhard's case will only become convincing if further 
investigation confirms her impression that early first century material is absent from a 
rather wider area than simply that of the Palaimonion. 15o If she is wrong, then there arise 
some fascinating, if admittedly speculative, possibilities. Given we have no knowledge of 
how Palaimon was worshipped in the Hellenistic period, and cannot assume that this 
146Gebhard (1993), p.79. 
147Gebhard (1993), pp.81-82 in fact proposes that Corinth resumed control of the games far sooner than 
7 BCE - 3 CE. If they were not held at Isthmia, then the evidence provided by Strabo, Geography 
8.6.22, is no longer decisive. She favours 40 BCE when coins began to be minted on which the name of 
the city was enclosed by a (victor's?) pine wreath. 
148Gebhard (1993), p.86. 
149Kent (1966), no.153 was set up by a certain Regulus to honour his father, who had been an 
agonothetes of the games. His father is also said to have done something 'ad Isthmum', probably building 
work. It therefore seems that when this man was an agonothetes, the Isthmian games were indeed held 
at Isthmia. Unfortunately, the father could either be Lucius Castricius Regulus (duovir 21122 CE) or Cn. 
Publicius Regulus (duovir 50/51 CE). Kent opts for the former, suggesting at the crucial point 'TIBereon 
caesarEON SEBASTEON ET agonothete ISTHMION ET CAESAReon' (capital letters indicate those 
portions of the inscription in existence). Gebhard suggests that the emperor in question was in fact 
Tiberius Claudius. Yet this is problematic. Unless Kent's reconstruction is more widely erroneous, there 
is not room for the sequence 'Tibereon Claudieon Caesareon Sebasteon' found in West (1931), nos.82 
and 83, to which Gebhard (1993), p.88 n.44, refers in her own support. To prove her point, Gebhard 
would therefore need to propose an alternative reconstruction of the entire inscription. Further, a return 
to Isthmia in the reign of Claudius does not fit all that neatly with the 'commemorative' coinage from the 
reign of Nero. 
150Gebhard (1993), pp.84-85. Gebhard et al. (1998), p.416 n.24 seem to reflect such uncertainty by 
hedging their bets. They still feel that the number of early first century finds from the sanctuary, the 
theatre and the stadium are too small to suggest regular use, but concede that "on some occasions during 
this period they (the games) may have been held at their traditional site." 
290 
involved mysteries, then it may be that what we witness at Isthmia circa 50 CE is the 
establishment ofa new mystery cult. Even if Gebhard is right, the worship of Pal aim on in 
association with the games provides evidence of a local mystery cult attached to one of 
the most significant events in Corinthian civic life. 
9.5.3 The Cult of Isis at Kenchreai 
In the 1960s a substantial area of the harbour side at Kenchreai, the 
eastern and smaller of Corinth's two ports, was explored by archaeologists. At that date 
this was an innovative project, for part of the site was underwater. On the mole at the 
south-west end of the harbour, there was found evidence of eleven periods of 
construction, and/or alteration, running from pre-Augustan times down to the sixth or 
seventh century CEo It is in this area that Pausanias locates temples of Isis and 
Askiepios,151 and here too that Apuleius sets his story of Lucius' initiation into the Isis 
cult. 152 In the first two periods of occupation it seems clear that the buildings were used 
for commercial purposes, with at least one substantial warehouse constructed during the 
reign of Augustus. But then, "presumably from the first century after Christ",153 two 
rooms were adapted to create a small courtyard with a quadrangular niche at one end. 
This is the first evidence of specifically religious use of the buildings. Thereafter, 
development was impressive, with the construction of an apse, an enlarged courtyard and 
new precinct walls. These were probably built in the aftermath of the earthquake of 77 
CE.154 Around 100 CE there was further expansion with the addition of a Fountain 
Court complex and a Pylon court. 155 The former, so named because of the presence of a 
fountain and a mosaic floor, is defined as sitting beside the temple, "a sunken area, but 
not a building in the sense of a structure with walls, and presumably a roof "156 The 
151Pausanias, Descriptions of Greece, 2.2.3. 
152 Apuieius, Metamorphoses, XI. 
153Scranton, Shaw & Ibrahim (1978), pp.70-71. These pages give a useful summary of the different 
phases of development. This part of the report was written by Scranton, and will be cited from now on in 
his name only. 
154Period 4. 
155Period 5. 
156Scranton (1978), p.60. 
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Pylon court was given its name because the foundations next to its doorway seemed 
"excessive for a mere enclosure wall, and indeed suggests something rather more 
analogous to a tower - or to the pylon of an Egyptian gate." 157 There is no evidence of 
any further expansion until the third and fourth centuries C£158 but then, after suffering 
earthquake damage and partial abandonment in either 365 CE or 375 CE,159 what 
remained of the complex subsequently became a church. 160 
The identification of the nature of the site has become controversial. 
The excavation team concluded that it was a temple of Isis,161 but Robert Wild states 
bluntly that, "I myself find it difficult to believe ... that this structure was a temple of any 
sort, much less an Iseum. "162 He points out that II at this site no inscriptions were 
recovered, no cultic or religious objects, not even a base for a cult statue." 163 Such 
objections are ill-founded. While nothing was found in the complex which definitely 
identifies it as such, there are a number of pieces of evidence which, although 
inconclusive when considered in isolation, combine to strongly suggest a temple of Isis. 
To argue that the complex is not a temple rather dismisses the text of Pausanias, and, if 
this rather splendid complex, situated in an area of otherwise commercial character, was 
not a temple, what was it? Further, the complex later became a church and such take-
overs of pagan sites are not uncommon. The dedication of the temple to Isis also seems 
plausible. The opus sectile glass discovered in the Fountain Court contained Nilotic 
swamp scenes and,164 for what it is worth, the layout of the site is compatible with such 
topographical indications as are given by Apuleius. 165 More significantly, the word 
157ibid. 
158Periods 6 and 7. 
159Period 8. See Scranton (1978), pp.75-78 for a discussion of the earthquake, its effects, and all 
subsequent periods. A change in sea level seems to have ensued, and this probably explains the 
spectacular discovery of a substantial quantity of opus sectile glass, apparently designed for use in 
decorative friezes, which was found in the Fountain Court still in its shipping crates. 
160Periods 9-1l. 
161 Scranton (1978), pp.71-75. 
162Wild (1981), p.170. 
163ibid. 
164See above, p.291 n.159. 
1650f course, we have no way of knowing whether Apuleius ever actually visited Kenchreai or not. 
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oprIA was found inscribed on a column. 166 Scranton notes what he takes to be a 
parallel inscription from Saloniki where an altar was found bearing an inscription to 
ElcHv Opyiav - 'Isis of the Mysteries'. He supposes that "at Kenchreai, the all 
important word 'Isis' would have been higher on the column and now lost."167 Whether 
this hypothesis is correct or not, given that Pausanias gives us a choice between temples 
dedicated to Isis and Asklepios, the word apYLa surely suggests that it is the mystery 
deity who is more likely to have been worshipped in these buildings. 
The beginning of her worship at the site in the first century is 
interesting. There is nothing at all to suggest that Isis had been worshipped on this site 
previously, so there are not the same questions of continuity and discontinuity as at 
Corinth and at Isthmia. Given the fact that one of the goddess' aspects was Isis Pelagia, 
Kenchreai in general, and its harbour side in particular, was an utterly logical location for 
her worship. What is remarkable about the Kenchreai temple is the rapidity of its 
development from humble beginnings. Scranton compares these beginnings to those of 
the cult of Sarapis at Delos, where an inscription by a descendant of the founder records 
that "it was founded, on the instruction of a vision, in a small place filthy with litter and 
dung, rented and adapted for the purpose of establishing the cult in it. "168 Yet, by the 
early years of the second century, the Isis complex provided a worthy counterpart to the 
temple of Aphrodite and statue of Poseidon on the opposite northern mole of the 
harbour. This expansion must have required very considerable financial resources. There 
are not such specific links to the 50s CE as with Demeter and Kore on the Acrocorinth, 
or Palaimon at Isthmia,169 but this impressive building programme demonstrates once 
166This is unknown to Wild, who admits (1981), p.169 n.22, to not having read Scranton's final report. 
The inscription had earlier been misread as opr AA and so was not mentioned in the preliminary 
reports. 
167Scranton (1978), p.73. 
168Scranton (1978), p.7S. 
169The beginning of the cult of Isis at Kenchreai lies somewhere between the end of Augustus' reign in 
14 CE and the earthquake of 77 CEo 
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again that the mystery cults were a significant factor in the religious environment of the 
Corinthian Christians. 
One might also suggest that they were an increasingly significant 
factor. While we have no information as to the origin of their financial resources, it 
seems reasonable to suppose that the investment in buildings at Kenchreai and on the 
Acrocorinth provides a rough index of popularity. If so, and if the mysteries of Palaimon 
were an innovation introduced during the 50s CE, then the mystery cults appear to have 
been advancing in first century Corinth. This certainly ties in with an apparently 
widespread increase in the popularity of Isis and Sarapis. Wild has demonstrated that 
these mystery deities enjoyed a peak of popularity in the second century CEo Almost half 
of all the known temples of Isis were constructed during this century, and the surviving 
votive inscriptions shows two sharp numerical peaks, one in the second century BCE, 
the other in the second century CEo Wild comments that "surely the preceding period of 
gestation must have extended well back into the first century. "170 Of course, what is true 
of the cults of Isis and Sarapis is not necessarily true of the other mystery cults. Further, 
such general conclusions about change may hide a host of regional variations. 171 
Nevertheless, our evidence from Corinth, admittedly fragmentary and inconclusive as it 
is, does seem to fit this pattern. The suggestion that the mystery cults influenced the 
practical consciousness of the Corinthians is a plausible one. 
l70Wild (1981), p.5. Wild seeks to correlate this upsurge in popularity with theological change. Here he 
develops further the thesis ofVidman (1970) that in the first and second century CE there was a 
renewed emphasis upon the specifically Egyptian elements of these cults. Wild argues, somewhat 
speculatively, that a new emphasis was placed on Osiris and on the possession of actual Nile water in 
which he was felt to be immanent. If Wild were to be proved right then, at first sight, this might appear 
to suggest a sort of 'magical sacramentalism', the existence of which amongst the mystery cults I have 
been at pains to deny. However, there is no evidence at all of the Nile water having been drunk, or of it 
having been poured over worshippers, or of it being used in any other way which could conceivably be 
interpreted as securing 'sacramental' union with the god. 
171Bookidis (1987), p.480: "As specialisation has affected most aspects of ancient art and archaeology, 
so it has invaded the field of ancient religion ... The change has arisen from an increasing awareness of 
regional variations in ancient religion, which have made the generalisations of the past somewhat 
suspect." On the other hand Corinth, as a major port, may have felt early the impact of any spreading 
religious change. 
10 
Conclusions 
10.1 Paul and the Corinthians 
The Corinthians responded to Paul's advocacy of conversion and 
adopted a new Christian set of religious symbols. Yet the significance which they granted 
to these specifically Christian symbols was not solely determined by Paul. The Graeco-
Roman society and culture in which they lived also played a part. At the level of 
discursive consciousness transformation dominates but, at the level of practical 
consciousness, there is also a significant degree of reproduction. The Corinthians' 
understanding of their own conversion and its consequences inevitably indigenises their 
new faith to some degree. This process was far from unique to the Corinthians in 
particular, or to early Christianity in general. Over the preceding centuries, those of the 
mystery cults which were oriental in origin had undergone a process of Hellenisation. 
While the content of myths and the details of rites had often remained oriental, the basic 
pattern is that provided by Eleusis. 1 The result combines the appeal of the exotic with the 
ease of the familiar. Although the proportions of the mixture are undoubtedly different, 
something similar occurs among the Corinthians. They develop an interpretation of 
conversion and its consequences which allows them to enjoy the experience of 
transformation in the Spirit without having to voyage deep into the strange and 
unfamiliar social world charted by Paul. Much to his disappointment, they develop an 
interpretation of the Christian faith containing both the enticingly exotic, and the 
comfortingly familiar. Paul would have preferred them both less enticed and less 
comfortable. 
One way of characterising these differences between Paul and the 
Corinthians is through their respective conceptions of sin and its consequences. For Paul, 
lSee above, pp.244-45. 
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sin plays a vital role in his understanding of conversion. The human plight comprises 
both transgression and bondage to the power of sin, their inter-relationship exemplified 
by the problem of unrecognised sin. Human existence has been infected by sin at every 
level and the solution provided by Christ is correspondingly comprehensive. Paul 
interprets the forensic and participatory categories of his thought by each other, and 
closely connects the individual with the communal and cosmic levels of his thought, in 
order to better express his all-encompassing gospel. Such radical conceptions of plight 
and solution have strong consequences for the way in which humanity is perceived. It is 
now divided not primarily by gender, ethnic status or social status, but by its response to 
Paul's gospel. Christians are both united with each other, and separated from those who 
are still in their sins. 
While we have insufficient information to enable us to reconstruct the 
Corinthians' views on sin, it does seem that it played a far less significant role in their 
understanding of conversion than in that of Paul. For the consequences of his 
understanding of the human plight and the solution provided by Christ are present among 
the Corinthians only in much diluted form. In their attitude to one another, and in their 
approach to the outside world, the people and practices of Graeco-Roman society, the 
Corinthians display neither the degree of internal unity nor the degree of separation from 
unbelievers desired by Paul. The influence of the voluntary associations and the mystery 
cults have served to promote the following features: 
(i) In the internal life of the Corinthian congregation emphasis is not 
placed on the whole church and its unity as clearly as by Paul. The Corinthians' 
understanding of baptism, the rite of conversion, does not fully reflect some concepts 
that are central for the apostle. The forgiveness of sins, conformity to Christ and 
incorporation into his body are subsidiary to the transformation of the individual wrought 
by the experience of the receipt of the Spirit. Further, the Corinthians perceive baptism 
to create a bond between individual believers and those who preside at their baptism. 
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This bond is one of the dynamics promoting 'parties' or factions among the Corinthians. 
Smaller groups rather than the entire congregation become the focus of loyalty for 
individual converts. It is therefore not surprising to find that the Corinthians have a 
restricted sense of their obligations to one another and to Christians elsewhere. In some 
circumstances litigation between church members is acceptable and, at the very least, 
aiding the poor in Jerusalem is not a high priority. 
(ii) In their attitude towards the world outside the church, the 
Corinthians do not emphasise separation to the same degree as Paul. They believe that, 
at baptism, God extends His patronage and protection to each individual convert, so 
granting them a new exalted personal religious status. This lifts the individual far above 
those who have not shared his or her experience of the Spirit, but does not engender a 
critical attitude towards the social and religious practices of those outside the church. 
Those outside are characterised more by unwitting inferiority than by infectious impurity. 
The competition for honour and status endemic within Graeco-Roman society also finds 
expression in the life of the church. There are factions whose leaders expect recognition 
from followers, and these individuals attempt to use the Lord's Supper as a vehicle by 
which to display their status. In the Corinthians' understanding, conversion elevates but 
does not separate. 
In developing their own understanding of converSIon and its 
consequences, distinct in certain respects from that held by the person who had first 
advocated conversion to them, the Corinthians provide one of the earliest examples of a 
process that was to be repeated many times, and in numerous contexts, over the course 
of the next two millennia. 
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10.2 Conversion and Future Research 
In relation to the issues examined in Part 1 of the thesis, 'Studying 
Conversion and Converts,' I hope that my exploration of the understanding of 
conversion and its consequences held by Paul and the Corinthians has served to clarify 
certain points. They are: 
(i) By comparing two understandings of conversion from within early 
Christianity I have illustrated the variations which can arise within a single religious 
tradition. If there are significant differences in the way conversion is understood even 
within a single tradition, then a quest for a universal and inclusive understanding or 
definition of conversion is unlikely to be helpful. It risks obscuring precisely those 
distinctive elements which may be of greatest importance to individual converts and 
communities of converts. 
(ii) Yet, employing the case of the Corinthians, I have attempted to 
demonstrate the influence exercised over such a particular understanding of conversion 
by factors other than the early Christian tradition itself For example, the Corinthians' 
understanding of personal transformation is partially shaped by the understanding of such 
transformation current within the mystery cults. There are common features to be found 
across the boundaries of religious traditions. An approach which emphasises only 
particularity will also miss much. 
(iii) Given (i) and (ii), a comparative approach has strong advantages. 
It has the potential both to recognise that which is distinctive in a particular 
understanding of conversion and that which it shares with others. That the Corinthians 
are Paul's converts, but nevertheless develop an understanding of conversion which 
departs from his as well as resembles it, illustrates this point. 
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(iv) Studies of conversion need to pay attention to both the individual 
and social dimensions of the transformation involved. An important feature of Paul's 
understanding of conversion is the availability of evidence relating to both dimensions. 
To concentrate on only one of these dimensions would neglect the often complex 
interplay between the individual and communal elements of religious experience. 
(v) Such experience should not be regarded simply as a construct. That 
Paul's converSIon expenence played a significant part in shaping his theology 
demonstrates that converSIon experiences can shape conversion accounts, and the 
authorised interpretations of conversions developed by communities, as well as vice 
versa. 
(vi) Structuration theory can provide a helpful theoretical resource for 
the study of conversion. Giddens' constant striving to turn dualisms into dualities is 
helpful in several ways, but perhaps especially in the ability it confers to conceptualise 
social change. In contrast to approaches which take the early churches as given 
phenomena for analysis, this aspect of structuration theory helps to highlight their nature 
as communities of converts and reminds us that the most startling thing about them is 
their existence. 
In terms of further research, these conclusions suggest the possibility 
of other comparative studies which move beyond the boundaries of early Christianity. 
Obvious candidates for inclusion would be the mystery cults, considered this time in their 
own right, the philosophical schools, and Judaism. Such studies would aim to explore 
particular understandings of conversion, considering each in its own right, but also 
recognise that each may be best understood if it can be located on a map of conversion in 
the first century Graeco-Roman world. 
Appendix 1 - A Classification of Paul's Use of Ka.leco K1:1. 
In providing a tentative classification I adapt the proposals of William 
W. Klein, who provides a useful survey of Paul's use of the verb.! However, in important 
respects I am in disagreement with Klein's approach to the material, especially the 
narrow focus of his article, which concentrates on the linguistic genealogy of Paul's 
usage. 2 This disagreement is reflected in the categories I employ. Klein proposes what he 
terms an axis of source or origin, an axis of instrument, an axis of circumstance, and an 
axis of goal or purpose. I retain Klein's axes of instrument, and of goal or purpose as 
useful categories, but not his axis of source or origin, nor his axis of circumstance. In his 
axis of source or origin Klein places only Rom. 9:24 with its statement that God has 
called ou /-lOVOV e~ 'Iou8a.icov c!i.)\:) .... a KCX:i. e~ e8vcOv. Although the presence of the 
preposition e~ with its overtones of separation is indeed striking it seems more than a 
little artificial to separate this use of Kcxleco from those in 1 Cor. 7 which relate to 
circumcision, a vital component of Jewish national identity. A linguistic criterion (the 
presence of a preposition) is dividing uses which raise the same theological and social 
issues. I avoid this by proposing a category of status on being called. In addition to all 
uses concerned with the ethnic status of those who were called, this also contains those 
uses which refer to the marital and social status of those who were called, instances 
which Klein places in his axis of circumstance. 
I further depart from Klein in proposmg a category of new 
role/identity, and a category of divine identity and intention. Again, the aim is to select 
categories which reflect the theological and social issues raised by Paul's usage. Further, 
my categories are far from rigid. Some of Paul's uses ofKcxlEco K1:1. fit into more than 
one category, and in these cases I have given the references twice, using italics to 
lKlein (1984), pp.53-64. He does not consider either the noun or the adjective. 
20ne has not necessarily understood the meaning of a term by explaining its derivation. See above, p.57 
n.l3. 
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indicate a second appearance. It seemed less important to force each occurrence into a 
single category for the sake of neatness than to indicate the breadth of meaning conveyed 
by the concept of calling in certain contexts. 
A. Category of Divine Identity and Intention (9 occurrences) 
(i) Creation - Rom. 4: 17, 1 Cor. 1 :26 
(ii) Calling reflects God's Purposes - Rom. 8:28, Rom. 8:30[2] 
(iii) Abraham's Descendants to be Named through Isaac - Rom. 
9:7 
(iv) Election by Calling not Works - Rom. 9:12 
(v) God's Call is Irrevocable - Rom. 11 :29 
(vi) The One Calling is Faithful - 1 Thess. 5 :24 
B. Category of Instrument (3 occurrences) 
(i) Called by/through Grace - 1 Cor. 15:9, Gal. 1:6, 1:15 
C. Category of New Role/Identity (12 occurrences) 
(i) Called to Apostleship - Rom. 1: 1, 1 Cor. 1: 1, Gal. 1: 15 
(ii) Called to be Saints - Rom. 1 :7, 1 Cor. 1:2 
(iii) Called to be God's People/Family - Rom. 1:6, 8: 3 Or2}, 9:24, 
9:25, 9:26, 1 Cor. 1:9 
D. Category of Status on Being Called (13 occurrences) 
(i) Statements of Principle on Status - 1 Cor. 7:17, 7:20[2], 7:24 
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(ii) Ethnic Status - Rom. 9:24, 1 Cor 1:24, 7: 18[2] 
(iii) Social Status - 1 Cor. 1:26, 7:21, 7:22[2] 
(iv) Marital Status - 1 Cor. 7: 15 
E. Category of Purpose (7 occurrences) 
(i) Into Fellowship - 1 Cor. 1:9 
(ii) To Peace - 1 Cor. 7: 15 
(iii) To Freedom - Gal. 5: 13 
(iv) A Call Upwards - Phil. 3:14 
(v) Into God's Kingdom and Glory (cf Rom. 8:30) - 1 Thess. 2:12 
(vi) To Sanctification - 1 Thess. 4:17, 1 Thess. 5:24 
Appendix 2 - Meaning and Righteousness in Rom. 6:7 
E.P. Sanders draws a sharp distinction between what he regards as two 
distinguishable uses by Paul of the passive form of 81K<X10CO. One use is 'forensic' and 
denotes being righteoused from concrete sins; the other and more dominant use is 
paticipatory, and denotes the transfer from being under the power of sin to being under 
the lordship of Christ. Sanders is explicit as to where in Paul we find the clearest 
examples of these two uses: "One who becomes a Christian is 'justified' from sins (1 
Cor. 6: 9-11) or from the power of sin (Rom. 6: 7). ,,1 These two texts represent the 
opposite poles of Paul's use of the verb. In the course of 4.3, I argued that close 
examination of the text reveals that justification in 1 Cor. 6: 9-11 is not restricted to a 
'forensic' sense. While 81K<X10CO in 6: 11 does reflect the strong legal imagery of the 
preceding argument, this imagery itself helps to grant the passage a participatory 
flavour. By focusing on the transformation of identity involved in conversion, Paul here 
implies the freedom of the believer from the power of sin. One of the two opposites 
poles of meaning established by Sanders has broken down, and the following question 
arises: is justification exclusively participatory in Rom. 6:7 any more than it is 
exclusively 'forensic' in 1 Cor. 6:9-11? 2 
In Rom. 6:6 Paul expresses the view that he and his readers have been 
crucified with Christ so that they might no longer be enslaved to sin. Thus, it is 
something of a surprise when Paul writes in 6:7 6 yap cX.noS<xvcOv 8E81Kcx,lco'tcn 
I Sanders (1977), p.501. See also pp.472,503,506,545. Also Sanders (1983), p.lO and Sanders (1991), 
~.48. 
-Some earlier scholars had, far from distinguishing between the meaning of righteousness in 1 Cor. 6: 9-11 
and Rom. 6:7, identified the two. See Lightfoot (1895), p.213; Bultmann (1924, ET 1995), p.195; and 
above, pp.138-40. 
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(bra 1:11~ cq...lap1:ta~. One might have expected him to keep the thought parallel to that 
of 6:6 by using the verb EAEU8EPOCO to say that the one who has died is set free from 
sin, so giving positive expression to what has just been said in negative form. 3 Sanders 
claims that this is nevertheless just what Paul does do. "In Rom. 6 the general context of 
participation in Christ's death so that one may participate in life determines the meaning 
of dikaoumai. It cannot mean 'justified' in the sense of 1 Cor. 6:9-11, where one is 
justified from sins. Thus the usually juristic dikaoumai does not determine the meaning 
of Rom. 6:7, but is rather pressed into the service of another conception. ,,4 Instead of 
meaning justified from sins, it means justified from the power of Sin, something that 
can aptly and accurately be translated into English as 'set free from sin.'s Rom. 6:7 is an 
instance where "the normally juristic, forensic or ethical language of righteousness is 
forced to bear the meaning of 'life by participation in the body of Christ'. ,,6 
The idea that Paul has coerced language which usually means one 
thing into meaning another is one which Sanders refers to several times. The judicial 
meaning is "the principal and normal meaning of the terms for 'righteousness' both in 
Greek and English, ,,7 yet Paul uses it to mean something else. "The passive of dikaioun 
does not easily bear this meaning - changed, transferred, incorporated into another 
3Commentators often explain Paul's unusual eJl.'pression as an allusion to the rabbinical principle of Shab 
151b baraita that when a person dies they are freed from the obligation to observe the law's 
commandments. See Sanday & Headlam (1895), p.159; Kasemann (1980), p.160; Fitzmyer (1993), 
pp.436-37. Along with Ziesler (1989), p.160 I doubt that there is any such allusion here. This is because 
(i) although 5:20 establishes a connection between the two, it is sin and not the law which is under 
discussion here, (ii) the death referred to by Paul is clearly not literal death but that of the person who dies 
with Christ, and (iii) the rabbinical principle is attributed to Rabbi Shimeon ben Gamaliel (c. 140 CE). 
Even if this attribution is accurate we have no way of knowing whether the principle was current in the 
first century. 
4Sanders (1977), p.503. 
sThis course is followed by the majority of English translations. See the AV, RSV, NRSV, NIV, GNB. Of 
these only the A V provides the reader with Justified' as an alternative reading. 
6Sanders (1977), p.504. 
7Sanders (1991), p.47. I have considerable doubts about this sweeping claim. See below, p.306 n.14. 
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person - but Paul forced it to do so. ,,8 About this coerCIOn Sanders never asks the 
obvious question of why Paul should do such a thing. If what Paul meant in Rom. 6:7 
was that the one who has died with Christ is set free from the power of Sin, then why 
did he not express himself using EAEUSEPOCO, as he does in 6:18 and 6:22? If, as 
Sanders claims, both Paul and his readers understood DtKatOCO as a forensic term in 
their everyday speech, why risk misunderstanding by using the verb in another way 
altogether? Why not find alternative terms to express alternative ideas? 
Here some reflection upon the relationship between language and 
meaning can offer us valuable assistance. In their work on the subject, Riches and 
Millar point to "the important distinction between, on the one hand, linguistic entities, 
sentences and other expressions, and, on the other hand, the senses possessed by these 
expressions on particular occasions of use. The interpreter seeks to bridge the gulf 
between the knowledge of what inscriptions a text contains and the knowledge of what 
is being said through these inscriptions by the author of the text. ,,9 Thus to discern the 
meaning of a declarative sentence one needs to know what is being expressed by that 
sentence in its context. This means that there is no purely linguistic level at which one 
can determine the meaning of a sentence, and the ability to read Greek does not in itself 
grant us access to the meaning of sentences in the New Testament. We need also to 
understand which propositions are attached to sentences, and thus what can be inferred 
from particular statements. This is something which is shaped by convention. 
"Sentences express what they do because of conventions which govern the use of their 
. ." 10 constItuent expressIOns. 
8Sanders (1991), p.48. 
9Riches & Millar (1985), p.37. 
IORiches & Millar (1985), p.40. 
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Not surprisingly, the conventions governing the use of particular terms 
and expressions vary across time and space. "What a person means by the English term 
'democracy' will depend upon the conventional uniformities governing the person's use 
of the term. The network of conventional links which reflects the use of the term by a 
Marxist of Stalinist inclinations will be rather different from those of a New Right 
Conservative. tIll Yet despite the fundamental differences between what 'democracy' 
means when its use is governed by these alternative conventional networks, it does not 
follow that the two networks are entirely unrelated. "There will be a degree of overlap 
between the concepts of democracy which they determine. All concepts of democracy 
pertain to rule by the people but what in detail that amounts to will depend upon the 
wider networks in which the concepts figure.,,12 Thus, presumably, the development of 
new conventional networks governing the use of terms draws upon existing ones while 
at the same time modifying them more or less radically. It is easy to see why one of the 
clearest ways of explaining what structuration theory has to say about social practices is 
through the analogy of language. "The rules and resources of language simultaneously 
structure communication and are reproduced in that very communication. They are both 
the medium which permits meaningful communication and the outcome of that 
communication. They are both enabling - they facilitate communication - and 
constraining - they define and limit meaningful communication.,,13 
What are the implications of this for Paul's use of OlKcx,lOO) in Rom. 
6:7? On the one hand, Sanders is right to be fully aware of the possibility of 
transforming the meaning of a word by using it in a new context, and is right to draw 
1 1 Riches & Millar (1985), p.42. 
12ibid. 
13Horrell (1996), p.48. One should note that Giddens is not arguing that society is like a language. See 
above, p.35 n.114. Rather language serves simply as an analogy, albeit an illuminating and important one. 
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our attention to the fact that where we would expect Paul to have used EAEU8EPOCO he 
instead employs 81KCX10CO. Yet on the other, he overlooks the fact that even as Rom. 6:7 
modifies the meaning of 81KCX10CO, it also inevitably reproduces it. If the previous 
meaning of righteousness terminology for his readers was a forensic one,I4 Paul can 
certainly transform this, but he cannot simply obliterate this previous meaning as he 
does so. In Rom. 6:7 81KCX10CO can and does mean being set free from the power of sin 
through participation in Christ, but it cannot do so to the exclusion of its forensic sense. 
This gives us an important indication of why Paul did use 81KCX10CO in 
Rom. 6:7. It is often observed that Rom. 1-4 is dominated by the concept of the human 
plight as having transgressed, and Rom. 6 by that of being under the power of Sin, Rom. 
5 forming a bridge through the use of both concepts. IS Against this background the 
entire point of using 81KCX10CO in 6:7 is as a statement of equivalence, requiring the use 
of a forensic term in a participatory context. Paul therefore does not want his readers to 
come to 6:7 and switch effortlessly from a forensic understanding of the verb to an 
See Giddens (1984), p.24 for an assessment of the limitations of the analogy. 
14As Sanders assumes, but Ziesler (1972), p.212 argues on the basis of the Hebrew and Greek background 
that Paul's use of the verb is "essentially relational or forensic," while the noun and adjective describe 
"behaviour within relationship." Thus, the previous conventional networks governing the sense of 
righteousness terminology are not purely forensic. The problem with Ziesler's work is the assumption that 
in understanding the Hebrew and Greek background he has also understood Paul's own usage. As Riches 
and :Millar (1985), p.42 point out, "it is obvious on reflection that an author or editor who takes over some 
linguistic eA'Pression or the core of some concept need not be borrowing uncritically." Just because others 
before him maintained a distinction between the meaning of the verb and that of the noun and adjective 
does not mean that Paul did so. Rom. 6:7 itself rather highlights this problem, for Ziesler (1972), p.201, 
insists that the verb is here forensic even although it appears "in primarily ethical-renewal surroundings." 
Ziesler thus implies that the meaning of the verb is unaffected by its context, Sanders (1977), p.503 that 
its context is the only factor shaping its meaning: "In Rom. 6 the general context of participation in 
Christ's death so that one may participate in life determines the meaning of dikaoumai. " Ziesler forgets 
that authors can change and develop the conventional networks governing meaning, Sanders that as they 
do so they inevitably continue to draw upon existing ones. If Ziesler is correct in his understanding of the 
Hebrew and Greek background of Paul's use of righteousness terminology, then perhaps he provides an 
indication as to one of the ways in which Paul modifies its meaning. 
lSSee Sanders (1977), pp.498-99 and de Boer (1988), pp.147-56; (1989), p.182. Even if Sanders is wrong 
in supposing that both the principal and normal meaning of righteousness terminology with which Paul's 
readers were familiar was the Judicial' one, it is certainly a valid observation that most of his uses of these 
terms in Rom. 1-4 have been forensic. In the context of this letter, the use he makes of the verb in Rom. 
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exclusively participatory one. Instead, he intends to provoke dissonance, and by doing 
so to secure from his readers a recognition that to be justified by the forgiveness of one's 
sins is also to be justified by being set free from the power of Sin, and vice versa. Paul 
wishes to make the two concepts one. The meaning of 8lK<XlOCO in 6:7 is therefore fully 
forensic in the sense that, if it were not, there would be no point to its use here, and Paul 
could and should have used £A£u8£poco. Yet it is also fully participatory in that, by 
using this forensic transfer term in a context that is otherwise entirely participatory, Paul 
transforms its meaning. ~lK<XlOCO itself becomes a participatory term, and 
transformation of meaning is achieved in, and through, reproduction. 
Just as we concluded that the use of 8lK<XlOCO in 1 Cor. 6:9-11 is not 
exclusively forensic, so we are now able to conclude that its use in Rom. 6:7 is not 
exclusively participatory. In relation to the texts which he regards as his most secure 
examples of each type, Sanders' thesis that Paul makes two distinguishable uses of 
8lKCXlOCO has not survived examination. Instead, in both 1 Cor. 6:9-11 and Rom. 6:7, 
Paul allows the forensic and participatory themes of his theology to interpret each other. 
As he does so he inevitably draws on existing conventional networks governing the 
meaning of righteousness terminology. Yet, in any given instance, Paul does not 
necessarily draw exclusively upon one of these networks. Writing in the context of a 
new religious movement, and therefore seeking to forge a vocabulary by which to 
express what it meant to be converted to faith in Christ, Paul often broke down the 
distinction between different networks of convention. To simply ask whether, in 
general, Paul intends righteousness terminology in a forensic or participatory sense 
would therefore be a somewhat crude question. Sometimes he may indeed draw upon 
6:7 therefore runs counter to expectations which Paul himself has created. 
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one existing set of conventions and so provide an instance in which righteousness is 
quite clearly one and not the other16 but, in other cases, Paul blends the two, with 
varying degrees of emphasis. Whereas Sanders perceives Paul to have established 
sharply differentiated categories of meaning through his use of 81KCX10CO, I believe the 
opposite. One of the uses to which Paul put this vocabulary was the blurring of the 
distinction between the forensic and the participatory. 17 
Paul's use of 81K<X10CO therefore cannot be used as a support for the 
contention that it is the participatory categories alone which best reflect what Paul 
'really' thought. Yet Sanders is right that Paul does not systematically treat justification 
as a forensic gateway to life in Christ so that one must first be forgiven in order to enter 
into union with Christ. It is equally accurate to say that "one dies with Christ to the 
power of sin and lives in the Spirit, which also concretely means that one stops (and is 
acquitted of) sinning and produces the fruit of the Spirit. ,,18 The problem comes when 
Sanders goes on to say "but we cannot understand Paul's thought the other way 
161n 1 Cor. 4: 1-5 we encountered an instance of OlK<XlOro where the forensic sense appears completely 
dominant. See above, p.308 n.16. 
171 therefore disagree with Sanders' belief that what Paul unselfconsciously understood to be one we can 
retrospectively discern to be two. Instead 1 would take teA1:s like Rom. 6:7 and 1 Cor. 6:9-11 to indicate 
that Paul did indeed understand them to be one, but that he did so consciously, forging their unity. There 
is considerable tension in Sanders' position, for Paul is said to have conceived Christ's death for the 
forgiveness of sins and Christ's death to release from the power of Sin not as two different things but as 
one; yet, he is also said to have coerced a transfer term which in normal linguistic usage would be applied 
only to the first of these so as also to apply to the second. The first assertion suggests a lack of self-
consciousness as to category distinctions, the second a strong awareness of them. I stand much closer to 
the position of Martyn, who sees in Paul's thought a deliberate pushing beyond forensic categories. See 
again Martyn (1997a), pp.152-53. The difference would be that whereas by 'pushing beyond' Martyn 
would seem to mean leaving behind in the sense of rendering decisively subsidiary, I would point to 
Paul's use of OlK<XlOro as indicating something much more akin to equal importance. De Boer (1988), 
pp.147-56, and (1989), pp.182-85, argues that forensic categories are subsidiary on the basis that Paul 
shares them with those against whom he argues in Romans and Galatians. In Romans Paul explores 
conunon forensic ground first before moving on to discuss participatory ideas which are more fully his 
Owll. However, it is difficult to see why matters over which one disagrees with others are necessarily 
more important in one's Owll overall pattern of thought than ones where there is agreement, or why that 
which appears first in a discussion is necessarily subsidiary to that which appears second. 
18Sanders (1977), p.507. 
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around, ,,19 for Paul does sometimes express himself in that opposite order. At Gal. 1:4 
Paul speaks of Christ as 'tou 86v'to~ ECXU'tOV U1tEP 'tcDV cXI-lCXP'ttcDV lll-lcDV, 01tCO~ 
for sins is said to be instrumental in the release of believers from bondage to the power 
of sin.20 There are also occasions when these two concepts are so fused that one would 
be hard pressed to speak of an order at all. At 1 Cor. 15: 17 Paul says that if Christ has 
not been raised then £'t1 E(!'tE EV 'tcxl~ aI-lCXp'ticx1~ Ul-lcDV. Is this a claim that if 
Christ has not been raised believers remain guilty of their sins, or a claim that if he has 
not been raised believers remain under the power of sin? Surely it is both. It is a mistake 
to force a choice between the forensic and participatory elements in Paul's theology so 
that only one or the other can be regarded as truly characteristic of his thought. 
19ibid. 
20 Sanders (1977), p.465 disagrees. "When Paul writes that the Lord Jesus Christ 'gave himselffor our sins 
to deliver us from the present evil age', we note the implication that not only are past transgressions 
remitted, but that Christians are delivered from the evil aeon. Thus the purpose of Christ's death was not 
simply to provide expiation, but that he might become Lord and thus save those who belong to him and 
are 'in' him." The exegetical sleight of hand involved here is not difficult to spot. Sanders' position would 
be tenable if Paul had written that Christ died in order that sins might be forgiven and those who belong 
to him delivered from the present evil age. However what Paul says is that Christ died for sins in order 
that (011:(0<;) those who belong to him might be delivered. Sanders' interpretation requires the expression 
of purpose to come before the mention of sins, but in fact it comes after it. 
Appendix 3 - 1 Cor. 10:1-22 and the Myth of Magical Sacramentalism 
In these verses Paul provides a midrashic interpretation of the 
experiences of the Israelites in the desert, during which he speaks of the ancestors as 
having received forms of both baptism and communion, yet still sinning so as to incur 
God's judgement, and forfeit entry to the promised land: Kcx:tECrtpWSllcrcxv yap EV 'til 
EPTII..lq? (10:5). The function performed by this warning in Paul's argument is clear. It 
provides an illustration of the danger of being disqualified (a86Kl!..lO~) from the race for 
salvation, which Paul has just spoken of in relation to his own ministry in 9:24-27, and it 
prepares for the warning against taking part in idol-feasts which is to come in 10:14-22. 
Paul is concerned lest the Corinthians fall to destruction (10:12). He discerns potential 
disaster unless they mend their ways, but the Corinthians apparently do not share his 
concern. It is this lack of concern which is purportedly explained by the suggestion that 
the Corinthians were 'magical sacramentalists,' "die sich durch die Sakramente vor aller 
Gefahrdung gefeit wahnen." 1 The Corinthians consider that participation in the 
sacraments provides a complete guarantee of future salvation, irrespective of any 
immoral conduct in which they might currently indulge,2 and so tum the sacraments into 
a sort of "natural charm. "3 It is this attitude which Paul seeks to correct. 
Yet how is it that the Corinthians believe 'magical sacramentalism' to 
operate? If the Corinthians regard the sacraments as protective talismans, granting them 
lSchrage (1995), p.381. We should note from the outset that the term 'magical sacramentalism' is a 
loaded one, for the dividing line between religion and magic is very much in the eye of the beholder. 
One person's positive religious experience may be another's crude magic. For their devotees, the mystery 
cults fell on the religious side of the divide. Walsh (1994), p.xxxiii points out that, in his Apology, when 
in court on a charge of 'magic', Apuleius sought to establish "a distinction between healthy curiosity, 
which seeks knowledge of the true reality by intellectual effort and religious experience, and the debased 
curiosity which seeks a false reality by way of magic and sensuality." In Apuleius' case the appropriate 
religious e)..'Perience took the form of many initiations. 
2Schrage (1995), p.14: "Speziell der massive Sakramentalismus konnte in Korinth nicht nur die 
Begriindung:fur die Freigabe der Teilnahme an Kultmahlen abgegeben haben, sondem auch :fur die der 
nopvEia." 
3Conzelmann (ET 1975), p.167. 
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security through their union with Christ, then what are the threats which they aim to 
ward off? There are only two possibilities. They are (1) that the sacraments provide 
protection against some danger inherent in idol-feasts themselves, and (2) that the 
sacraments provide protection against the wrath of a jealous God, angered by disloyalty. 
I shall examine each possibility in tum, before moving on to suggest (3) an alternative 
rationale for the continued Corinthian involvement in cult meals. 
1. Cult Meals - Dining in Danger? 
Far from believing cult meals to be inherently dangerous occasions at 
which Christian participants required sacramental protection, the Corinthians seem 
simply not to have recognised that such meals were dangerous. Instead they say, 
o18a~Ev 0-n OU8EV E18wAOV EV KOo"~C9, Kat 0U Ou8Ei~ 8EO~ E1 ~rl Et~ (8:4). 
It is this rather rational sounding piece of monotheism which Paul refers back to in 10: 19 
with rhetorical questions designed to shield him from the accusation of according reality 
to other gods. 'ti OUV ~11!l1; O'tl E18wAo8u'tov 'ti Eo"UV; it 0U E18wAov 'ti Eo"'tW; 
Having secured the recognition that he too would answer no to these questions, Paul can 
then safely move on to express his opinion that although the reality behind idols is not 
divine, it is demonic.4 He is instructing the Corinthians as to the existence of a danger 
which they have not previously appreciated, not warning them that they are wrong to 
rely on 'sacramental' protection from a danger which they already feared. 
Thus, if the Corinthians know that an idol is nothing, they do not need 
'sacramental' protection. Fee seems to miss this point, and assumes that the Corinthians' 
knowledge and their 'magical sacramentalism' go together. He writes, "their argument 
with Paul most likely included some reference to their own security through the 
sacraments, which so identified them as Christians that attendance at the idol temples 
4Calvin (ET 1960), p.l1S. 
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was immaterial since those 'gods' did not exist (8:4-6)."5 Yet if the gods did not exist, 
then the degree to which one was identified as a Christian through the sacraments was 
irrelevant to one's security. What was there in an idol's temple which could do anyone 
harm? Barrett at least accepts that the knowledge that idols have no existence and 
'magical sacramentalism' are "essentially different, "6 but then suggests that they could be 
combined without initially offering any explanation as to how.7 Yet how can an attitude 
which regards a particular activity, i.e., attending cult meals, as harmless be combined 
with one which sees in the same activity a danger from which there is need of protection? 
Far from being identical or even compatible, the Corinthians' knowledge and their 
supposed 'magical sacramentalism' are mutually contradictory. 
2. Cult Meals - Provoking God's Wrath? 
Paul does not think that the Corinthians should only be afraid of the 
demonic reality lurking behind idols. He also wishes them to avoid idol feasts out of fear 
of the Lord. At 10:22 he asks, 11 napa~l1Aou~£v 1:0V KUPtoV; ~rl to'XUP01:£POl 
aU1:ou EO'~£V; At 11:30 he explains that some of them have died or are ill because of 
their abuse of the Lord's Supper. Perhaps the Corinthians are 'magical sacramentalists' in 
the sense that they believe that they are protected from the wrath of God which would 
otherwise fall upon them as a result of their breach of their covenant relationship with 
Him. They sin that grace might abound, and Paul is informing them that God will not 
5Pee (1987), p.443. 
6Barrett (1971b), p.224. 
7Barrett obviously noticed the problem, since he provides an endnote to his commentary (1971b), p.399, 
in which he suggests that the 'magical sacramentalists' and those who emphasise knowledge are 
different groups. However, this makes the connection between the content of 10:19 and 8:4-6 difficult to 
e}.'Plain. Why should Paul introduce material aimed at those possessing knowledge into chapter 10, 
where his target is those who are 'magical sacramentalists'? Once the connection between 10:19 and 8:4-
6 is acknowledged, then the whole of 10:14-22 reads more as if it were directed to those possessing 
knowledge. In order to sustain the concept of two separate groups one would be left arguing that the 
midrash of 10:1-13 was directed against the 'magical sacramentalists,' and 10:14-22 against those 
possessing knowledge, something scarcely credible in light of the 8U)1tEP with which v.14 begins, 
signalling that what follows is an application of what has gone before. 
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tolerate that. 8 While it is certainly true that attending the feasts of even non-existent idols 
might be construed as disloyalty to the Lord, Paul conducts his argument specifically in 
terms ofKOtvWV1CX, emphasising the sheer impossibility of being united both to the Lord 
and to idols. ou buvcxcrSe no'trlPwv KUP10U nlvEl.,v Ked, no'trlPwv benJ.1ovlwv, 
This builds directly on the assertion that although idols are nothing the sacrifices made to 
them are offered to demons (10:20), and so is designed to counter the Corinthians' false 
deduction that because idols do not exist, their cult meals are harmless. It is difficult to 
see how the Corinthians could regard as sinful entering into KOl vwvlcx with something 
that did not exist. In that case God would literally have nothing of which to be jealous, 
and the Corinthians no need for the sacraments to provide protection from his anger. 
3. Christians at Cult Meals - An Alternative Rationale 
Even if the Corinthians did not perceive any danger in attending cult 
meals, did they develop any justification for doing so beyond the fact that these meals 
were "occasions of good company, good food, and good fun"?9 Paul's argument contains 
a hint that perhaps they did. He makes the intriguing comment that ci SUOUcrlV, 
bCXlJ.10v10l~ KCXt ou SeeP SuOUcrlV (10:20). Why does he feel the need to point out 
that the things sacrificed to idols are not sacrificed to God? That much ought to be 
8However, I know of no scholar who has actually argued this. Willis (1985), p.159-161 places great 
emphasis on the breach in the Corinthians' covenant relationship with God involved in their attending 
idol feasts; but he presents this as an alternative to the idea that Paul is here attacking 'magical 
sacramentalism,' and not as a variation on that theme. 
9Willis (1985), p.63. The relaxed conviviality of cult meals provides a sharp contrast with the high 
solemnity of initiation into the mystery cults. This pattern may help to explain the gravity with which 
the Corinthians invest baptism, but the more relaxed attitude they adopt towards the Lord's Supper. 
Commenting on 1 Cor. 10 and the Corinthians' 'sacramental' security, Nock (1972) VoL II, p.811 
observes that "this idea presumably attached to baptism; the next chapter of the same epistle suggests 
that, as one might have expected from the pagan evidence, they were not predisposed to regard the 
communal meals as a mysterium tremendum - quite the reverse." Thus, although Paul's words in 10: 1-4 
imply that he tied baptism and the Lord's Supper together as a particular, identifiable category of things, 
this does necessarily mean that the Corinthians did so. To speak of 'sacraments' in general in Corinth 
may simply be anachronistic. 
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obvious. It "introduces a thought which is quite superfluous." 10 Paul's words here look 
like an allusion to the LXX version of Deut. 32: 17, YE8uO'av 8at!-lov{ot~, Kat 01:> 
E>EcP. ll Certainly such an allusion would fit the general context of Paul's argument, since 
Deuteronomy refers to the Israelites in the desert, but what is its specific point? It still 
appears out of place in Paul's train of thought since for the Israelites to sacrifice to 
demons was apostasy, but for the pagans to whom Paul refers here it is only that which is 
expected. Is this allusion for the sake of allusion? 12 
I would suggest instead that it may have fitted Paul's argument very 
well. Does Paul say 01:> 8E4) in order to contradict the Corinthians' opinion? Knowing 
that there is no God but one, did the Corinthians take the plethora of gods in Graeco-
Roman religion to be simply various representations of Him? Far from breaking the 
terms of their covenant with God, do they believe that in taking part in idol feasts they 
are honouring their own Lord? Are idol feasts to them simply acceptable alternatives to 
the Lord's Supper, albeit presumably inferior ones? Certainly the notion that one God 
was the reality behind all the gods is a well substantiated phenomenon at the educated 
end of the spectrum of Graeco-Roman religious belief 13 If it was shared by the 
Corinthians then far from being an action from whose consequences they required 
magical protection, attending idol feasts might even be considered beneficial. 
'Magical sacramentalism' therefore seems a classic example of the over-
interpretation of a text. Paul's sense of the dangers inherent in taking liberties in the use 
of the 'sacraments' has been projected onto the Corinthians, and a reason found to 
10Robertson & Plummer (1911), p.2l6. 
111 Cor. 10:20 has a large number of variant readings. However, all those with significant support both 
contain the problem and permit the allusion. 
12Both Robertson & Plummer (1911), p.216 and Fee (1987), p.472 n.47 suggest that in 10:20 ou Seq) 
should be translated 'to a no-god' or 'not to a god' or 'even to one who is no-god.' In support of this they 
point to Deut. 32:21 where the thought clearly requires that ou Seq) mean 'that which is not God.' 
However, there the phrase has the preposition ETd, thus signalling a different meaning. In Deut. 32: 17 
'not to God' makes perfect sense. 
13See MacMullen (1981), pp.88-89. Also Barclay (1992), p.70. It is a notion which Apuleius has Isis 
express about herself. See Metamorphoses XI.5. 
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explain their apparent flouting of them, when a much simpler explanation lay to hand. 
The Corinthians did not see these dangers; Paul's universe contained a type of hazard 
which theirs lacked. Far from being inclined to 'magic', they simply believe that through 
baptism they have progressed to a higher level of spiritual existence, and see no reason to 
fear that they might be about to slip back down again. That scholars have been so blind 
to this possibility may be attributed to present day considerations. It is striking the 
number of occasions on which it is remarked that the Corinthians believed the 
sacraments to work ex opere operato.14 Without it being stated openly, Protestant 
scholars have implicitly identified 'magical sacramentalism' with Roman Catholicism. 
Further, the hypothesis that the Corinthians were 'magical sacramentalists' has itself 
performed the function of a magical charm. For if the Corinthians were not 'magical 
sacramentalists' then Paul cannot here be tempering overly enthusiastic and 'realistic' 
attitudes towards baptism and the Lord's Supper. 'Magical sacramentalism' has provided 
modem Christian scholars with an effective talisman to shield them from the 
uncomfortable fact that Paul held views concerning the sacraments, and indeed the 
demonic, which they would find distasteful and primitive. 15 
14E.g., Kasemann (ET 1964), p.1l6; Barrett (l971b), p.224; Schrage (1995), p.385. 
15See Schweitzer (ET 1931), p.22 and Nock (1972) Vol.II, p.808 for warnings against the tendency to 
project modem ideas about the sacraments back onto Paul. 
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